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Abstract of Thesis
Premises essential for an analysis of the elections 
are outlined in the initial chapter of the thesis. The 
validity and shortcomings of the available evidence are 
briefly discussed. The constitutional development of 
the magistrates is outlined, showing that the electoral 
system was not democratic in intention or result, and that 
the magistrates were generally able to implement their 
policies. An analysis of the social and political back­
ground of the members of the governing class suggests that 
senators’ family loyalties were significant in dictating 
their political attitudes and allegiances, and that their 
position at the top of a hierarchical structure of personal 
patronage was the basis of their political control in both 
the senate and assemblies. All these factors are then 
considered together in a general discussion of the extent 
and nature of the control of legislative and electoral 
voting in the assemblies by political factions of senators.
In the light of conclusions drawn on these matters, 
the elections of the curule magistrates in the period 
$09 to 219 B.C. are analysed year by year in the remaining 
chapters of the thesis. The names of the successful 
candidates are considered in relation to the political 
issues which are likely to have been of concern at the 
time of their elections. Factors taken into account in 
this process are, on the one hand, the magistrates’ 
personal background, likely associates and activities 
in office, which may all contribute to forming a picture
of their attitudes and likely support bases, and, on the 
other, external circumstances, the magistrates’ personal 
qualifications and the relative authority of other senators, 
which might render the magistrates’ political views 
irrelevant to their elections.
The overall conclusion drawn at the end of the survey 
is that matters of public policy, especially military 
matters, may often have been of prime importance in the 
initial stages of the elections, when the senators were 
forming political factions, but less frequently played any 
direct part in dictating the votes cast in the assemblies.
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PREFACE
Modern work on the subject of the election of Roman 
magistrates during the Republic may be divided into three 
major stages of development. Firstly, in reaction to 
the nineteenth century representation of optimates and 
populares as government and opposition parties {1), Gelzer 
established that in the last centuries of the Republic, 
all magistrates belonged to an exclusive nobility within 
which political power depended on family name, personal 
relationships and mutual obligations (2). Then Munzer 
developed his views for the period from the mid fourth 
century B.C., arguing that this aristocracy was divided 
into family factions whose members' main aim was to 
promote the election of their candidates by using available 
constitutional means such as the electoral president's 
powers as well as by marshalling their dependants.
On these grounds he reconstructed the membership of such 
factions from evidence in the narrative sources of 
marriages, adoptions and family friendships and from the
1. See T. Mommsen, History of Rome, trans. Dickson 
(London, 1894)(=HR)3 303f» identifying optimates with 
Prussian Junkers. However he did recognise that by 
Cicero's day the optimates and populares were not divided 
by distinct political ideas. See F. Cassola, I Gruppi 
Politici Romani nel III secolo A.C. (Trieste, 1962)(=GPR) 
7f on the misleading use of the terminology by twentieth 
century historians.
2. M. Gelzer, The Roman Nobility, trans. Seagar (Oxford, 
1975)(=RN). His view is the basis of works such as
H. Strasburger, 'Optimates', PWRE XVIII.1 (Stuttgart,
1939) 773f; L.R. Taylor, 'Caesar and the Roman Nobility', 
TAPA 1942, 1-24, Party Politics in the Age of Caesar 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1949)(=PPAC); E. Badian,
Foreign Clientelae (Oxford, 1958)(=FC).
7lists of magistrates (3). More recently, Scullard, in 
reaction to Munzer, suggested that frequently the 
principal raison d'etre of such family parties in the 
first half of the third century B.C. was to promote their 
policies, although he accepted that their members still 
depended on personal backing to win the elections (4). 
There have also been stronger reactions against Munzer; 
Cassola, for example, has questioned the extent of the 
president's influence in elections, and outlined shorter 
lived factions whose members were less concerned with 
loyalty to their gentes than with promoting policies 
influenced by those outside the nobility in the third 
century B.C. (5).
3. F. Munzer, Romische Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien 
(Stuttgart, 1920)(=RAA). His methods have^been directly 
used by F. Cornelius, Untersuchungen zur Fruhen Rbmischen 
Geschichte (Munich, 1940)(=UFRG) for the fifth century 
B.C.; A. Lippold, Consules (Bonn, 19&3)(=C) and W. Schur, 
Scipio Africanus und die Begrundung der Romischen 
Weltherrschaft (Leipzig, 1927} for the second half of
the third century B.C., and R. Syme, The Roman Revolution 
(Oxford, 1939)(=RR)» for the transition from Republic 
to empire.
4. H. Scullard, Roman Politics (Oxford, 195l)(=RP), 
defended in BIOS 1955, No.2, 15-21. For some earlier 
doubts about Munzer's approach, see A. Momigliano, rev. 
Syme, RR, in JRS 1940, 75f; R. Haywood, Studies on Scipio 
Africanus (Baltimore, 1933)(=SA) 45f; M. Patterson,
'Rome's choice of magistrates during the Hannibalic War', 
TAPA 1942, 319f.
5. Cassola, GPR. For other recent reactions to both 
Munzer and Scullard, see L.R. Taylor, rev. Scullard, RP,
AJP 1952, 302-6; M. Henderson, rev. Scullard, RP, JRS 
1952, 114-6; E. Staveley, rev. Cassola, GPR, JRS 1963,
182f; C. Meier, 'Pompeius' Ruckkehr aus dem Mithridatischen 
Kriege und die Catilinarische Verschworung', Ath. 1962,
112 n.35; A. Toynbee, Hannibal's Legacy, (Oxford, 1965) 
(=HL) 1. 326f; R. Rilingar, Der Einfluss des Wahlleiters 
bei den romischen Konsulwahlen von 366 bis 50 v. Chr~! 
(Munich, 1976)(=EWRK) 1-11.
8No historian, however, has made a detailed study of 
the direct role that magistrates' views on matters of 
policy played in their election. This thesis attempts 
to fill the gap for the important period from 509 to 219 
B.C., when the state developed from a small primitive 
city ruled by army generals to an Italian federation, 
dominated by an oligarchy maintaining control through 
both magistracies and senate. The thesis question may 
be considered at two levels. Firstly, what relevance 
did matters of policy have to the formation of factions 
in the senate? Did the members of a family group tend 
to share the same views on policy, and if so, why?
If not, could nobles ever have ignored the bonds of 
amicitia based on traditional family loyalties and formed 
themselves into new associations according to their 
common views on policy? Or would family ties have been 
strong enough to bind senators to particular programmes 
regardless of their views on individual issues?
Secondly, in what way were a candidate's political views 
relevant to the final choice made by the electorate?
Would he have made direct appeal to the voters with his 
policies? Or would he or his supporters in the senate 
have controlled the vote in some other way?
Before these questions are applied to individual 
elections, they must be considered in a more general sense, 
and certain basic assumptions must be made. This is the 
purpose of Chapter 1. In part A the criteria for 
judging the surviving evidence are determined.
In part B I establish my position on relevant 
constitutional issues: electoral procedure, legal methods 
of influencing the vote, and the roles of the executive, 
legislative and consultative in the implementation of 
policy. In part C, I examine the nature of the
governing class, the reasons for the existence of parties
within it, the system of clientela and the likely extent 
and nature of control of elections by the senatorial 
parties. Then, in a chronological review in Chapters 
2 to 6, I relate the various possible factors noted in
Chapter 1 to the political issues - insofar as they can
be identified - to determine the extent to which the 
latter influenced the results of the elections (6).
6. Throughout the thesis, the dates will be B.C., 
unless otherwise defined.
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CHAPTER 1 - SOURCE MATERIAL AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL, SOCIAL 
AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND TO THE ELECTIONS
A: The Nature of the Evidence
Historical evidence for this subject falls into two 
categories. Firstly, there are coins, archaeological 
remains and inscriptions, which together comprise only a 
small proportion of the total (l). Secondly, there are 
literary works written from the early second century 
onwards, which provide the bulk of our information; their 
authors gathered their material, directly or indirectly, 
from four types of source.
Firstly, various state records were kept. From 
the beginning of the Republic the pontifex maximus 
published tablets, dated with the names of annual 
magistrates, publicising major events such as portents, 
victories, festivals and famines; their contents were 
preserved by the pontifices together with notes from 
regal times to serve as a record of precedents and a
1. For coins, see M. Crawford, Roman Republican 
Coinage {Cambridge, 1974){=R&G). For archaeological 
evidence, see I. Scott Ryberg, An Archaeological Record 
of Rome from the 7th to the 2nd c. B.C. (London, 1940 
(=ARR) and E. C.jerstad, Early Rome (Lund, 1953-1966)
(=ER) i-iv. For inscriptions, see Corpus Inscriptionem 
Latinorum, ed. Mommsen (Berlin, 1893)(=CIL) vol. 1, ed. 2, 
and Inscriptiones Italiae, ed. Degrassi (=11) 13.1,
'Fasti consulares et triumphales' (Rome, 1947) and 13.3, 
'Elogia' (Rome, 1937). For recent bibliography, see 
review articles by J. Reynolds, etc. in JRS I960, 204fî 
1966, ll6f, 1971, 136f, 1976, 174f; 1981, 121f.
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calendar (2). Some of them survived the sack of Rome 
in 390 (3). At intervals they may have been compiled 
into annals for easier access, storage and safety; in 
130, in the pontificate of Q. Mucius Scaevola, the use 
of tablets was ended altogether (4)« Having always been
2. For evidence of a priestly chronicle in the regal 
period, see J. Crake, 'The Annals of the Pontifex Maximus',
CP 1940, 383-4; B. Frier, Libri Annales Pontificum Maximorum; 
the origins of the Annalistic Tradition (Rome, 1979)(=LAPM) 
107-114- For evidence of annual tablets being produced
by the pontifices from 509, see K. Beloch, Romische 
Geschichte (Berlin, 1926)(-RG) 88-95; Crake, art.cit.
379-382; Frier, LAPM 116-127, 152-9, 175f. For the 
contents of the pontifical tabula, see Beloch, RG 46-52; 
Frier, LAPM 83f. On their provision of precedents, see 
Livy, 8.18.12, 27.8.10; on their function as a calendar, 
see P. Fraccaro, 'The History of Rome in the Regal Period', 
JRS 1957, 60, and H. Scullard, A History of the Roman 
World: 753-146 B.C. 4th ed. (London, 1980)(=HRW^) 407.
Frier, LAPM 93-9, 127-132, 175f sees the purpose of their 
publication as political; cf. Ogilvie rev. Frier, LAPM,
JRS 1981, 200.
3. On the sack of Rome, see Plut. Cam.22.6, 30-2; D.H. 
13.12.2; Diod. 14.115-116; Livy 5.41-2, 50. For hints 
that the pontifical records survived see Livy 5.49-3, 50.
2-3, 6.1.2; Plut. Numa. 1.2; Ogilvie, A Commentary on Livy, 
books 1-5 {Oxford, 1965){=CL) 6; A. Alfoldi, Early Rome 
and the Latins (Michigan, 1965)(=ERL) l66f; Gjerstad, ER 
vol.3, index s.v. Gallic invasion; Frier, LAPM, 126.
4. For the early compilation of annals, see Cic. de 
dom. 86, de leg. 1.6; Quint. 10.2.7; Livy 8.18.12. M. 
Henderson, rev. Walsh, 'Livy: His Historical Aims and 
Methods' {Cambridge, I96I), JRS 1962, 277-8, and Frier,
LAPM 100-1, 175, suggest that this was for convenience. 
Editors of the annals are postulated in the late fourth 
century (T. Mommsen, Romische Forschungen (Berlin, I964)
(=RF) 151; A. Bernardi, 'Dagli Ausiliari del Rex ai 
Magistrati della Respublica' Ath. 1952, 13-14; Alfoldi,
ERL 167) and the mid third century (E. Kornemann, 'Die 
Alteste Form der Pontifikalannalen', Klio, 1911, 249).
For the view that no annals existed before the annales 
maximi, see Beloch, RG 87; Crake, art.cit. 377, 382f; 
Fraccaro, rev. Beloch, RG,Riv.Fil. 1928, 61. Mommsen's 
view (HR 3, 348) that in 130, the annales maximi (attested 
by Cic. de orat. 2.52, de rep. 16.25; Serv. ad Aen 1.373; 
Macrob. 3.2.17; Fest. 113L; Cell. 4-5) were compiled by 
Mucius when he ended the publication of tablets has been 
generally accepted; however Frier, LAPM 27-67, 179-200, 
has recently argued that they were produced in the late 
Augustan period; cf. Ogilvie, art.cit. 200 for criticisms.
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public, unlike the sacred laws, the pontifical records 
are likely to have been available to the earliest 
historians such as Fabius Pictor, whose work may have 
had an annalistic form because they used such records 
as a basic framework. The nature of the information 
and the style of many surviving histories of Rome suggest 
that their writers inherited information from the 
pontifical lists through Pictor and other annalists (5). 
The general agreement of Livy, the Oapitoline Fasti, 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Diodorus on the names of 
the principal magistrates in the early Republic which 
survive almost complete, suggests that they had a common 
source, and the pontifical records, being the only
5. Cic. ad Att. 6.1.8 implies that the earliest annal­
ists had easy access to the records of the pontifices who, 
like them, were members of the ruling class; cf. A. Michels, 
The Calendar of the Roman Republic (Princeton, 1967) 8-9; 
Frier, LAPM 96. On Fabius Pictor being the earliest 
annalist and historian of Rome, see Livy 1.44.2, 2.40.10, 
8.40.5; D.H. 1.6.2; Cic. de leg. 1.6; Lippold, C 7-12.
On the use of pontifical records by the earliest annal­
ists, see Gell. 5.18.6f; Cic. de rep. 1.25; F. Walbank,
A Historical Commentary on Polybius (Oxford, 1957)(=CP)
1 64-5; Frier, LAPM 139f, 259-260, 269-274; cf. M. Gelzer, 
'Romische Politik bei Fabius Pictor', Hermes, 1933, 129f, 
'Der Anfang Romischer Geschichtsschreibung', Hermes, 1934, 
46f, and (a modified view) 'Nochmals liber der Anfang der 
Romischen Geschichtsschreibung', Hermes, 1954, 342f.
For objections to Gelzer's view that the early annalistic 
style was the result of Greek influences on Pictor, see 
Walbank, 'Polybius, Philinus and the first Punic War',
CQ 1945, 15-18, and Frier, LAPM 69-81. For the independent 
development of the annalistic tradition see Livy 9-44-4; 
Beloch, RG 95-107; Frier, LAPM 112, 123-5, 152f, 161-284- 
For objections to the recent view of T. Wiseman, Clio's 
Cosmetics (Leicester, 1979)(=CC) 12f that the annales 
maximi were based on the research of Piso, the first 
Roman annalist, see the review by J. Briscoe, CR 1981,
50.
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continuous original source, are the most likely candidate 
(6). There was also an independent chronicle, the libri 
linteii, established in the fifth century, and housed in 
the temple of Juno Moneta from 344» which we know retained 
at least the names of curule magistrates (7); it was used 
by the annalists Aelius Tubero and Licinius Macer, who 
were in turn sources for Livy and Dionysius (8). The 
infrequency of Livy's notes of discrepancies between the 
names given by the libri linteii and those of other annal­
ists using the pontifical records suggest that both 
retained largely reliable records (9). From 449, the 
senatus consulta were kept in the temple of Ceres (10). 
Copies of them were stored in the aerariura, where laws 
and treaties, some of which were also on public display, 
were kept (11). By the late Republic, the ae-rarium may
6. of. Beloch, RG 1-21; L.R. Taylor and T. Broughton, 
'The order of the two consuls' names in the yearly lists', 
MAAR, 1949 3; Cornelius, UFRG 50-8; G. Perl, Kritische 
Untersuchungen zu Diodors Romischer Jahrzahlung (Berlin, 
1957) 31f; Frier, LAPM 145f.
7. For various theories on them cf. R. Palmer, The 
Archaic Community of the Romans (Cambridge, 197G)(=ACR) 
203, 232-8; Ogilvie, CL 11, 544 and 'Livy, Licinius 
Macer and the libri linteii', JRS 1958, 40-6; Frier,
LAPM 137-159.
8. Beloch, RG 105-7; Ogilvie, CL 7-12, 16-17.
9. Since the differences in magistrates' names in the 
libri linteii and other sources quoted by Livy <4.7.12, 
13.7, 20.8, 23.3) appear in a single decade they may 
have been the result of chronological confusion or the 
fading of names on part of the linen. Cornelius, UFRG 
51f and Beloch, RG 3 argue for the authenticity of both 
lists.
10. Livy 3.55.13.
11. Frier, LAPM 127-135.
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have contained details of trials and records of legislative 
and electoral voting, but we have no evidence of such 
records being kept as early as the third century (12).
A second source of information dating from the 
beginning of the Republic was the family records retained 
by the aristocratic gentes. In the earliest times they 
took the form of carmina, elogies and legends (13); 
later they were also recorded in inscriptions, family 
portraits, written accounts and the private papers of the 
magistrates (14). They retained details of magistrates' 
family origins, cognomina, paternities, marriages, careers, 
censorial records, and possibly senatorial debates (15).
The extensive use of them by writers such as Gellius and 
Valerius Antias, who were sources for Livy and Dionysius (16)
12. Scullard, RP 251-2.
13. Bernardi, art.cit. 14-15; Momigliano, 'Perizonius, 
Niebuhr and the Character of the early Roman tradition', 
JRS 1957, 104-114.
14. See e.g. Polyb. 6.53.1-1.54.3; Hor. Sat. 1.6.17; 
Pliny NH. 35.2.7, 12; Cic. Brut. 62, 75; Tusc. Disp.
4.2.3, de off. 1.55, de rep. 6.10; Degrassi, II 13.3.
15. See D.H. 1.74.5; Polyb. 6.53; Livy 10.7.11; Pliny 
NH. 35.2.7; Scullard, RP 252; art.cit. 20. Family 
records and legends may have been the only means of 
preserving senatorial debates; see Scullard, RP 251;
W. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327- 
70 B.C. (Oxford, 1979)(=WIRR) 6-7, 255. Many speeches 
in surviving histories are later compositions to make 
narration more vivid; see P. Walsh, Livy: His Historical 
Aims and Methods (Cambridge, 1962) 219-244. They 
contribute to the length of annalistic writing of the 
late Republic, which is often attributed to the public­
ation of the Annales Maximi; cf. Beloch, RG 103-7.
16. D.H. 1.7.3-4, 6.11.2; Ogilvie, CL 7f; Walsh, op. 
cit. 121f; Frier, LAPM 65, 186-9, 209-210.
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may partly explain the great length of their work. Many 
details from them, some taken direct from the archives of 
current leaders, others transcribed by the genealogical 
historian Atticus, were used in the Augustan period to 
fill out the state records to form the Capitoline Fasti, 
which are lists of consuls, censors, dictators, magistri 
équités and decemviri, with full paternities and cognomina, 
and the Acta Triumphales; parts of both, together with 
other fasti produced in the later period from the 
annalistic tradition, survive today. The Capitoline 
Fasti were probably used by Dionysius, but not by Livy; 
this may explain some of the minor differences between 
them in the names of the magistrates (17).
A third source of material for histories of the 
early Republic, about which the Romans had no clear or 
detailed evidence of their own, was the historical 
tradition of Greece. While some of this material would 
have reached Roman writers through early Greek historians 
such as Timaeus (18), some would have formed part of the 
general cultural and religious influences from Greece 
which had been permeating Rome's traditions since earliest
17. Degrassi, II 13.1 xiv-xv; L. Taylor, 'The Date of 
the Capitoline Fasti', CP 1946, 1-11; 'Degrassi's Edition 
of the Consular and Triumphal Fasti', CP 195G, 84-95 ;
'New Indications of Augustan Editing in the Capitoline 
Fasti', CP 1951, 73-8; Frier, LAPM 140f.
18. R. Laqueur, 'Timaios', PWRE (Stuttgart, 1937) 6. 1, 
1201f; A. Momigliano, 'Linee per una valutazione di Fabio 
Pittore' in Terzo Contribute alia Storia degli Classici
e del Monde Antico (Rome, 1966)(=TC) 6lf.
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times, through the Etruscans, traders, envoys and colon­
ists (19). The rest would have become directly available 
once Rome gained political control of Greece in the late 
third and second centuries (20). Some results of this
Greek contact were the traditions that Trojan and Greek 
heroes and gods were the Romans' ancestors (21), the 
prominence of women in accounts of major changes at Rome 
(22), the appearance of details from Greek legends in tales 
of Republican heroes (23), and the explanation of the
19. Cic. de rep. 2.19.34; R. Bloch, 'Rome de $09 à 
473 environ avant A.C.', REL 1939, 124-7; J. Heurgon,
The Rise of Rome, trans. J. Willis (London, 1973)(=RR) 
75-98; Palmer, ACR 282f; Ogilvie, CL 710f; Scullard,
HRW4 22-5, 31, 39-41, 36lf.
20. For full details of the Greek sources, both direct 
and indirect, of Pictor, Varro, Cicero, Livy and Dionysius, 
see E. Pais, Ancient Legends of Roman History, trans. M. 
Cosenza (London, 1906)(=ALRH) passim; Beloch, RG 96;
Walsh, op.cit. 117f; Lippold, C 22-7; Momigliano, TC 
56-68; E. Gabba, 'Considerazioni sulla tradizione letter- 
aria sulle origini della republica', EFH vol. xiii (I967) 
133-174; E. Rawson, 'Cicero the Historian and Cicero the 
Antiquarian', JRS 1972, 33-42; Palmer, ACR 14f; Frier,
LAPM 260-265.
21. Two basic traditions were 1) that the Romans were 
descended from Aeneas and the Trojans, through Alba or 
Lavinium (see Palmer, ACR 290-1; E. Gjerstad, Legends and 
Facts of early Roman History (Lund. 1960)(=LF) 37f;
Heurgon, RR 128-130; Scullard, HRW4 450-1) and 2) that 
Romans were descended from Spartans, through the Sabines 
(see Palmer, ACR 17-19, 290-1). T. Cornell, 'Aeneas 
and the Twins; the Development of the Roman Foundation 
Legend', PCPS 1975, If has recently shown that the story 
of Romulus and Remus being reared by a wolf was based on 
a native legend, and mingled with the legend of Aeneas
by the earliest historians of Rome.
22. Alfoldi, ERL 147-159.
23. For examples, see Ch.2 145, 152.
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origin and development of the constitution according to 
Greek theories, often in rigid terms of numbers, laws 
and lawgivers (24). Finally, historians of Rome often 
tried to correlate Greek and Roman events chronologically, 
although the Greek system of dating could not always be 
successfully combined with that of the Roman; attempts 
to do so by ancient writers have resulted in the creation 
of fictions such as a period of anarchy from 375 to 371 
and four dictator years from 334 to 300 (25).
The fourth and most important source of material for 
the surviving histories was the work of other writers; 
most of what we read has passed through the hands of 
several annalists and historians, who would generally not 
have consulted the original sources. Only a few writers, 
such as Polybius, Varro, Cicero and Calpurnius Piso, who 
was a source for Valerius Antias, Livy and Dionysius,
24. F. Walbank, Polybius (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
1972)(=P) I3O-I56; Palmer, ACR 14-25; Rawson, art.cit.
25. For the ancients' attempts to correlate Greek and 
Roman events, cf. Gjerstad, LF 36-9; Walbank, GP 1 339, 
665-9; E. Bickerman, Chronology of the Ancient World,
2nd ed. (London, 1980} 77-8. For Greek methods of 
dating, see Bickerman, op.cit. 75f; Walbank, CP 1 35f, 
669f. For the Roman method of counting years by 
magistracies, see Bickerman, op.cit. 70; these years did 
not necessarily correspond to calendar years; see T. 
Mommsen, Romische Staatsrecht (=RSt) (Leipzig, 1887)
3rd ed. 1 597f; Ogilvie, CL 404-5. Diodorus repeated 
consulships to co-ordinate his chronology; for details, 
cf. E. Schwartz, 'Diodorus', PWRE (Stuttgart, 1905) 
663-704; Beloch, RG 43-4; 110-2; Perl, op.cit. 4f, 106f; 
Badian, rev. Perl, Gnomon, 1958, 295-300. For the 
supposed anarchy from 375, see Degrassi, II 13.1 103, 
396-7; T. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman 
Republic (New York, 1951) Vol. I (=MRR) 109-110.
For the dictator years in the Capitoline Fasti, see 
Degrassi, II 13.1 110; Broughton, MRR I4I, 148-9, 163*4, 
171. In this thesis I will follow the standard Varronian 
system used by Broughton and most modern writers.
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seem to have shown much regard for accuracy as a necessary 
component of historical writing (26). Thus, as each 
historian copied errors, omissions and those prejudiced 
interpretations of material to which they were indifferent 
or which they favoured, and added their own personal views, 
distortions accumulated in the Roman historical tradition 
through the centuries (27).
Firstly, a distinguished ancestry being very 
important for a successful political career, the numbers 
of magistracies and triumphs may sometimes have been 
exaggerated in the family records (28). It is unlikely 
that major alterations of state records of the leading 
magistracies by individual pontifices to enhance their 
personal family traditions or those of their allies would 
have been tolerated by their successors, cr the rest of 
the governing class, and the use of such records by the 
later compilers of annals and official lists would often 
have prevented the exaggerations in family records 
seriously contaminating the tradition as a whole (29).
26. Munzer, RAA 4-5; G. Szemler, The Priests of the 
Roman Republic (Brussels, 1972)(=PRR) 11, 15-16; cf. 
Frier, LAPM 150f.
27. Rawson, art.cit. 40-1; Walbank, CP 1. 13-1-4; P. 
50f, 71f.
28. Cic. Brut. 62; Livy 8.40.5; Plut. Numa 1.2.
29. It has been argued, e.g. by Kornemann, art.cit. 
and Beloch, RG 9-32, that the consular Fasti from 509 
to 367 were interpolated by biased pontifices or annal­
ists, because plebeians, who according to the tradition 
did not hold the consulship until 366, appear in them. 
For objections, see Cornelius, UFRG 51f; Bernardi, art. 
cit. 12-13; Ch.IB 59f; Ch.2 146f.
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However, this would not always have been the case for 
lesser or extraordinary magistracies and triumphs, and 
even the records of consuls in the exceptional year of 
509 and early cognomina seem to have been distorted as a 
result of family prejudice (30). Family bias is more 
clearly apparent in the stories in the annalistic 
tradition. Historians from Pictor onwards tended to 
exaggerate heroic tales from the family records of their 
ancestors and those of their political allies or patrons 
at the expense of others - particularly those whose 
descendants were their political opponents or whose 
families no longer had much power (31). Often the same
30. Although dictatorships and triumphs would generally 
have been entered in the pontifical records, they did not 
occur yearly, and were particularly prestigious for their 
families; hence they were liable to be duplicated, or 
wrongly placed; see Beloch, RG If, 63-76, 87-9-2; cf. 
Fraccaro, art.cit. 559-560. The lesser curule and 
plebeian magistracies were probably never recorded in 
state records; hence evidence of them is patchy and 
contradictory. See Oh.2 132f on the consuls of 509.
On the general unreliability of cognomina, see Beloch,
RG 50-2; Fraccaro, art.cit. 558-9; Taylor, GP 1946, 8-10; 
Ogilvie, CL 563, 568-9. (However,
the early names to which clearly anachronistic cognomina 
are attached (see Cornelius, UFRG 50-1)
may still have been genuine) Topographical cognomina, 
indicating a family's place of origin or residence, are 
generally accepted; see Ogilvie, CL 615; L. Taylor,
Voting Districts of the Roman Republic (Rome, I960)
(=VDRR) 40; P. Willems, Le Sénat de la republique romaine 
(Paris, 1978)(=SRR) 1. 11-14; J. Gagé, 'La 'Rogatio 
Petillia' et le procès de P. Scipion', RP 1953, 42; cf. 
Mommsen, RF 2. 291f. Early honorific cognomina are not 
so readily believed; see Mommsen, RF 2. 294f; cf. Degrassi, 
II 13.1 108. However, Livy himself (4.17.7, 30.45.6) 
is confused about the date of their introduction, and 
probable cases may be found in the fifth century (see, 
e.g. Ch.2 138, n.78).
31. Livy 7.9.5; Beloch, RG 96-8; Ogilvie, CL 9-10;
Frier, LAPM 281-2.
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tales were repeated for several different members of a gens 
because the family records, especially the early oral 
legends, did not retain clear dates or because historians 
assumed hereditary traits within gentes. A clear example 
of the latter tendency is Valerius Antias * portrayal of 
all the early Valerii as popular leaders (32). It is less 
certain who was responsible for the depiction of all the 
Claudii as arrogant patricii in the early Republic (33); 
there is a case to be made for it being based on a certain 
amount of truth (34)• Stories from family records were 
popular with later writers like Livy, although he was aware 
of their unreliability (35), because they livened up their 
chronicles of events, particularly those of the early 
Republic, for which there was often little more material 
than the dry facts of the pontifical annals (36).
32. Livy 3.5.12; J. Heurgon, Recherches sur l'Histoire, 
la Religion et la Civilization de Papoue Prëromaine, 
(Paris,1942)(=CP) 163f, 271; Ogilvie, CL 14-15. R. 
Laroche, 'Valerius Antias and his numerical totals, a 
reappraisal'. Hist. 1977, 358-368 warns against attribut­
ing too much to Antias' family bias.
33. For various views of the originator of the tradition 
of Claudian arrogance, see Alfoldi, ERL 159f (Fabius 
Pictor); Mommsen, RF 1 287-318 (a post-Gracchan annalist); 
Ogilvie, CL 15 and Wiseman, CC 113-139 (Antias) (see 
Briscoe's review, CR 1981, 50-1 for criticisms of the 
latter).
34. Authority within the patriciate, or concern with 
the constitution of the curule state, both of which 
could have contributed to the hostile tradition, were 
often particularly relevant to the posts to which Claudii 
were appointed; see, e.g. Ch.2 139, l62f, 170f.
Since the Claudii were consistently absent from military 
activity and the priestly lists, they might have developed 
as family traditions.
35. Livy 8.40.5.
36. Cic. de leg. 1.6; Ogilvie, CL 17-18.
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Polybius, Calpurnius Piso, and Cato, whose work was 
used by Cicero, Livy, Dionysius and Plutarch (37), were 
the first major historians of Rome to view history's 
purpose as being not merely to narrate events, occasionally 
glorifying specific leaders, year by year, but also to 
provide instruction from the past on how men should 
behave in the future. Their idealised view of past Roman 
virtues, and their use of historical figures to give moral 
lessons often contributed to the distortion of facts in 
their accounts, or those of the writers who used them; 
for example, anecdotes illustrating moral truths were 
freely moved from one character to another, according to 
the personal prejudices of the writers (38).
Little direct evidence of the constitution or domestic 
policies in the early Republic is likely to have been 
retained in state or family records, and what was available 
is unlikely to have been thoroughly or impartially consulted 
by later historians. The views of Polybius, Cicero,
37. D. Kienast, Cato the Censor (Heidelberg, 1954) lOf;
D. Russell, Plutarch (London, 1973) 21, 54f» 135.
38. See G. Forni, 'Manio Curio Dentate, uorao democratico' 
Ath. 1953, 172-183 and Cassola, GPR 353-4, 349-50 (Cato); 
Walbank, P 84f (Polybius); Frier, LAPM 211-2 (Piso);
M. Rambaud, Giceron et l'histoire romaine (Paris, 1953)
27f (Cicero); Walsh, op.cit. lOf, 82f (Livy); Gabba,
'Studi su Dionigi da Halicarnasso', Ath. I960, 175f 
(Dionysius); Russell, op.cit. 84f (Plutarch). The 
single combat of Valerius and,Manlius against a Gaul 
(see Ch.4 255 n.58), the frugal practices of Curius and 
Fabricius (see Ch.5 332 n.Ill), the 'devotio' of three 
generations of Decii and the severe military disciplining 
of their sons by Manlius and Postumius (see Ch.4 ^oO n.7b) 
are examples of repeated moral tales.
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Dionysius and Tacitus on the early Roman -constitution may 
have been based not just on Greek patterns, but also on 
assumptions made from their own experience and their 
idealised view of the past (39). Political bias is 
particularly evident in the work of annalists involved in 
the turbulent politics of the late Republic; for example, 
Licinius Macer's support of Marius and Valerius Antias’ 
support of Sulla are clearly reflected in Livy's early 
books, especially his account of the struggle of the 
orders (40).
Similarly, political bias and patriotism influenced 
historical accounts of Rome's foreign policy. Rome's 
historians and possibly even those who stored the laws 
and treaties naturally maintained a favourable picture 
of the city's relationship with other states, by discarding 
evidence both of early weaknesses and later imperialist 
behaviour (41). The occasional use of writers with
39. Walbank, P 130-156; Gabba, art.cit.; E. Berti, II
'De republica' de Cicerone e il pensiero politico classico 
(Padua, 1963) &4f; R. Syme, Tacitus (Oxford, 1958) 27f,
547f.
40. Tacit. Hist. 1.1; Ogilvie, CL 7-12, 15-16; Frier,
LAPM 154 n.41. It is now generally agreed that Livy's 
earliest books were written too early to contain much 
propaganda for Augustan domestic policies; see T. Luce, 
'Livy's First Decade', TAPA 1965» 209-240.
41. On the possibility of laws being altered or hidden, 
see Cic. de leg. 3.20.46, pro Sulla 40f; M. Cary, 'A 
Forgotten Treaty between Rome and Carthage', JRS 1919,
67-70; Toynbee, HL 1 552-5. Such changes and cover-ups
are more likely than distortions of the lists of magistrates, 
because they were in the interests of the whole governing 
class. See Ch.2, 128-9 on the playing down of Rome's 
weaknesses in the fifth century. See Harris, WIRR 105- 
130 on late Republican writers playing down Rome's 
imperialism. Pride in Rome's achievements was revived 
in the Augustan age; see Livy 9.17-19, 21.5.1; Walsh, 
op.cit. 64f, 144f, 151f.
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opposing prejudices, such as Philinus, the pro-Carthaginian 
writer (42), who was a source for Polybius and Diodorus 
for the first Punic war (43), helps to redress the balance 
here. Historians' personal attitudes and aims may also 
have affected their accounts. Fabius Pictor's inter­
pretation of Roman expansion probably reflected the defensive 
military policy of his immediate forefathers, and his 
concern to establish Rome's cultural and political position 
in Greece, which may have been part of the reason that he 
wrote his history, may have affected its content (44). 
Polybius' ideas of the role of Tyche in the affairs of men
(45), and of Rome's deliberate aim to dominate the world
(46) - the latter possibly partly resulting from the
42. Walbank, CP 1 65; cf. R. Laqueur, 'Philinus', PWRE 
19.2 (Stuttgart, 1938) 2192f.
43. Philinus and Pictor were contrasting sources for 
Polybius for the first Punic War; Pictor then became
his main source for the period up to the second Punic
War; cf. G. De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani (Turin, 1907- 
64)(=StR) 3.1 224-230; Gelzer, Hermes, 1933, 129f;
Walbank, CQ 1945, 1-18; Lippold, C 4f, 22-7; Cassola, GPR 
356-361. On Diodorus' use of Philinus, see Diod. 23.8.1, 
24.11.1; De Sanctis, StR 3.1 231-235; Lippold, C 25-6.
44. See Ch.5, 315f, 328-9, 335, 349f, Gh.6, 373-9, 387, for
the Fabii's defensive military policy and interests in 
developing Rome's diplomatic and cultural relations with 
Greece in the third century. For the influence of such 
interests on Pictor and other early historians, see F. 
Munzer, 'Fabius', PWRE 6.2 (Stuttgart, 1909) 1837, noting 
that Pictor himself went on an embassy to Delphi in 216; 
Polyb. 1.14.1-3; Beloch, RG 98-100; Gelzer, Hermes, 1933 
129f, 1934 48f, 1954 342f; Frier, LAPM 201-284. However, 
their use of the Greek language, and interest in Greece 
need not suggest, as Gelzer proposes, that propaganda 
to the Greek world was their sole aim; see n.5;
Momigliano, TC 64f; Lippold, C 13,22.
45. See Walbank, P 58f.
46. See Polyb. 1.3.6, 63.9.
24
influence of his patrons, the Scipionic circle, whose 
forebears had led in the imperialist adventures of the 
third century (47) - may have sometimes caused him to make 
biased or over-generalised judgements on Roman foreign 
policy. However, his use of Fabius Pictor as a basic 
source for the period before the second Punic war, the 
impossibility of combining his general theories with each 
other, and his concern with truth may have often counter­
balanced this tendency in his writings (48).
In view of the possible distortions in our information 
touched on above, we may now establish a few broad criteria 
for judging its value. It is clear that archaeological 
remains from the period under consideration are the most 
reliable form of evidence, being subject only to dis­
tortions of interpretation by their modern discoverers. 
After them, distinctive facts from state and family 
records - the magistrates' names, both curule and plebeian, 
genealogies, laws, treaties and major events - retained 
in literary works and inscriptions are the most reliable 
available, largely because their transcribers had to make
47. Thus imperialist aims noted by Polybius, which Harris, 
WIRR 105-130 argues were quite accurate, may have only 
been maintained by this sector of the Roman ruling class. 
For hints of Polybius' use of evidence from the house of 
the Scipios see Polyb. 10.9*3; Oassola, PG 183-190,
358-360; Ch.6 386 n.80, 390 n.94*
48. Polybius' view of Rome's deliberate aim of world 
conquest contradicted his view of Tyche (Walbank, P 60f, 
'Polybius and Rome's Eastern Policy', JRS 1963, 1-13)
and could not always be easily explained in a way favour­
able to his Scipionic patrons. For examples of his 
willingness to criticise Roman imperialists, even Scipios, 
see Polyb. 1.21.4-8; Harris, WIRR 113-5* The philhellen- 
ism of Pictor in the third century and that of the Scipios 
in the second century (Scullard, RP 120f, 212f) meant 
that their views did not always clash.
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deliberate changes to them if they wanted to make them 
comply with their views. Except when well established 
in the tradition, flaws in such evidence are indicated by 
contradictions between different surviving sources, and 
we can often make good guesses about whether family pride, 
political prejudice, patriotism, chronological difficulties, 
or errors in transmission are responsible for them (4-9).
The least reliable evidence is what makes up the 
rest of the literary tradition - policies, opinions, 
causes of events and anecdotes, which, being more nebulous 
by nature than factual details, were more susceptible to 
exaggeration and distortion through prejudice and simple 
confusion in the course of transmission. Yet we do not 
have sufficient information for our subject without such 
material (50). Often it may be judged according to its 
compatability with archaeological evidence (51), or the 
facts from the official lists (52). Otherwise, the more 
frequently that anecdotes and the like appear in historical 
accounts with different original sources, the more credible 
they are. Where available histories contradict each 
other, those written nearest the times they describe are 
likely to be the most accurate.
4.9. Fraccaro, art.cit. 557-8; Adcock, CAH 7 581-2; 
cf. W. Frederiksen, rev. Samnium and the Samnites,
E.T. Salmon (Cambridge, 1967), JRS 1968, 226.
50. Fraccaro, art.cit. 552-3»
51. A. Momigliano, 'Origins of the Roman Republic',
in Interpretations I Theory and Practice, ed. 0. Singleton 
(Baltimore, 1969) 3-4»
52. Munzer, RAA A; T. Frank, 'Roman Census Statistics 
from 508 to 225 B.C.', AJP, 1930, 313-324»
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Sometimes, for example in certain periods of the third 
century, because Livy, the Capitoline Fasti and Dionysius 
are all missing, it is necessary to fall back on the less 
reliable writers from later times, such as Appian and 
Zonoras (53)» Where all the literary sources contradict 
themselves and each other, and are of similar credibility 
in terms of age and type of information, then one often has 
to simply choose that which is most compatible with the rest 
of one's account. When assumptions have to be made about 
details concerning the constitution, political views and 
political factions on which we simply lack information, they 
can sometimes be consolidated by cautious comparision with 
other states and later periods of Roman history (54).
So much important information for our subject is lack­
ing - most notably, details of electoral, legislative and 
judicial procedure, senatorial debates, direct hints of 
individuals' political views, factional attachments and 
family backgrounds, the nature of the struggle between 
patricians and plebeians, and the names of junior and 
plebeian magistrates, and candidates - that little work has 
been done on elections in the period. Yet certain import­
ant details - above all, the names of the leading magistrates 
do survive, and appear to be authentic; together with infer­
ences from the remaining material they can provide a credible, 
if murky picture of the likely basis of the electoral results.
53. See A.H. Macdonald, 'Appian', OCD 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1970) 
87, on Appian, and F. Millar, A Study of Cassius Dio (Oxford, 
1964) 2-3 on Zonoras.
54. See A. Momigliano, 'An Interim report on the origins 
of Rome', JRS 1963, 113-4 for comments on the comparative
method.
27
B: The Constitutional Background
I will now outline my views on aspects of the Roman 
constitution most relevant to the subject at hand - the 
conduct of elections and the implementation of policy.
1) The Regal Period
The ancient writers' concern to define all stages 
of the early evolution of the state numerically and to 
attribute them to specific kings, especially Romulus, 
has resulted in some rather unlikely and contradictory 
accounts of the regal constitution; I give here a 
version that is more historically probable to set the 
scene for the development of the Republic.
In the early monarchical period, the Roman 
population was divided into thirty curiae and three 
tribes (1). The thirty curiae were primitive village 
groups which were joined together to form the city-state 
in the legendary age of Romulus. Once united, each 
curia continued to maintain some land and its own 
religious practices; together, the curiae shared a 
common leader, fought in a state army and developed 
common cults. Romans inherited membership of the 
curiae; immigrants probably had to join them to become
1. Cic. de rep. 2.14, 15, 20: Livy 1.13: Fest. 42L: 
D.H. 2.7.2-4, 47: Varro, 1.1.5.55: Plut. Rom. 20.1-2.
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true members of the city (2). When the number of curiae 
was restricted to thirty, they were grouped in three tribes 
mainly for the sake of the organisation of the army; hence 
the numbers of units of infantry until the Servian reforms 
and of cavalry throughout the Republic were divisible by 
three (3). The patres of the leading gentes or farailiae 
in the ouriae were nominated by the king to a senate to 
give him counsel (4). Many gentes established increasingly
2. For full details, see W. Warde Fowler, The City State 
of the Greeks and Romans, (London, 1893), 27-34, 44-5; H. 
Last, 'The Servian Reforms', JRS 19-45, 30, 33-4; P. Grimai, 
L'enceinte servienne dans 1'histoire urbane de Rome', MEFR 
1959 43f; Gjerstad, LF 32; Momigliano, art.cit. 99-103, 
111-112; Palmer, ACR 76-175, 284-6, (for valid reservations 
on parts of his theory, see review by H. Drummond, JRS,
1972, 176); J. Richard, Les Origines de la plèbe Romaine 
(Rome, 1978)(=OPR) 135f, 197-214, 227; Scullard, HRW^, 43- 
6, 5O-I. Kinship being the sole criteria for membership 
of the curiae seems unlikely, since the curiae survived 
into the Republic, through the regal period of heavy 
immigration (Momigliano, art.cit. 101-3; Richard, OPR, 270- 
286, 290-310) and the Servian reforms.
3. cf. Heurgon, RR 120-1 (arguing against the tribes' 
Etruscan origin); Momigliano, art.cit. 110-4 (arguing 
against the tribes being class distinctions); Palmer, AOR 
5f, 152-6 (emphasising the tribes' military functions); 
Richard, OPR 195-6 (arguing against the tribes' ethnic 
origin); Scullard, HRW% 67 (pointing out the tribes' lack 
of political significance). For the recruitment of 3000 
infantry from the tribes, see Varro 1.1.5.81, 89; Plut.
Rom. 13.1. The ancients' accounts of the development
of the cavalry (Plut. Rom. 13, 20, 26; Livy 1.13.8, 15.8,
30.3, 36.2-8, 45.9, 21.17.3; Serv. ad Aen 5.560; Polyb. 
1.16.2, 6.20.9-21; Varro 1.1.5.81, 89, 91; Val.Max. I.4.I; 
Fest. 48L, 168-9L, 452L, 475L; D.H. 2.13, 3.70f; Cic. de 
rep. 2.8.14, 36; Flor. Epit. 1.1.5) are contradictory and 
over-schematic, but all are based on the number three.
For a summary of modern interpretations of the cavalry's 
development in the regal age, see Richard, OPR 337-9, 
379-382.
4. D.H. 2.14.1-2, Cic. de rep. 2.14-15, Livy 1.49.7 and 
Plut. Rom. 27, Num. 2.2 attest to the senate's counselling 
role. Again, ancient accounts of the increase in its 
numbers are schematic and contradictory, it is more likely 
that it naturally expanded with the state (Willems, SRR 1 
19-21, 24-6; Ogilvie, CL 63-4; Richard, OPR 156 n.70, 232-3) 
See Ch.IB 76 and Ch.2 147-8 for arguments that the 
minores gentes. conscript! and a maximum of three hundred 
senators were all Republican concepts.
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secure hereditary places in the senate, cavalry and priest­
hoods; some became the patrician gentes of the Republic (5) 
The king, who had absolute authority, led the army, acted 
as supreme judge, and performed priestly functions (6). 
After each king died the senators chose interroges every 
five days to name a replacement until one of them named a 
man who met with the approval of the senate and Jupiter (7)
5. Richard, OPR 230-264, 311-354, 394-404, 416-428, 
outlines the theory that gentes later defined as patrician 
were developing into an elite increasingly at odds with 
the Tarquin dynasty, which tried to undermine it by en­
larging the senate, creating a timocratic constitution, 
building up a hereditary monarchy, avoiding interroges 
and senatorial ratification and, finally, decimating 
senatorial numbers. cf. Momigliano, art.cit. 117-120;
A. Alfoldi, Per Friihromische Reiteradel und seine 
Ehrenabzeichen (Baden-Baden, 1952)(=FRE) and T. Oantz,
'The Tarquin Dynasty', Hist. 1975, 347-8, 552, for 
similar views. For objections to details in these 
schemes see notes 40 and 79, and E. Staveley, rev.
Richard, OPR, in Gnomon, 1981, 34.
6. cf. Oic. de leg. 3.3.8, Brut. $3; D.H. 2.14.1;
U. Goli, 'Regnum', SDHI 1951, 77f; Richard, OPR 22$, 
n.l23, 124; Scullard, HRW4 69-71.
7. D.H. 2.14.3, 57-8, 60.2,3.1, 36.1, 46.1, 62.1,4.5,
38, 4O-I; Cic. de rep. 2.23-5, 31-8; Plut. Num. 2.6-7;
Livy 1.17, 18.5f, 22.1, 32.1, 35, 41f. For some 
alternative views, see e.g. A. Magdalain, 'Cinq Jours 
Épagomènes à Rome?', REL 1962, 201-227 {interroges were 
annual, for religious reasons) and S. Friezer,
'Interregnum and patrum auctoritas', Mnemosyme, 1959,
302f {there were no regal interregna). The validation 
of the interrex's choice by auctoritas patrum seems 
unlikely (A. Guarino, 'Notazioni romanistiche' in Studi 
in onore di Siro Solazzi (Naples, 1948) 1.21f, contra 
Willems, SRR 2 57f, and P. De Francisci, 'Intorno Alla 
Naturae alia Storia Dell'Auspicium Imperiumque' in 
Studi in memoria di Emilio Albertario (Milan, 1953) 
(=St.Alb. ) 412 n.4); it could have been retrojected
by the ancients because of the basis of the patricians' 
claims to it in the Republic (see 52-3 W l o w ) .
On the ceremony of inauguratio, see Coli, art.cit. 79f.
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It is unlikely that the people gathered in their curiae 
contributed more than a shout of acclamation; the ancient 
accounts of their role may be distorted by Greek ideas 
of popular sovereignity and their retrojection of later 
conditions (8).
The Etruscans who filtered into Rome in the seventh 
century were a trading people with many connections in 
Italy and Greece, and were therefore familiar with the 
Greek hoplite fighting methods, which depended on heavily 
armed infantry fighting in formation (9). This system 
required the organisation of fighting units according to 
the personal wealth of the soldier. Servius Tullius, 
king of Rome during the period of Etruscan supremacy (10), 
facilitated the creation of such a hoplite army at Rome 
by registering citizens in locally based tribes and
8. Coli, art.cit. 60f, 79f, Bernardi, art.cit. 30,
P. De Francisci, Primordia Civitatis (Rome, 1959)(=PC) 
580f and Palmer, ACR 184f, 210-3, contra Mommsen, RST
1.3 212f, G. Botsford, The Roman Assemblies from their 
origin to the end of the Republic, (New York, 1909)(=RA) 
182f, and De Sanctis, StR 1 345, 353-4, 2 233, who all 
accept the ancients’ view of popular sovereignity.
Cicero (de rep. 2.23-5, 31-8) even suggests that the 
people not only assented to the interrex's choice, but 
also passed a lex curiata; this would be a natural 
assumption if he knew that the curiae were most 
significant in the regal age.
9. A. Snodgrass, Arms and Armour of the Greeks (London, 
1967), 48f; Richard, OPR 355-359, 366-7, 374-5.
10. De Sanctis, 'Mastarna', Klio, 1902, 96-104 and StR 
1 375; Last, CAH 7 391, 402; Gantz, art.cit. 342-553, 
and Richard, OPR 266-270, 292-3 and 354-9 all argue that 
Servius Tullius was a Latin who continued the Tarquins' 
policy of expanding and modernising the state. For the 
alternative view that he was Etruscan, see De Francisci, 
PC 599, 638f; Heurgon, RR 144-5; R. Ridley, 'The Enigma 
of Servius Tullius', Klio, 1975 147-177, and R. Thomsen, 
King Servius Tullius (Copenhagen, 1980)(=KST) 57-114.
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recruiting them in centuries according to their wealth (11) 
There were nineteen original Servian tribes; the Claudia 
tribe was created about 505 when the gens was said to 
have come to Rome, while the Clustumina tribe was formed 
after the capture of the major city of the region in 499 
(12). Tribes were then created in pairs in the rest of 
the Republic, to facilitate the working of the tribal 
assembly; the last fourteen of the final total of thirty- 
five were created as the state expanded in the fourth and 
third centuries. Fraccaro shows that only the eighteen 
centuries of cavalry, formed according to the old curiate 
system, and the first three classes of iuniores, which 
made up sixty centuries, comprised the regular fighting 
army of Servius’ day. This means that Servius effectively 
doubled the number of fighting units from thirty curiae
11. Tribal lists (Livy 1.42.5f; Zon. 7.9; Cic. de leg. 
3.3.7) were the basis of levying and taxes (Taylor, VDRR 
7-9 and ’The centuriate assembly before and after the 
reform’, AJP 1957, 337-42; contra Beloch, RG 283f, 
Walbank, CP 1 698-9 and Richard, OPR 396, 406-413).
The tribal system ensured that immigrants and the non­
landed were included in the citizenry and thereby the 
army (Last, art.cit. 40f; Bernardi, art.cit. 20f, 31; 
Richard, OPR 311, 348-9, 400-8). Hence D.H. 4.22.3f 
states that Servius enfranchised the freedmen (Ogilvie, 
CL 24I-2); slaves may have been increasing rapidly in 
number since the conquests of Tarquinius Priscus (Livy
1.35.38; D.H. 3.49c). The tribes were based on the old 
gentile estates (Mommsen, RSt l66f) and the ancient 
divisions of the city (Scullard, HRW^ 45).
i. The Claudii probably settled in-Rome during the 
;gal age (Mommsen, RF 1 293f, RSt 3 26 n.l); the
12
re^ _  . .
tradition that they only arrived about 505 may be due 
to the Claudia tribe being founded then (Ogilvie, CL 
273-4, 292; Taylor, VDRR 6 35-7). For Crustumeria’s 
capture in 499, see Livy 2.19.2; D.H. 5.49.6. For the 
creation of the tribe Clustumina, in 495, see Badian, 
rev. Taylor, VDRR, JRS 1962, 201-2; Ogilvie, CL 284-5.
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to sixty centuries (13). After this reform the curiae 
were largely only of significance for religious and family 
rituals (14).
2) Electoral Procedure
i) Electoral Assemblies and the Voting Structure
The most important electoral assembly was the comitia 
centuriata where the consuls and praetors who had military 
and judicial powers, the censors, and, for a brief period, 
the quaestors were elected (15). The day of election and 
the candidates were announced at a preliminary contio, or 
assembly of the people, by the electoral president, who 
was one of the consuls, the dictator or the interrex (16).
13. P. Fraccaro, 'La Storia dell *Antichissimo Esercito 
Romano e I'Eta dell'Ordinamento Centuriato', in Opuscula 
(Pavia, 1956-7)(=Opusc.) 2 287f. The view is defended
by Fraccaro, 'Ancora sull'Eta dell'Ordinamento Centuriata', 
in Opusc. 2 293-304, Last, art.cit. 42f, Heurgon, RR 149f, 
Staveley, 'The Constitution of the Roman Republic', 1940- 
1954, Hist. 1956, 76f and Gnomon, 1981 35, and Richard,
OPR 351-2, 359-376, 394-7, 408-413, against e.g., Beloch,
RG 284f, De Sanctis, StR 1 374, 2 192f, and 'Le Origini 
dell'Ordinamento Centuriato', Riv. Fil., 1933, 289f,
A. Momigliano, 'Studi sugli ordinamento centuriati',
SDHI 1938, 509f (all arguing that the system was not 
created until the late fifth century) and Bernardi, art. 
cit. 3f, 21f (only the first class was created by Servius). 
For outlines of the full centuriate system, see Livy 1.43; 
D.H. 4.15.6-16.1, 20.1; Cic. de rep. 2.39-40. For 
arguments against the ancients' view that S-ervius intended 
the centuries to be used for political purposes, see 
Fraccaro, Opusc. 2 291, 295f; Last, art.cit. 34-5, 42f; 
Bernardi, art.cit. 21; Richard, OPR 353-5, 378-383.
14. Immigrants might still have joined the curiae for 
these reasons. For activities of the curiae in the 
Republic, see Mommsen, RSt 3^1 318f; W. Liebenam, 'Comitia', 
PWRE (Stuttgart, 1901) 4 684-6.
15. See Botsford, RA 229, 469 and n.21 below.
16. Botsford, RA 139f, 469f; E. Staveley, Greek and 
Roman Voting and Elections (New York, 1972)(=GRVE) 143f.
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On the appointed day of the election, all the citizens cast 
as many votes as there were places to be filled. They 
voted within their Servian centuries; a candidate required 
a relative majority within each century to win its vote.
The centuries voted successively in a specific order - 
the first eighteen cavalry centuries, led by the sex 
suffragia, which acted as the praerogativa, then classes 
one to five. Results were announced as they voted. The 
vote of the praerogativa was reputed to be of some influence 
on subsequent voters. A candidate was officially declared 
as being elected by the president, in a process known as 
renuntiatio, once he gained an absolute majority of century 
votes, which, until 230, was possible after only the 
cavalry and first class centuries had cast their votes (17). 
In 230 a change was made to this procedure with the direct 
co-ordination of at least some of the voting centuries 
with the thirty-five Servian tribes. One senior and one 
junior century was created in each tribe. This made a 
total of seventy voting centuries in the first class, which, 
with twelve cavalry centuries, voted first, followed by 
the sex suffragia. The voting centuries in classes two 
to five were created by amalgamating the senior and junior 
centuries from each tribe in groups of two or three, so 
that the total number of voting centuries remained as 
before at one hundred and ninety-three. The special 
privilege of casting a prerogative vote was given to one
17. For outlines of the procedure, see Mommsen, RSt 3 1 
290f, U. Hall, 'Voting Procedure in Roman Assemblies', 
Hist. 1964 267f, correcting Mommsen's view that origin­
ally the voting was successive, and Ogilvie, CL 667, 
arguing that the sex suffragia were the original prae­
rogativa, as indeed their name suggests (see n.40 below).
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of the first class centuries chosen by lot (18). It may 
be noted that with the reduction of centuries in the first 
class in this new system, the second class centuries had 
to cast their votes before it was possible to reach an 
absolute majority. Possibly for this reason, simultaneous 
voting of all centuries within each class, save the 
praerogativa, was introduced at the same time to speed up 
the electoral process. The order of the results announced 
within each class, which was significant for the final 
result, would have been decided by lot for the second class 
onwards (19).
There were two forms of tribal assembly, the comitia 
tributa which included all citizens and held elections at 
the same time of year as the comitia centuriata, and the 
concilium plebis, which included only plebeians, and was 
held at a different time of year (20). Several minor 
magistrates were elected in the comitia tributa. From 421 
quaestors, whose numbers had increased from two to eight
18. Sassola, PG 268f argues for this date. For the 
development of^this interpretation of the reform, see 
Mommsen, RSt 3 1 270-9; F. Tibiletti, 'II Funzionamente 
dei Comizi Centuriati alia Luce della Tavola Hebana',
Ath. 1949, 201f; J. Nichols, 'The Reform of the Comitia 
Centuriata', AJP 1956, 220f; L. Taylor, art.cit. 337f; 
Roman Voting Assemblies (Michigan, 1966)(=RVA) 85f; 
Walbank, CP 1 683-7. For other views, see E. Staveley, 
'The Reform of the Comitia Centuriata', AJP 1953, 2-23; 
Hist. 1956, 114f (voting centuries were directly co­
ordinated with tribes in the first two classes); De 
Sanctis, StR 3.1 353f, A. Dell 'Oro, 'Rogatio e Reforma 
dei Comizi Centuriati', in Parola del Passato, 1950, 132f, 
and E. Schonbauer, 'Di Centurienreform' in St. Alb. 1 
699f, 711f and 'Di Romische Centurienverfassung in neuer 
Quellenschau', Hist. 1953, 21-49 (all three arguing that 
voting centuries were directly co-ordinated with tribes
in all classes in various ways).
19. cf. Staveley, GRVE 171.
20. Mommsen, RSt 1^  600f.
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by 219, and who dealt largely with justice and finance (21), 
and from 367 two curule aediles, who were largely concerned 
with public buildings and games (22), were elected there. 
Military tribunes, six from 362 and sixteen from 311, and 
duoviri navales for a short time from 311 were also elected 
in the assembly (23). By 471, plebeian tribunes, who 
acquired legislative and judicial powers (24), were being 
regularly elected in the concilium plebis; also elected in 
this assembly were their assistants, the plebeian aediles, 
who were concerned with guarding the plebeian cult, public 
building and certain archives (25). Procedure was much 
the same in both types of tribal assembly as in the 
centuriate assembly; each tribe in succession returned a 
single vote until candidates had won the votes of an absolute 
majority of tribes. There was a particular order in which 
the tribes voted, but the decision on which tribe was to 
begin the voting - the principium - was made by lot. In 
the third century, possibly at the time of the comitia 
centuriata reform, the process may have been speeded up by
21. See further on the quaestors. Ch.2, 126-7; Ch.3, 201; 
Ch.5 306, E. Staveley, 'The significance of the consular 
and tribunate', JRS 1953, 34 and 'Provocatio during the 
fifth and fourth centuries'. Hist. 1954 425 suggests 
that when their numbers were increased to four in 421, 
their election was moved from the comitia centuriata to 
the comitia tributa. For alternative views of their 
development see K. Latte, 'The Origin of the Roman 
Quaestorship', TAPA 1936 24-33 and W. Harris, 'The 
Development of the Quaestorship', GQ 1976, 92-106.
22. Mommsen, RSt 2^ 480f; A. Lintott, Violence in 
Republican Rome (Oxford, 1968)(=VRR) 92-101.
23. Mommsen, RSt 1^ 118 n.l; Staveley, JRS 1953, 32;
Hist. 1956, 80 n.37.
24. See 70-72; Ch.2 126-8.
25. Mommsen, RSt 2^ 470f; ¥. Quinn-Schofield, 'Observations 
on the Ludi Plebeii', Latomus, 1967 678f; Lintott, VRR 93f.
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the simultaneous vote of the tribes, the results being 
announced in an order decided by lot (26). Theoretically, 
therefore, the tribal assemblies were more democratic than 
the centuriate (27).
Altogether, however, it is clear that elections in both 
assemblies were not devised or maintained for any democratic 
purpose. They only met in Rome, even when citizens lived 
in many parts of Italy. Many individuals might not agree 
with the vote of their group. The successive voting, or 
announcement of votes, meant that the votes of many groups 
were irrelevant to the result. Tribal assemblies were 
biased against the urban tribes, which were only four of 
the thirty-five voting groups by 241; the centuriate assembly 
was biased against the poor. The whole system reflects 
the love of hierarchy and lack of concern for the 
individual which, as we shall see, pervaded all spheres of 
Roman political and social life (28).
ii) The Competence of the Assemblies
Having concluded that the assemblies had no clear 
democratic purpose, we may now go on to consider how their 
role in the magisterial elections developed, with particular 
emphasis on the comitia centuriata, where the leading curule
26. For outlines of the whole procedure, with varying 
views of the tribal order, cf. Mommsen, RSt 3.1 369f; 
Fraccaro, 'La Procedura del Voto nei comizi Romani’, in 
Opusc. 2 235f; Taylor, VDRR 46, 69-79; Hall, art.cit. 
276-8, 284-6, 293-7; Staveley, GRVE 154-6, 172-182.
27. Cic. de leg. 3.19.44.
28. cf. Scullard, RP 22-3; H. Hill, The Roman Middle 
Class in the Republican Period (Oxford, 1952)(=RMG) 13f; 
Hall, art.cit. 267-271; Rilingar, EWRK 133f.
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magistrates were elected. This involves a more detailed 
explanation of the origin and powers of the leading 
magistrates.
Faced with the embellishments and contradictions of 
ancient accounts of the change from the raonarchial to the 
Republican state, and the constitutional problems that the 
change involves, scholars have varied widely in their 
opinions on the origin of the Republican system of consuls 
being annually elected by the comitia centuriata. While 
many have argued that it only gradually evolved over a 
period of two hundred years or more, the traditional view 
that it resulted from a revolution against Tarquinius 
Superbus, the Etruscan tyrannical king of Rome, is generally 
accepted today (29). It is supported by the Romans' 
traditional hatred of kings (30), and by subsidiary evidence 
that he met his downfall, after carrying out an active 
building programme and aggressive policy abroad (31), in 
approximately $09, the date universally accepted for the
29.For summaries of the alternatives, and defence of the 
traditional view, see De Francisci, PC 672f; Staveley, 
Hist. 1956, 74f; Scullard, HRW4 462-5. The traditional 
view is based on two premises already noted above: the 
basic reliability of the Fasti, and Fraccaro's inter­
pretation of the Servian reforms.
30. Livy 2.1.9, 8.2; Cic. de rep. 2.52.
31. R. Ogilvie, Early Rome and the Etruscans (London, 
1976)(=ERE) 71-8; CL 194-7; Richard, OPR 416-428.
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start of the lists of magistrates (32).
ihe use of fasces and triumphs, which were developed 
by the Etruscans, in the Republic (33), and the appearance 
of Etruscan names among the earliest known consuls indicates 
that the revolution was not against the Etruscans as a 
whole; the appearance of the names of ancient aristocratic 
gentes among the earliest consuls suggests that it was also 
not a popular rebellion against the ruling class. It 
seems most likely that the revolution was led by the 
generals of Tarquinius * army who were as ambitious as their 
king and included both Etruscans and Romans of more ancient 
descent. In the vacuum after Tarquinius was expelled the 
army may then have acclaimed new leaders of the state from 
among them, who became the first Republican consuls. 
Dionysius retains hints of this in his general account of 
events in 509. Such an interpretation of events explains 
how the consulship and the comitia centuriata became
32. The statement of Polybius 3.22 that the treaty with 
Carthage and the dedication of the Capitoline Temple were 
carried out by the first consul in the list of magistrates 
after the expulsion of the Tarquins is credible because:
1) Circumstances in the rest of Italy in the late sixth 
century show that it was a likely time for the fall of 
Etruscan leaders in Rome (Ogilvie, ERE 81-6; Scullard,
HRW4 75-6);
2) The Carthaginians could well have wanted to renew the 
treaty they had with the Etruscans with the new political 
leaders of Rome (see Ch.2 129);
3) The new leaders might have been anxious to gain the 
gods' approval by dedicating the temple that had been 
under construction.
For arguments against the views held by K. Hanell, Das 
Altromische eponyme Amt, (Lund, 194-6) 79f, 179f; Gjerstad, 
OF 44-68; R. Bloch, Origins of Rome (London, 1966) (=-0R) 
92-101 and others, that the kings continued to reign into 
the fifth century, with one or more magistrates acting as 
their subordinates, see Staveley, art.cit. 90-2; De 
Francisci, PC 757f; Ogilvie, CL 477-8; Thomsen, KST 35f, 
232-3; Scullard, HRW^ 463-5.
33. See 41 below on the fasces; see L. Warren,
'Roman triumphs and Etruscan Rings : the changing face of 
the triumph', JRS 1970 49f, on the triumph.
39
fundamental elements of the Republican constitution (34).
The most important duty of the consuls in the early 
years of the Republic, to lead the army, is reflected in 
all their most ancient powers and duties (35) and in their 
original name of praetor (36). With the downfall of the 
Etruscan leader, Rome had to cope with more than one area 
of attack; this explains why two consuls were elected and 
why there were two legions in the early Republican army 
(37). The two consuls had equal power, with the right of 
intercessio over each other except when one of them was 
presiding over the election of their successors; this 
exception was presumably originally established to ensure 
the transfer of command (38). Their equal powers and
34* Bernardi art.cit. 24f, and 'Patrizi e plebei nella 
costituzione della primitiva republica roraana*, in RIL 
1945-6, $f has a similar view of the revolution; however,
he believes that the praetors were already military
officials in the monarchy, which is disputed by Staveley, 
art.cit. 92-4, De Francisci, PC 76lf and Ogilvie, CL 
231-2. For the names of the early magistrates, and a
full explanation of events in 509 see Ch.2 132f.
35- These powers and duties included levying the troops 
(Livy 2.24-7), taking the census (Livy 4-8.3), disposing 
of booty (I. Shatzman, 'The Roman General's Authority 
over Booty', Hist. 1972, 177-205) and moving war and peace 
in the assemblies (see 71 below).
36. Mommsen, RSt 2^  74f.
37. Staveley, art.cit. 80-1 notes that this is an essential 
part of Fraccaro's theory of the centuriate state.
38. The consuls' collegiality (Mommsen, RSt 1^  27f, 2^
81f) is indicated by their monthly alternation of fasces 
(Taylor and Broughton, MAAR 1949, 10-11). Since the 
question of which consul should be president never appears 
as a controversial issue in the Republic, it was presumably 
usually peacefully settled according to the personal 
authority of each, the military circumstances, mutual agree­
ment, or the lot; see Mommsen, RSt 1 41 n.5. For other
theories, cf. Taylor and Broughton, art.cit. 3-14; ’The 
Order of the Consuls' Names in Official Republican Lists', 
Hist. 1968, 166-171; Lippold, C 106f; Rilingar, EWRK 41-
59.
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the annual election of new consuls may have been instituted 
at this stage not only as a precaution against regnum, 
but also to satisfy competition for the leadership of the 
new state among the officers of the army (39).
The development of the comitia centuriata from the 
army's approval of leaders after the revolution is indicated 
by its organisation in army units. The six most prestigious 
equestrian centuries were known as sex suffragia in the 
Republic, and had the prerogative position in the voting 
order of the assembly. They may have remained the 
traditional preserve of the aristocrats; perhaps some of 
the leaders of the revolution had been in their ranks or 
were trying to ensure their support with this mark of 
respect (40). Further indications of the comitia 
centuriata'8 origin are that it met outside the pomerium, 
the sacred boundary of the city, on the Campus Martius, 
the army training ground, and maintained many military 
features (41)•
39. Mommsen, HR 1 313f, RSt 2 82, Staveley, art.cit.
92f, De Francisci, PC 744f, Momigliano, art.cit. in 
Singleton, op.cit. 18-20 and Scullard, HR¥^ 463-4 outline 
the principal arguments against those such as Beloch, RG 
230f, A. Guarino, 'La formazione della republica romana', 
RIDA, 1948 95f, and 'Dal regnum alia respublica', Labeo 
1963, 347f, and F. De Martino, Storia della costituzione 
romana {Naples, 1972) Vol.l ed.2, 234f, who believe that 
there was a period of unequal or single magistrates before 
the collegiate consulship was established.
40. For the view that the sex suffragia were the elite
of the cavalry, see Mommsen, RSt 3^  254» De Sanctis, StR 1 
247-8; H. Hill, 'Equités and Celeres', CP 1938, 283-290; 
RMC 208-211; Alfoldi, FRE 93-101. For arguments against 
the conclusion that they were exclusively patrician, see 
A. Momigliano, 'Procum Patricium', JRS i960 18f, and 
Richard, OPR 486.
41.Liebenam, art.cit. 689-690.
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While the power of the old kings was based on the 
consent of Jupiter and the patres of the senate, the only 
basis of power for the first consuls, except for the lex 
curiata, was the consent of the army to their leadership. 
The use of twelve fasces by the consuls to symbolize their 
imperium, or military and judicial power, may have been 
inherited from the Etruscan federal leader, who used them 
to represent the voluntary investment of power in his hands 
by the twelve Etruscan towns, through the Roman kings, who 
used them to signify their authority over people allied 
with Rome in a military league. The first consuls may 
have used such fasces to indicate that their imperium was 
based on the similar consent of the army centuries to 
their power (42). The lowering of the fasces by one of 
the earliest consuls, Valerius, before the civilian 
population may therefore have been in acknowledgement of 
his lack of legal authority over them (43). In order to 
rectify this, and provide the consuls with civil powers, 
the centuries which gathered to elect the consuls quickly 
came to include not only those serving in the army, which 
was disbanded each winter in any case, but also the rest 
of the citizens, including the fourth and fifth classes 
of centuries, the five centuries of non-combatants, and 
the seniores, who were classified in centuries duplicating 
those of the Servian system. Thus was created the full 
political assembly of one hundred and ninety-three
42. Coli, art.cit. 153f, followed by Staveley, art.cit. 
107-112, contra Mommsen, RSt 1^  22f.
43. Livy 2.7.7; Plut. Popl. 10.5; Cic. de rep. 2.43; 
cf. Ogilvie, CL 251.
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centuries; the numbers of lower and senior centuries 
formed may have been arranged partly so that the assent 
of only the cavalry and the first class centuries was 
required to return magistrates (44). The traditional 
removal of the axes from the magistrates' fasces when 
they entered Rome probably only developed later to 
acknowledge that their military judicial powers were 
subject to provocatio, or appeal, within the city (45). 
Although the dictator was not directly chosen by the 
centuries, he, and in turn the magister equitum whom he 
named, indirectly gained imperium from the centuries 
through the consul who nominated him (46). The 
dictator's twenty-four fasces, and the praetor's six, 
symbolize the extent of their powers in relation to that 
of the consuls, and incidentally, support the view that 
both offices were only created after the consulship had
44. See Last, JRS 1945 44-5; Bernardi, Ath. 1952, 29f; 
Staveley, art.cit. 78, 81f, 109f. For some other views 
see U. Coli, 'Tribu e Centurie dell'antica Republica 
Romana', SDHI 1955, 186-7, followed by Cornelius, ÜFRG 
75-80 and Richard, OPR 383 n.262 (the political assembly 
must have been created after the concilium plebis in 471 
and before the 12 tables); Bernardi, Ath. 1952, 48, 51, 
57 (the military activity of the seniors in the late 
fourth century must have preceded their political 
participation); Guarino, Labeo, 1963, 352-5 (only when 
plebeians were regularly elected, from 366, would the 
full assembly have existed).
45. See Ch.2 126-7 on the development of 
provocatio in the mid fifth century.
46. cf. Mommsen, RSt 2^  150f; Rilingar, EWRK 25-34.
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been established (47).
After the first year of the Republic the validity of 
the consuls' power depended not only on the consent of 
the centuries, or designatio, but also on the voluntary 
transfer of power from their predecessors, creatio.
This term could not be used for dictators, since their 
power was superior to that of the consuls; indeed they 
may have taken their name from the alternative process 
of nomination, dictio (48). It is unlikely that in the 
early years of the Republic the consul presiding over the 
election of his successors allowed the centuries to do 
anything more than vote their agreement to his choice 
of names. The reason for their participation, after all, 
was not that their views should be expressed, but simply 
that they should provide a valid basis for the consuls'
47. For the dictators' powers and fasces, see Mommsen, 
RSt 2^  153f. His fasces symbolized his freedom from
intercessio. For the development of the view that
the dictator developed as an emergency .^ magistrate in 
the early Republic, see Mommsen, RSt 2 I67f, Staveley,
art.cit. 101-7, De Francisci, PC 774-6 and Scullard, 
HRW4 80. Livy 2.21.3 and D.H. $.71-7 suggest that at 
first he was one of the consuls elevated by his 
colleagues; in subsequent emergencies, however, an 
extra person was named for the post. For the powers 
and fasces of the praetor, see Mommsen, RSt 2^  193f; 
Staveley, art.cit. 108-9.
48. F. Tibiletti, 'Evoluzione di Magistrate e Populo 
nello State Romano', St. Ghis. II 1 (1950) 6-21.
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power (49). Comparison may be made here with the tribal 
assemblies which were originally formed to elect plebeian 
magistrates to represent the people and their grievances; 
with this very different basis, the voters in these 
assemblies probably always made a real choice from a list 
of candidates (50).
•Gradually, however, powers of selection were 
developed for the comitia centuriata in order to curb the 
powers of the electoral presidents and improve the chances 
of winning the elections for a greater number of senators. 
The initial change was made as a political compromise 
between a group of patricians, who had monopolised offices 
for many years in the first half of the fifth century 
simply by naming each other as successors, and their 
plebeian opponents. From 444 the procedure in the 
elections of consuls remained the same, but when the senate
49. The undemocratic structure of the assembly, the 
likely voting by acclamation in the earliest period of 
the Republic (Staveley, GRVE 157-8) and the use of 
some of the same terms (e.g. 'rogator') as were used in 
legislative assemblies, where the voters could only give 
a yes or no, also suggest that no choice was given to 
voters in the early electoral centuriate assembly, 
cf. A. Schwegler, Romische Geschichte (Tubingen, 1870) 
(=RG) 2 147-152; Mommsen, RSt 1^  470f. I would accept 
the objections made by Staveley, art.cit. 83-4 to the 
interpretation of provocatio of H. Siber, Romische 
Verfassungsrecht in geschichtliche Entwicklung (Lahr, 
1952) 47f, which is the basis of his taking this view; 
however, I would dispute Staveley's point that plebeian 
magistrates would not have been willingly nominated by 
patricians (see 59f below). Plut. Popl. 11
suggests that Valerius, the consul of 509, introduced 
free candidacy; this might be retrojection, or simple 
invention; see Schwegler, op.cit. 149f and Ch.2 133.
50. See Schwegler op.cit. 147 n.2 and below, 54f, 
for further support for this.
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agreed to it, there was implemented an alternative form of 
election of consular tribunes. These magistrates were 
elected by the centuries, which were presented with a choice 
of candidates greater than the number of places available. 
This method of election had perhaps recently been instituted 
for the quaestors, previously nominated by the consuls, 
because the responsibility they gained in the Twelve Tables 
for dealing with appeals from the consuls' judicial 
decisions required that the consuls' influence over their 
appointment be reduced. The process was similar to the 
method of electing the large colleges of plebeian tribunes, 
whereby places not filled after the electoral process were 
taken by tribunes co-opted by those already elected (51).
51. See 59f below and Ch.1C, 99-100
on the patrician method of maintaining office in the first 
half of the fifth century. See Ch.2 127 on the develop­
ment of the quaestors' election. It is likely that the 
law against the co-option of colleagues by the plebeian 
tribunes was passed, not in 448, as Livy 3.64-5 suggests, 
but in 401, when Livy 5-10-11 notes that plebeian tribunes 
co-opted their colleagues, and a Trebonius was plebeian 
tribune, as in 448. By 401, links between patricians 
and plebeians were close enough (see Ch.3 211-4) 
for Trebonius (whose gens shows no sign of patrician 
connections, being absent from the lists after 383), to 
fear that plebeians within patrician-dominated groups might 
take over the plebeian tribunate elections. In 401, 
client control of these elections may not have been 
effective enough for Trebonius to fear it as an alternative 
means of such plebeians gaining power. Livy may have 
placed the Lex Trebonia in 448 partly because another 
Trebonius was then tribune, and partly because in that 
year two of his colleagues were Tarpeius and Aeternius, 
whom he had noted as consul in 454; Livy believed that all 
consuls were patrician at that time (6.42.9) and that 
all tribunes were plebeian (2.33.1); if he knew the reason 
for Trebonius’ law, and found a Trebonius in the list of 
plebeian tribunes, he might have tried to explain this 
contradiction away with the story of the law being a 
reaction against the co-option of patrician allies.
On the law, see Ogilvie, CL 514 and 648.
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In the case of the consular tribunes, however, those co­
opted to make up the full number of six in such circum­
stances were not given consular power, for it was the 
direct transfer of consular power from one magistrate to 
another within the same clique that the new system was 
designed to avoid. It may have been because of a similar 
precaution that consular tribunes did not at first appoint 
dictators (52).
Because changing circumstances meant that in the early 
years of the experiment those who had supported it did not 
always co-operate in the senate, so that few consular
3
52. See Mommsen, RSt 2 188f for a summary of the consular
tribunes' powers.
This interpretation of the consular tribunate explains:
1) why, according to all the ancients, the institution of 
the consular tribunate was intended to resolve disputes 
between the patricians and plebeians and yet clearly did 
not work (see Livy 4.1-6, 31, 43-5, 6.37; cf. 4.7.2; D.H.
11.53-60; Zon. 7.19); 2) the large number of direct refer­
ences to the free election of consular tribunes (and 
quaestors) after 444 (e.g. D.H. 11.56; Livy 4.6.8f, 7.9, 
25.14, 36.1, 43.5f, 5.12.12); 3) the variation in their 
number; only three, ..four and six are attested for certain 
(see Mommsen, RSt 2^  184 n.2); perhaps this was so they 
could evenly rotate the fasces among them in the twelve 
regular calendar months. The steady increase in the 
number returned may be explained by the increasing ability 
of senators to manipulate the voters and co-operate with 
each other (see Ch.1C lOOf, 117f). In 426, the first
year that four were returned, the consular tribunes first 
named a dictator (Livy 4.31.4f); this may have been because 
their elections were already controlled by a powerful 
senatorial faction. While the military and administrative 
explanations of the consular tribunate (see e.g. Cornelius 
UFRG 59-67 and K. Von Fritz, 'The reorganisation of the 
Roman Government in 366 B.C.', Hist. 1950, 39f) do not 
adequately account for the conflict between the patricians 
and plebeians, other political explanations (see e.g. 
Staveley, JRS 1953, 34-6) do not adequately explain the 
steady increase in the numbers of consular tribunes. 
Schwegler, RG 3 141f has a similar view to the above - 
that in reaction to the patrician domination of office, 
the comitia centuriata was given a choice of candidates 
from 449, for the posts of both consul and consular tribune.
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tribunates were voted, and in the later years methods of 
®Fficiently controlling the voters had been developed, as 
is attested by the increasing numbers of consular tribunes 
returned by the assemblies, the system of the consular 
tribunate was abolished in 367. Henceforth the only 
apparent attempts made to prevent monopoly of office were 
by rules on candidature. At the same time the system of 
allowing the centuries to choose from many candidates was 
extended to the election of consuls and all other magistrates 
because it gave a greater chance of office to any who could 
control the voting in the assembly. This set the pattern 
for the rest of the Republic (53).
Finally, I should note the nature of elections conducted 
by the extraordinary presidents, the interreges and dictators 
Because, unlike the kings, the magistrates did not go through 
the ceremony of inauguratio, the magistrates had to take the 
auspices before every state act (54). I would support the 
view that Republican interreges were introduced after the 
Republic began by the patricians as a means of recreating 
the magistrates' auspicia publica from their own auspicia 
privata, when their transfer from one magistrate to another 
was for some reason impossible. The patricians claimed 
authority to do this on the basis of their gentes' ancient
53. The introduction of choice in all the elections may 
partly explain conflict over methods of electoral control 
in the second part of the fourth century (see Ch.10 110). 
For the view that it was only introduced in the late third 
century, see C. Meier, 'praerogativa centuria', PWRE 
Suppl.8 (Stuttgart, 1956) 586.
54. Coli, SDHI 1951, 81f, 98.
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histories of representation in the regal senate and priest­
hoods (55), Occasions for interreges generally arose when 
the consuls died or their election was decreed invalid, in 
times of religious crisis and when there was such great 
political conflict that the normal elective system might 
not yield acceptable results. In the latter case the 
purpose of the interreges was primarily to make a compromise 
between warring factions. Interreges were chosen by lot 
from among the patricians after all other magistrates had 
resigned. The first interrex could not name consuls; 
possibly his role was simply to establish that the auspices 
were favourable to the whole interregnum. Each subsequent 
interrex, who did name consuls, probably made no personal 
choice, but simply acted as the spokesman of all the 
patricians (56). They acknowledged the need for the assent
55. The link between the patricians' revival of interregna 
and their auspicia (see Coli, 1951 72, 93f) is 
indicated by the fact that many of the references to the 
patrician claim to be the sole repositors of auspicia (for 
objections to it, see Livy 4.63; Botsford, RA lOOf) concern 
the transfer of these auspicia (e.g. Livy 6.41, 7.17.10, 
8.23.16; Cic. de domo 14.38). The institution of interregna 
after the Republic began is indicated by:
1) the likely origin of auspicia publica in the lex curiata
(n.63) ;
2) the fact that the first certain interregnum is in 482 
(Ch.2 133, 150);
3) the fact that interregna declined rather than becoming 
opened up to the plebeians, like other offices dominated 
by the patricians (see 59T below) which 
suggests that they were not an inherent part of the 
Republican state system, but were a specific patrician 
device of political control.
56. The fact that the interrex had no place in the fasti
of magistrates (Staveley, Hist. 1954, 195) or the senatorial 
hierarchy (Willems, SRR 1 67-8), and the continuance of the 
regal practice of rotating the post every five days suggest 
that the interreges acted merely as the spokesmen of the 
whole patriciate.
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of the comitia centuriata for imperium by presenting the 
names to it for approval, but probably never allowed it to 
make a choice(57). After their frequent use in the 
political conflicts in the second half of the fourth 
century, often after the augurs had used their powers to 
cause the consuls' abdications, interregna declined, 
because the patricians no longer formed a united body, nor 
did they fairly represent the political and religious 
leaders of the state. However, they were still
occasionally required in the third century (58).
The superiority of the dictators over the consuls was
principally due to the fact that they were unencumbered by
the intercessio of any colleague; since the consuls were 
also immune from this when presiding over elections, there 
was no legal difference between their powers as electoral 
presidents. However the dictators had much greater 
prestige, since they were single raagistrcxtes, and the post 
was otherwise used for emergency tasks such as the leader­
ship of the army at times of military crisis, the quelling 
of civil disturbances, and special religious functions. 
Hence the dictator's personal recommendation -to the voters 
at the preliminary contiones might have been more effective
57. For the procedure in the interregnum, see Mommsen,
RSt 1^  650f; E. Staveley, 'The Conduct of Elections 
during an Interregnum', Hist. 1954, 193-207. J. Jahn, 
Interregnum und Wahldiktatur (Kallmunz, 1970){=IW) 25f 
suggests that the interrex only named one consul; however, 
this would have been time-consuming and less likely to 
end deadlock; cf. J. Briscoe, rev. Jahn, IW, JRS 1972,
188; Rilingar, EWRK 16-24.
58. After seven interregna from 355 to 320, there were 
only five until 82; see Palmer, ACR 300-1 for a complete 
list of Republican interreges.
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in swaying their choice than that of the regular electoral 
presidents (59). Dictators were named by consuls at the 
decree of the senate, which had an increasing amount of 
influence on their choice as its general authority 
strengthened (60), to hold elections when the consuls still 
remained in office but were unable for some reason, usually 
because they were too far from Rome, to hold them themselves 
This most frequently happened in the second half of the 
fourth century, a time of heavy war. In the third century, 
because the number of curule magistrates had been increased 
and the senate was concerned to prevent curule magistrates 
prolonging distant campaigns, the number of dictators 
declined (61).
Summing up, it is clear that the electoral assemblies 
were an essential part of the Republican electoral system. 
Their competence was limited in the early Republic and 
during interregna by the lack of opportunity to make a 
choice of candidates, but this was not so during most of 
the Republic. At the same time, it should be repeated 
that the system of voting successively in groups meant 
that there was little chance for the individual voter or 
certain groups to make a mark on the result.
59. Staveley, Hist. 1956, 107; Rilingar, EWRK 34f.
60. Mommsen, RSt 2? 148f. 3^  1033 n.2, 1218f; cf. 
Lippold, G 110; Rilingar, EWRK 31f.
61. Lippold, 0 106f; Jahn, IW 32f.
51
(ill) Overriding the Result from the Electoral 
Assemblies
Our conclusions on the ways in which the results 
returned by the electoral assemblies might be overridden 
are particularly tentative, since we cannot expect direct 
evidence of their use in cases when they caused the 
repetition of the whole electoral procedure.
While the assembly vote was essential for a valid 
election, the president may have always retained the legal 
authority to refuse to accept the assembly's decision, 
based on his right of transferring power, or, in the case 
of the interrex, his authority as representative of the 
patricians. However, after the centuriate assembly was 
given the choice of candidates for the purpose of curbing 
his authority, it would have been more difficult for him 
to use this theoretical power without offending the rest 
of the governing class. It was probably only viable 
when he had much personal influence, and the governing 
class was weak and divided (62).
To enable them to take on religious duties after the 
state army had given them imperium in 509, the first consuls 
used their auspicia privata to call the curiae, which 
authorised, with a lex curiata, the use of these auspicia 
on behalf of the whole community. The consuls handed on 
the right to their successors, and the curiae acknowledged 
it with their law. Once the patrician claim to the right
62. cf. Mommsen, RSt 1^  4-72; Staveley, GRVE 14-8 n.266; 
Jahn, IW 50 n.l78; contra Willems, SRR 1 63-6.
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to renew the auspices by the interroges when this chain was 
broken was accepted, the lex curiata became less significant 
(63). By the time censors were introduced in 4.A4-» the 
religious standing of the curiae was declining, as the 
state augurs gained importance (64-), and the comitia 
centuriata was fully established as the main citizen 
assembly; hence the censors' auspicia were approved by an 
equivalent lex centuriata (65). The lex curiata rapidly 
became a formality of little political or even religious 
significance (66).
One of the privileges retained by the patricians 
throughout the Republic was passing the auctoritas patrum 
to validate the curule magistrates' election (67). It is
likely that they established it in the mid 4-80's as part of 
their attempt to monopolise Republican government. The
Q
63. of. Mommsen, RSt 1 609 (the consul took auspicia
privata before he called the curiae); Coli, art.cit. 77f, 
98; (auspicia publica were of Republican origin); Staveley, 
art.cit. 84.-90 (the lex curiata acknowledged auspicia).
For some alternative views of the purpose of the lex 
curiata, see Mommsen, RSt 1^  609-615 (an oath of fealty);
De Sanctis StR 1 354-, 2 60 (to bestow imperium); Tibiletti, 
art.cit. 16f (confirmation was required after creatio); 
Bernardi, Ath. 1952, 31f (patrician authorisation);
A. Magdalain, 'Note sur la loi curiate et les auspices des 
magistrats', RHDFE, I964, 198-203 (a formal investiture).
64.. Szemler, PRR 25-6; De Francisci, PC 772-3; Palmer,
ACR 80-175, esp. 90-5, 121, 150, 2Ô3-1 n.ll, 210.
65. Cic. de leg.agr. 2.11.26.
66. cf. Mommsen, RSt 1^  6l3f; Staveley, art.cit. 88-90;
D. Shackleton Bailey, Cicero Epistulae ad Familiares, 
(Cambridge, 1977) 1 31^^^^
67. Cic. de domo 11.38; D.H. 9.11.3; Livy 6.12.10f.
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phrase auctoritas patrum, used in order to emphasise the 
origin of the practice in their ancestors' role in the 
election of the king as patres, is one example of the 
alternative use of the term patres to signify patricii, 
rather than senators in general, which contributes to 
confusion over the definition of the patriciate (68).
The lex Maenia passed in 338 decreed that auctoritas patrum 
should precede rather than succeed the elections, thus 
validating all candidates rather than simply those elected. 
This made it more difficult for patricians to use auctoritas 
patrum to impede elections, and saved a lot of time when 
they insisted on objecting to a candidate. It was part 
of the general challenge to the use of patrician privileges 
to monopolise offices at that time (69). As a result of 
the reform, and the decline in the patricians' unity and 
their overall importance in the governing class, auctoritas 
patrum was probably only a formality in the elections by 
the third century.
68. For examples of the use of 'patres' to denote 
'patricii', see Willems, SRR, 1 37f. This need not 
imply, as Willems assumes, that the early senate was 
exclusively patrician; whenever 'patres' complemented 
'plebeii' (e.g. in the law of 150 forbidding inter­
marriage between the two sectors: Cic. de rep. 2.63) 
it would have been understood that the term was being 
used with its more specific meaning.
69. For the lex Maenia, see Cic. Brut. 55; of. pro 
Plane. 3.8. For arguments for this date, see Willems, 
SRR, 2 69-73 and Staveley, Hist. 1951, 201, contra
G. Niccolini, I Fasti del Tribuni Della Plebe (Milan,
1931)(=FTP) 77-8, 391-2 and Forni, art.cit. 187f.
For the purpose of the law, see Forni, art.cit. 192 
(it reduced patrician power) and Staveley, GRVE 187-190 
(it saved time), contra Willems, SRR, 2 73-1 (it increased 
the senate's power).
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The augurs were able to halt electoral proceedings - 
or any other act of state - at any stage by announcing 
that the auspices were unfavourable (70). The practice 
in elections noticeably increases after the use of 
auctoritas patrum was curbed in the second half of the 
fourth century. The priesthood was probably still then 
dominated by patricians, some of whom may then have used 
it as an alternative means of obstruction. When augural 
intervention caused certain magistrates to abdicate, this 
resulted in interregna, in which all the patricians chose 
the magistrates. In the third century, since equal 
numbers of patricians and plebeians in the priesthood had 
been ensured by legislation passed in 300, and the unanimous 
consent of the augural college was probably not required 
for one of them to obstruct the election, it remained a 
potential weapon of general political obstruction (71); 
this may be the reason why many of the known augurs of 
the third century were leading political figures (72).
Finally, electoral results could be overridden by 
the veto of the plebeian tribunes, who were originally 
simply the representatives of the people agitating about
70. Mommsen, RSt 1^  104-116, 2^  18-73, 3^  110-111; 
Rilingar, EWRK 96f.
71. See 63-4 for the legislation of 300. New augurs 
were chosen from the amici of the existing augurs (Oic.Fam 
3.10.9), and held office for life (Szemler, PRR 29).
Any single augur could report auspicia oblativa (e.g. 
see Cic. Phil. 2.33.83). For examples of augurs using 
their powers for political reasons, especially after 
338, see Botsford, RA lOOf; Palmer, ACR 252-3. For the 
ethical justification for this, see Cic. Sen. 11;
Szemler, PRR, 36-44, 179-184.
72. Szemler, PRR, 64-100, 179-184.
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economic grievances, but after the formation of the 
patriciate included those within the governing class who 
had been excluded from major offices of state by the 
patrician monopoly and were primarily concerned with 
political grievances. By the Volerian law in 471, regular 
elections by the concilium plebis of these tribunes were 
established (73). The powers of the tribunes were based 
on the sacrosanctitas, or sacred inviolability, that they 
claimed, which was acknowledged in consular law in 449 
(74). These powers included their obstruction of levies 
and their veto of acts in the centuriate assembly, which 
were never in themselves formally recognised. In the 
early Republic, when there was much economic distress, 
they were often acknowledged simply because they were
73. After the first tribunes were elected at the secession 
from levying in 494 (Mommsen, RSt 2^ 272f; Niccolini,
FTP If; A. Momigliano, 'L'origine del tribunate della 
plebe', in Quarto contribute alia storia degli studi 
classici e del monde anbico (Rome, 19^9)(=Quart. G}
294P) others were probably also occasionally elected to 
represent the people, meeting in the tribes in which they 
were levied (see E. Herzog, Uber die Glaubwiirdigkeit der 
aus del* Romischen Republik (Tubingen, 1881) 14f; Ogilvie, 
CL 380f and Richard. OPR 559f contra the ancients' view 
(see Mommsen, RSt 2^  274) that they met in curiae) before 
the Volerian law decreed that a fixed number of tribunes 
(five according to Livy 2.58.1 and D.H. 10.70.2, followed 
by Niccolini, FTP 16-17, and four according to Diod.
11.68.8, followed by Mommsen, RSt 2^  274-7 and Ogilvie,
CL 381-2, 446) would be annually elected in an exclusively 
plebeian assembly (Livy 2.56.9, 2.60.4-5; Mommsen, RSt l3 
487 n.2).
74. On the law of 449, see E. Staveley, 'Tribal legis­
lation before the lex Hortensia', Ath. 1955, II6; Ogilvie, 
CL 494-5, 500-1. The fact that the tribunes required no 
auspices (Livy 6.41.6; D.H. 9.41.2, 10.4.3; Mommsen, RF
1 165-6) may have contributed to the ancient belief that 
the patricians alone had the right to them (see n.55).
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backed by great popular support (75). After the 
political disputes between the patricians and plebeians 
ended, in the middle Republic, tribunician vetoes were 
generally accepted as potential weapons in political 
disputes for all factions, although in practice the size 
of the tribunician colleges meant that it was rarely 
possible for a united group to control the whole college; 
thus one tribune would usually be impeded by his 
colleagues (76). The many examples of the use of the 
veto in the late Republic (77) suggest that it was a well 
established custom, but at the same time suggest that 
some ancient writers might have exaggerated its earlier 
use.
(iv) Rights of -Candidature
We may now turn to consider restrictions on candid­
ature for curule elections by law or custom. It is 
generally agreed that only members of the equestrian or
75. For the tribunes' obstruction of levies by holding 
tribal assemblies, see A. Greenidge, Roman Public Life, 
(London, 1922) 96-7. While there was no direct means 
whereby the curule magistrates could over-ride the 
tribunes, since they had set themselves up in opposition 
to them (Cic. de rep. 2.58; Polyb. 6.12.2) their vetoes 
of interroges, dictators, the comitia curiata and the 
senate (e.g. Livy 4.6.6, 7.7.12-13; D.H. 9.13; Cic. de 
leg.agr. 2.12.30) are likely to have been restrained
by the authority of these institutions (Staveley,
Hist. 1954, 427-8; Hist. 1956 107; Walbank, CP 1 691; 
Ogilvie, CL 599). Similarly, it was necessarily 
accepted that the tribunes represented only the civil­
ians, and could take no action against the consuls in 
their capacity as army generals (D.H. 8.87.6; Livy 
3.20.5-7).
76. e.g. See D.H. 9.1-5, 10, 31; Livy 2.44.1, 4.48,
4.53-7, 6.37f.
77. See Taylor, PPAC 22f.
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senatorial class were able to stand for office (78).
More specifically, there were three possible forms of 
restriction that should be examined; denial of rights 
of candidature to plebeians by patricians, the 
president's rights over candidates, and laws and customs 
concerning frequency and order of office.
Firstly, I should explain my position on the origin 
of patricians and plebeians, a subject on which there 
are widely divergent opinions. I would support the 
view that the patriciate was only formed after the 
beginning of the Republic, probably immediately after 
the attempted coup of Spurius Cassius in 486, and 
comprised a group of powerful aristocrats with long 
family histories of leadership in the regal senate; 
this explains their name, which means 'sons of the 
patres', and the ancient stories that they existed in 
regal times. They formed themselves into an exclusive 
hereditary group, claiming ancestral rights to religious
78. Willems, SRR 1 183-210; Gelzer, RN 3-53.
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and political control of the state (79)* In so doing, 
they did acknowledge the Republican system of magistrates 
and the comitia centuriata, trying to establish their 
authority within it (80). Although the development of
79. For the etymology of 'patricius', see Mommsen, RSt
3 13f. This, together with the patricians’ emphasis on
their heritage has naturally caused confusion about their 
origin among the ancients; see Richard, OPR 79-134 for an 
extensive survey of their views. Richard, OPR 1-78 also 
gives an outline of the development of modern views on the 
subject. There are three basic categories:
1) The patricians were the only full citizens of the 
regal state; see e.g. Mommsen, RF 1 71f, 140f, RSt ]3 9f 
{plebeians were the patricians’ clients, in the curiae 
but not the comitia curiata); Bernardi, Ath. 1952, 28f 
(plebeians were not in the curiae). See Botsford, RA 
25f, Jones, CAH 7 417-420, Last, JRS 1945 30f and 
Scullard, HRW^ 64-5 for objections.
2) The patricians gradually formed from those frequently 
represented in the fifth century magistracies, see A. 
Magdalain, ’Auspicia ad patres redeunt’, in Hommages à
J. Bayet (Brussels, 1964) 427-473. See Thomsen, KST 
28 n.8 for objections.
3) The patricians were the elite of the regal ruling 
class. See Richard, Momigliano and AlfoMi, cited in 
n.5. I would accept this with the proviso that only 
those with authority at the time of the patricians’ 
formation were included.
There are several reasons for dating the formation of the 
patriciate to 486. The names of the magistrates change 
distinctly at that time (see Ch.2 146f).
The ancients make frequent reference to the role of patres 
and patricii in the elections of the late 480’s {Livy 
2.42.7-8, 43.11, 48.If, 56.5; D.H. 8.77.1, 82.4f, 80.3f,
9.1, 14, 42.3f, 10.17). The first likely interrex was 
in 482 (n.55). After the decimation of the senate by 
Superbus and the army revolution, it would have taken some 
time for the patricians to form a united group. Many 
would have been army officers at first trying to gain 
power within the new regime. Possibly only when the 
senate was regularly called by the consuls would they have 
come together, and only after Cassius had attempted his 
coup (Ch.2 146 ) would they have realised the need and
opportunity for their establishing their corporate authority
80. While the revival of interregna and the patrician 
adoption of the calceus inherited from the Alban kings 
(Willems, SRR 1 123-132; Mommsen, RSt 3^  15 n.2) are signs 
of their claims to government on the grounds of inheritance; 
their attempts to control the consulship and the possible
’centuria procum patricium’ (Momigliano, JRS 1966 20f) 
are hints of their concern to work within the Republican 
system.
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the early plebeian state from a popular secession and the 
portrayal of fifth century political struggles in late 
Republican colours suggests that the plebeians comprised 
only the lower clases, they may in fact be defined as all 
the citizens who were not patricians and thus included 
all classes (81).
The ancient writers tell us that until the second half 
of the fourth century the patricians denied curule office 
to plebeians, and this has been accepted by Mommsen and 
many subsequent historians. However I would accept the 
alternative view that plebeians were not actually ineligible 
for office, on the grounds that some of the magistrates 
in this period were plebeian, as will be shown in Chapters 
two and three, and the patricians’ monopoly of office may 
readily be explained simply by their political loyalty.
They could have dominated office when the assembly had no 
choice of candidates simply by agreeing to hand office over 
to each other; when the president of elections had to 
present the comitia with a choice they could have then 
joined forces to manipulate the electorate (82). Their 
plebeian opponents sometimes won office when they were 
able to muster enough popular support to combat this (83); 
for example, three plebeian quaestors probably won office 
in the tribal assembly in 409 because they made direct 
appeal to the people suffering economic distress (84).
81. cf. Jones, CAH 7 417-422; Richard, OPR 26$f.
82. cf. Schwegler, RG 2 147f; Bernardi, RIL 1945-6, 7f,
Ath. 1952, 33-4. Such an informal agreement best explains 
their holding most, but not all, curule offices. For 
their methods of manipulating the electorate, see Ch.10 
lOOf.
83. Staveley, JRS 1953, 35.
84. Scullard. HRW^ 91.
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More frequently, however, plebeians were able to win 
office when some patricians developed greater political 
loyalty to them than to their fellow patricians. The 
consular tribunate system described above was instituted 
in 444» the year after the repeal of the lex conubii, 
which banned marriage between patricians and plebeians, 
and which had been carried just five years before; the 
failure of this law clearly attests to the lack of loyalty 
among the patricians at the time (85). By the second 
half of the fourth century many patricians had more 
political ties with the increasingly powerful plebeians 
than with each other; thus the legislation carried to 
ensure that plebeian candidates would win places would 
have had the approval of some of the patricians (86).
The Licinian-Sextian law in 367 decreed that one consul 
must be plebeian (87), the Genucian law in 342 allowed 
two plebeians to be consuls in one year (88) and the 
Publilean law in 339 decreed that one censor must be 
plebeian (89). The Genucian law was not used until the 
second century because of the continued authority of the 
patricians; even the Licinian-Sextian law, which was not 
permissive, was not consistently obeyed until 342.
85. Last, JRS 1945 31-3 argues that the lex conubii was 
an innovative law, of. Ogilvie, CL 527-8. Livy 4.1-6 
links its repeal with the introduction of consular tribunes
86. For details of the supporters of the Licinian-Sextian 
law, see Ch.3 232-3.
87. Bernardi, RIL 1945-6, 7f.
88. Livy 7.42.2; Zon. 7.25.
89. Livy 8.12.
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I would suggest that the latter was because it had been 
denied auctoritas patrum in a final attempt to retain 
their monopoly of office by those who relied most upon 
their patrician status as a political weapon (90).
Further signs of the weakening of patrician political 
loyalty in this period are that the first known plebeians 
reached the curule aedileship in 364, the dictatorship 
in 356, the censorship in 351 and the praetorship in 336 
(91) ; it appears that no legislation was -necessary to 
open up these posts.
It has been noted that the creation of new magistrates 
- inevitable as the state expanded - tended to be at the 
times when measures were taken against patrician monopoly 
of office (92). In 444 when the consular tribunate was 
instituted, there was also created the post of censor, 
whose duties at that time were largely the drawing up 
of the census and the control of public morals. A 
monopoly was at first retained over this post by patricians, 
again claiming that only they had the religious authority
90. This is suggested by Livy 6.42.9f, 7.6.11.
91. Livy 7.1.6, 7.17.7-9, 22.6f, 8.15.9.
92. Bernardi, art.cit. 18; Staveley, art.cit. 30.
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and right by tradition to carry out such duties (93)•
The post may have been created partly to compensate the 
patricians for the creation of the consular tribunate (94) 
Then in the year of the Licinian-Sextian law one post of 
praetor and two of curule aedile were created (95)• 
Although they may have been partly to compensate for the 
loss of six consular posts with the abolition of the 
consular tribunate, they may also have formed part of a 
compromise with the patricians who had obstructed the 
passage of the auctoritas patrum for the Licinian-Sextian 
law; perhaps such patricians agreed to treat the law as 
binding on the understanding that plebeians would not take 
these new offices. In fact, both sides of the bargain 
rapidly broke down, as we see, on the one hand, from the 
dates of the first plebeian curule aedile and the first 
plebeian praetor noted above, and, on the other, from the 
fact that each of seven consular colleges from 355 to 
343 was held by two patricians. It was presumably in 
the period of protest against the use of patrician 
privileges from 342 to 338 that the Licinian-Sextian law
93. For the creation of the censor, and his powers, see 
J. Suolahti, The Roman Censors (Helsinki, 1963)(-RC) 32f; 
Taylor, VDRR 17-24. The ruling against suffect censors 
may have been partly to emphasise the censors’ religious 
aura; see Mommsen, RSt l3 216, 2^  341; Ogilvie, CL 696-7.
If there was a restriction on the length of the censor’s 
office, it was probably waived when his tasks were in­
complete; see, with reference to the famous case of 
Caecus, Suolahti, RG 26f; Mommsen, RSt 23 348f; A. Carzetti, 
’Appio Claudio Cieco nella storia politica del suo tempo’, 
Ath. 1947 192f; E. Staveley, ’The Political Aims of Appius 
Claudius Caecus’, Hist. 1959» 412.
94. Staveley, JRS 1953, 30; Suolahti, RC 28.
95. Livy 6.42, 7.1; Lyd. Mag. 1.38.
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was acknowledged as binding by all patricians (96).
Finally, the patricians* common religious pride meant 
that they dominated the priesthoods in the early Republic 
(97), but their monopoly over those priesthoods with some 
political power was naturally eventually broken when 
political loyalty developed between patricians and 
plebeians. In 367 it was decreed that half the decem­
viri sacris faciundis, who consulted the Sibylline books 
for advice on state action, and had recently been partic­
ularly active in the aftermath of the siege of Veii and 
the Gallic sack of Rome (98), should be plebeian (99).
In 300, after the obstruction of state procedure by augurs 
had become common practice, the lex Ogulnia decreed that 
half the augurs should be plebeian. In the same law it 
was decreed that half the pontifices should be plebeian (100)
96. For some other interpretations of the two patrician 
colleges, see Miinzer, RAA 30f (in 356 it was agreed that 
plebeians would be elected in alternate years); Scullard, 
HRW^ 479 (the Licinian-Sextian law was only permissive); 
Von Fritz, Hist. 1950, 28-33 (the Licinian-Sextian law 
only applied to 367); Beloch, RG 344-7 (the Licinian- 
Sextian law was passed in 321); Staveley, Hist. 1954» 208- 
211 (the third praetorship in 366 created a loophole in 
the Licinian-Sextian law).
97. Mommsen, RF 1 77f; Richard, OPR 238-247. As with 
the consulship, we cannot assume from the legislation 
reserving priesthoods for them that plebeians were 
absolutely excluded from the major priesthoods.
98. The Sibylline books had been introduced to Rome from 
Greece through Cumae (D.H. 4.62). The decemviri sacris
faciundis later took general charge of many foreign rites 
at Rome; see Szemler, PRR 26-8; J. Gage, Apollon Romaine 
(Paris, 1955)(=AR) 148» 155f.
99. Livy 6.37.12, 42.1» 10.8.1-3.
100. Livy 10.6-9; Mommsen, RF 1 80f.
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This was just four years after the civil law and the fasti 
kept by the pontifices had been published, in an effort 
to reduce the political power that the patricians gained 
by their domination of the pontificate; however their 
traditional legal knowledge, their control of the religious 
calendar and the authority of the pontifex maximus over 
the other priests meant that the pontifices still had 
political power (101). By 219 the patricians retained 
exclusive control only over the priesthoods with little 
political power, the rex sacrorum and the curio maximus 
who simply carried out ancient regal religious practices, 
and the flamines maiores, who were unable to leave Rome 
or enter the senate, and thus were greatly restricted in 
the magistracies (102).
Summing up, the patricians' monopoly of state and 
priestly offices was due not to their restriction of 
candidature', but to their mutual loyalty; accordingly 
this monopoly gradually collapsed with their failure to 
co-operate with each’other.
We may now turn to the question of the rights of the 
president of elections once the practice of allowing the 
assemblies a choice of candidates had been instituted. 
Theoretically, because he still had the duty of presenting
101. Szemler, PRR 22-4, 47-63, 78-9; Taylor, PPAC 78- 
80, 90f; Bickerman, op.cit. 43-7; Frier, LAPM 132-5.
102. See Mommsen, RF 1 78 for the patrician domination
of these priesthoods. The plebeian Marcius was possibly 
accepted as rex sacrorum because he was descended from a 
king; see Palmer, ACR 147. For the lack of political 
power of these priests, see Ogilvie, CL 4C8-9; Coli,
SDHI 1951 77f; Szemler, PRR 34f, 76f, 95f; Scullard,
HRW4 79 n.5.
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the names of candidates to the voters, he could omit or 
add candidates to the list; he could also show his favour 
to particular candidates at the preliminary contio.
However, like his right to refuse the centuries' verdict, 
the president's omission or insertion of names would not 
have been customary; it would probably only have been 
tolerated by the rest of the governing class when the 
latter was weak and divided, and the electoral president 
had particular personal authority, for it restricted the 
voting groups' choice of candidates, which had been 
originally instituted for the very purpose of curbing 
the president's power (103). There seems to have been no 
legal requirement until the late Republic that men make 
professio - that is, register their names sometime before 
the election on the list of candidates presented to the 
assembly at the preliminary contio by the president - in 
order to be elected, although they probably generally did 
so to ensure the assemblies' awareness and the president's 
approval of their candidature (104). There were also no 
legal restrictions on the president himself or his coll­
eague standing for office until laws were passed restricting 
frequency of office in the mid fourth century, but again 
this would not always have been tolerated by the governing 
class under normal conditions, for it ignored one of the
103. For this view, see Staveley, JRS 1953, 73, Jahn, IW 
50 n.l78 and Rilingar, EWRK 105-113 contra Willems, SRR 2 
63f . The electoral president's right to insert names 
could explain cases where individuals not standing for 
office were elected.
104. Mommsen, RSt 1^  501f: A. Astin, 'Professio in the 
Abortive Election of 184 B.C.', Hist. 1962, 252 n.4; 
staveley, GRVE, 1451: Rilingar, EWRK 63-91.
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earliest safeguards of the Republican system - the transfer 
of power (10$).
In 342, in his attempt to broaden opportunities for 
candidates already noted above in relation to patrician 
monopoly, Genucius introduced a law stating that two posts 
could not be held simultaneously and no magistracy could 
be repeated within ten years (IO6). This law became a 
major weapon of the governing class in its drive to curb 
the power of individual magistrates in the late fourth 
and third centuries. However several leaders were able 
to have it waived at times of military crisis, or retained 
military command for more than a year by standing for 
the praetorship the year after their consulships (107).
The law was implemented more effectively once there had 
developed the system of promagistrates, whose appointments 
were closely monitored by the whole senate. In 26$ it 
was decreed that no one could be censor twice because the 
post had become so prestigious by that time; for the same 
reason it became customary for censors to hold the consul­
ship first (108). By 219 magistracies were generally 
held in a certain order; candidates for the praetorship 
were expected to have held the quaestorship and curule 
aedileship; candidates for the consulship were expected
10$. Jahn, IW 96. For some early examples of conflicts 
over the president or his colleagues being elected, see 
Livy 3.21, 35-39, 64, 7.9.4, 24.11-25.2.
106. Livy 7.42; Zon. 7.2$.
107. R. Develin, Patterns in Office-Holding, 366-49 B.C. 
(Brussels, 1979)(=POH) 12, 15-18; Lippold, C lllf.
108. Mommsen, RSt 1^  520 n.2; Suolahti, RC 77f.
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to have held the praetorship; dictators were expected to 
have been consuls. This meant, assuming that they did 
some military service first, that most consuls in the mid 
Republic could reach office in their mid thirties. There 
were no set rules on this until the laws defining the 
cursus honorum were passed in the second century; general 
pressure from the rest of the governing -class fearing 
individual ambition was sufficient to establish it (109).
Altogether, once the assemblies made a choice of 
candidates, there were few formal restrictions on candidacy; 
the system functioned satisfactorily because on the one 
hand it was not in the interests of those with power to 
restrict their numbers or stand for office frequently 
themselves to offend the rest of the governing class, and 
on the other, methods of electoral control, as we shall 
see in part C, were such that only a limited number of 
candidates would have found it worthwhile to stand for 
office.
(v) -Conclusion
Three major themes of significance have emerged in 
the above account of electoral procedure - the lack of 
democracy and the hierarchical structure in the assembly; 
the dependence of the system on a combination of 
rules and customs that were continually developing 
according to the immediate circumstances throughout the 
Republic; the dependence of all those with influence in 
the elections on each others' co-operation. There was
109. Develin, POH 13-30
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always potential conflict between the great theoretical 
power in electoral procedure which remained with the 
presiding magistrate, and the agreement that a choice of 
candidates be given to the voting assembly, both being 
based on their fundamental roles in the foundation of the 
Republic. The electoral president could only fully use 
his power if he had enough personal influence within the 
governing class (110). The steady growth of the 
corporate authority of the governing class despite its 
complete lack of legal power will be further demonstrated-, 
in the rest of Chapter 1.
3) Implementing Policy
The other constitutional question of basic importance 
is the extent to which a curule magistrate could implement 
his views on policy. For most of the Republic the three 
major institutions of the state - the magistracies, 
popular assemblies and senate - played some part in putting 
policies into practice; like the different bodies of 
influence in the elections, the three were closely 
dependent on each other's co-operation and their respective 
powers varied in different periods of the Republic.
However we shall see that current and recent magistrates 
were likely to have exercised decisive influence on policy 
within at least one of them at all times.
Magistrates presented motions to the various assemblies 
of the people, who voted for them successively in groups
110. cf. Munzer, RAA 3; Scullard, RP 19-20; Cassola, GPR 
14f; Rilingar, EWRK 9-10, 132-9, 172.
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as in elections; these were known as leges rogatae (ill).
The reason for the comitia curiata's law has already been 
noted. The others may have developed from the consuls' 
practice of summoning the army centuries in the camp to 
gain support for their military decisions in the earliest 
days of the Republic; they may have then continued this 
practice with the full citizen centuries to ensure that 
they might exercise their civilian powers (112). After 
the institution of regular concilii plebis in 471 the 
co-nsul-s copied its example and often called the citizens 
together for legislation in tribal rather than centuriate 
formation for the sake of efficiency; this was the origin 
of the comitia tributa (113). Laws in all these assemblies 
required the validation of auctoritas patrum (114). The 
concilii plebis passed resolutions known as plébiscita 
which, at first, like all their other acts, had no legal 
validity for the whole state until they were passed by 
curule magistrates in the comitia centuriata or comitia 
tributa (115). With the laws of 449 the validity of
111. Mommsen, RSt 2^  725, 3^  311-2; E. Weiss, 'lex',
PWRE (Stuttgart, 1925) 2315-7; G. Rotondi, Leges Publicae 
Populi Romani (Milan, 1962)'(=LP) 14f.
112. Mommsen, RSt 3^  326f; Botsford, RA 230-4; P. Be 
Francisci, 'Dal 'regnum' a 'res publica", SDHI 1944» l62f
113. Staveley, Ath. 1955, 3f; Ogilvie, CL 381.
114. Presumably this was in reaction to Sp. Cassius' 
programme. For examples see Livy 3.10, 25, 30.5-6;
D.H. 10 15.7, 26.5, 30-I, 41. See also on it Staveley, 
art.cit. 26; Rotondi, LP II4.
115. For the definition of plébiscita, see Gai. 1.3;
Gell. 15.27.4. When Livy (2.56.2-4, 3.18.6) describes 
tribunician vetoes and Dionysius (9.41.4f, 49f, 10.26.5, 
30-I) describes lack of senatus consulta hindering 
plébiscita, they may in fact be misinterpreting the 
refusal of the full citizen assemblies to pass them.
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plébiscita was confirmed on the same conditions as the 
legislation and elections in the other three assemblies - 
that they received auctoritas patrum and were not vetoed 
by plebeian tribunes or priests (116). As the power and 
unity of the patricians declined, the condition of 
auctoritas patrum became onerous; in 339 it was decreed 
that it should precede the vote of the comitia centuriata 
and should be abolished for the comitia tributa. It was 
retained for the concilium plebis, to counterbalance the 
exclusion of the patricians from that assembly, but in 
287 it was abolished for it too (117). it is significant 
that the first two stages of the developments of the 
legislative assemblies coincided with measures to restrict 
the powers of the presidents in elections, reduce the 
patrician dominance of the magistrates and reduce the 
judicial powers of the magistrates; all were part of the 
same general reaction to executive authority and the 
monopoly of power. It should be emphasised however that 
the authority of the magistrates presiding over the legis­
lative assemblies remained great in all periods, for only 
the presidents could decide when the vote was to take place 
and what the motion was. This he decreed in a preliminary 
contio as in an election. The president could also 
summon subsequent contiones to discuss the issues, and 
had the right of granting permission to individuals to 
address the audience and cancel those summoned by his 
inferiors. He was, however, subject to intercessio by
116. Staveley, art.cit. 12f. Scullard, HRW^ 469-470 
summarises alternative interpretations of the law.
117. Staveley, art.cit. 26f.
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his colleagues; this was a particular handicap for the 
plebeian tribunes with their many colleagues (118).
The nature of the laws passed in the different 
assemblies varied. The comitia curiata passed little 
more than the law confirming the magistrates' religious 
powers. It was expected that the army, in centuries 
or tribes, should vote only on military issues (119).
The full comitia centuriata was the chief law making body 
of the state until the development of the comitia tributa; 
then the comitia centuriata came to be reserved for formal 
matters such as the censors' lex centuriata, the removal 
of citizenship and important issues of foreign policy such 
as the ratification of treaties and the declaration of 
peace and war (120). It was probably because of the
118. For outlines of legislative procedure, see Mommsen,
RSt l3 191f; Rotondi, LP 119-147: Hall, Hist. 1964 276f, 
290f; Staveley, GRVE 171-2.
119. Livy 7.16.7-8.
120. For the legislative activity of the comitia centuriata, 
see Mommsen, RSt 33 340-6; Rotondi, LP 57-9; Walbank, CP 1 
687-8; Taylor, VDRR 17f. There is no clear evidence of 
which assembly voted on peace or treaties in the third 
century (see Cassola, GPR 181f); I would suggest that
the comitia tributa took over the task after the reform 
of the comitia centuriata. Votes on war were carried 
either after the fetiales' attempt to gain redress from 
the enemy in the early Republic (Ogilvie, CL 127-9) or as 
provisional measures for legates to take to the enemy once 
they became too distant for the fetiales' procedure (J.
Rich, Declaring War in the Roman Republic in the Period of 
Transmarine Expansion (Brussels, 1976) 60-104; Harris,
WIRR, 166f, 267f). It may have been partly because 
Claudius only took out indirect authorisation for war 
against Carthage, in the form of the comitia's vote for 
alliance with the Mamertini that the senate refused him a 
triumph after he declared war in 264; see Rich, op.cit. 
119-127; Cassola, GPR 185f.
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special nature of such duties that the auctoritas patrum 
was retained as a preliminary to the vote of the comitia 
centuriata after 339 (121). When the concilium plebis 
was still a revolutionary body plebeian tribunes often 
presented it with laws that included both measures against 
political monopolies and measures for the relief of 
economic hardship. The former were the major concern 
of many of the tribunes, while the latter were included 
to persuade the people to pass them and to give them and 
their allies future support (122). Once plébiscita and 
plebeian tribunes were fully incorporated within the 
state, however, the concilium plebis, like the comitia 
tributa, was concerned with all forms of regular legis­
lation (123).
A senate was called by the consuls in the earliest 
days of the Republic to give advice on policy and religious 
matters and arbitrate in disputes, the latter being most 
clearly illustrated by the arrangement whereby the senate 
decided whether consular tribunes should be chosen from 
444 to 367 (124). Senatus consulta were already common
121. Staveley, art.cit. 29.
122. For some examples, see Livy 6.39; D.H. 7.14f,
9.45.14, 10.36f.
123. Rotondi, LP 71f shows the breadth of tribal legislation
124. For some examples of the senate's early role, see 
Livy 2.56.7, 3.21, 4.7f, 6.1.9; D.H. 4.75.4, 9-49, 11.5-21, 
62. Given that (a) the senate had been decimated by 
Superbus, (b) the consuls sought confirmation of their 
auspices from the curiae and (c) the patricians tried to 
monopolise government through the interregna and 
magistracies, the senate cannot have played an original
or basic part in the Republican constitution, despite 
suggestions to the contrary by D.H. 4.80.2, 5.13.2, 9.47, 
confused by the senate's later supremacy.
13
enough by 449 for a decree that they should be kept by 
plebeian aediles in the temple of Ceres to be part of the 
compromise with the plebeian leaders to amalgamate the 
plebeian and curule state (125). Yet they had no legal 
force; they could only be implemented after a magistrate 
converted them into leges rogatae in the assembly (126). 
Their real importance may only have developed in the second 
half of the fourth century, when the senate represented 
the governing class better than the patriciate, and the 
auctoritas patrum was losing force as a validation of leges 
rogatae. It then became required by custom that a lex 
rogata should have first been voted by the senate; this 
became a useful means of curbing the executive power of the 
magistrates (127). For example, when the senate and the 
curule magistrates did not agree over policy, d senatus 
consulta might still be implemented through a plebeian 
tribune as a plébiscita (128). On occasions the authority 
of senatus consulta and the extent of senatorial control 
over the legislative assemblies might have been such as 
to force a magistrate to introduce a senatus consulta to 
the assembly for ratification against his own personal will.
125. Livy 3.55.13.
126. Mommsen, RF 1 264 n.l9; RSt 3 977, 1022f.
127. For the increasing significance of senatus consulta, 
see Greenidge, op.cit. 272f; and E. Meyer, Romischer Staat 
und Staatsgedanke (Zurich, 1961)(2nd edition)(=RSS^) 210f. 
Another reason for the refusal of Claudius' triumph in 264 
might be that the alliance on the basis of which he declared 
war had not been preceded by a senatus consulta; see Polyb. 
1.11; Walbank, CP 1 60-1; T. Frank, Roman Imperialism
(New York, 1929)(=RI) 88-91.
128. For the development of the plebeian tribunes into 
tools of the senate, cf. De Sanctis, StR 2 220f, 4 535f; 
Toynbee, HL 1 326.
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By 232 it was considered revolutionary for the plebeian 
tribune Flaminius to present a law to the assembly that 
was not a' senatus consulta (129).
In the early Republic, the consuls, being first and 
foremost army generals, had complete executive authority 
in the sphere of military and foreign policy, carrying 
out their own strategy in the field; the senate only gave 
general advice, decreed triumphs, suggested provinces of 
command which the consuls arranged between themselves 
either by lot or mutual agreement (130), and sent and 
received envoys (131). However the need for authority 
that lasted more than a year to provide continuity in the 
increasingly complex military and foreign policy, and the 
need for a watchdog over the army generals, who had 
increasing opportunities to develop ambitious policies 
in the field for their personal benefit from the late 
fourth century (132) caused the senate to take a more
129. P. Fraccaro, 'Lex Flaminia de Agro Gallico et Piceno 
Viritiura Dividundo', in Opusc. 2 194?» Z. lavetz, 'The 
Policy of C. Flaminius and the plebiscitum Glaudianum', 
Ath. 1962 336; J. Bleicken, Lex Publica (Berlin, 1975) 
(=LP) 307f. Disputes between the senate and the 
plebeian tribunes were more common after the Gracchan 
period; see Taylor, PPAC 15f; Lintott, VRR 132-174•
13c. When the personal benefits of available commands 
were similar, or consuls were qualified by local knowledge 
or experience for certain commands, the lot may not have 
been taken; see e.g. Livy 4.45.7-8, 6.3C.3» 10.24. 
of. Mommsen, RSt l3 $0f; Ogilvie, CL 395.
131. For the extent of the magistrates' and senate's 
authority over all these affairs in the early Republic, 
cf. Willems, SRR 2 521-6; Mommsen, RSt 3^  1071f; F.
Adcock, The Roman Art of War under the Republic 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1940)(=RAW) 83f; De Francisci, PC 
769f.
132. Adcock, op.cit. 84f; Cassola, GPR 192; Lippold, C 
73f; 121f; Harris, WIRR 27f.
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decisive role in this sphere. From the time of the 
second Samnite war, its influence grew as it more frequently 
advised generals on strategy, acted as a court to foreign 
envoys, appointed embassies, commissions and promagistrates, 
awarded triumphs, controlled the funds of the consuls on 
campaign, and developed a real say in the magistrates’ 
choice of dictators and spheres of military activity (133). 
However, the senate could still do little to prevent a 
consul extending his sphere of activity with his own 
military strategy thereby indirectly influencing future 
foreign policy, nor could it prevent a consul with extensive 
personal authority holding a triumph by his own imperium 
or by the vote of the legislative assembly. From 321 
onwards, there are several examples of conflict over these 
matters between such magistrates and the senate (134).
While executive action by the magistrates was cur­
tailed during the Republic by the senate and assemblies, 
whose combined powers could be used to implement policies 
against the magistrates’ will, in normal circumstances 
the consuls did support the policies voted in the senate
133. The increase in minor magistrates from 367 and the 
curbing of the consuls’ military authority in 342 (see 
Ch.4, 259-261) were early stages in this 
weakening of executive authority. For the senate’s 
increasing authority, cf. Willems, SRR 2 472f, 525f; 
Mommsen, RSt 1^  641f, 2^  675f, 3^  345-6, 1071f; Walbank, 
CP 1 675-696; Adcock, op.cit. 75f, 90.
3
134. Mommsen, RSt 3 1084f notes the consuls’ freedom
from the senate once in their provinces. While the 
senate did not have sole rights over triumphs (Livy 
3.63.8-11, 7.17.9, lO.37.8fy full prestige was gained 
from triumphs to which the senate allocated funds 
(Walbank, CP 1 689). For details of the disputes from 
321 see Ch.4, 277, 288; Ch.5, 318, 331, 337-8; Ch.6,
358, 376-7, 383-5.
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and presented by themselves to the assemblies, because they 
themselves had great influence in the senate. Since the 
senate was only revived in the Republic by the consuls, 
they naturally established a powerful role for themselves 
in both its formation and procedure. In the early 
Republic the senate included not only the patres of gentes 
with traditional places in the senate - patricians and other 
ancient families - but also those who had been curule 
magistrates. The latter became known as the conscripti, 
because they won their position by selection rather than 
inheritance. Thus before they were acknowledged as part 
of state government plebeian tribunes and aediles only 
held places in the senate through -hereditary right (135).
135. Willems, SRR 1 49f, 132-6 argues that curule 
magistrates were included in the senate from 509. 
Momigliano, 'The rise of the plebeians in archaic Rome', 
Riv. Stor. Ital. 1967, 303f and Richard, OPR 479f argue 
that 'patres' and 'conscripti' formed distinct groups 
of the 'inherited' and 'selected' in 509. However, 
Momigliano believes that conscripti comprised all non- 
patrician senators, and Richards believes that they were 
recruited in 509 to make up the number of senators to 
300 after Superbus' decimation. Both base their views 
on Livy 2.1.10-11; Fest. 304L and Plut. Popl. 11.
However these ancients may have confused evidence of 
conscripti first appearing in the senate in 509 with 
the mistaken view that all senators in the monarchy were 
patrician {see n.5), and have derived their idea that 
164 senators were recruited in 509 from a genuine record 
that 136 were left after Superbus' decimation, and their 
erroneous belief that the senate always comprised 300 
from the monarchy. With regard to the latter, {cf. D.H.
3.67.1, 5.13, 7.55.5) a maximum of 300 may only have been 
required once the curule magistrates became more numerous 
(cf. Plut. 0. Gracch. 5.2). Other ancients describing 
the conscripti being recruited during the monarchy (Lyd. 
de Mag. 1.15; Schol. Bob. Cic. 374; Zon. 7.9; Serv. ad 
Aen 1.426) may have done so to accommodate their knowledge 
of plebeians in the regal senate with the tradition that 
the patricii were the regal patres.
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It is unclear how membership of the senate was maintained 
in the first two centuries of the Republic; the consuls 
probably filled vacant places as they arose and ejected 
senators as they pleased (136). Since the number of 
curule magistrates rose in the fourth century, and there 
was an increasing need for the senate's authority over 
the implementation of policy, however, a more organised 
system of recruitment was introduced in the lex Ovinia 
in about 313 (137). According to this law, every five 
years the censor carried out a lectio senatus. He could 
only expel a senator for specified reasons, and had to 
register in the senate 'ex omne ordine optimum quemque'; 
this probably meant that all ranks of magistrates, including 
the plebeian tribunes, who were by this time full members 
of the governing class, were henceforth regularly recruited 
in the senate. Thus the lex Ovinia caused the senate 
to mirror the magisterial governing class more precisely, 
and depleted the consuls' powers over its composition, 
contributing to the general curbing of their executive 
powers evident in other spheres in this period (138).
By 220, it has been estimated that curule magistrates 
comprised one third, and patricians one fifth of the whole
136. Willems, SRR 1 29-34, 109.
137. For this date, see Willems, SRR 1 153-6, 186; 
Rotondi, LP 233-4.
138. Willems, SRR 1 157-171. Thus curule magistrates 
were only registered every five years. A safeguard 
over the censors' new powers was that consuls could 
refuse to accept the lectio senatus; this happened after 
Claudius Gaecus registered the sons of freedmen in the 
senate in 312; see Willems, SRR 1 182f; Garzetti, Ath. 
1947, 202; Staveley, Hist. 1959, 413.
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senate (139)•
The magistrates' powers over senatorial procedure 
were always extensive. Throughout the Republic the 
consuls, praetors, dictators, interroges and magistri 
équités had the right to summon the senate while only 
the praetors and consuls could lay questions before it. 
From the time of the lex Ovinia plebeian tribunes were 
also able to convene it, and lay questions before it 
{140). Throughout the Republic, senators made their 
opinions known orally to the president in a certain order 
as in the oomitia. First came the princeps senatus, 
the man placed at the head of the list of senators by the 
magistrates who carried out the lectio senatus; this 
position was retained by the patricians. He was followed 
by the ex-magistrates in order according to the number 
and nature of offices they had held. Those who had not
i
held curule magistracies, the pedarii, voted last of all; 
they were ordered according to their family and age. The 
opinions of the princeps senatus, consulares and censorii, 
whose position in the senate was boosted in the lex Ovinia, 
on the motion presented by the president had a prerogative 
influence on the other senators. Thus while the curule 
magistrates could have great influence over senatorial 
policy because of their powers of calling the senate and 
presenting motions to it, their influence was very much 
greater if they also had political allies among those who
139* F. Cavaignac, 'Le S^nat de 220', REL 1932 458-468.
140. Mommsen, RSt 1^  209-210, 2^  129-130.
19
had recently held curule posts (I4I).
Summing up, it is clear that by the end of the third 
century the powers of the magistrates to implement policy 
were as great as in the early Republic, but were frequently 
regulated by their dependence on the approval of the senate, 
which, by providing some continuity of government, allowed 
the necessary development of relatively long terra policies 
which was impossible under a system of annual magistrates. 
Under normal circumstances the senate and the magistrates 
were in agreement over policy, which they implemented by 
passing legislation in the assemblies; on the odd occasion 
when the senate and magistrates differed, the assemblies 
were manipulated by one against the other.
4) Conclusion
The emergence of the Republic from a revolution led 
by army generals meant that the constitution was founded 
on the interdependent bases of magistrates and populus.
Then in the early Republic, the patrician attempt to mono-, 
polise government influenced its evolution; most notably, 
it caused the development of the plebeian state's tribal 
system of voting, the creation of various legel obstructions 
and restrictions on elections and legislation, and the 
introduction of the element of choice into the centuriate 
elections. Once the patrician attempt to form an exclusive 
governing class had failed, the need to increase the power
141. cf. D. Monro, 'On the Pedarii in the Roman Senate', 
J. Phil. 1872, 113-8; Willems, SRR 1 137-144; Greenidge 
op.cit. 267f; Scullard, RP 25-6.
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of the governing class over the magistrates with their 
considerable theoretical powers in order to preserve the 
stability of the system was satisfied not by modifications 
of the constitution, but by the natural increase in the 
power of the senate, as the numbers of former magistrates 
within it increased, the development of unofficial but 
effective restrictions on the electoral presidents, and 
the foundation of a cursus honorum.
C: The Social and Political Relationships of Voters and 
Candidates
We may now consider the composition of the ruling 
-class, the formation of parties within it and the relation­
ship of its members with the voters. This will enable us 
to evaluate fully how and why senators controlled elections 
and implemented policy.
1) Factions within the Ruling Class
We have already noted that the patricians' attempt 
to restrict the governing class to an exclusive oligarchic 
sect by only handing over magistracies to each other failed 
when individual patricians developed common economic and 
political interests and family ties with plebeians.
Some of these plebeians were from ancient Roman gentes 
whose members had taken part in developing the alternative 
plebeian state system and might have been in the background 
of the senate for generations. Some of them, and many 
other plebeians who reached curule office from the fourth 
century, seem to have had family associations with areas 
outside Rome where patrician families, expanding from their
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main gentes, were developing interests, largely through the 
military activity of their members (l). The plebeians 
with links in these areas may be divided into two main 
categories. Many of those whose names are unknown before 
the fourth century would have belonged to families from 
towns beyond Rome which had been incorporated in the Roman 
federation (2). Several, for example, are attested to be 
from Tusculum, the first Latin town to be enfranchised, in 
380 (3)• Their ties with Roman leaders might have been of 
ancient origin, since from regal times the ruling families 
of central Italy had been intermarrying to form a sort of 
international aristocracy (4), or they might only have 
developed as a result of Rome's conquest of their states. 
Those plebeians with provincial associations whose names 
appear in the lists of plebeian tribunes in the fifth century 
may often have belonged to gentes which spread out when
1. Of course senators had to live in Rome to exercise 
their duties; see Willems, SRR 1 178.
2. cf. Münzer, RAA 46f; Heurgon, CP .260f, 284f; 
Toynbee, HL 1 337-34C. Families in a gens such as the 
Annii, represented by a leader of the Latin revolt in 
340 (Livy 8.3-6) who was possibly a freedman by 3C4 
(n.92), and by Roman senators in 3C7 {Willems, SRR 1 
26$ n.l) and 218 (Livy 21.25.4) might have entered the 
Roman governing class by different routes.
3. Taylor, VDRR 290f; Toynbee, HL 1 324-5.
4. Livy 1.24; D.H. 6.1.1-3, 18-21,7.2, 11.2.2;
Münzer, RAA 46f; Gantz, Hist. 1975 539-554; Richard,
OPR 273-4, 282-4. Gentes immigrating to Rome retained 
ties with their places of origin; e.g. in 450, Claudius 
retired to Regillum, his town of origin (D.H. 11.15.4, 
22.4f).
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Rome was a thriving city in the prosperous days of the 
Etruscan trading empire, or divided up to seek better 
fortunes in Latium, Campania and Etruria, when economic 
decline set in at Rome with the fall of this empire.
Those who reached curule office in the fourth century 
might either have been newly enfranchised members of the 
emigrant branches who gained influence at Rome through 
their kinsmen, or members of the branches which remained 
at Rome who rose to power because the areas where their 
kinsmen had. settled were becoming involved with Rome and 
they had interests and influence in them.
The general expansion of the governing class to 
include all these different types of plebeians is indicated 
by the increase in the numbers of novi homines, as the 
first members of their gentes to reach curule office 
were known (5), in the fasti in the hundred years beginning 
in the mid fourth century. Several established their 
gentes as leading members of the ruling class and forced 
minor patrician gentes into decline. But many enjoyed 
success for only a few generations, for once the minimal 
number of new gentes necessary to consolidate the authority 
of a balanced ruling class had been included by the mid 
third century, it was in the interests of all its members 
to maintain its exclusive nature (6). By the end of the
5. Cic. de off. 1.39» 138; Earn. 3.18.1. For a recent 
discussion of the precise definition see P. Brunt,
’Nobilitas and Novitas*, JRS 1982, If.
6. Scullard, RP 9-12; Cassola, GPR 89f; Toynbee, HL 
1 325-6, 344-9; Brunt, art.cit. 15-17.
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third century most of the novi homines reaching the 
consulship only did so because of their particular talent 
or knowledge (7). This closing of the ranks of the 
governing class contributed to the development of loyalty 
to its interests, the basis for the increasing authority 
of the senate and the restriction of magisterial power 
noted above.
Some historians have entirely discarded the view that 
senators within such a governing class ever divided into 
effective opposing political groups; others have acknowledged 
the possibility, but assumed that evidence is not sufficient 
to allow a worthwhile study of them (8). Admittedly, 
there is little direct evidence of them in this period, 
and the few references that our sources do make to them 
are of dubious value, since they may well be portraying 
them in late Republican terms, whose meaning even for that 
period is not clear (9)- Hence we must assess the 
probability of the existence of factions by considering 
the more indirect evidence of the likely aims and interests 
of the magistrates. Here there are two main schools of 
thought. Münzer believed that senators joined together
7. Sail. Jug. 63.6-7, Cat. 23.6; Cic. in Cat. 1.18, 
Verr. 2.3.7.
8. cf. Henderson, JRS 1952, 114-6; A. Bernardi, rev. 
Scullard, RP, Riv. St. Ital. 1953» 105-111» C. Meier, 
Res Publica Amissa 2nd ed. (Wiesbaden, 1980) xxxiif,
7f, 174f, 182f; T. Carney, 'Prosopography: Payoffs and 
Pitfalls', Phoenix, 1973» l64f.
9. Taylor, PPAC 6-24; Scullard, BICS 1955» 15f;
P. Brunt, 'Amicitia in the late Roman Republic', POPS 
1965, 1-20; R. Seagar, 'Factio: some observations',
JRS 1972, 53-8. A. Sherwin-White, 'Violence in Roman 
Politics', JRS 1956, 1-9» and Meier, op.cit. xxxiif 
warn against similar anachronisms by modern historians,
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in factions purely to win the elections, while Scullard 
believed their aim was to promote their policies; both 
believed that individuals had long term commitments to their 
factions which were based on their family allegiances (10).
There is clear evidence of the role in political life 
of the loyalties and traditions maintained by the gentes, 
or clans, and the familiae into which they divided through­
out the Republic. The paterfamilias (11) retained certain 
judicial powers over his family even after the development 
of similar functions by state officials (12). The 
religious bonds of gentes, which had their own rites, places 
of worship, household gods and burial grounds from primitive 
times (13)» are reflected in Republican political life in 
the associations of certain gentes or familiae with particular 
gods and their members' inheritance of certain priesthoods 
and religious duties (14). The inheritance of gloria
10. cf. Münzer, RAA 133f» 427f and Scullard, RP, If, 
art.cit. 17f.
11. A pater gentis doubtless existed (Scullard, RP, 8-9; 
Richard, OPR 153-4) but the paterfamilias had direct legal 
authority.
12. The Twelve Tables recognised his judicial authority; 
cf. Willems, SRR 1 265; Mommsen, RSt 3^  22f; A. Watson, 
Rome of the Twelve Tables (Princeton, 1975)(=RTT) 40f.
13. See P. Fraccaro, 'La Tribus Veturia e i Veturi 
Sabini', in Opusc. 2 If; A. Jones, OAH 7 417; Cornelius, 
UFRG 120; Ogilvie, CL 250; Watson, RTT 67.
14. Livy 2.42.5 and 10.6.7 notes sons dedicating their 
fathers' temples. On inheritance of public and private 
cults, cf. Mommsen, RSt 3^  19; G. Wissowa, Religion und 
Kultus der Romer (Munich, 1912) 2nd ed. (=RKR^) 398f;
J. Bayet, Les Origines de L'Hercule Romain (Paris, 1926) 
(=Hercule) 248f. Hence the Romans readily adopted the 
Greek idea of gentes being descended from gods; see 
Wissowa, RKr2 32f; Pais ALRH 169; Cornelius, UFRC 106 n.57.
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gained from military service, which was such a major part 
of a political career, was clearly important to the lead­
ing families (15). Wealth, which was an essential 
requirement for political success, was inherited within 
the family and gens mainly in the form of landed estates 
but also, especially by the third century, in commercial 
and industrial enterprises (16). When they inherited 
property from their families, individuals also inherited 
clients and the same tribal registration, both of which 
will be shown below to be important for political control. 
Finally, the facts that senators held ancestral magistrates
15. .Harris, WIRR 10-41.
16. For the importance of agriculture throughout this 
period, see T. Frank, An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome 
(Baltimore, 1933) 1 1-108; Cassola, GPR 25f, 89f;
Richard, OPR 372-3. Whether or not there was ever a 
system of joint landholding by gentes, (suggested by 
Mommsen, RSt 3^  22-9, followed by Last, CAR 7 468f, 478-9; 
for objections see Jones, CAH 7 4l6f), there are a few 
hints that whole gentes were still centred on agricultural 
estates in the early Republic, as in the original village 
communities of the curiae. 1) Not just the primitive 
Cpagi* and 'prata', but also ten of the rural tribes 
formed in the later monarchy and the Claudia tribe, 
founded in 5C5, took the names of gentes of Republican 
magistrates, the Claudii being attested as settling in one 
area; see Ogilvie, CL 148, 226, 442 and Taylor, VDRR 5-6, 
29-30, 35-45, 283, deducing the position of tribes from 
evidence of gentes' burial sites, legends, etc. 2) The 
Twelve Tables note the gentes' right of inheritance of 
property of intestate members (Cai. Instit. 3.17; Watson, 
RTT 67f, 183-4). 3) Stories of modest farming plots of
the early Republican leaders (Livy 3.26.8) and the low 
first class census qualification (Frank, ES, 1 22-3) are 
more explicable if such farms formed part of a larger unit 
with those of their kinsmen. Of course leading gentes 
maintained town residences too (Livy 2.7.5-12, 41.11) and 
their country estates would have become less significant 
as the state expanded and the number of families in each 
gens increased.
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within their gentes in great honour throughout the 
Republic (17), patricians retained great pride in their 
status throughout the Republic (18), many fathers, sons 
and brothers can be detected in the lists of magistrates 
(19) and certain families or gentes dominated certain 
offices over centuries (20) all indicate the importance 
of gentile or family traditions of political participation 
(21).
Since family tradition was such an important part of 
political life, kinsmanship, both direct and by inter­
marriage and adoption, and family friendships, became the 
structural basis of the governing class, on which was built 
the corporate loyalty and authority of the senators. As 
we have noted, intermarriage and family friendship with 
existing members allowed new gentes to enter the ruling 
class; at the same time, senators’ concern to link their 
families with those with prestigious traditions of 
political participation helped to preserve its exclusive 
nature. By the middle Republic, most senators could 
probably trace indirect family links with each other; at 
the same time, rival family cliques, whose members had 
particularly strong traditional and contemporary ties.
17. Livy 6.20.14, 8.32.15; Cic. de dorao 13.35; Gelzer,
RN 27f; Münzer, RAA 156f; Brunt, art.cit. If.
18. Mommsen, RF 1 69f; Taylor, PPAC 26-7; Cassola, GPR 9f.
19. Beloch, RG 52-61; Develin, POH 55-7.
20. e.g. Seven Valerii were interreges from 462 to 320;
seven Papirii were censors from 443 to 272.
21. cf. Polyb. 2.30.3; Cic. de off. I.II6.
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would have been continually forming within the loose 
structure. Noting the repeated juxtaposition of the 
names of certain gentes and families in the lists of 
magistrates, and odd pieces of information in the ancient 
histories about intermarriage and adoption, Munzer came 
to believe that senators worked together for electoral 
success solely on the basis of such family ties (22).
However it is not credible that family loyalty alone 
would have dictated the composition and purpose of political 
factions within the governing class. Leading senators 
must usually have had views on current political issues 
and wanted to implement them. These views might well have 
prompted them to rebel against their relations and family 
friends, and join other political circles (23). For 
example, if a senator had personal ambitions to gain 
military glory, new ideas on strategy, or interest in a 
new sphere of influence which he had conquered, he might 
have supported the promotion of a war which members of his 
family group opposed. Certainly such fluctuations within 
family circles are attested in the last century of the 
Republic (24). It would seem to be a reasonable assumption
22. Munzer, RAA 6-7; cf. Scullard, RP 1-3, 30; Taylor,
PPAC 33-5; Toynbee, HL 1 332f. Of course, the more 
exclusive the governing class and the larger the gentes, 
the less the significance of sparse evidence of individual 
marriages etc.
23. This point is made by M. Gelzer, rev. Scullard, RP, 
Hist. 1950, 636f, H. Last, rev. Taylor, PPAC, Gnomon,
1950 361-2, Yavetz, Ath. 1962, 329f and Harris, WIRR 34.
24. See Syme, RR 62f; E. Gruen, The Last -Generation of 
the Roman Republic (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1974) 47f;
J. Briscoe, ’Supporters and Opponents of Tiberius Gracchus’, 
JRS 1974, 125-135; Meier, op.cit. xxxii, xxxixf.
that family associates co-operated politically only if they 
agreed on matters of policy of immediate concern to them.
In fact there are several reasons for believing that 
there was generally little conflict between family loyalty 
and political opinions in the early and middle Republic 
(25). Common concerns - such as those of families with 
neighbouring estates to defend their region against hostile 
intruders - would often have been the basis of friendship 
between two families (26). Senators' views on policies, 
especially those of a long term nature, such as patrician 
monopoly of government, or military expansion into a 
certain region, were usually dictated by their concern to 
increase military glory, religious authority, economic 
interests and political power, which, as we have seen, 
were firmly based in the family. Even families from one 
gens with interests in different spheres of influence in 
Italy and'no immediate ties of kinship might retain 
political loyalty because of common interests in broad 
issues such as the development of commerce, which might 
have caueed them all to branch out originally from their 
central gens (27). Finally, if a member of a gens or 
family was indifferent to the immediate issues at hand, 
he might revert to supporting his kinsmen's views on them
25. cf. Scullard, RP 6; Rilingar, EWRK 5.
26. Cornelius, UFRG 119» suggests this for the Fabii and 
Gornelii in the fifth century.
27. A likely example is the Claudii, who, in the third 
century, had personal connections in Corsica, Campania, 
Tarentum, Etruria and Sicily, all trading areas (E. Rawson, 
'The Eastern Clientelae of Clodius and the Claudii', Hist. 
1973» 219f and 'More on the Clientelae of the Patrician 
Claudii', Hist. 1977 340f).
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for the sake of family loyalty; this may have been partly 
the reason that a few large patrician gentes with many 
families, such as the Gornelii, built up much power by 
the middle Republic (28).
An important corollary of this is that we may often 
draw conclusions about a senator’s political views from 
his family background. The location of family spheres of 
interest - their towns of origin, their landed estates, 
or the areas where they had commercial connections - which 
may be suggested by hints of registration in particular 
tribes, cognomina, the location of family or gens burial 
grounds, and the activities of other members of the family, 
may often provide clues about an individual’s attitudes.
In particular, if members of one gens or family fight in 
a certain area over several generations, this is likely 
to be because they inherited personal connections there, 
which they could use to further Rome’s interests and their 
own influence in the area.
If we assume that factions only existed as long as 
there was harmony, or at least indifference, within them 
over political issues of immediate concern, their 
composition would have been liable to much fluctuation, 
especially in the middle Republic, when family ties were 
more complex than earlier, and political issues and views 
were constantly changing with the circumstances (29).
28. e.g. Livy 35.10 notes the whole Cornelian gens 
supporting a candidate in the second century.
29. Scullard, RP 5, 97-8; Taylor, AJP 1952, 302-6; 
Rilingar, EWRK 3.
90
But two factors besides the family basis of political 
loyalty would have contributed to their stability and 
permanence. Firstly, the great dependence of senators 
on each other in elections, which will be fully outlined 
below, suggests that a senator who had given active support 
within a faction for several years might have retained 
political allegiance to its members when he no longer shared 
positive views on matters of policy with them in the hope 
that they would support his candidature. Secondly, the 
dependence of a magistrate on the support of leading 
senators - that is, those who had recently held magistracies ■ 
in implementing his policies would have encouraged the 
operation of stable factions with long terra political aims 
in the magisterial elections.
All we may conclude is that family friends and relations 
with common political views would have formed factions 
within the increasingly exclusive governing class, and that 
the composition, purpose, duration and cohesion of these 
groups would have varied according to circumstances.
Hence when the term 'faction' is used in this study, it 
will signify no more than a group of senators sharing some 
sort of common interest. A clear distinction must be made 
between such factions and, say, a modern British political 
party. The latter may be distinguished by a traditional 
support base and outlook, a nationwide organisation developed 
in response to the constituency system of voting, and party 
manifestos, all of which contribute to party loyalty, which 
generally supersedes individual views on policy. In Rome, 
however, where none of these conditions existed, the only 
analogous long term loyalties of individual politicians
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were to the maintenance of the governing class as a whole 
(30).
2) Clientela and other Relationships based on Fides
Before considering how members of political factions 
might control voting, it is necessary to note the extent 
and nature of the relationships of mutual dependence 
between them, junior senators, and. other voters, which, 
since the time of Gelzer, have been accepted as forming the 
basis of political control throughout the Republic (31).
In such relationships the parties involved provided each 
other with bénéficia according to long term obligations 
bound by fides (32). When such relationships were defined 
as amicitia and hospitium, the parties to them were generally 
of equal standing; under a bond of clientela, however, the 
client was always inferior to his patron, although some­
times he might rise to the status of an amicus (33).
Such relationships originated in the primitive age 
when the family rather than the state was the social, legal 
and political focus of the individual. Clientela described 
the inferior position of those who were attached to other 
households because they had lost their own; hospitium was 
the favour shown to an individual temporarily without a
30. The breakdown of the attempt to form a patrician 
government in the early Republic shows that such loyalties 
only developed gradually; they probably only superseded 
other loyalties when the whole governing class was threatened.
31. Gelzer, RN 62f.
32. A. von Premerstein, 'Clientes', PWRE 4 (Stuttgart,
1901) 23-4, 32-3, 38-40; E. Badian, FC 1-2; Watson, RTT
101-4; Richard, OPR 166-170.
33. Von Premerstein, art.cit. 23, 39-41; Gelzer, RN 65-66; 
Badian, FC 7, 11-13.
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household; amicitia was a bond between two households (34)• 
The increasing importance of the state's authority and 
relative decline of that of the gens with the introduction 
of Servian tribes based on property rather than gens, the 
development of state law and growing economic prosperity 
suggest that clients would have become less dependent and 
less numerous as the Republic wore on. Yet we have seen 
that the gens or family remained a powerful force through­
out the Republic, and it is likely that relationships 
founded on it, such as clientela, also remained an essential 
part of social and political life. Our direct evidence 
of them from the fifth to the third century may be tainted 
by the colours of the late Republic and early empire, but 
they could not have then become such a powerful political 
force without having some basis in the earlier phases of 
the Republic (35). Four basic ways of becoming a client 
are attested in the Republic. Firstly, slaves, who lost 
their households when captured, automatically became clients 
when manumitted (36). Such freedmen retained particularly
34. A. Watson, 'Roman Private Law and the Leges Regiae', 
JRS 1972, lOOf; Riohard, OPR 157-189, 226-230.
The ancients' view that Romulus made each plebeian the 
client of a patrician (Cic. de rep. 2.9.16; D.H. 2.9-11; 
Plut. Rom. 13) developed because they always tended to 
attribute ancient institutions to Romulus, the patricians 
emphasised their gentes' ancient heritage, 'patrician' 
and 'patron' shared the same etymology, and patricians 
did have many plebeian clients from the date of their 
formation (see 99-100 below).
35. cf. D.H. 2.10.4; Plut. Rom. 13.6; Watson, RTT 98f.
36. For the origin of slaves, and their manumission, 
see Watson, RTT 81f and Ch.IB 31 n.ll.
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strong bonds with their patrons throughout the Republic
(37). Secondly, client status was theoretically inherited,
although it tended to die out after a few generations; this 
may have put many individuals in ambiguous positions (38). 
Thirdly, client status was gained by deditio, the handing 
over of body and goods to the discretion of a superior, 
which came to refer largely to the succumbing of an entire 
city or state to conquest by a Roman general, representing 
the Roman state (39). Finally, an individual could 
voluntarily become a client by applicatio, which, by dint 
of its origin, probably created the least onerous
obligations (4"0). Altogether, the extent of the clients'
duties and the duration of their bonds varied widely from 
one individual to another. The duties themselves also 
covered a broad range of activities. Three general 
categories of clients of political significance in the 
early and middle Republic may be outlined.
Firstly there were the ordinary voters in the assembly. 
Although the bonds between soldiers and their generals 
would have been very much looser than they were before the
37. For the client status of freedmen, see Von Premer­
stein, art.cit. 30f, 43f; Steinwenter, 'Libertini', PWRE
13.1 (Stuttgart, 1926) 109-110; Badian, FO 2-4; Cassola, 
GPR 272; Watson, RTT 104-110. Their retention of 
particularly strong bonds with their patrons is indicated 
by their taking of their patron's gens name (Mommsen, RSt 
32 424f) a practice which later lapsed for other clients 
(Von Premerstein, art.cit. 37-8).
3
38. cf. Mommsen, RSt 3 70f; Von Premerstein, art.cit.
35-6; Badian, FC 4; Taylor, PPAC 44f.
39. For its precise definition, cf. Von Premerstein, 
art.cit. 23-4, 26-9, Badian, FC 4-7 and Heurgon, CP 
167-170.
40. Badian, FC 7f argues against the legalistic view 
of 'applicatio' of Mommsen, RSt 33 57-8 and Von Premer­
stein, art.cit. 32-5.
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Servian (41) and after the Marian (42) reforms, they still 
represented a form of clientela, the soldiers exchanging 
their loyal services for shares in booty and the hope of 
promotion in the army ranks (43). In law a patron acted 
as legal advisor and advocate for clients in return for 
financial aid in his own suits (44)» even after the 
publication of legal procedure (45), since an aristocratic 
patron's superior influence and knowledge was necessary 
for a member of the nouveaux riches or a more humble client 
to win his case (46). Dionysius notes many other forms 
of financial aid given to clients which include helping 
to cover the cost of their patrons' magistracies; these 
may only have prevailed in the early Republic (47).
41. Before Servius, clients provided military service 
in the gens; see Von Premerstein, art.cit. 37, 49 and 
Alfdldi, ERL 315-6. References by D.H. 6.47.1, 7.19.2, 
9.15.12 and 10.43.2 to clients following their patrons 
in war in the fifth century may be the result of his use 
of details from Greek histories, his knowledge of Scipio 
taking his clients to war in 134 (App. Hisp. 84) and his 
concern to compare the Roman client system with the serf­
dom of her neighbours {J. Heurgon, 'Les penestes Étrusques 
chez Denys d'Halicarnasse', Latomus, 1959 713-723).
42. Gelzer, RN 117-8, 121; Last, CAH 9 133-7; Taylor,
PPAC 47f.
43. See e.g. Livy 3.29.3, 7.16.3-6, 10.25.1-3.
44. Mommsen, RF 1 374-385; Von Premerstein, art.cit.
39, 41, 47-8; Watson, 102-3.
45. For the publication of dies fasti and the civil
law formulae in 304, see Cic. ad Att. 6.1.8; Livy 9.46.5; 
Pliny NH 33.6.17.
46. Von Premerstein, art.cit. 35, 41 and 47; Gelzer,
RN 63-5, 70-86, 126; Scullard, RP 16-17.
47. D.H. 2.10.1-4; Von Premerstein, art.cit. 40-1, 43,
45. Scullard, RP 16; Watson, RTT IO4.
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Most important of all, the client's duty of voting for his 
patron in the political assemblies is clearly attested by 
Dionysius (48), and by the complexity of the system of
marshalling clients in the late Republic outlined by
Cicero (49), which suggests that it was well established 
in custom. The full political reasons for this, and 
details of how it worked will be given later.
It is likely that most of the rank and file of the 
senate had some sort of relationship of dependence with 
leading senators, marshalling their own clients to support 
them in the assemblies, voting themselves in the upper 
centuries and supporting them within the senate, in return 
for promotion as lesser magistrates and officers in the 
army, which would have resulted for some in their eventually
reaching the status of equal amici of the leading senators
within the political factions noted above (50). For the 
lieutenants and commissioners in the late third and early 
second centuries from families previously known only in the 
early Republic, however, such a role might have become 
established in their families (51). Fear of clients being 
manipulated by their patrons while in power is indicated 
by the ruling that curule magistrates could not be clients 
(52).
48. D.H. 2.10.3.
49. See Taylor, PPAC 42f, 50f.
50. For hints of this, see Livy, 5.8.13, 12.12, 7.26.10, 
10.44; Gelzer, RN 101-9; Scullard, RP 2, 17; cf. A. Lintott, 
'The Traditions of Violence in the Annals of the early 
Roman Republic', Hist. 1970, 24-9.
51. e.g. Titinii, Trebonii, Maenii, Cassii, Antonii, 
Antistii, Cominii, Genucii, Canuleii, Pinarii.
52. Plut. Mar. 5; cf. Ti Gracch. 13.
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A third category of clients which overlaps with the 
first two is that of those living beyond the immediate 
vicinity of Rome. Roman armies were not renowned for 
their siegecraft (53)» and may often have won towns only 
because their generals already had personal connections 
with factions within them or promised them patronage in 
return for their support (54) • Once a provincial area 
was fully under Roman control, Roman leaders patronised 
more of its inhabitants, including citizens from Rome with 
whom they provided conquered land in allotments and colonies 
(55). These relationships were of great mutual benefit.
The Romans gained prestige, political influence and 
economic benefits in the provincial areas ; hospitia and 
amicitia with provincial leaders might often result in 
lucrative marriages, especially in Campania and south Italy, 
where rich land was given as dowries and there were many 
trading opportunities (56). In return, Roman leaders 
could provide public works for their dependants, and speak 
on their behalf in Rome (57). When the provincial area
53. Adcock, RAW 67f.
54. For examples of towns being taken thus, see Livy 
9.16, 24-5, 10.10.1-5; A. Bernardi, 'Rome e Capua nella 
seconda meta del quarto sec. av.c. (2)', Ath. 1943, 26. 
For examples of the subsequent rewards to the enemy, see 
T. Frank, CAH 7 794; Taylor, VDRR 301.
55. D.H. 2.11; Cic. pro Sull. 21.60f; Von Premerstein, 
art.cit. 34; Scullard, RP 17.
56. Livy 4.13.2; Cassola, GPR 71, 122f, 170, 217f,
381f; Toynbee, HL 1 332-6.
57. Von Premerstein, art.cit. 34-5, 40; Gelzer, RN 90f; 
Taylor, PPAC 44-5.
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was enfranchised, or the settlers from Rome retained their 
citizenship, such dependants could provide their Roman 
patrons with valuable political support in the Roman 
assemblies, in return for their own political advancement 
(58). Inherited personal ties with provincial people in 
Italy and beyond became of basic importance in forming 
the political views of Roman senators. Often the military 
defence of their personal associates was the basis of 
Roman attacks on other states; for example, the Samnite 
wars were largely the result of the Romans' defence of their 
Campanian allies; once this happened, the state could be 
said to have taken over the role of patron (59). Thus 
hospitia, amicitia, clientela and the most extreme means 
of attaining the latter, deditio, came to be used as 
diplomatic terms referring to the relationship between Rome 
and other states (60).
To sum up, there was an intricate structure of 
relationships of mutual dependence between the leading 
senators and individuals of all classes and in all spheres 
of political and social life. Within such a system, one 
client might easily have several patrons, and the exchange
58. This is the basis of Münzer's view of the fourth 
century novi homines noted above. Beloch, RG 338-9 
argues that provincial leaders would not have wanted to 
come to Rome, but surely once their states were part of 
Rome, greater political power was to be had there.
59. On Roman leaders developing and inheriting patronage 
of states, see Livy 5.50.3; Mommsen, RF 1 361 n.lO, 651 
n.2, RSt 33 65 n.l; Gelzer, RN 63; Taylor, PPAC 44;
Cassola, GPR 122f, l66f. On the use of such relations 
to maintain peace in the federation, see Harris, Rome in 
Etruria and Umbria (Oxford, 1971)(=REU) 114-144; E. Salmon, 
Samnium and the Samnites (Cambridge, 1967)(=SS) 293.
60. See n.39 above and Badian, FC 55f.
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of favours could approach bribery. It would have been 
largely the identity of the parties involved, and the 
original basis of their bond which dictated the nature of 
the clients' duties, and the extent to which they felt 
obliged to carry them out (61).
3) The Senators' Control of the Assembly Vote
There appear to have been two principal methods of 
electoral control in the final century of the Republic. 
Optimales, wealthy senators concerned to conserve the 
existing system of senatorial authority and their own 
family traditions of political leadership, tried to control 
the elections in the centuriate and tribal assemblies by 
marshalling their own extensive resources of dependants, 
and persuading their amici to marshal theirs, from enough 
tribes as was necessary to win absolute majorities (62). 
Populares, many of whom were novi homines in the late 
second century, but who by the final generation of the 
Republic largely belonged to the senatorial class (63), 
■concentrated on winning the support of the urban dwellers.
61. Gelzer, RN 139; Badian, FC Ilf; Rilingar, EWRK 137.
62. On the optimates' use of personal patronage, see 
Gelzer, RN 54f, 123f, Taylor, PPAC 1-75, VDRR 309-313,
A. Von Premerstein, art.cit. 51-55 and Von Werden und 
Wesen des Prinzipats (Munich, 1937) esp. 15-22, 112, 267f, 
and Syme, RR 12f, 276f, 369f, 404f, the last two arguing 
that Augustus established himself as emperor by these 
means.
63. For the change in the definition of 'populares' cf.
H. Last, CAH 9 137-9; H. Strasburger, 'Optimales', PWRE
18.1 (Stuttgart, 1939) 776f; Taylor, PPAC 12-23, 65;
Ch. Meier, 'Populares', PWRE, Suppl. X (Stuttgart, 1965) 
550f; R. Seagar, 'Cicero and the word Popularis', CQ 1972, 
328-338.
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many of whom retained registration in rural tribes (64) , 
by introducing popular legislation and giving lavish games 
and handouts to the people in the city. The populares 
also used devices such as vetoing the elections as plebeian 
tribunes until the clients marshalled by the optimates had 
returned home (65). Intimidation, violence, soliciting 
of votes and bribery were also methods widely practiced 
by the very late Republic (66). Evidence about similar 
methods in the early and middle Republic from the Sullan 
annalists may be distorted by their familiarity with this 
system, as well as their own political prejudices; we can 
hardly expect all aspects of electoral control used in the 
period when the system was breaking down into civil war 
to have prevailed in earlier, more stable times (67).
The patricians would have had large numbers of clients 
in the early fifth century. Since patrician gentes had 
•been in Rome since earliest times, and were able to re­
establish their political power in the early fifth century, 
when the Etruscan empire was declining, most had large 
landed estates to which many suffering from the slump in
64. cf. H. Last, rev. F. Marsh, History of the Roman 
World, 140-30 B.C. (London, 1935)(=HRW) in AJP, 1937 
468-471, Taylor, PPAC 4-5, 53-62, VDRR I4I, 149 and 
Lintott, VRR 86-8.
65. Taylor, PPAC 1-75 and Meier, art.cit. outline 
'populares' methods.
66. Gelzer, RN 110-123; Taylor, PPAC 18f, 68-75, 167-8; 
Lintott, VRR 74f, 173-4.
67. Taylor, RVA 17, PPAC 15, 61-2 and Scullard, RP 3 
note the distinct features of the late Republic. The 
basic constitutional structure and family traditions of 
patronage and leadership, of course, are likely to be 
well established.
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commerce and industry would have come to join their 
inherited clients (68). All these clients presumably 
supported their patrons in the assembly as part of their 
duties. However, the prestigious family name, religious 
authority, military experience, and connections with the 
wealthy voters, especially the prerogative centuries, of 
the patrician electoral president and his nominees were 
probably of greater significance in the centuries' accept­
ance of the patrician names presented to them before they 
were given a choice of candidates {69).
It would have only been after the plebeian leaders 
won the free choice of consular tribunes by the centuries 
in the hope of preventing monopoly of office, that the 
practice of deliberately marshalling rich amici and clients 
obliged to obey their patrons to vote in the centuries 
gradually developed. Together with the personal authority 
of the patrician candidates and recommendation of the 
president, which are likely to have remained significant 
factors, it could be used against plebeian candidates who 
hoped to win the elections because of the direct appeal 
of their policies to the people, which would have been the 
standard method of control in the plebeian assembly, since 
tribunes were elected to represent the people's grievances 
(70). The harsh measures taken against Sp. Maelius in
68. cf. Beloch, RG 333-6; Meyer, RSS^ 33f; Richard, OPR 
3l6f, 353f, 376f and 426f.
69. cf. Schwegler, RG 3 145; Bernardi, RIL 1945-6, lOf; 
Staveley, Hist. 1956 82-3; Rilingar, E¥RK 138.
70. cf. Staveley, JRS 1953 35-6.
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439 (71) and M'. Manlius in 384 (72) and the passage of a 
law against the whitening of a toga to indicate candidature 
in 432 (73) indicate that Sp. Cassius* attempted coup in 
486 had caused a firm reaction against the use of mass 
popular appeal as an ethical means of winning elections 
among the patricians, whose authority depended essentially 
on traditional personal obligations (74). The effective­
ness of client control is indicated by the continued 
monopoly of office by the patricians and their allies in 
the period of the consular tribunate, when only six per 
cent of consular tribunes belonged to gentes which had not 
already held consular or Decemviral office, and thirty 
three per cent belonged to gentes with the names of rural 
tribes, which, being named after prosperous estates in 
Servius* time, would have retained many clients. Such 
clients, living quite close to the city, could have been 
readily marshalled for the vote; the dependence of many of 
them on their patrons' legal, political or financial 
support would usually have been such as to ensure their 
appearance at the assembly (75). Clients from all classes 
would have been called upon to vote until their patrons
71. Livy 4.14f.
72. Livy 6.20.
73. Livy's account of the election of 444 (4.6.9-12) 
suggests that he was mistaken in representing the law 
of 432 as a tribunician measure directed against the 
patricians (4.25.9-14). Later the practice of whiten­
ing the toga was re-established; see Ogilvie, OL 574-5.
74. cf. Staveley, GRVE 193.
75. Taylor, VDRR 14. In this respect the situation 
was similar to that of the late Republic, when many rural 
tribesmen were living in Rome.
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were sufiiciently well organised and united for all six 
consular tribunes to be returned by the centuries, as they 
were almost every year from 405 « When this happened, 
the bias towards the wealthy centuries in the assembly may 
have contributed to the patricians' success.
By the mid fourth century, the plebeians developing 
common interests with the patricians would have had more 
solid client bases, either being recently enfranchised 
landed aristocrats from outside Rome, or having recovered 
from the economic slump within Rome. Thus the client 
system of controlling the elections would have been 
maintained by the new plebeian-patrician nobility, and used 
to squeeze out the minor patrician families. By this 
time some plebeian leaders could also have begun to use 
their clients and amici in the tribunician elections in 
the plebeian assembly, but only to a limited extent, since 
rich men had less power there, and they still depended on 
popular backing in order to use their vetoes and threaten 
secessions effectively.
The extension of citizenship beyond the area of Rome 
was of basic importance to client control of elections.
In the fifth and early fourth centuries there was some 
enfranchisement of members of neighbouring states and 
settlement of Romans on conquered land near the city to 
satisfy land hunger at Rome (76).After this time it became 
less acceptable to most of the Roman governing class.
76. Frank, ES 1 37f; Toynbee, HL 1 115f, 133f, 189f, 
204-5; E. Salmon, Roman Colonization under the Republic 
(New York, 1970)(=RC) 48f; A. Sherwin-White, The Roman 
Citizenship (Oxford, 1973) 2nd ed. (=RG ) 19-20, 58f, 
195f.
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partly because people conquered from this time on tended 
to have well developed political systems of their own, and 
partly because it did not at first seem feasible that 
citizens who lived at some distance from the city would 
be able to play a full part in the city state's political 
life {77). Thus several alternative methods of incorpor­
ation in the state were devised. Gives sine suffragio 
had -no voting rights and no independent foreign policy, 
but had full trading rights, and could marry Roman citizens, 
their offspring becoming full citizens; this status was 
given, for example, to the Campanians, who lived in well 
established city states (78). Socii, for example the 
southern Greek cities, were fully self governing allies 
with individual treaties with Rome, which usually promised 
military or naval support (79). A special category of 
allied states, including some former members of the Latin 
league and large Latin colonies founded for strategic 
reasons, were those with the ius Latii, whose members 
could obtain citizenship by moving to Rome (80). At the 
same time, the citizenry did expand by other means in the 
late fourth and third centuries. The inhabitants of
77. Fraccaro, Opusc. 2 199f; Frank, CAH 7 661-2; A.
Bernardi, 'Rome e Capua nella seconda meta del quarto sec.
av. A.C. (1)', Ath. 1942 94f; Toynbee, HL 1 105-6, 296f, 
311f; Harris, WIRR 132f.
78. Bernardi, Ath. 1942 86f. Ath. 1943, 21f; Toynbee,
HL 1 204f; Sherwin-White, RC^ 39f, 200f.
79. Adcock, RAW 75f; Toynbee, HL 1 130f, 142f, 258f,
424f; J. Thiel, A History of Roman Seapower before the 
Second Punic War (Amsterdam, 1954)(=HRSP) 27-78; Harris,
REU 85-113; Sherwin-White, RC^ 119f.
80. Fraccaro, Opusc. 2 198-202; E. Salmon, 'Rome and the 
Latins', Phoenix, 1953 93-104, 123-135, and 'Roman Expansion 
and Roman Colonization in Italy', Phoenix, 1955 63-75; 
Toynbee, HL 1 157-161, 249f; Sherwin-White, RC 97f.
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citizen colonies in vulnerable and distant areas of Italy 
were obliged to stay in the colonies because they gave 
their military service to the state in the form of garrison 
duty, and retained their citizenship as compensation, 
although since they could not leave the colonies they were 
effectively disenfranchised (81). Settlements of citizens 
were made at some distance from the city in certain parts 
of Campania, central Italy and Etruria in the late fourth 
century and in north east Italy in the third century, to 
ensure that citizen numbers were maintained after the heavy 
drain on them by Latin colonies and war casualties and 
again to -compensate the settlers for their protection of 
the conquered areas (82). Distant peoples such as the 
Sabines and Picentes in north east Italy in the third 
century were enfranchised partly to maintain citizen 
numbers, and partly because they were primitive tribes 
with no political organisation of their own (83).
Apart from natural concern to maintain the loyalty of 
the city state federation, other political factors influenced 
its development. The economic benefits to individual 
senators of unsettled ager publicus were probably less 
significant in causing objections by the governing class to 
the expansion of the citizenry than the prospect of those 
with clients and amici among the citizens beyond Rome's
81. Toynbee, HL 1 178-189; Salmon, RC 70-81; Harris, 
REU 147-160; Sherwin-White, RC^ 76f.
82. This is fully explained in Ch.5 303-4.
83. T. Frank 'On Rome's Conquest of Picenum, Sabinum 
and Etruria', Klio 1911» 375f, CAH 7 660-1.
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immediate vicinity marshalling them to vote in Rome (84).
The latter practice partly explains the increasing 
significance of the tribal registration of voters in the 
Republic. The comitia tributa, being much more efficiently 
summoned than the comitia centuriata, was becoming the 
place for the election of junior curule magistrates in the 
late fifth and fourth centuries. These elections were 
held at the same time as the centuriate elections. If 
senators were summoning clients and amici from different 
areas to vote in the comitia centuriata, they would 
naturally have tried to ensure that they would also be of 
influence in the tribal assembly (85). This was relatively 
easy to plan, since the senators' clients tended to be 
centred on their tribes (86). It might be objected that 
many of those at a distance from Rome would have had little 
contact with their patrons, who spent most of their time 
as senators in Rome, and therefore would have felt little 
compulsion to fulfil their duties towards them, at 
considerable trouble to themselves. This would have been 
the case particularly for those who merely inherited their 
status, or only held it as ex-soldiers settling on the 
land won by their patrons, and owed allegiance to more than 
one patron. However the patron could have encouraged them
84. cf. Fraccaro, Opusc. 2 197f and Toynbee, HL 1 312f 
(ager publicus was not important); Oassola, GPR 93f, 209f 
(ager publicus was important) and Taylor, VDRR 300f(emphasising 
political benefits).
85. Taylor, VDRR 299.
86. Neighbours would often have been clients of the same 
patron, and in this period tribes were largely geographically 
homogeneous. See 85 n.l6 ; Livy 5.32.8; Mommsen, RSt 3-^ 
194f; Taylor, RVA 68f, VDRR 14-15, 79-100, 305; Staveley,
GRVE 136f, 1961.
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to fulfil their obligations with reminders of his authority, 
gifts, public works, including the building of roads to 
Rome to facilitate the journey to the polls, promises of 
booty, and occasionally, perhaps, the appeal of his policies 
Such attractions could be presented early in the campaigns 
in the local tribes, and later in their headquarters; 
in this process, senators could have taken the opportunity 
to establish further links of mutual obligations with 
fellow tribesmen (87).
The practice of summoning clients and amici in tribal 
formation is attested by several constitutional develop­
ments in the late fourth and third centuries. Firstly, 
the creation of new tribes as the citizenry expanded until 
the total reached thirty-five in 241 may have been not just 
for administrative convenience, but also to facilitate the 
tribal organisation of clients and amici (88). This 
contributed to the political importance of the censor, who 
registered citizens in tribes (89). Secondly, there was
87. For hints of methods of encouragement, see Livy 35-10; 
Garzetti, Ath. 1947, 196f; Taylor, VDRR 14-15. When all 
Italy had the vote, individuals were developing vast personal 
bases of clients and populares practiced demagogy in the 
city, Q. Oicero (Comm. Pet.53) warned his brother against 
advertising his policies in his campaign, so that every man 
would hope for his support. This hardly implies, however, 
that patrons in the more stable period never used political 
views relevant to their clients' local communities to 
encourage them to vote for them.
88. Taylor, VDRR 47-68, 297, 3CO-3. On senators changing 
tribes for political reasons, cf. Taylor, VDRR 280f (they 
tried to dominate specific tribes) and two of her reviewers, 
E. Staveley, CR 1962 74» GRVE 198 (they tried to spread 
their influence into many tribes) and Badian, JRS 1962 209- 
210 (they disliked changing tribes).
89. Taylor, PPAC 52-4, VDRR 297, 305.
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the reform of the comitia centuriata, in which the first 
class centuries were directly related to the tribes; if 
clients and other dependants were already generally marshalled 
in tribes to vote in the comitia centuriata, this would 
simply have formalised the existing prevalence of the 
provincial men in the first class; hence the names of the 
magistrates elected after the reform are no different from 
before (90). Under the new system, the first class tribal 
centuries, especially that chosen as praerogativa, provided 
a lead for their fellow tribesmen, marshalled for the vote, 
but still susceptible to distraction (91). Thirdly,
Livy notes that after a controversial election in the comitia 
tributa in 304, the humilies were registered by the censor 
in four urban tribes. Perhaps these voters were rural 
peasants who had recently migrated to the city to get work 
from those investing the booty won in the second Samnite 
war in building and commerce, but kept their registration 
in rural tribes. If they had voted for the candidate 
whose policy directly appealed to them they could have upset
90. The latter point is noted by De Sanctis, StR 3 1 
346-7 (concluding that the reform did not achieve its 
purpose) and Staveley, AJP 1953 25f (taking it into 
account); cf. Taylor, AJP 1957 348 and VDRR 304 (less 
novi homines after the reform; on this, cf. Staveley, 
art.cit. 32-3, and Oassola, GPR 273f).
91. The sex suffragia provided a secondary prerogative 
function; cf. Staveley, art.cit. 30-2; Rilingar, EWRK 
35f, 139. Simultaneous voting, possibly introduced in 
the reform, would also have helped those marshalling 
voters by reducing the scope for using spare votes
(see n.l02). For a positive reason for the whole reform 
see 114-115 below.
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the control of those marshalling their clients from the 
tribes (92). Freedmen may have been registered in four
92. For the 304 measures, see Livy, 9.46.Ilf, Val.Max.
2.2.9' For hints that a curule aedile Flavius was elected 
by direct appeal in 304, see Livy 9-46.3, 9-10, 13; Gell.
NA 7.9; Pliny, NH 33.6.17-18.
Livy 9.46.10 suggests that the 'forensis factio' that 
elected Flavius had become powerful as a result of Claudius 
Caecus' censorship in 312. Certainly Caecus and his 
successor had facilitated public works which would have 
encouraged humilies to come to Rome (see Ch.4 285, 290). 
However, it is also suggested that Claudius registered 
humilies in the rural tribes (Livy 9-46.11), Claudius gave 
each citizen the right to be enrolled in any tribe (Diod. 
20.36.4-5), Claudius courted popularity by giving freedmen 
suffrage (Plut.Popl. 7-5), and Flavius was Claudius' scribe, 
publishing the civil code, a popular move, at his request 
(Pliny, NH 33-6.17).
These statements may be the result of confusion of 
several facts:
1) The political significance of tribal registration by 
property or domicile was first evident in 3C4;
2) Fabius, the censor of 304, was a political opponent of 
both Claudius and Flavius (see Ch.4 285-8, 294-8);
3) A similar measure was taken in 220 for the freedmen, who 
were the 'forensis turba' in the late Republic (Taylor,
PPAC, 54-5);
4) Flavius was the son of a freedman (Gell. NA 7-9-2;
Diod. 20.36.5; his father having been in the Annii gens, 
cf. Cic. ■ Att. 6.1.8; Pliny NH 33-6.17; Livy 9-46.1; 
Heurgon, CP 276; Frier, LAPM I4I) and Claudius enrolled 
the sons of freedmen in the senate in 312 (Cassola, GPR
102-3).
For other views see Mommsen, HR 1 396, RF 1 305f,
RSt 23 402f (landless were registered in tribes for the 
first time in 312 and restricted to urban tribes in 304; 
for objections see P. Fraccaro,'"Tribules" ed "Aerarii": 
una Richerca di Diritto Publico Romano', Ath. 1933, 150f); 
Beloch, RG 265f, 482f (the change in 304 is retrojected 
from the third century); Garzetti, Ath. 1947, 202f;
Staveley, Hist. 1959 414f, Taylor, VDRR 11, 113-8, 299 
and Cassola, GPR 102-3 (Claudius introduced registration 
by property or domicile, thus distributing humilies, 
largely freedmen, over rural tribes, for political advantage, 
or, for Staveley, to encourage commerce and industry. They 
have to assume that freedmen were re-distributed in rural 
tribes before 220).
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urban tribes in 220 (93) for a similar reason. By 220 
many freedmen would have been skilled Greek craftsmen 
or businessmen originally captured in the southern wars. 
Although such men might have had landed property in the 
rural tribes sufficient to put them in the first class, 
they probably lived largely in the city, as commercial 
agents of their patrons, who could then marshal them to 
vote in the recently reformed comitia centuriata with 
greater ease than those clients living beyond the city 
(94)• A similar measure relegated freedmen to one urban 
tribe in 169, after several attempts to register the sons 
of freedmen and upper class freedmen back in the rural 
tribes (95).
Control of the plebeian tribune elections would have 
been rather different from that of the other assemblies, 
because they were held at a different time of year, and 
it would not have been easy to marshal distant clients 
frequently. Presumably, senators marshalled a few clients 
or tribesmen from the most outlying tribes, and made direct
3
93. Livy Per. 20. For this date, see Mommsen, RSt 3 
436 n.3 and Broughton, MRR 235-6, contra Taylor, VDRR 138 
and Cassola, GPR 272-3.
94. For the increase in wealthy freedmen in the fourth 
and third centuries, cf. Frank, ES 1 37, 67, CAH 7 806; 
Taylor, VDRR 133; Cassola, GPR 104, 272; Harris, WIRR 59f. 
Staveley, AJP 1953, 29 n.86 and Hist. 1959 416 suggests 
that wealthy freedmen, like other rich urban voters, would 
not have remained as clients; however, their ignominious 
social position (Willems, SRR 1 183f) and their patrons' 
need for first class voters would have strengthened their 
bond of mutual dependence.
95. For detailed discussions of these measures, cf. 
Taylor, VDRR 138f; Cassola, GPR 119-120, and Palmer, ACR
74-5.
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appeal to other voters with their policies; the traditions 
of the assembly and the large numbers of tribunician places 
available would have discouraged any measures to develop 
firmer methods of control over it, or to integrate it 
more closely with the other assemblies (96).
The political leaders who learned to marshal voters 
with personal obligations to them from beyond the immediate 
vicinity of Rome naturally maintained the patrician 
opposition to mass popular appeal as a means of gaining 
the vote. In 358 an attempt to prevent canvassing is 
attested, and in 327, a plebeian tribune is recorded as 
winning his elections by bribery (97). Those unable to 
keep up with the marshalling of clients from outside Rome 
as the state expanded would have been using these methods 
in both the provinces and the city to attract the votes 
of those clients most locsely committed to the leading 
senators. Thus it may have been at this stage that leaders 
dependent on client control established that certain 
practices, such as advertising outside the city and 
providing lavish dinners, could be used to attract one's 
own tribesmen and clients, but were not acceptable if used 
to attract those of others (98). The lack of legislation
96. Marsh, HR¥ 21 and 372 notes that the majority of 
tribes were within ten miles of Rome; Hall, Hist. 196-4 
299 and Staveley, GRVE 180 show that distorted results 
were more likely in tribunician elections.
97. Livy 7.15.12-13, 8.22.2-4.
98. The law of 358 would probably only have been used 
against those canvassing the clients and tribules of 
others - e.g. in 314» see n.lll below and Ch.4 283-4* 
cf. Gelzer, RN 54f; Taylor, PPAC 63f, VDRR 13; Forni, 
Ath. 1953 229-230; Staveley, GRVE 202-3.
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on electoral abuse in the third century suggests that the 
principles laid down at this time were generally obeyed; 
not until 181 were there any more laws on bribery (99) and 
not until 139 was it necessary to introduce a secret ballot 
(100). Acceptable methods of attracting spare votes must 
have also been established in the late fourth century.
Of course as the system of marshalling clients and other 
dependants outlined above became established, few entirely 
uncommitted voters of influence would have come to the 
comitia centuriata; when a patron brought a client into 
Rome to vote, the patron would naturally have tried to 
ensure that the client used his votes for as many candidates 
as the patron favoured, the votes being transferred from 
one to another as they were returned (101). But spare 
votes might still have become available in the course of 
the elections, as candidates were returned, and some 
clients and tribesmen might have come to the city with only 
some of their votes committed to their patrons, especially 
in the middle Republic, when many magistrates were being 
elected. Then a reputation for being generous with booty, 
games and public works, a prestigious name, the personal 
recommendation of the president, the vote of the pre­
rogative centuries or principium, and perhaps, occasionally,
99. For second century bribery laws see Scullard, R-P 
23-5, 172-3, 224, 266.
100. Cic. de leg. 3-33-39; for comments, see J. Larsen,
'The Judgement of Antiquity on Democracy', CP 1954 lOf, 
and Staveley, GRVE 172-3, 187f.
101. Livy 39.41.4 and Cic. Att. 1.2 note canvassing on 
behalf of more than one candidate; Cic. in Ascon. in 
Cornel. 85 describes his supporters' vote being transferred 
to Antonius after he was returned.
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the announcement of proposed policies at contiones summoned 
by friendly magistrates might all have been useful to win 
these o-dd votes, as well as to ensure the loyalty of 
marshalled clients (102).
It should be stressed that in the middle Republic 
populares as such would have had little success in the 
face of competition from all the rich provincial clients 
and amici gathered from outside Rome, whose influence was 
protected by the fourth century laws against ambitus and 
intimidation of clients, and the re-registration of rural 
tribesmen when their numbers built up in the city (103).
It was only in the second century that enough rural 
tribesmen without client obligations built up in Rome for 
them to be no longer re-registered in urban tribes, and 
populares' methods to develop. It was largely because 
of this increase in uncommitted voters that second century 
legislation concerning the registration of voters and 
electoral abuses was passed, and the votes of the 
prerogative centuries gained the influence attributed to
102. For hints of these devices, see Livy 9*40.16,
10.21.13”l6, 24»7”9» 26.22, 27*6.3» 35*10; Cic. Sest.
109, de leg. 3*4-0; Scullard, RP 18, 23-4, Festivals 
and Ceremonies in the Roman Republic (London, 1981)
<=FCRR9 40f, lb4f, 184f; Staveley, GRVE 199-200.
103. The suggestion that novi homines in this period 
formed a democratic opposition, winning office by direct 
appeal to the voters (cf. Beloch, RG 476f; Frank, CAH 7 
S06f; A. Passerini, 'Sulle Trattative dei Romani con Pirro', 
Ath. 1943, 92f; Forni, Ath. 1953, 170f; Cassola, GPR 94, 
155f, 218f) is belied not only by the system of marshall­
ing voters, but also by evidence of their many links with 
other members of the governing class, noted in Ch.3-6.
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them by Cicero (104).
In the early Republic, laws were voted in the plebeian 
assembly, which had been instituted as a forum for the 
people's grievances, according to their direct appeal to 
the voters (105), while in the comitia centuriata the 
authority that they used in elections presumably allowed 
the patricians to carry measures. As the practice of 
summoning clients developed in elections, the same would 
have happened for legislation. It was particularly 
effective for the latter, insofar as the passage of laws, 
unlike elections, could take place at all times of the year; 
legislators could introduce them at a time when it suited 
them to marshal their clients, confident of little 
competition from their opponents, who could not summon 
clients from afar for every vote. Thus the legislator 
required only a few rich men to carry a bill in the comitia 
centuriata and a few clients of any class from a majority 
of the tribes to carry a bill in the comitia tributa and 
plebeian assembly (106).
104. After the measure of 304» urban registration was 
presumably accepted by other rich urban dwellers, since
it did not affect their influence in the comitia centuriata 
until after its' reform. The increase in wealth and invest­
ment in land after the second Punic War and a law in 150 
restricting legislation at the time of election suggest an 
increase in rural tribesmen of all classes in Rome in the 
second century; cf. Marsh, HRW 30-1, 372f; Last, AJP 1937 
468f; Scullard, RP 22-4; Staveley, AJP 1953, 24f, GRVE 200f. 
For the significance of the prerogative vote in the late 
Republic, see Taylor, PPAC 56-7.
105. See Ch.IB 72; Livy 4.49.Ilf» 5.12.3,
5.24.4f.
106. Naturally the extent to which clients were summoned 
varied according to the significance of the legislation; 
e.g. compare Livy 10.9*2 and Cic. Sest. 109.
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Since in most of this period few of the urban dwellers 
would have been registered in rural tribes, the passage 
of a law in the tribal assembly would have depended, to a 
certain extent, on the marshalling of such voters from 
outside Rome, and the direct appeal of the law to voters 
close to the city would only have been of limited effect. 
This was not always the case, however, for legislation 
in the comitia centuriata. By the third century, there 
were probably enough wealthy businessmen in Rome for 
senators to win certain types of legislation through the 
comitia centuriata by directly appealing to them rather 
than marshalling their clients. Thus several of the laws 
by which wars or alliances likely to be of commercial 
benefit were instituted in the third century may have been 
voted in the comitia centuriata because they directly 
appealed to these urban voters (107). In the reform 
of the comitia centuriata in 230, however, the co­
ordination of the centuries with the tribes, which simply 
formalised the pattern of electoral control, reduced the 
power of those with commercial interests to vote for 
expansionist policies and forced the president of the 
comitia centuriata to marshal clients to control the vote 
on such legislation. I would suggest that this was a major 
aim of the reform. A similar motive may have partly 
dictated the registration of freedmen in the four urban 
tribes in 220. The ease with which those living in the 
city but registered in rural tribes could be summoned by
107. For hints of an increase in rich urban voters, and 
legislators making direct appeal to them in the third 
century, see Frank, ES 1 55f» Staveley, GRVE 139» 148-9»
Cassola, GPR $0f; Taylor, RVA l6f, 57.
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their patrons gave the latter a great advantage in the 
legislation of the comitia centuriata after its reform.
Such patrons are likely to have shared their clients' 
interests in commercial development; it may be no 
coincidence that the measure restricting the freedmen was 
carried when there was a clear prospect of a major war 
of expansion (108).
Summing up, the system of marshalling clients, amici, 
and other dependants to the centuries was the principal 
form of electoral and legislative control as soon as they 
had a choice of candidates, having naturally developed 
from the attempts to take control of the state by patricians 
dependent on personal authority. Thus most of the time 
the potential influence on the voters of their seniors 
in the voting assemblies was replaced by the influence of 
their personal patrons. The group vote system, whereby
108. The reforms did not prevent the second Punic War 
being voted; this may be due simply to changing attitudes 
in the senate; the centuriate assembly did reject a vote 
for war in 200. cf. Cassola, GPR 274-5. The reformers 
of 230 may not have appreciated the number of rich urban 
freedmen or the potential unity of their patrons in 
support of war, or perhaps they already anticipated having 
to restrict them to urban tribes.
cf. Staveley, AJP 1953 27-33, JRS 1963 184, and 
Cassola, GPR 97-107, 268-275 for similar views of both 
reforms. For some alternative views.of the comitia 
centuriata reform, see Mommsen, RSt 3 280f, De Sanctis,
StR 3 1 337f, and Thiel, HRSP 341f (democratic; for 
objections see Staveley, AJP 1953 24f; Walbank, CP 1 686);
P. Fraccaro, 'La Riforma dell'Ordinamento Centuriate', 
in Opusc. 2., 188-190, and Taylor, AJP 1957 347, VDRR 
67-8 303-4 (to reduce the influence of new citizens in 
outer tribes; for objections, see Cassola, GPR 99»
Staveley, art.cit. 28f).
The custom of leaving time between the announcement 
and passage of a law, formalised in the law of 98 (Staveley, 
GRVE 144) might have developed as a result of the reform 
of 230.
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only a fraction of the individual votes ever counted, lent 
itself admirably to this method, so long as citizens 
remained registered in the tribes of their domicile (109).
It remains for us to consider how methods used by 
senators to attract voters worked out for their factions 
in different circumstances. Senators' mustering of their 
dependants for the candidates from the faction to which 
they belonged would have been an essential aspect of their 
role in that faction (110); such co-operation would have 
only been considered unethical if they had joined forces 
with no common bond other than concern to gain electoral 
control. When the ancients wanted to describe groups of 
senators fighting elections who had done so, or were using 
other unacceptable methods of electoral control, they 
called them coitiones (111).
Firstly, we may consider the case where the 
composition of a political faction remained the same for 
several years because its members were united on relatively
109. Rilingar, EWRK 134f.
11-0. Those who voted for particular candidates were only 
marshalled by their immediate patron - the candidate 
himself, or one of his amici; see Gelzer, RN 49, 62; 
Scullard, BIGS 1955, 18; Toynbee, HL 1 331.
111. The term originally meant 'conspiracy' (G. Lewis 
and G. Short, A Latin Dictionary (Oxford, 1879) 364; cf. 
Livy 2.28.1, 3.48.1, 39.15.11-12) and it may have been in 
this sense that it was used to describe the patrician 
agreement to pass on the consulship before choice was 
introduced (Livy 3.35.9, 65.8). For its use to define 
groups using unacceptable methods of electoral control, 
cf. Livy 7.32.12, 9.26.9, 39.40-41; Gic. pro Plane. 53. 
Gelzer, RN 123, Hall, Hist. 1964 301-4, and Staveley,
GRVE 205-6, argue that the coitio itself was not illegal.
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long term policy. In the early fifth century such 
parties, usually united by patrician loyalty, could have 
simply decided upon two consular candidates, and had them 
elected through their own and the president's authority. 
When the choice of candidates was given to the centuries, 
such parties could retain control simply by ensuring that 
their members together brought in enough voters to gain 
majorities within a majority of tribes or centuries for 
a limited number of candidates agreed on within the group 
(112). Such co-operation may have been partly the reason 
that patricians defeated plebeian candidates, too numerous 
or disunited to capture many voting groups, in the consular 
tribunate elections in the late fifth century. Once a 
faction thereby gained control of office, it could often 
retain power for several years by marshalling the same 
clients, so long as its composition and the allegiance of 
its opponents remained the same. In subsequent years, 
it had the extra bonus of the electoral president's 
recommendation to catch spare votes. Thus if we have
112. With a system whereby the more the candidates, the 
more random the result (Staveley, GRVE 180), such agree­
ments had clear advantages. They would have required 
much trust from all hoping to be candidates in the faction, 
but many would have been quickly satisfied with support 
for the lesser, more numerous posts. The lack of evidence 
of such agreements in the late Republic may be due firstly 
to individuals having greater edifices of personal support 
which would have reduced their unity with others over 
political issues and the extent of co-operation required 
to marshal voters (see n.30 above and P. Brunt, rev. Meier, 
op.cit. in JRS 1968 231), and secondly to the greater 
number of laws against electoral abuses which may have 
made senators wary of co-operative practices that might 
be misinterpreted by their political opponents (Hall, 
art.cit. 301).
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reason to believe such a faction was in power, we may 
sometimes deduce an individual's allegiances from those 
of his colleagues. Since the tribes could be called to 
vote in any order, members of the faction would have to 
have arranged to dominate a solid majority of them to 
ensure success, although the drawing of the lot to choose 
the principium might be influenced occasionally by author­
itative leaders or electoral presidents. Similarly, before 
the reform of the comitia centuriata, a broad range of 
equestrians, and after the reform, rich men from a large 
number of tribes had to be marshalled to ensure the 
prerogative vote, although the firmer the general control 
of the faction, the less likely it was that it would 
influence the final result. Of course once one faction 
had power over enough voting groups, its opponents might 
view the considerable effort required to marshal clients 
as fruitless, and simply not submit candidates. Their 
only methods of competition then would be constitutional 
devices such as the tribunician vetoes used by the 
plebeians in the fifth and fourth centuries, or religious 
disruptions, if they happened to be well represented in 
the priestly colleges.
Such stable political factions would have readily 
implemented their policies; in the early Republic, the 
magistrates themselves had great authority over policy; 
later, when the senate controlled it, their members, as 
ex—magistrates, held the most influential places in the 
senate. Thus if the same family names coincide with the 
same long term policies over several generations, this 
may be due to such factions forming and re-forming as
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the same circumstances recur (113).
Secondly, we may consider the situation where results 
were less predictable, because views on political issues, 
and hence the composition of the senatorial factions, were 
altering with developing circumstances, or because there 
were frequent changes in the registration of citizens in 
tribes. In these cases, since more candidates would have 
competed (114), the attraction of spare votes and 
constitutional devices, such as the electoral president's 
refusal of candidates or the centuries' votes (the senate's 
restraining influence being weakened by the changes and 
divisions), would have been more significant for the 
results. With these more random elections, the political 
allegiance of colleagues and successors may only be assumed, 
given no other evidence for it, when the electoral president's 
influence is specifically attested, which is rare.
The ability to implement their own views on policy 
of curule magistrates who won their elections in the above 
circumstances naturally would have varied. In the early 
Republic, most magistrates would still have been able to 
implement the policies they supported, except when they 
were minor leaders liable to pressure from other senators. 
Later, policies might reflect either the general opinion 
of the senate when the magistrates did not have enough
113. This is assumed by Scullard, RP - e.g. 61, 74, 97, 
I65f, 212 and Lippold, C - e.g. 120, 142, 146-7; see 
Cassola, GPR 20-3 and Staveley, rev. Lippold, C JRS 1964 
197 for reservations. It does not imply that members' 
views were dictated by the party; rather the reverse; cf. 
Rilingar, EWRK 4«
114. See Livy 35.10 for an example of such a highly 
contested election. When senators were turning away from
old allies and obligations, they would have been loth to 
agree with their new allies on candidates.
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personal backing or authority to object to it, or the 
opinions of the magistrates when the senate did not have 
enough corporate authority to object to them, and they had 
won in the conflict because of their personal authority.
By the late fourth century some senators might have built 
up such well organised client bases that they could win a 
consular election in competition with the majority of the 
senate, including its leaders, the most recent ex­
magistrates, when political allegiances were changing.
It would generally have been such magistrates who challenged 
the senate's authority over policy in the late fourth and 
third centuries (115).
Despite the difficulty of winning seats when there 
was evenly balanced conflict, only hints that plebeian 
tribunes and consular tribunes had to co-opt colleagues in 
the fifth century suggest that magistracies were not 
regularly filled through the electoral system. This may 
have been mainly because it was more common for stable 
factions to develop monopolies of power, but it may also 
often have been due to political factions, divided on some 
issues but united on others, compromising in support of 
the same candidates in order to increase their chances of 
electoral success when their differences were not of direct 
relevance, and it seemed that otherwise a clear result might 
not easily be gained. This may have happened, for example, 
in the early fourth century, when plebeians with some common 
interests with patricians won their support as candidates
115. Haywood, SA 4-6.
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for the consular tribunate because they threatened to 
impede the elections and conduct of the war; their unity 
ensured that the six magistracies were filled. The 
magistrates named by interroges nominated because of 
political conflict may represent a compromise between 
factions that were more positively opposed. Another 
form of compromise is evident in the third century; when 
obscure names then appear in the lists at times of 
political conflict, this may often have been due to 
senators, uncertain about which policy to support, giving 
at least one vote to a more neutral figure with whom they 
had personal connections, and who might readily carry out 
the policy agreed upon by the senate as a whole, while more 
prominent candidates remained too evenly balanced against 
each other to win absolute majorities.
Of course not all elections would have been fought by 
factions divided over political issues. When there were 
no disputes over matters of policy of immediate relevance 
to the post at hand, senators presumably supported kinsmen, 
family friends, the most authoritative senators, or, more 
often than not, those best qualified for the post. When 
there was a crucial military situation, for example, those 
with most military expertise or local knowledge would 
naturally have been supported in the senate and their 
provinces of command arranged accordingly (116). In such
116. It is generally accepted that factional interests were 
subordinate to those of the state; cf. Beloch, RG 48G; 
Patterson, TAPA 1942, 319f; Lippold, C 112, 121, 173; 
Harris, WIRR 31f; Rilingar, EWRK 35. At the same time, it 
should be emphasised that war was a routine matter in this 
period (Adcock, RAW 75f, lOlf) and factions could form over 
strategy (Scullard, RP 5-6, art.cit. 19).
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circumstances, voters might often be relied upon simply 
to follow the lead of their seniors in the assemblies
(117).
It is not always easy to distinguish between the 
occasions when one faction was simply the most powerful 
in the senate, those when several factions were compromising 
over common ground, and those when the governing class or 
the senate as a whole was of common mind, and hence 
policy had little direct bearing on the results of the 
elections. Hints must simply be gleaned from the pattern 
of names, the nature of the policies, the immediate 
circumstances, and the relationship between the senate 
and the magistrates (118).
117. e.g. Livy 26.2.
118. cf. Meier op.cit. xxxix. At senatorial level
there are three factors to be taken into account in 
drawing conclusions on an individual's election - 
family ties, views on policy and qualifications. The 
first two, often closely inter-related, might dictate 
his faction; the faction or his qualification might 
explain his election. Let us take a typical case.
A man with knowledge of an area is elected as consul, 
and fights in that area in his magistracy. He might
(a) represent a faction promoting war in the area, 
supporting the policy through personal interest,
(b) represent a faction united on some other basis, 
supporting him as a candidate because he is best qualified
to fight there or (c) be generally supported because of
his qualifications by the whole senate agreed over 
policy.
129
CHAPTER 2 - ELECTIONS: 509-445 B.C.
The Political Issues
In this period it is unlikely that any choice of 
candidates was given to the centuries (1); thus we are 
largely concerned with the extent to which political issues 
swayed the electoral president in his choice of successors.
In the constitutional sphere, the first matter of 
debate after the army leaders had overthrown Tarquinius 
was the institution of the Republican government, the main 
-concern being to satisfy those who had engineered the coup 
and others competing for leadership (2).
Once Republican government had been established, a 
major issue was the patricians' attempts to control this 
government by handing over the consulship to each other. 
Except when some of them supported plebeians because they 
shared common interests, or feared their disruption of 
government, the patricians monopolised the consulship in 
this way throughout the period. The identification of a 
man as a patrician or plebeian is therefore of first 
importance in assessing his political attitude. A few 
hints on how this will be done may be noted here, although 
it should be emphasised that they are only general guide­
lines which do not hold good in every case (3). Firstly,
1. See Ch.IB 43-4-
2. See Ch.IB 39-40.
3. We cannot work directly from the ancient sources in
defining patricians, because they contradict themselves, 
as I. Shatzman, 'Patricians and Plebeians: the case of the 
Veturii', GQ 1973, 72f shows. For further examples cf. 
Livy 2.33.1, 58.2, 3.54.12-14» 65.1» 4.3.17, 12.3» 58.2;
D.H. 10.58.4.
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patrician status was dictated by gens in the early 
Republic, except in the special case of the Verginii, 
which is explained later (4); plebeian families with the 
gens name of patricians from the middle Republic were 
probably descendants of patricians' freedmen, who retained 
their patrons' gens name (5), or patricians who underwent 
transitio ad plebem for political reasons (6). Since 
the patricians' claim to government was based on their 
long family traditions of membership of the regal senate, 
they are more likely to have Latin or Sabine than Etruscan 
names (7). Since patricians are likely to have been 
based in well established landed estates, gentes after 
which Servian tribes were named may tend to be patrician (8)
4. The significance of gentes in the early Republic 
(see Gh.lC 84f), the patrician claim 'solos
gentem habere' (Livy 10.8.9) and the special category of 
patrician gentes maiores (n.l34) indicate this.
5.  ^ See Ch.1C 93 n.37.
6. See Willems, SRR 1 79 n.5 and Palmer, ACR 290, 293.
It has been argued that all apparently plebeian names in 
the early fasti were those of patrician gentes which under­
went transitio ad plebem or became extinct (cf. Willems,
SRR 1 15f, 49f; Cornelius, ÜFRO lOOf; Shatzman, art.cit.
75f). But the Menenii, Oenucii, Aternii and Tarpeii were 
represented by both consuls and plebeian tribunes in the 
fifth century. For further objections, see Bernardi,
RIL 1945-6, 8f; Momigliano, Riv. Stor. Ital. 1967 308; 
Richard, OPR 5191, 537f.
7. Patricians were not, of course, racially distinct 
(cf. Botsford, RA 36f; Jones, CAH7 421f; Palmer, ACR 196f; 
Richard, OPR 63f) and Latin and Etruscan names were inter­
mingled from such an early age (R. Conway, CAH4 406f, Last, 
CAH7 382f, Harris, REU 194-5) that if a gens has an Etruscan 
form of name, it need not have settled in Rome in the regal 
period of Etruscan influence. For the most ancient names 
in Rome, see Palmer, ACR 132f, 290f.
8. See Ch.1C 85 n.l6, 99-100. cf. Palmer, ACR
292; Shatzman, art.cit. 71f.
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Since patrician powers generally declined during the 
Republic, patricians would have held the priesthoods and 
interregna which Cicero attributes to them in the late 
Republic (9). Although there were no legal restrictions 
on plebeians holding any magistracies or priesthoods, 
patricians would have held most of those specifically 
noted as being opened up to plebeians in the second half 
of the fourth century; thus any gens appearing in such 
offices with any frequency from the time the patricians 
closed their ranks is likely to have been patrician (10). 
Finally, gentes represented by plebeian tribunes and 
aediles were not patrician, and those whose members had 
suffered recent political disgrace, or whose fortunes 
were declining with the decrease in commerce and industry 
at Rome at the time the patriciate was formed are unlikely 
to have been patrician (11).
A major issue arising from patrician monopoly of the 
consulship was the development from the meetings of dis­
contented people of an alternative plebeian state by those 
excluded from consular office by the patricians; they used 
it as a vehicle of protest about the patrician monopoly 
of curule government, and tried to have the authority of 
their own magistracies and assembly fully acknowledged by
9. ^ de domo 14-.38.
10. cf. Palmer, ACR 292f. All statements below concern­
ing the numbers of offices held are based on the evidence 
of Broughton, MRR.
11. The kings' gentes may have been relegated in the 
regal senate to preclude hereditary monarchy, and hence 
became plebeian in the Republic (cf. Richard, OPR 223f)• 
Similarly, the stigma of links with the Tarquinian house 
may have confirmed the plebeian status of the Aequillii,
lunii and Tullii.
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the patricians. Of specific concern in this period was 
the consuls* extensive use of coercitio, their right to 
enforce their will on citizens by punishment, which at 
first was curbed only by the intercessio of their 
colleagues (12). On the basis of their sacrosanctitas, 
the plebeian tribunes developed ius auxilii, by which 
they claimed the right to protect any citizen called to 
justice by a consul, and conducted their own prosecutions 
of both patricians and plebeians. Like their veto of 
consular acts, this had no legal meaning for the 
patricians, but was still of practical concern to them 
when the tribunes had popular support (13). By the mid 
fifth century, it was clear to many patricians that a 
compromise had to be made over consuls' and plebeians' 
legislative and judicial powers. In 454 maximum fines 
by consuls were fixed, and the tribunes' right to fine, 
within voluntary limits, may have been recognised (14).
In the tables drawn up by the Decemvirs of 451 and 450, 
which were largely a code of private law (15)» the judicial
12. Staveley, Hist. 1954 415-6. The consuls named 
quaestors to investigate capital crimes; see Plut. Popl. 
12.3; Zon. 7.13; Tacit. Ann. 11.22.
13. On the 'ius auxilii' developing as a counter to 
'coercitio' and a forerunner of 'provocatio', see Staveley, 
art.cit. 416-9; Lintott, VRR Ilf, 24f. For hints of 
conflict between consuls and tribunes over judicial 
authority, see Livy 2.56.12-16, 3.13» 24» 45.8-9» 53.4;
D.H. 9.48f, 10.5.3» 11.1. cf. Ogilvie, CL 325-6, who 
concludes that tribunes' trials up to 449 are fictional.
14. Staveley, art.cit. 419-421.
15. cf. Gic. de rep. 2.61; Livy 3.31.7-8, 33.5, 34.1;
D.H. 10.55.4-5; Diod. 12.23-4; Tacit. Ann. 3.27; Gell.
11.18.6, 20.1.3; Zon. 7.18; Pomp. Dig. 1.2.2.3-4.
127
activities of consuls and tribunes within the city were 
restricted by the development of powers for the assembly. 
The first Decemvirate decreed that capital cases must be 
brought to the comitia centuriata by the plebeian tribunes 
(16), and that the comitia centuriata could hear cases 
on appeal, or provocatio, from the consuls' sentence; the 
latter was not compulsory, so the tribunes' ius auxilii 
was needed to enforce it (17). Because the Decemvirs had 
acted as judges with absolute power (18), the right of 
provocatio from any magistrate was noted in the consular 
laws of 449 (19). These laws also formally recognised 
the tribunes' sacrosanctitas, thus acknowledging them as 
state prosecutors, and recognised plébiscita if validated
16. J. Strachan Davidson, Problems of the Roman Criminal 
Law (Oxford, 1912)(=PRGL) 1 157f, 178; Staveley, art.cit. 
422f. Lintott, VRR I63 suggests it only applied to 
political cases.
17. Staveley, art.cit. 418-419, 421f argues that with 
provocatio quaestors became popularly elected, and duoviri 
perduellionis were introduced. For arguments against 
the ancients' view that provocatio was introduced in 509; 
see Staveley, art.cit. 413-4; Ogilvie, CL 252. A loop­
hole in the law of 449 'ne quis ullum magistratum sine 
provocatione crearet' (see Ch.IB 43) and the 
personal authority of the dictator explain the ancients' 
view that the dictator was free from 'provocatio' (Zon. 
7.18; Livy 2.18.9, 29.11, 3.20.8; D.H. 5.70.2-4, 75.2).
For alternative explanations, see Staveley, Hist. 1954 
428; Ogilvie, CL 283. Naturally, having developed from 
the tribunes' ius auxilii, provocatio did not apply to 
military imperium (see Ch.5 332).
18. The idea that the Decemviri were judges 'sine 
provocatione' (Livy 3.31-33; Cic. de rep. 2.61; D.H. 
7.59.2, 10, 57, 60; Zon. 7.18) is a natural interpret­
ation of their replacement of consuls and tribunes while 
resolving disputes over judicial power (Cic. de rep.
2.54; Livy 3.32.6, 34.8, 36, 41.7, 45.8, 53.4, 55.5;
D.H. 10.58.2, 11.3.6; Zon. 7.18).
19. Livy 3.54.15; cf. Staveley, art.cit. 427, Ath. 1955, 
14f and Ogilvie, CL 449 and ERE, 126-8 both arguing that 
the law was fictitious.
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by auctoritas patrum (20). Plebeian leaders then returned 
to the issue of patrician monopoly of the consulship; by 
the end of 445 they had won the introduction of the alter­
native consular tribunate, as well as the abolition of the 
Decemvirs* lex conubii forbidding intermarriage between 
patricians and plebeians (21).
Despite the impression given by patriotic historians, 
foreign and military policy in the first half of the fifth, 
-century was largely defensive. Having expelled her king, 
who had pursued an aggressive foreign policy (22), Rome 
was left without protection against hostile tribes eager 
to take advantage of her weakened circumstances. Of 
immediate concern was the defence of the Republic against 
Etruscan forces marshalled by the Tarquins and by Lars 
Porsenna, king of Clusium (23). Soon after they were 
quelled, Rome, being attacked by Aequi, Yolsci and Sabines 
(24), and facing internal unrest, was forced to accept 
an equal place in the Latin federation, over which it had
20. See Ch.IB 55, 69-70.
21. See Ch.IB 44-6, 60-2.
22. For the general increase in Rome's power in central 
Italy during the Etruscan monarchy, see A. Momigliano, 
rev. Alfoldi, ERL, JRS 1967, 212f; Sherwin-White, RC^, 
190f; Richard, OPR 300f.
23. Livy 2.6-7, 9-15, 18.4, 21.5, Plut. Popl. 9, 13,
16-19 and D.H. 5.3, 14, 21-35, 45, 50f note the Tarquins 
getting aid from Porsenna, Veii, Tarquinii and the Latins, 
led by Superbus' son-in-law, Mamilius, ruler of Tusculum; 
cf. Ogilvie, CL 198-9, 247-8, 279-281 and Scullard, HRW4 
75-6, arguing that Porsenna's aid is unlikely. _ Porsenna 
made a broad campaign against Latium and Campania; if he 
conquered Rome in the process (Pliny, NH 34.139; Tacit. 
Hist. 3.72.1) this had little apparent effect on the new 
Republic, and the whole attempt was soon thwarted; cf. 
Alfoldi, ERL 73f; Heurgon, RR 156f; Ogilvie, CL 255, 270; 
Cjerstad, ER(v) 346.
24. For summaries of events, see Ogilvie, ERE 92-7 and 
Scullard, HRW^ 93f.
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retained hegemony in the period of Etruscan rule (25).
In all these conflicts Rome's military action was generally 
forced upon her. Once these dangers were over, however, 
conflict with Veii from 485 to protect the salt trade 
(26) and against the Sabines, Aequi and Volsci simply to 
ensure their quiescence on Rome's and Latium's frontiers 
may have involved more positive decisions at Rome (27). 
After this phase, warfare relapsed into necessary defensive 
measures (28).
In the early fifth century general overcropping of 
land, aggravated by pestilences and attacks by hostile 
tribes caused much impoverishment of the peasants, and the 
harsh laws on nexum forced many of them into near serfdom 
(29). The restriction of Roman trading outlets in the 
treaty which Carthage was quick to impose on the city 
immediately after the expulsion of the king (30) may have 
also caused problems in this period for urban workers and
25. Ogilvie, -CL 317-8, ERE 100-4 and Sherwin-White, RC 
21f defend this view of the Cassian treaty. Other wars 
and internal unrest prevented it being drawn up until 493, 
three years after the battle of Lake Regillus ended 
conflict, but it was in its spirit that joint Latin 
colonies were created from 495 (Salmon, Phoenix, 1953,
93f, RO ; cf. Ogilvie, CL 292, 308-9, 322).
26.. Pliny NH 31.89; Ogilvie, ERE 113-4, 148; Scullard, 
HRW^ 97-8.
27. For hints of Roman aggression, see D.H. 8.82, 9.61; 
Livy 3.2-3.
28. Ogilvie, CL 423f shows that Sabine incursions in this 
period are exaggerated.
29. cf. Last, CAH 7, 462-480: Tibiletti, 'II Possesso 
dell'Ager Publicus e le Norme de Modo Agrorum sine ai 
Gracchi', Ath. 1949 20f; Ogilvie, CL 256-7, 296-8, 394-5.
30. For full discussion of the treaty, see Walbank, CP 1
337-345; Thiel, HRSP 6 n.lO, 45-50; Toynbee, HL 1 519-539; 
Cassola, GPR 85-7; Richard, OPR 300f.
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tradesmen of all classes who had been benefiting from the 
economic developments made in Rome and Latium by the 
Etruscan kings (31). However, the building of several 
temples (32), Greek imports (33) and a possible increase 
in population in Rome up to the mid 480‘s (34) suggests 
that some of them were still then making a living. The 
general decline of the Etruscan trading empire in the 
western Mediterranean in the first half of the fifth 
century (35), however, becomes reflected after that time 
in the decreasing amount of imports found in Rome (36), 
a decline in population (37) and the fact that it took 
twelve years to build the last known temple commissioned 
for thirty years - that of Castor and Pollux vowed in 496 
(38). This may have forced many urban workers to emigrate
31. See Frank, ES 1 3f; Gjerstad, LF 33f, ER(iv) 514f; 
Scullard, HRW4 23-4, 40-60, 348-350; Richard, OPR 292f.
32. Six from 509 to 484. They bear witness to current 
issues of concern (four were to gods of commerce, industry 
and agriculture; two were to gods of Rome's enemies), and 
to Rome's broad contacts (three of the gods were Greek, 
reaching Rome by different routes through the Etruscan 
empire). For full details, see Ogilvie, CL 213f, 288- 
290, 304, 336, 342-3, 347f, 502.
33. See Livy 2.27.5; Frank, ES 1 8-9; Scott Ryberg, ARR 
51f, 78f; Bloch, REL 1959 123f.
34. cf. D.H. 5.20, 75; Plut. Popl. 12; Hieron 01.69.1.
35. Bloch, art.cit. 130f, Richard, OPR 419-429 and 
Scullard, HRW^ 34-5.
36. Scott Ryberg, ARR 51f, 80; Gjerstad, ER(iv) 517f.
37. Frank, AJP 1930, 315-6.
38. Livy 2.20.12, 42.5. Only one temple was built from 
484 to 445, in 466 (see 157 below).
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or become clients on agricultural estates (39). The 
latter process contributed, together with the relative 
stability of Rome's defences from 485 to 460, and lack of 
pestilence from 490 to 471, to an increase in the peasant 
population (40), and eventually, as a result, to renewed 
agitation for land. The land shortage, and an increase 
in attacks by hostile tribes from 460 intensified over­
crowding in the city; this, together with another series 
of pestilences, exacerbated urban and rural poverty by 
the middle of the century (41).
The number of measures concerning the corn supply, 
building, and allocation of land proposed and taken 
throughout the period (42), and the legal codification of 
the primitive agricultural way of life by the Decemvirs 
(43) show that these conditions were a major political
39. See Ch.1C 99-100. Those remaining in the
city became part of the plebeian tribunes' support base; 
see Cornelius, ÜFRC 86f; Bloch, art.cit. 128; Ogilvie,
CL 293f, 309; Momigliano, art.cit. 309; Richard, OPR 295f.
40. Livy 2.41.8, 42 notes corn shortages in 486 and 476; 
Livy 3.3.9, 24.10 and D.H. 9.36 show a population increase 
from 474 to 459.
41. There were pestilences and famines in 471, 463, 456 
and 453 (Ogilvie, CL 256, 394-5). The Aventine Law on 
housing in 456 (Livy 3.31; D.H. 10.32.4) attests to over­
crowding in the city.
42. Accounts of land law proposals (Livy 2.41.1, 42.6,
43.3, 44.1, 48.2, 52.2, 54.2, 61.1, 63.2, 3.1.2; D.H.
6.20, 8.69.3—4, 70-78, 81, 87.3f, 9*1.3, 5*1, 37-8, 51,
69.1, 10.35f) may be exaggerated and anachronistic but 
the circumstances noted above suggest that they are 
based in fact; cf. n.l28; Last, GAH7, 471-2; Cornelius,
UFRG 121.
43. For full details, see Last, CAH7, 476-7; Frank, ES
1 13-19; F. Wieacker, 'Die XII Tafeln im ihrem Jahrhundert', 
EFH xiii (1966) 291-362; Watson, RTT passim.
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issue. This was mainly because after the formation of 
the patriciate, plebeian leaders championed many of the 
measures to alleviate economic distress in order to build 
up popular support for their political goals. It is 
indicative that the temple of Ceres, god of corn, became 
the plebeians' political centre (44)» and the constitutional 
laws of 449 were preceded by a secession.
Before these issues are considered in the context of
the elections, two general points should be made. Firstly, 
since the magistrates had great authority in the implement­
ation of policy in this period, it may be assumed that 
their actions reflect their political views, except when 
external pressures are apparent. Secondly, individuals' 
views on many issues would have been centred on the 
interests of their gentes, which retained, a strong corporate 
identity in this period (45).
The Elections
In 509 the institution and defence of the new
Republican regime would have been the main concern in the
choice of the first consuls. Their number and identity, 
however, is not so clear. Five men are named as consuls: 
Sp. Lucretius, L. lunius Brutus, L. Tarquinius Gollatinus,
P. Valerius and M. Horatius (46); accounts of their role
/ \
44. D.H. 6.95.4, 10.45.2; H. Le Bonniec, Le Quite de Ceres 
à Rome des Origines à la Fin de la Republique (Paris, lV38) 
T-CC) 342f.
45. See Ch.IB 68-79, Ch.10 84f, 100
for the basis of these statements. In fact the patrony- 
mies of many magistrates suggest that they were directly 
related to others of the same name.
46. Broughton, MRR 1-3.
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in events contain many fanciful and contradictory elements 
(47). Details in the stories of lunius' leadership of the 
coup and heroic death and Lucretia's rape by a Tarquin were 
borrowed from Greek legends by the earliest historians and 
elaborated by their powerful descendants in the middle and 
late Republic (48). lunius' and Valerius' constitutional 
laws, lunius' post as tribunus celerum, and the magisterial 
posts of Lucretia's father were included in late Republican 
attempts to give the Republic a legal basis (49). Valerius' 
role was exaggerated by Antias, and details of his activities 
were duplicated from the consulship of his grandson Popli- 
cola, who, with a colleague Horatius, like the supposed 
consul of 509f carried popular constitutional laws in 449 
(50). The most credible characters, on the grounds that 
neither had powerful descendants to maintain their place in 
the tradition, are Horatius, whose name was on the 
inscription on the Capitoline temple dedicated in $09 ($1),
47. Major accounts are Gic. de rep. 2.46, 53-5; Livy 
1.57-2.8; D.H. 4.64-5.19; Plut. Popl. 1-14.
48. For contradictions in the stories of lunius, compare 
Livy 1.59.7 and D.H. 4.71 with Cic. de rep. 2.46, and Livy 
2.6.6 with D.H. 4.75.1, 5.14.3. For details of the 
development of both tales, see Ogilvie, CL 218-220, 232; 
Alfoldi, ERL 82, I40, 153f; Gjerstad, LF 48 n.l; Gagé,
AR 62-3.
49. Rotondi, LP 190-1; Ogilvie, CL 229, 236f.
50. See n.l7; Alfoldi, ERL 82-4; Degrassi, II 13.1.90; 
Ogilvie, CL 253. Valerius' supposed triumph in 509 could 
be a duplication of that of 504 (Degrassi, op.cit. 535-6).
51. Polyb. 3.22; Livy 2.8.5-8; cf. D.H. 5.35.3 and Tacit. 
3.72, dating this to his second consulship, and Val. Max.
5.10.1, saying that he was pontifex. Such confusion might 
be due to his name being inscribed on the temple without 
the date (Walbank, CP 1 340) and the influence of other 
legends. Polybius also notes Horatius signing the treaty 
with Carthage, which he may infer from its date. For other 
arguments for Horatius' consulship, see Last, CAH7 859—862 
and Gjerstad, LF 45-9.
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and Herminius ($2), Dionysius notes them as the generals 
left in charge of the army besieging Ardea, which refused 
to accept the king back into the camp, while the election 
of lunius and Tarquinius as consuls, later approved by 
the centuries, was taking place in Rome (53). Since the 
army's discontent with the length of the siege ($4) is a 
more likely trigger for the king's overthrow than Lucretia's 
rape, it is possible that the actual coup took place in the 
camp, and Horatius and Herminius were nominated there as 
its leaders, and therefore the first magistrates, charged 
with military control of the state (55).
While the stories about all the supposed consuls of 
509 are clearly elaborated by later writers, it is unlikely 
that their role in events is entirely fictitious. I would 
suggest that they became included among the magistrates 
of 509 because they belonged to the coterie of army officers 
who engineered the coup and remained in control of Rome for 
the next five years (56), sharing a common policy of
52. Plut. Popl. 16.4, calls him one of the most illustrious 
men in the city in 508.
53. D.H. 4.66-85.
54. Livy 1.57.1-4; D.H. 4.64.1-2, 83.2-3.
55. cf. Ch.IB 38f. In the accounts of Livy
1.59-60 and D.H. 4.66-85, many details differ; clearly they
were simply trying to reconstruct legally satisfying accounts 
of the revolution. D.H's concern to make it follow on from 
the regal period forced him to place a meeting of the curiae 
at the beginning of the uprising, and his concern to provide
a regular consular election forced him to tell an unconvincing 
tale of the first comitia centuriata meeting while the army 
was still at Ardea, and then repeating its vote after the 
army returned (D.H. 5.1.2).
56. cf. Cornelius, UFRG 113; Ogilvie, CL 232.
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establishing their government in Rome, and defending it 
against invaders. Consuls from 508 to 504 were M. 
Horatius, T. Herminius, M. and P. Valerius, T. Lucretius, 
Sp. Larcius and P. Postumius. The names included among 
the consuls of 509 not on this list are lunius and 
Tarquinius, neither of whom, as descendants of the 
Tarquinii, may have been trusted as part of the new 
government, especially after the attempted coup by their 
relations in 509 (57). This view is supported by the fact 
that several of the consuls from 508 to 504 held office 
more than once and are represented with their relations 
as military officers in the same period (58) and by hints 
of personal loyalties among them, such as the family ties 
of P. and M. Valerius, and P. Postumius, and the common 
Etruscan origin of the Larcii and Herminii (59)*
From 503 to 496 fifteen individuals from thirteen 
different gentes were consuls (60), which suggests that by
57. Walbank, CP 1 339, argues that Polybius noted lunius 
signing the Carthage treaty because the tradition of his 
consulship was already established. Perhaps he exercised 
his paternal rights to execute his sons when they took part 
in the attempted coup (Livy 2.3-5; D.H. 5.6.4-9»3; Plut.
Popl. 3.3-7.3), and his descendants, fostering this tale, 
allowed the idea to develop that he was consul (the consul 
having judicial power to take the same action). The story 
of Tarquinius being removed from the consulship is of Greek 
origin (see Ogilvie, CL 238-9) but he is likely to have 
been a genuine figure, since his family never gained curule 
office (Gjerstad, LF 47-8; Ogilvie, CL 232).
58. Broughton, MRR 5-7.
59. Plut. Popl. 20.1, 22.2; Richard, OPR 332. Alfoldi,
ERL 76, suggests that the Etruscans were Porsenna's confidants, 
but many generals in Tarquin's former army would have been 
Etruscan.
60. Broughton, MRR 8-12.
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the end of $04 there was some pressure from other leading 
Romans that a broader range of magistrates be nominated.
The sketchy evidence suggests that in this period consuls 
were named according to their spheres of interest, 
experience, or personal ties, carrying out a necessarily 
defensive military policy. Gominius, Veturius, and 
Tullius had Volscian connections (6l) and shared interests 
in Latium with Sulpicius, Gloelius and Menenius (62). 
Gominius had family in Praeneste (63), a Latin town under 
much Etruscan influence (64); like Larcius, Aebutius, and 
Verginius, he may have been of Etruscan origin (6$).
Veturius and Minucius might have been quaestors in the 
first years of the Republic (66), when Postumius and Larcius 
also held office; the consul of $04, Valerius, who may have 
instigated this series of consuls, was probably a neighbour
61. In the legend of Coriolanus, leader of the Volsci 
in 489 (n.109), Gominius was his friend (D.H. 8.22.4), 
Veturius a kinsman (n.,67), and Tullius his Volscian 
host (Livy 2.37.1, 39.1; cf. Ogilvie, CL 326).
Gominius' cognomen Auruncus suggests links with a tribe 
south of the Volsci (Willems, SRR 1 12). (For further
hints of links between Romans and Volsci in this period, 
see Livy 2.37; D.H. 7.2).
62. Munzer, 'Sulpicius', PWRE 4.A.I (Stuttgart, 1931) 
731-2; Ch.IB 30; Ogilvie, CL 283, 548; Livy 1.30.2, 
3.25.5; D.H. 10.22f.
63. Ogilvie, CL 279.
64. Ogilvie, CL 28$; Scullard, HRW^ 39-40 and n.47.
65. W. Schulze, Zur Geschichte Lateinischer Eigennamen
(Berlin, 1904)(=GLE) 100, 108, 279.
66. Plut. Popl. 12.3; Zon. 7.13.
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of Veturius in the tribe of his name on the west coast 
(67). Verginius, Cassius,Tullius and Minucius may have 
been neighbours on the east side of Rome (68) bordering 
the Menenia tribe near Praeneste (69). The first two, 
with Menenius and Postumius, who had triumphed over the 
Sabines in 50$ (70), were named to fight the Sabines 
threatening this area in $03 and $02 (71). Apart from 
raids by Fidenae, quelled in 499 (72), the prevention of
67. See P. Fraccaro, Opusc. 2, 1-3 and Taylor, VDRR 42 for 
the location of the tribe. There are hints of the Valerii's 
interests in the area in an early fifth century inscription 
from Satricum (Ogilvie rev. Stibbe etc. Lapis Satricanus 
(Rome, I98O) in JRS 1981 207) the legend of the Valerii 
coming to Rome via Ostia (Val. Max. 2.4.$), Antias' 
cognomen and the prevalence of Valerii in Ostia during the^ 
empire (R. Meiggs, Roman Ostia (Oxford, 1973) 2nd ed. (=R0 ) 
476-8). Also Valeria appears in the legend of Coriolanus 
(Livy 2.40, D.H. 8.39f, Plut. Ooriol. 33), becoming priestess 
of the temple of Fortuna founded on the Via Latina in 488 
(Plut. Coriol. 37). This cult, like that of Hercules,
Greek god of commerce, superintended from early times in 
Rome by (Valerii?) Potitii (Bayet, Hercule, 132f, 248f)
was prominent in Antium (Macrob. Sat. 1.23.13; Suet. Gal.
$7; Hor. Od. 1.35; Tacit. Ann. 3.71; Cio. bei Non. 284.1).
68. This is suggested by the cognomina Caelimontanus, of 
Verginius, consul of 496, and Esquilinus, of Verginius, 
consul of 478, and Minucius, consul of 458 (Degrassi, II
13.1, 90, 352-3, 356), and evidence that Cassius and Servius 
Tullius lived on the Esquiline, the latter having confirmed 
it as part of Rome (Livy 1.43.3, 2.41.11; D.H. 8.79;
Ogilvie, CL 179).
69. Taylor, VDRR 43-4.
70. Degrassi, op.cit. 535-6.
71. cf. Livy 2.16.9; Zon. 7.13; D.H. 5.44, 49; Val. Max. 
6.3.1; Degrassi, op.cit. 6$, 536. The revolt of Cora and 
Pometia in $03 (Livy 2.16) and the similar stories of the 
taking of Pometia and Cameria in $02 (D.H. $.49; Livy 2.17; 
Zon. 7.13) may belong in 495, the ancients possibly being 
confused by the cognomina of the consuls of 501-500,
Auruncus and Camerinus, and mistakenly identifying the 
cities Pometia and Auruncan Suessa; cf. Ogilvie, CL 272,
276, 285-6.
72. The date of Fidenae's capture is uncertain; cf. Livy 
2.18.9-11, 19; D.H. 5.40, 44, 52, $8-61; Ogilvie, CL 284.
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war with the Latins was then of prime concern (73). Four 
of the consuls from $00 to 498 may have been named partly 
because they had personal influence with them (74); in $00 
they also sent Valerius, the consul of $04, to dissuade 
them from war (7$). After Volscian aid was sought in vain 
(76), Larcius and Cassius, both experienced generals, 
became dictator and magister equitum to face the threat 
in 498, but it came to nothing until 496, when Postumius, 
son of the consul of $03, was elevated from consul to 
dictator to meet them, making Aebutius, consul of 499, 
his magister equitum (77). T. Herminius, consul of $06, 
and M. Valerius, consul of $0$, were his lieutenants.
They won a victory at Lake Regillus (78).
73. For hints of Latin unrest, see D.H. $.61-2, 75-6,
6.1-3; Livy 2.21.1.
74. Veturius, Tullius, Sulpicius and Cloelius. Sulpicius' 
cognomen suggests that he retained links in Cameria, one
of the Latin towns supporting war against Rome (D.H. $.$1.1; 
cf. 6.19-20.1). The influence of Menenius and Cominius 
might have caused Praeneste's alliance with Rome in 499 
(Ogilvie, CL on Livy 2.19.2).
7$. Livy 2.18; D.H. $.$0-1.
76. D.H. $.62.3, 6.3.3, 5.3.
77. While Livy 2.18.4-7, 19-21, followed by Broughton, MRR 
9-12, dates Larcius' dictatorship to $01 and the Battle of 
Lake Regillus and Postumius' dictatorship in 499, D.H. 
$.70.1-77.6, 6.2.4f, followed by Degrassi op.cit. $36 and 
Ogilvie, CL 281-3, 286 (except that he puts Larcius' 
dictatorship in 497), dates both three years later. They 
are easily confused, since Larcius was consul in $01 and 
Aebutius was consul in 499*
78. For the battle and Postumius' triumph, see Livy 2.19.20; 
D.H. 6.4-17; Willems, SRR 1 Ilf (accepting that he thus 
gained the cognomen Regillensis); Degrassi, op.cit. 91, 536 
and Ogilvie, CL 285-7, 663, (both suggesting that the 
cognomen denotes origin, which seems rather coincidental).
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Concern to consolidate Rome's borders and take further 
niilitary action to protect the state after the victory over 
the Latins, together with the rising unrest among the people 
(79), were the main issues at the election of the consuls 
of 495» Claudius and Servilius (80). Both probably shared 
interest in the defence of the Ager Crustumerius, since it 
bordered on the Claudia and Sergia tribes; they created a 
new tribe for citizens settling there since its conquest in 
499 (81). While Claudius made severe judgements on debt 
cases at Rome (82), Servilius, taking his victorious 
predecessor Postumius as his lieutenant (83), marched 
against both Sabines and Volsci (84), and helped to found 
the colony of Signia, which provided more land allotments 
and separated the Latins and Aequi from the Volsci (8$).
79. cf. Livy 2.21.1, 23; Cic. de rep. 2.58-9; D.H.
5.51.3, 53-7, 59.1, 63f, '6.17, 22, 26.
80. Broughton, MRR 13.
81. The Servilii were related to the Sergii; see Beloch, 
RG 11; Ogilvie, CL 462. On the consuls' spheres of 
interest and the creation of the tribe, see Ch.IB 31; 
Taylor, VDRR 35-7, 40. The Claudii also lived in the 
northern part of Rome (Gjerstad, LF 43).
82. D.H. 5.66-8, 6.24, 27, 38, 59-64, 68, 7.48f and Livy 
2.22.15, 27.1, 10-13, 29.9-12 attest to his severity from 
496 to 491.
83. Livy 2.26.2; D.H. 6.33. Since he led the cavalry 
in 495 and had vowed a temple to their patron in 496 
(Ogilvie, CL 288-9) the appointment might have been due 
partly to superstition.
84. Livy 2.22-7; D.H. 6.23-33; n.71.
85. Livy 2.21; D.H. 5.58; Ogilvie, CL 215, 292.
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Servilius, who was on the conciliatory embassy to the 
people in 493 and supported making economic concessions 
to the people in 494 in opposition to Claudius, was only 
able to levy the people by making favourable promises to 
debtors (86). The consuls' difference of opinion over 
how to deal with domestic discontent may have been the 
basis of quarrels noted between them (87); if such disputes 
generally prevailed in the governing class, they might 
have been named partly to compromise between both points 
of view.
At the election of 494 the people's unrest in the 
face of attack by Aequi, Volsci and Sabines was of prime 
concern (88). One of the consuls, A. Verginius, and 
other magistrates of 494, M'. Valerius, dictator, who 
named Servilius as his magister equitum, and T. Larcius, 
praefectus urbi (89), may have been named because they 
shared Servilius' conciliatory attitude towards the people. 
A. Verginius' brother supported Servilius' proposed debt 
concessions in 494 (90); M'. Valerius resigned when he 
was prevented from fulfilling his pledge of relief to the 
people (91); Larcius argued for general debt relief in
86. Livy 2.23.15-24, 27.2-3; D.H. 6.23.3, 26.3, 27.1, 
28-29.1.
87. Other reasons for disputes are noted by D.H. 6.23.2,
30 and Livy 2.27.4-6; Ogilvie, CL 303, discards the latter.
88. D.H. 6.34; Livy 2.28-9.
89. Broughton, MRR 13-14.
90. D.H. 6.37.10; Livy 2.29.7.
91. Broughton, MRR 14; Ogilvie, CL 306-7.
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494 (92); Valerius, Verginius and Larcius were all with 
Servilius on the conciliatory embassy of 493 (93); 
Valerius' brother had tried to alleviate debt before the 
battle of Lake Regillus, and his nephew went to buy grain 
for the people in Sicily in 492 (94). This attitude did 
ensure a levy in 494, and T. Veturius, the other consul, 
Valerius and Verginius fought the Aequi, Sabines and 
Volsci respectively, the latter setting up a colony at 
Velitrae, providing a little more land (95).
In 493 the consuls, Sp. Cassius, who had been consul 
in 502 with Verginius, and Cominius, consul in 501 (96), 
may have been chosen partly because they shared their 
nominators' policy of alleviating economic hardship.
They named M'. Valerius as princeps senatus 
<97) and T. Larcius as lieutenant (98), and appointed 
them and other ex-consuls to an embassy to placate the 
people, who had already seceded to the Sacred Mount before 
the election (99). The full conditions of the agreement
92. D.H. 6.35-7, 42.1; Livy 2.29.8.
93. D.H. 6.58, 69.3, 81-2, cf. 7.54.
94. D.H. 5.64f; n.l05 below.
95. D.H. 6.42; Livy 2.30.8-31.6; Frontin. Str. 2.1.7; 
Degrassi, op.cit. 536. Veturius may have won his election 
through personal ties with the Valerii.
96. Broughton, MRR 14-15.
97. GIL 1^ 189f.
98. D.H. 6.92.2.
99. Cic. de rep. 2.57-59; D.H. 6.44-8, 69-80; Livy 2.32-3:
Ch.IB 55, n.73. The attitudes of some of the envoys
have been suggested above; for hints of those of Sulpicius 
and Menenius, see D.H. 6.49-56, 96; Livy 2.33, 10-11.
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they made are not certain, but they probably included the 
promise to import corn and carry out a census. Cassius 
also dedicated the temple of Ceres, which became the 
plebeians' political centre (100). After making these 
domestic arrangements, Cassius made the formal agreement 
on Rome's relations with the Latins, while Cominius 
defeated the Volsci at Antium and captured Corioli, in 
his family's sphere of interest (101).
In 492 amid a new famine (102), the consuls T. 
Geganius and P. Minucius (103) were probably named for 
the same reasons as their predecessors. Both possibly 
had family interests in the corn supply; M. Minucius, 
the consul of 497, might have dedicated the temple of 
Saturn, an agricultural deity; two Minucii held the 
consulship in 458 and 457 when there was another corn 
shortage, and a Minucius was praefectus annonae in 440
100. This may be the basis of the legend that his property 
was consecrated to Ceres after his condemnation; see Livy 
2.41.11; D.H. 8.79.3; Val. Max. 5.8.2; cf. Ogilvie, CL
338-9, 343-4.
101. D.H. 6.91-94.3, Livy 2.33.4-9, Val. Max. 4-3.4 and 
Plut. Cor. 8.1-11.1 describe military events; cf. n.l09 
below. Cominius' links in the Aurincan area (n.6l) 
may have been another factor in his choice as consul.
102. Livy 2.34-2; D.H. 7.1-2.
103. Broughton, MRR 16-17.
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when a Geganius was consul (104). In 492 the consuls 
sent P. Valerius, son of Poplicola, and L. Geganius, the 
consul's father, from Ostia to Sicily to buy corn; other 
envoys went to Etruria, the Volsci and Cumae (105).
Like Cominius,Geganius may also have been named for his 
personal knowledge of the Volscian area, since in four 
out of the seven consulships held by members of his gens, 
they fought, or intended to fight, the Volsci. In 492, 
when pestilence prevented Volscian attacks, another 
colony was established at Norba and Velitrae was strength­
ened (106); this consolidated Cominius' victory and may 
have alleviated popular distress.
Consuls of 491, a year of no war, were M. Minucius 
and A. Sempronius {107), who had both gained experience of 
city administration in 509, 497 and 496 (108). Their
104. Also a column statue was built in the third century 
or later to commemorate the praefectus annonae of 440; in 
the second century Minucius Rufus built a porticus Minucia 
nearby; corn was later distributed to the people here.
The location of the gens' ancestral rites by the river Tiber, 
and the coincidence in the fifth century of independently 
attested corn shortages with consulships of the Minucii in 
which, uniquely, two pairs held office one year after the 
other - as one might expect if specialist knowledge was 
suddenly required - suggests that later members of the gens 
did not devise the tradition of this family interest. See 
Last, CAH7 536-7; Momigliano, 'Due Punti di Storia Romana 
Arcaica', in Quart C 331fî Ogilvie, CL 256, 290, 550, 556-7; 
Lintott, Hist. 1970 15-16; Crawford, RRC 273-5.
105. Livy 2.34.3-5; D.H. 7.1-2, 12; cf. Gell. fr. 20;
Licinius fr. 12, Peter.
106. Livy 2.34*5; D.H. 7.12.4-5, 14-19*
107. Broughton, MRR 17.
108. Plut. Popl. 12.3; D.H. 6.2; Livy 2.21.2.
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main concern was the distribution of the corn brought 
from Sicily; hence the legend of Marcius Coriolanus 
trying to sell corn cheaply in return for the abolition 
of the plebeian tribunate is placed in this year (109).
No political issues are apparent in 490; Q. 
Sulpicius and Sp. Larcius, the consul of 506, may have 
been nominated as -consuls simply because of personal 
ties (110).
The consuls of 4-89» C. lulius and P. Pinarius, and 
488, Sp. Nautius and Sex. Furius (111), were all from 
Sabine or Alban families with personal connections in 
Latium or the Volscian area, where attacks were expected
109. Evidence of Rome's capture of Corioli in 493» the corn 
shortage in 491, the institution in 494 of plebeian tribunes, 
who developed judicial powers at Rome, the dedication of
the temple of Fortuna Muliebris in 488, and the Volscians' 
trial of their leader in 488 were combined to form the story 
of Coriolanus (see Broughton, MRR 18 for full references) on 
a framework provided by the analogous tales of Themistocles 
in Athens (Cic. Brut. 41-3) and Cassius, Maelius and Manlius 
in Rome (cf. Cic. de rep. 2.49, de dom. 101). Thus Rome's 
conflict in 489 with a leader who had the name of a king 
and attested relatives (n.67, Pliny NH 18.15) and friends 
(D.H. 8.22.4) in Rome was explained, and the Marcii gained 
a heroic ancestor. In truth, a branch of the Marcii gens 
may have been established on the Latin west coast since the 
king founded Ostia (Ogilvie, CL 139-140) and his sons were 
exiled to Suessa Pometia (Livy 1.41.7), and the leader of 
the Volsoi may have risen to power among them as they spread 
into Antium and beyond, being suspected by them of betrayal 
to his kinsmen at Rome (no doubt more distant than the 
legend suggests) in 489. For theories of how the story 
developed, cf. Mommsen, RF 2 113-152; W. Schur, 'Fremder 
Adel im Romischen Staat Der Samniterkriege', Hermes 1924, 
450-4; R. Salmon, 'Historical Elements in the Story of 
Coriolanus', CQ 1930 96-101; Russell, 'Plutarch's Corio­
lanus', JRS 1963, 21-8; Alfoldi, ERL 155-7, Ogilvie, CL 
314-6.
110. See Broughton, MRR 18 for their names. T. Larcius 
preceded Sempronius as consul in 498, and D.H. 8.22.4 notes 
the friendship of Sulpicius, Larcius and Minucius with 
Marcius Coriolanus.
111. Broughton, MRR 18-19.
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from the Aequi and Volsci led by Coriolanus (112). Since 
^11 lour were from previously unknown gentes that belonged 
to the patriciate formed within the next few years, they 
may have been elected partly as a result of pressure for 
representation from that quarter (113).
The consuls of 487, T. Sicinius and C. Aequillius
(114), may have been named for their military experience
(115), and their influence with the people through their 
kinsmen, who were two of the tribunes in 493, L.
Sicinius and L. lunius respectively (116). They chose as 
magistrates to control the city while they fought the 
wars (117), two men with appropriate experience, Sp. 
Larcius, consul of 490, and A. Sempronius, consul of 491
(118). The consuls for 486, when another corn shortage
112. For the lulii and Nautii's Alban origin, see Palmer, 
ACR 29O-I and Frier, LAPM 52f. For hints of the Furii's 
Sabine origin and links with Latium, see Livy 5.44*1; 
Degrassi, op.cit. 90, Münzer, 'Furius', PWRE 7.1 
(Stuttgart, 1910) 315. For hints of the Pinarii's links 
with Tibur, Campania and the Volscian area, all related to 
their superintendence of the Hercules cult, see n.67, D.H.
8.22.4, Wissowa, RKR2 275, H. Gundel, 'Pomponius', PWRE 
21.2 (Stuttgart, 1952) 2324, and Bayet, Hercule, 319*
For military events in 489 and 488 see Livy 2.37-40; D.H.
8.1-38, 63; Plut. Cariol. 26-39; n.109*
113. D.H. 6.69 portrays Nautius as a young patrician in 
493. All these gentes reappear in office at times of 
patrician domination in the fifth century; cf. Cornelius,
UFRG 113-4.
114. cf. Degrassi, op.cit. 536-7, Broughton, MRR 19-20 
and Ogilvie, CL 311 for variations in their names.
115. D.H. 8.64.1.
116. For the links between the Aequillii and lunii see 
Livy 2.4f; D.H. 5.6.41; Plut.Popl. 3*3f. Broughton, MRR 
15-18 notes these and other more doubtful appearances of 
their kinsmen in plebeian magistracies in 492 and 491*
117. Livy 2.20.14; D.H. 8.64*7; Degrassi, op.cit. 536-7.
118. D.H. 8.64.3.
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is recorded (119), were probably named for the same reasons 
as their predecessors. They were Sp. Cassius, consul of 
493, and Proc. Verginius, son of Cassius' colleague in 
$02, and a relative of Cassius' predecessor in 494 (120). 
Cassius may also have been chosen for his diplomatic 
experience; after fighting the Hernici in 486, he made 
an agreement with them similar to that which he made in 
493, while Verginius fought the Aequi (121). However, 
Cassius' proposal to distribute land in 486 divided the 
consuls. Whatever the exact contents of his bill, much 
distorted by later writers, it appears that he hoped to 
muster enough popular support with it to gain personal 
leadership of the state (112). It was opposed by his 
colleague who vetoed the bill and made some more moderate 
proposals, and by the rest of the governing class (123).
The patriciate emerged from those united by their 
opposition to Cassius, filling the gap left by the recent 
death of several ex-consuls at the hands of the Volsci (124)
119. Livy 2.41.8.
120. Broughton, MRR 20.
121. Livy 2.41; D.H. 8.68-9; Val. Max. 6.3.1b; Degrassi, 
op.cit. 66-7, 537; Ogilvie, CL 339-340.
122. The ancients suggest fear of his foreign policy,
his ambitions for popularity and tyranny and his land law 
as the bases of his downfall (see Broughton, MRR 20).
De Sanctis, StR, 2 9f, Ogilvie, CL 339-342 and Lintott, 
art.cit. 18-22 note the unlikely aspects of the land law.
123. D.H. 8.71-5; Livy 2.41; for anachronisms in their 
accounts, see De Sanctis, StR 2.10.
124. Fest. 180L, supported by comments by D.H. 8.77.1
on the youth of the leaders in 48$. De Sanctis StR 2 10f 
and Ogilvie, CL 339 discard the alternative story of Dio. 
fr.22, Zon. 7.17 and Val. Max. 6.3*2.
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The patricians* attempts to regain their ancestors' 
traditional leadership is clearly apparent in the electoral 
results of the next twenty-three years. The monopoly of 
office by a relatively small group with strong family ties 
is suggested by the facts that only nineteen gentes from 
485 to 463, compared with twenty-eight from 509 to 486, 
appear in the consulship, and fifteen out of the thirty- 
three individuals in the forty-six consulships were 
brothers, sons or cousins of other consuls within the 
period. The extent of the change made in 486 is indicated 
by the fact that almost half those in consular office from
485 to 463 belonged to gentes previously unrepresented in 
consular office, while fifteen out of the fifty-one consuls 
from 509 to 486 were from gentes which do not appear again 
in curule office for more than a century. The idea that 
the change was due to the formation of the patriciate is 
suggested by the fact that it was in the mid 480's that 
all signs of commercial and industrial activity, in which 
few patricians would have had major interests, disappear
at Rome, and, more significantly, according to the criteria 
noted at the beginning of the chapter, forty-one or more 
of the forty-six consuls from 485 to 463 were patrician, 
compared with thirty-four out of fifty-one from 509 to
486 (125). Finally, the six gentes maiores, defined by 
Mommsen from the known principes senatus as the most
125. See Fraccaro, Riv. Fil. 1928 556-7, Cornelius, UFRG 
99-100, 122, and Bernardi, RIL 1945-6 lOf for similar 
conclusions from the change in names. For others, see, 
e.g. Beloch, RG 11 (names up to 486 were interpolated) 
and Gjerstad, LF 60-1 (Servius Tullius' reign began in 
486 ).
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ancient and successful patricians in the Republic, held 
twenty-one out of the forty-six consulships from 485 to 
463, compared with six out of fifty-one from 509 to 486. 
Since five of them held eleven consulships in the seven 
years from 485, and there were only three years from 485 
to 470 when at least one consul did not belong to them, 
they may have won their distinction through having founded 
the patriciate (126).
Presumably Proc. Verginius nominated the consuls for 
485. While the Verginii's holding of four consulships 
and one augurate up to 463 and some versions of the tale 
of Verginia in 450 suggest the gens was patrician, four 
Verginii are attested as plebeian tribunes from 46I to 
394, and they may have been of Etruscan origin. Perhaps 
Verginius' special role in naming the first patrician 
consuls for 485 entitled his branch of the gens to special 
membership of the group, while other branches were excluded 
(127).
126. The an-cients' varying accounts of minores gentes being 
co-opted into the senate in the late monarchy and 509 
(Richard, OPR 319f) could be rationalised interpretations 
of the patrician claims to government by ancestral right, 
and evidence of the expanding senate. The maiores gentes' 
earlier place in the state^is generally accepted; cf. 
Mommsen, HR 1 108-9, RSt 3 30-1; Willems, SRR 1 22; Goli,
SDHI 1951 63; Ogilvie, CL 147-8. Richard, OPR 322-336 
argues for the Republican origin of the term maiores gentes; 
Magdalain, Hommages à J. Bayet, 469 n.l, suggests that they 
were so defined as a result of their fifth century consul­
ships. Mommsen, RF 1 258-9 lists them as the Aemilii, 
Cornelii, Fabii, Claudii, Manlii and Valerii; cf. Willems, 
SRR 1 112f.
127.The several Verginii families evident in the fifth 
century may be divided into two distinct groups, one holding 
curule offices and the other plebeian tribunates; see 
Willems, SRR 1, 70 and Degrassi, op.cit. 88-90. The 
ambiguous nature of their status is acknowledged by Ogilvie, 
CL 419, 479 and Richard, OPR 535, 537-8.
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From 485 to 483 the brothers Q. K. and M. Fabius 
shared the consulship with Ser. Cornelius, L. Aemilius 
and L. Valerius respectively. All belonged to gentes 
maiores, as did Cn. Manlius, consul with M. Fabius in 
480, and were of Sabine origin, as was Sp. Furius, consul 
with K. Fabius in 481. In 482, Q. Fabius was consul with
C. lulius (128). All evidently shared loyalty to the 
patriciate (129). Some appear to have been named to 
defend their family spheres of interest; the tribe with 
Aemilius' name lay towards the Volscian lands, near 
Valerius' family estates (130) and both fought in the area 
when consuls (131); the Fabii and Cornelius, who had the 
names of tribes in the north (132) fought the Veientanes
128. Broughton, MRR 22-4.
129. Five were from gentes maiores; five were of Sabine 
origin (see Livy 5*46.2; D.H. 2.48; n.ll2 above; Fest, 
116L; Varro, L.L. 115*73; cf. Cornelius, UFRG 119; 
Degrassi, op.cit. 89-90; Palmer, ACR 291); all were from 
gentes holding many curule posts up to 367; three had the 
names of rural tribes. The Fabii's ancient role in the 
state is indicated by their links with the Lupercalia. 
which they shared with the Quinctii (cf. Wissowa, RKR^
404 n.5, Palmer, ACR 97-135, 140; Richard, OPR 325-6, 
329-330, 343); that of the Aemilii is suggested by their 
claim of descent from Numa (Gundel, art.cit. 2324,
Ogilvie, CL 88f).
130. Taylor, VDRR 44-5.
131. Livy 2.42.3, 9; D.H. 8.83-6, 88-9.
132. For the tribes and evidence of Fabian interest in 
Etruria throughout the Republic, see Munzer, RAA 55-6, 
Taylor, VDRR 40-1, 43, Ogilvie, ERE 115 and Cassola,
GPR 158. Notably three tribes in the north, Fabia, 
Cornelia and Claudia, had Sabine names; presumably the 
gentes had originally settled in the direction of their 
homelands. Cornelius, UFRG 114, 119 notes the close 
links of Fabii and Cornelii in office throughout the fifth 
century.
150
in 4-85 > and 4-82-0 (133). The coincidence of Rome’s 
attack on Veii with the long sequence of Fabii in the 
consulship suggests that the Fabii deliberately promoted 
this war (134)•
A policy of internal discipline, as plebeian tribunes 
agitated about land shortages (135)» also appears to have 
been pursued by some of the group; in 485, Fabius refused 
to distribute plunder to the soldiers (136) and Cassius 
was condemned for treason in 485 after investigation by 
the quaestors, K. Fabius and L. Valerius (137). However, 
tribunician obstruction was such that in 482 an interregnum 
had to be called (138) with the result that the consuls 
of 482 represented a compromise within the whole patriciate; 
hence lulius, and his successor Furius, are contrasted
133. The Fabii also fought in Latium. For military events 
in all these years, cf. Diod. 11.40.5; D.H. 8.82, 84.1» 91»
9.1-3; Livy 2.43-7; Val. Max. 5.5.2; Frontin. Str. 1.11.1, 
2.6.7, 7.11; Oros. 2.5.7; Zon. 7.17.
134. cf. Ogilvie, CL 324; Momigliano, Riv.Stor.Ital. 1967, 
310; n.27 above.
135. D.H. 8.81, 87; Livy 2.42.6.
136. Livy 2.42.2; D.H. 8.82.4; cf. Ogilvie, CL 346-7.
137. Staveley, Ath. 1955» 426-7; cf. Latte, TAPA 1936 24f 
and Lintott, art.cit. 18-22, who deny the quaestors any role
138. D.H. 8.90. He says that after the first interrex 
Sempronius, Larcius named the consuls. Since the Larcii 
are Etruscan, and do not otherwise appear after 487, they 
are likely to have been plebeian, yet it is generally agreed 
that interreges were plebeian (Ch.IB 48).
Confusion with the consular lists in 491 and 490, in which 
Larcius succeeded Sempronius, or a misinterpretation of 
evidence of Larcius’ support of the consuls of 482 (D.H. 
8.91.4) may have caused an error in the interrex’s name; 
the statement of Lyd. Mag. 1.38 that Sempronius was dictator 
and Livy's lack of reference to an interregnum suggest that 
the real names were lost early.
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with the Fabii as favouring concessions to the people (139)
Because Manlius was killed and Fabius wounded in 4-80, 
an interrex named their successors, K. Fabius, consul of 
4-84- and 4-81, and T. Verginius, to pursue the wars (14-0). 
Verginius campaigned at Veii, while Fabius, the more 
experienced general, fought the more threatening Aequi 
(14.1) . While Verginius himself may have been patrician, 
one reason for his election might have been his influence 
among plebeian agitators protesting against the levies 
for the Fabii’s long war in 4-80 (142). Such leaders by 
now included those excluded from the patriciate, with whom 
Verginius could have retained personal ties through his 
plebeian relations; for example, his lieutenant Sicinius 
(143) might have been the consul of 487 who preceded his 
brother in office, and whose family henceforth only appears 
among plebeian tribunes.
According to tradition, K. Fabius volunteered his 
gens to fight at Veii alone, after Verginius* defeat there 
in 479, and in the resulting battle at Oremera all but one 
boy were killed (144)• This story developed from a
139. D.H. 8.90.5, 91.3, 9.1-4; Livy 2.43.2-10.
140. D.H. 9.14.1.
141. D.H. 9.14.2; Livy 2.48.4-5; Zon. 7.17.
142. For hints of this, see Livy 2.44.1, 48.1-4; D.H. 9.5.1
143. D.H. 9.12.5, 14.3.
144. of. Livy 2.48-50, D.H. 9.15, 19-22, Diod. 11.53, Fest. 
45OL, Gell. 17.21. 13, Serv. ad Aen. 6.845, Flor. 1.6, for 
different versions of the tale.
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confusion of Manlius’ battle at Veii in 480, in which all 
three Fabii brothers took part, Menenius’ defeat at Veii 
in 477, the setting up of a garrison at Oremera at about 
this time, and the defeat of three Fabii at the Allia in 
390. Fabius Pictor arranged details of these legends 
within the framework of the heroic tale of the Spartans 
of Thermophylae in order to explain honourably his 
family’s sudden absence from office after its period of 
dominance (145). The real reasons for the family’s 
decline are more likely to be the death and wounding of 
two of the Fabii in 480, and the increasing plebeian 
agitation, which caused influence within the patriciate 
to pass to those concerned with ending the Veian war, 
protecting the south and east and making compromises 
with the plebeian leaders. This is supported by the 
fact that six consuls from 479 to 476 were descended from 
leaders favouring concessions to the people in the troubles 
of 495 to 493, and thus may have inherited personal links 
with plebeian leaders (146). These were three Vergihii, 
two Servilii, whose frequent curule offices indicate that 
they were patrician, and Menenius, who may not even have 
been a patrician; while he has the name of a tribe, his
145. Accounts of military events in 480 and 477 (n.l33, 
150) are equally confused. Hints of the basis of the 
legend survive in Livy 2.45-8 and D.H. 9»H-2-6, 23-4.
For details of the legend’s development, see Pais, ALRH 
168-184; Last, CAH7 504-6; Ogilvie, CL 359-361. For some 
alternative explanations of it see Momigliano, JRS 1963 
121 (an attempted revival of the gentile army; cf. GhlC
94 n.41), and Heurgon, RR 181-2 (a private war by the 
Fabii) .
146. cf. Cornelius, UFRG 114; Bernardi, art.cit. 11-12. 
Broughton, MRR 25-7 suggests that four of them were sons 
of consuls from 503 to 495.
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gens is represented by plebeian tribunes from 410 (147).
In 478, military experience probably dictated the 
choice of Aemilius, the consul of 484» who won a victory 
at Veii in 478, and Furius, named as an extra magistrate 
to fight the Aequi, as he did when consul in 481. The
other consul was Servilius, who kept back the Volsci;
he was replaced by Opet. Verginius when he died in office 
(148).
In 477, Menenius was named as consul to placate those
objecting to patrician monopoly (149). He took a levy to
Veii and was badly defeated (150). His colleague Horatius, 
who was probably patrician, since he himself was an augur 
(151), and his gens held several curule posts up to 367, 
as well as taking the name of a rural tribe in the direction 
of Alba Longa (152), may have been named partly to fight off 
the Volscian invasions in his personal sphere of interest, 
which he shared with Aemilius (153), a^ id partly because he 
inherited influence among the plebeian leaders from the
147. For the Menenia tribe, see n.69 above. For the 
plebeian tribunes, see Livy 4-‘53, 6.19*5, 7.16.1.
14.8. For full references to these facts, see Broughton,
MRR 25-6.
149. D.H. 9.17.4-5, 18.1 notes domestic disturbances before 
the levy, and Aemilius' sympathies with the plebeian leaders
150. cf. D.H. 9.18, 23-4; Livy 2.50.2 and Dio. fr. 21.3.
151. Livy 3.32.3.
152. An indirect hint of the gens' sphere of interest is 
the ancient legend of the conflict of Horatii and Curiatii 
at Alba; see Taylor, VDRR 43; Ogilvie, OL 109f; Alfoldi,
ERL 312-3; Richard, OPR 197, 474*
153. For his military action, see D.H. 9*18.5,'24*3-4;
Dio. fr. 21.3; Livy 2.50.2.
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early years of the Republic (154).
Verginius and Servilius were named as consuls for 
476 (155) to prevent domestic unrest and continue the war 
in Servilius' sphere of interest in the north (156), the 
Etruscans having invaded Latium after Menenius' defeat, 
and caused grain shortages (157). However, while the 
consuls organised the import of grain from Campania (158), 
the plebeian leaders expressed their dissatisfaction with 
the state's leaders by prosecuting Menenius, the consul 
of 477, for military incompetence. Possibly through his 
influence with them, he was only given a trivial fine (159)
The import of grain in 475 (160) prevented the 
plebeian leaders getting enough popular support to win 
their prosecutions of Servilius for military incompetence 
at Veii in 475 (161) and the consuls of 474 on an uncertain 
charge concerning land in 473 {16-2). It may also have
154. According to the legend, the Horatii and -Curiatii were 
descended from a Sicinius (D.H. 3*13.4); the consul of 477 
was son of the consul of 509 and 507 (Broughton, MRR 26).
155. Broughton, MRR 27 *
156. D.H. 9.25.1 notes their military experience.
157. Livy 2.50.2; D.H. 9*25.1-4*
158. D.H. 9.25.4.
159. Cornelius, UFRG 122-3*
160. Livy 2.52, 54.2.
161. D.H. 9.26; Livy 2.51*4-9*
162. Livy 2.55.1 notes the tribunes' inability to obstruct
the levy in 473. For the prosecutions, which fizzled out,
see Livy 2.52.6-8, 54; D.H. 9*28-33, 37-8.
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caused Verginius and Servilius to become more concerned 
again with issues on which they had more in common with 
their allies in the centre of the patriciate. They 
instituted a new phase of consuls from 475 to 472 - 
P. Valerius, C. Nautius, L. and P. Furius, A. Manlius,
L. Aemilius (for the third time), Vop. lulius, and 
L. Pinarius. Aemilius himself and fathers, brothers 
or cousins of all the others were consuls from 489 to 
480, forming the patriciate and pursuing the wars; those 
in office from 475 may have shared their priorities (163). 
In 475 and 474, Nautius fought back the Volscians, 
Valerius, aided by Servilius, the consul of 476, defeated 
the Veientanes and Sabines, and Manlius won an ovatio 
over the Veientanes, making a forty year truce (164).
The consuls of 471 seem to have been named to 
•represent different sides in the conflict among the 
patricians over a bill establishing regular elections and 
legislation in the concilium plebis, which the plebeian 
tribune Valero Publilius hoped to have passed in the 
comitia centuriata (165). Consuls were App. Claudius, 
son of the consul of 495, and T. Quinctius Capitolinus 
(166); both were patrician, being from gentes of ancient 
standing in the state, and holding many curule offices
163. See Broughton, MRR 27-30 and Ogilvie, CL 371 for their 
names; see n.ll3, 129 above for hints of their concern with 
patrician monopoly.
164. Livy 2.53-4; D.H. 9.34-6; Degrassi, op.cit. 537.
165. See Ch.IB 55 for details of the law. See D.H. 
9.41-2, 43.4 and Livy 2.56 for Volero's promotion of it.
166. Broughton, MRR 30.
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up to 367 (167). While stories of Claudius' harsh treat­
ment of his unruly troops and trial by the tribunes contain 
many contradictions and coincidences (168), his opposition 
to the law which they illustrate is likely, since he 
opposed the acknowledgement of the plebeian state in 450 
(169). Quinctius' attested appeasement of Claudius, and 
passage of the law (170) are also credible. In the next 
•decade, when an aggressive military policy was pursued, 
facilitated by such economic stability that any attempts 
to disrupt government by plebeian tribunes could be ignored 
(171), Quinctius led the army four times; he was then 
absent from office from 463 to 446, when domestic and 
constitutional affairs prevailed, returning to pursue the 
same military aims as consul three more times. This 
career, and the fact that he shared with his predecessor, 
Furius, interests in areas of Latium vulnerable to 
Aequian attacks (172), where Quinctius fought in 471 and 
they both fought in 464 (173), suggest that Quinctius' 
promotion of the military policy was the basis for his 
support of the Volerian law.
167. See Ch.IB 31; n.l26, 129, 132 above; Palmer, ACR 
290-1; Ogilvie, CL 274-
168. Ogilvie, CL 383-7. Again, it seems to have fizzled 
out for lack of public support.
169* For more uncertain hints of his attitude, see D.H. 
8.90, 9.1-2, 42-5; Livy 2.44, 46.
170. D.H. 9-48f: Livy 2.56.15-57.
171. After Claudius' trial, there are only a few hints of 
internal disturbances in the next six years (Livy 2.61.1,
63.1, 64.1, 3.1; D.H. 9.59.1).
172. See n.ll2 above; A. Piganiol, 'Romains et Latins', 
MEFR 1920, 285f.
173. D.H. 9.50.1-2, 62-66; Livy 2.58.3, 60.1-3, 3.4-5.
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From 471 to 463 curule offices were held by leaders 
pursuing Quinctius' military policy and maintaining the 
patrician monopoly. They came from eleven gentes - the 
Claudii, Quinctii, Valerii, Aemilii, Verginii, Servilii, 
Fabii, Furii, Postumii, Aebutii, and Numicii (174). The 
first eight have been noted as patrician gentes; the 
Postumii, holding many curule and priestly positions up 
to 367, are likely to have been patrician; the Numicii 
and Aebutii must be left undecided, for we only know of 
the consuls of this period and one other curule magistrate 
from their gentes. All the consuls from 471 to 463 led 
armies against the Sabines, Aequi and Volsci (175), 
except Posturaius, who, being from a gens of much religious 
authority, may have been specially elected to dedicate a 
temple to the Sabine god Semo Sancus Deus Fidius (176), 
and the consuls of 463, who died in a pestilence (177). 
Each consul may have been particularly concerned about 
one hostile tribe according to the location of his gens 
estates; -Claudius, the Servilii and the Fabii with the 
Sabines; Valerius, the Aemilii, and Numicius, who took 
the name of a river south of the Aemilia tribe (178), with
174. Broughton, MRR 31-5; Ogilvie, CL 391-2, 398.
175. D.H. 9.55-66; Livy 2.62-5, 3.1.1-5; Frontin. Str. 
2.7.10, 12.1, 3.1.1; Degrassi, op.cit. 537.
176. D.H. 9.60.5; Ovid Fast. 6.213-8. Presumably they 
hoped to win the god over to Rome's side. See n.227 for 
evidence of the Postumii's religious authority.
177. D.H. 9.67-8; Livy 3-6-7; Oros. 2.12.3-
178. Ogilvie, CL 41-2.
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the Volsci; the Quinctii and Furius with the Aequi (179). 
Many inherited military interests from their relations 
who fought back the same tribes from 499 to 493, from 484 
to 480, and from 479 to 475; hence the combinations of 
names in the lists from 471 to 463 often repeat those of 
these times (180). The repetitions of office in this 
decade may reflect not only the close loyalty of the 
group, but also their concern to retain experienced military 
leaders; from 468 to 465» the climax of the conflict with 
the Aequi, five out of the eight consuls had already held 
the military leadership since 471; by contrast, in 464, 
when no fighting was expected, both consuls held office 
for the first time. Factional loyalty and experience of 
leadership would also have contributed to the choice of 
all other magistrates and officials involved in the war 
besides the consuls; all eight known were also consuls 
from 472 to 463 (181).
The domination of office by this military faction was 
ended first by the interregnum in 462, necessitated by 
the death of the previous consuls, which meant that the 
choice of consuls was made by all the patricians, and then 
by the build up, from 462 to 445, of a continual series of
179. Note that Quinctius and Furius fought the Aequi in 
465 and 464, Aemilius and Numicius the Volsci in 467 and 
469, and Servilius the Sabines in 468; all may have been 
named partly for their local knowledge.
180. cf. Cornelius, UFRG 115- Eight of the consuls were 
sons, cousins or nephews of twelve leaders in power in 
these earlier years.
181. For details, see Broughton, MRR 32-4.
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demands by plebeian leaders for the curbing of the consuls' 
judicial powers, full recognition of their own institutions, 
publication of the laws, and finally representation in 
the consulship. These plebeian leaders gradually gained 
support from the people as economic conditions worsened, 
and from patricians, whose loyalty to each other declined 
as the threat of external attack receded. The general 
lack of control by any one faction from 462 to 445 is 
indicated by the fact that sixty per cent of all gentes 
known in consular office from 5<39 to 367 are represented 
in these eighteen years, only seven gentes hold office 
more than once, and eleven out of the twenty-seven gentes 
reaching consular office in this period do so for the first 
time. The loss of patrician control is indicated by the 
fact that about eleven out of thirty-six consuls are 
plebeian, the same ratio as in the period before the form­
ation of the patriciate; only seven consulships are held 
by gentes maiores; only eleven consulships are held by 
the patrician gentes in power from 471 to 463, and seven 
of them are in the years 460, 459 and 446, when military 
affairs overshadowed the constitutional issues.
In 462 the interrex, P. Valerius, named the consuls 
L. Lucretius and T. Veturius (182). Both are likely to 
have been patrician; the Veturii are represented in early 
priesthoods and have the name of a rural tribe (183); the
182. Broughton, MRR 35-6.
183. See Livy 3.32.3, 29-38.6; n.67 above. cf. Beloch, 
RG 238f; Munzer, RAA 123f; Shatzman, CQ 1973 65f.
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Lucretii hold several curule posts up to 367 (184).
Since both are from gentes unknown since their fathers 
held consulships in the first fifteen years of the 
Republic, their choice may have resulted from demands for 
fairer representation within the whole patriciate. Both 
continued the wars against the Aequi and Volsci, Veturius 
fighting in the area of his family estates (18$); perhaps 
his local knowledge contributed to his election.
Lucretius may have represented those opposed to the bill 
put forward by Terentilius, a plebeian tribune, in the 
course of 462, which regulated and defined consular 
imperium (186). Lucretius’ opposition to the bill is 
suggested by his nominating as praefectus urbi in 462 one 
of its opponents, Q. Fabius, who nominated Lucretius to 
the same post in 459» when the law was still being debated 
(187). Also, in 461, Lucretius defended K. Quinctius,
184. While they hold nine curule posts from 486 to 367, all 
other gentes linked with the Tar-quin dynasty (admittedly 
through the male rather than the female line) became plebeian 
(n.ll) and a Lucretius was plebeian tribune in 210 (Livy 
27.5.16) so this conclusion is not certain.
185. See Livy 3.8.3-11, 10.1-4; D.H. 9.69.3-73.4; Degrassi, 
op.cit. 537.
186. -Mommsen, RSt 2^  702 n.2 and Ogilvie, CL 411f have argued 
that his proposal was not 'quinque viri legibus de imperio 
consulari scribendi' (Livy 3-9.10) but 'quinque viri consulari 
imperio de legibus scribendi', on the grounds that the Decem­
virs performed the latter task, and the consuls' powers would 
not have been subjected to such investigation. But the 
proposal did fail to get through; Cicero does not mention it 
in his account of the Decemvirate; D.H. 10.1.3 says that 
Terentilius proposed that laws be made on both public and 
private affairs. The bill made little progress in 462; cf.
D.H. 9.69.1, 10.1.5; Livy 3-9.13.
187. Livy 2.8.7, 3-9, 24-2; D.H. 9-69-2.
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another opponent, who was being tried by one of its 
supporters, the tribune, A. Verginius (188). The story 
of Quinctius’ trial, while full of suspect details (189), 
may have developed from a genuine tradition of individual 
attitudes towards the respective judicial powers of the 
plebeian tribunes and the consuls (190).
Of the consuls named for 461 (191), Ser. Sulpicius 
is clearly patrician from his family record of offices 
up to 367, while P. Volumnius, whose gens has an Etruscan 
name, and only holds this one curule position, is likely 
to be plebeian (192). Again, neither gens is known since 
the early years of the Republic; perhaps their predecessors 
chose them partly because they were old family friends 
whose gentes had long been excluded, like theirs, from 
consular office (193) • Volumnius may also have been 
named to weaken the plebeian leaders' support for the 
Terentilian bill; however it remained a matter of debate, 
and the plebeian tribunes' popular support, after some 
bad prodigies, was such as to force K. Quinctius into 
voluntary exile in the course of the year (194) .
188. Livy 3.11.6-13; D.H. 10.5-8; Auct. Vi-r. ill. 17.1.
189. Ogilvie, OL 4l6f.
190. Others defending Caeso were his father Gincinnatus, 
his uncle Capitolinus, and the consul of 464» Furius (Livy 
3.12; D.H. 10.5-8).
191. Broughton, MRR 36.
192. Ogilvie, CL 415.
193. A Volumnia was supposedly daughter-in-law of a Veturia 
(Livy 2.40) and Sulpicius' father preceded Veturius' in the 
consulship of 500.
194. of. D.H. 10.1.1, 2.1: Livy 3.10.5f; Ogilvie, CL 416.
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In 460, expectation of attack by the Sabines may 
explain the election of P. Valerius, who had fought the 
Sabines when consul in 475, and C. Claudius, who might 
have had useful local knowledge, since his family estates 
lay in the direction of the attack (195). The two consuls 
maintained different approaches to Terentilius' bill and 
the people's objections to the levy (I96); Valerius 
promised to present the Terentilian bill to the comitia 
centuriata if the levy was taken (197), while Claudius 
favoured a sterner approach (198). After Valerius was 
killed in battle, Claudius named L. Quinctius Cincinnatus, 
father of the man prosecuted the previous year, as consul 
suffect (199), partly, no doubt, because he shared his 
opposition to the Terentilian bill (-200), and Valerius' 
promise was not fulfilled (201).
195. Broughton, MRR 37-8. D.H. 10.14-16 and Livy 3.15f 
suggest that Herdonius attacked through the Claudian tribe.
196. For the domestic unrest over these issues, see D.H. 
10.8.5,9-11, 15.4; Livy 3.15.3, 16.5-6.
197. D.H. 9.49.3-4, 10.15.6-7; cf. Livy 3.18.6.
198. C. Claudius, probably the brother of the consul of 471 
(Ogilvie, CL 423) is generally portrayed as opposing 
concessions to the plebeians (D.H. 10.9.2, 12-13, 15.5,
17.1, 30, 32.4, 11.49; Livy 3.19.1, 58, 4.6.7) although like 
Lucretius he is shown to be willing to accept them when the 
military situation demanded it (Livy 3.40, 58.1; D.H. 11.7-15, 
22, 55-6, 60). Since Claudius himself and Valerius' and 
Verginius' kinsmen were involved in the disputes of 450 and 
449, many details of events in 46O may have been borrowed 
from them.
199. Broughton, MRR 37.
200. cf. Livy 3.19-21, Val. Max. 4.1*4 and D.H. 10.6, 18-19, 
hinting that judicial powers remained the main issue of 
contention.
201. D.H. 10.17.1; Livy 3*19.1*
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Quinctius and Claudius may have shared three common 
aims with their successors Q. Fabius and L. Cornelius, 
descendants of the first patricians to hold consulships 
(202) - the defence of the state against the Volsci and 
Aequi, against whom Fabius had already fought in 467 and 
465, the quelling of agitation for Terentilius' bill, 
and the re-establishing of a patrician monopoly. Fabius 
and Cornelius went to war and celebrated triumphs (203), 
appointed A. Cornelius and Q. Servilius as quaestors to 
investigate Velscius' false witness in the trial of K. 
Quinctius, thus reasserting the consuls' judicial authority 
(204), and carried out a census (205). Their dependence 
on patrician loyalty is indicated by the fact that the 
Fabii, Cornelii and Servilii do not reappear in curule 
office until after the constitutional settlements with 
the plebeians in 445.
In 458 the names of the consuls are confused; I 
will accept the view that they were C. Nautius and
202. Broughton, MRR 38.
203. D.H. 10.20-21; Livy 3.22-3, 24.10; Degrassi, op.cit. 
537.
204. See D.H. 10.7, Livy 3.13.1-3 for Volscius' evidence 
in Quinctius' trial. See D.H. 10.20.4, Livy 3.24 and 
Val. Max. 4.1.4 for unrest in 459 and the quaestors' 
investigation. Servilius'father may have been prosecuted 
by tribunes in 475, and Cornelius might have been father 
of the consul of 459 (Ogilvie, CL 437).
205. Livy 3.22.
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Papirius (206). The latter is the first consul from his 
gens, which was clearly patrician, since it had much 
religious authority (207), gave its name to a rural tribe, 
and held many curule posts up to 367. Patrician loyalty 
and the military drive against the Sabines and Aequi, who 
still threatened Latium in the vicinity of the Papiria 
tribe (208), may explain their choice, just as in 475, 
when Nautius was consul with Valerius, the consul of 460. 
Perhaps it was Fabius who so named them, since he was 
appointed praefectus urbi in 458 (209). When Papirius 
died, Nautius named as his successor Minucius, who is 
likely to have been a plebeian, since his gens was 
•represented in the tribunate in 401 (210). He may have
206. Livy 3.25.1, D.H. 10.22.1 and Diod. 11.88.1 note 
Nautius and Minucius as consuls; Nautius is noted by Val.
Max. 5.2.2 and late Fasti, the latter calling his colleague 
Atratinus (Degrassi, op.cit. 362-3); Fast.Oap. (Degrassi, 
op.cit. 24-5) notes Minucius as consul suffect, replacing
' - Carven - ' , who died in office. Ogilvie, 'The consul 
of 458', Hermes 1961, 379-382, reconstructs Papirius' 
name from this fragment, showing that Atratinus was in the 
late Fasti because it was wrongly used as a cognomen of 
the Papirii. However he argues that Papirius is misplaced 
from 411; see Oh.3 207 n.94 for objections to this. For 
other views, see Richard, OPR 323 n.ll2.
207. Cornelius, UFRG 98-9; Ogilvie, OL 147-238; Richard,
OPR 323-4; cf. Beloch, RG 80.
208. For the military threats, see D.H. 10.22 and Livy 3.25.5-
26.2. For the location of the tribe, and the gens' Latin 
connections, see Schulze, OLE 86, 331, Taylor, VDRR 43,and 
Ogilvie, art.cit. 381-2 and CL, 148, 615.
209. In this post he took an active part in military affairs; 
see D.H. 10.22.2, 23-4-5, 24-1 and Livy 3-25.6, 29-8; cf. 
Beloch, RG 8-9. This may partly explain the view of Diod. 
12.3.1 that he was consul in 457 with Gincinnatus, dictator 
of 458.
210. The unlikely story of Minucius being co-opted as an 
eleventh plebeian tribune in 439 (Livy 4-16.2-4) might have 
been developed by those who did not believe plebeians were 
consuls at this stage, and did not, like Divy, P^ace the law 
against such co-option as early as 448; cf. Ch.IB 4P n.p , 
Beloch, RG 16-17; Ogilvie, CL 551-
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made this choice, partly because the Sabine attacks were 
already causing corn shortages, and Minucius inherited 
knowledge about the corn supply, and partly in the hope 
of weakening the plebeian leaders * support for the 
Terentilian bill, as in 461 (211). The subsequent 
nomination of Quinctius Gincinnatus, the consul suffect 
of 460, as dictator in 458 to rescue Minucius and his army 
when trapped by the Aequi may have been largely because of 
his local knowledge (212). The dictator's brother, 
Quinctius Capitolinus, consul of 471, and M. Valerius, 
consul of 456, were named as quaestors to continue the 
prosecution of Volscius (213).
211. cf. D.H. 10.22.1; Livy 3-24.9, 25-2-4, 9, 29-8.
212. For full refs, to military events, see Broughton, MRR 
39 and Ogilvie, CL 436f. Cincinnatus would have shared 
the links in Latium of his brother Capitolinus (n.l72); 
perhaps it was through his influence that Mamilius, the 
Tusculan leader, possibly a kinsman of his magister equitum 
Tarquinius (n.23; Ogilvie, CL 442) was given citizenship in 
return for aid in the war (Piganiol, art.cit. 289)- 
Cincinnatus is said to have been recalled to serve the 
state from an estate in the north (D.H. 10.8.4-5, 23-4;
Livy 3.13.10, 26.8-12) but the story, repeated for Quinctii 
in 460 and 439 (D.H. 10.17; Cic. Cat.mai. 56, de dom 86) 
could have been located there because his son went into 
exile in Etruria (Livy 3-13-9) and there was an area called 
the prata Quinctia by the Tiber (Ogilvie, CL 442).
213- Livy 2.29-6-7, 3-25-2; Ogilvie, CL 438; H. Gundel, 
'Quinctius', PWRE xxiv (Stuttgart, 1963) 991f- Quinctius 
would have felt family loyalty to his nephew, and, while 
Valerius' cousin compromised over the Terentilian law 
when the Sabines threatened in 46O and recognised the 
plebeian state in 449, and the quaestors themselves made 
other concessions to plebeian leaders in 457-6, the quaestors, 
with hopes of future consulships, would have opposed restrict­
ing consular imperium, which was probably the real issue in 
Quinctius' and Volscius' trials. It is tempting to suggest 
that the sources confused the two Quinctii brothers this 
year, since Cincinnatus had been more directly concerned with 
Volscius' trial, Capitolinus was the more experienced general, 
and D.H. 10.23-4 suggests that Capitolinus led out the troops 
which Cincinnatus used.
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Since the story of Minucius’ abdication after his 
military failure in 458 is probably a duplication of events 
in 217 (214) , either he or Nautius named their successors 
for 457, when military defence, alleviation of the mount­
ing economic distress and the strife with the tribunes 
were the main issues at hand. One consul was the patrician 
0. Horatius, the consul of 477, who had experience as a 
general, and fought the Aequi in 457 (215); the other was 
Q. Minucius, who fought the Sabines (216) and, like his 
brother, may have been chosen to deal with the corn short­
ages. Possibly because they inherited links with 
plebeian leaders from the early days of the Republic (217), 
they were able to persuade A. Verginius, who had been 
plebeian tribune since 461, to abandon his attempts to 
have the Terentilian law passed by consuls, in return for 
their presentation in the comitia centuriata of a 
plébiscita which raised the numbers of plebeian tribunes 
to ten. It was supported by Cincinnatus, doubtless 
concerned about the levy, and opposed by Claudius (218).
In 456, military threats temporarily abated, and 
internal political issues prevailed. The new consuls 
were M. Valerius, the quaestor of 458, whose cousin, with 
another of the Horatii, passed the laws of 449 recognising
214. cf. Broughton, MRR 39-40; Cornelius, UFRG 54;
Ogilvie, CL 444*
215. D.H. 10.26.2-4, 30.7-8; Livy 3-30.2.
216. D.H. 10.26.1, 30.7; Livy 3-30.4-
217. Verginii and Minuoii held offices from 496 to 491 and 
Horatius was linked with Verginii from 478 to 476; both were 
periods of economic distress and plebeian agitation.
218. of. Livy 3.29-30; D.H. 10.26-30.
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the plebeian state, and Sp, Verginius, who was related 
to the plebeian tribunes agitating for this from 46I to 
449» and the consul who succeeded Valerius in 449- 
Both consuls, like their predecessors, were also 
descended from those who had supported economic concessions 
to the people from 494 to 492, and from 479 to 475 (219).
In 456, after a crop failure, and some dispute over the 
tribunes' powers, they passed in the comitia centuriata 
the law supplying housing on the Aventine, promoted by 
the plebeian tribune, Icilius, son of a tribune of 493 
(22), and tribune himself again in 449. These details 
suggest that the consuls of 456 shared concern to end 
the conflict over magisterial authority and alleviate 
economic distress, and that this was the reason for their 
nomination by predecessors of similar disposition.
From 455 to 452, six of the consuls are from gentes 
not previously represented in high office, and three are 
only ever represented in this period (221). Yet the 
names and associations of several indicate that their 
gentes were of long standing in Rome, so they may have been 
all loosely united by resentment of their exclusion from
219. Both were sons of magistrates in 494, see Broughton, 
MRR 41-2.
220. D.H. 10.31-2, 11.28.2; Livy 3.31.1.
221. Broughton, MRR 42-5; Cornelius, UFRG 115.
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Republican offices (222). Their obscurity means that 
further reasons for their elections are uncertain; this 
is particularly true of the first in the sequence, T. 
Romilius and C. Veturius. We may only surmise from tales 
of Romilius' severe measures to get a levy to fight the 
Aequi, his conflict with the lieutenants Verginius and 
Icilius, and his and Veturius' subsequent trial by plebeian 
officials challenging their consular rights over booty 
in 454 (223) that they did not share their predecessors' 
attitude to internal conflict (224); perhaps personal ties, 
developed through living in the same area and holding 
office in similar periods, influenced Valerius' choice of 
them (225). In 454 the increasing popular discontent may 
have contributed to Romilius' or Veturius' choice of
222. Menenius, Romilius and Veturius have the names of 
rural tribes (n.67, 69, 225); Sestius' cognomen 'Vaticanus' 
refers to an area in the Romilia (Degrassi, op.cit. 93-4; 
Ogilvie, CL 451); Tarpeius' gens name and cognomen 'Capitol­
inus' and Aeternius' cognomen 'Fontinalis' refer to areas 
of Rome (Degrassi, op.cit. 93); Plut. Num. 10.1 notes 
Tarpeia as a Vestal Virgin in Numa's reign; see n.l52 and 
129 for hints of the ancient standing in Rome of the 
Curiatii and Quinctilii (the latter through the Quinctii;
H. Gundel, 'Quinctilius', PWRE xxiv (Stuttgart, 1963) 894; 
Palmer, ACR, 135 n.2.)
223. Shatzman, Hist. 1972, 189*
224. It is difficult to determine whether Romilius was 
patrician or plebeian; he has the name of a rural tribe, 
but this is the only time that his gens reaches curule 
office.
225. For the Valerii's interests in the Veturian tribe, see 
n.67; for the Romilian tribe neighbouring it, see Taylor, 
VDRR 38; cf. Badian, JRS 1962, 201. A Veturius was a 
colleague of Valerius' and Verginius' fathers in 494, and 
P. Valerius may have named Veturius' uncle as consul in 462
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successors, Sp. Tarpeius and A. Aeternius, plebeian 
agitators who were tribunes in 448 (226). In 454 they 
passed the law concerning the consuls' and tribunes' 
rights to fine, and sent three ex-consuls, A. Manlius,
Sp. Postumius and P. Sulpicius, to Greece in preparation 
for the codification of the law (227). The consuls may 
have hoped the codifiers would further curb the consuls' 
judicial powers, establish fairer economic conditions 
for the people, gain fuller recognition for the plebeian 
state, and, since the pontifices who guarded the law and 
the consuls from 485 were largely patrician, generally 
decrease patrician control of the state. In 453, all 
we know of one of the consuls, Quinctilius, is that he 
died of pestilence (228); his colleague Guriatius,being 
related to Curtius, who set up the consular tribunate
226. cf. Ch.IB 45 n.51; D.H. 10.48.1, 50 describes them 
courting the populace.
227. The historicity of the embassy (Livy 3.31.8; Lyd. Mag.
1.34; D.H. 10.51-2; Zon. 7.18) has often been contested;
see Ogilvie, CL 449-450. However it is supported by stories 
of earlier expeditions from Rome to Greece (D.H. 4.68-9) 
and of Rome's early contacts with Greek ideas in Italy (see 
Ch.lA 15-16; Ch.IB 63 n.98, and above, 130). The envoys 
might have been chosen for their interests in them; the 
envoy's father, Postumius, vowed a temple to the Greek gods 
Ceres, Liber and Libera, at the order of the Sibylline books 
(D.H. 6.17; Le Bonniec, CC 213f). Postumius himself, who 
may have been a pontifex and therefore had knowledge of exist­
ing Roman codes of law (Broughton, MRR 36) had dedicated 
temples to the Greek deities. Castor and Pollux (Livy 2.42.5) 
and the Sabine god Semo Sancus, who was associated with the 
Greek god Hercules (Bayet, Hercule, 306f); Sulpicius, the 
envoy, was consul in 461, when the Sibylline books were 
consulted (Ogilvie, CL 415). Momigliano, Riv.Stor.Ital.
1967, 310-11, suggests that Greece influenced the development 
of plebeian political institutions.
228. Livy 3.32.2; D.H. 10.53-54-2; Degrassi, op.cit. 93.
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when consul in 445, may have shared the views of his pre­
decessors (229). The consuls of 452 were Sestius and 
Menenius, grandson of a mediator at the first secession 
and possibly nephew of the consul of 477 prosecuted by 
one of the Genucii in 476. Menenius' background, the 
story that the consuls tried to delay the setting up of 
the Decemvirate, and hints that they amended the law 
concerning the consuls' judicial powers (230) suggest 
that, although they were plebeian (231), they represented 
those fearing radical changes, who might have gained more 
influence in the governing class with the prospect of 
the return of the embassy to Greece in 452.
The major issue in the election of 451 was the creation 
of a Decemvirate to codify the law. One consul was Ap. 
Claudius, who had opposed the Volerian law in 471, and 
whose brother had opposed the Terentilian law in 460 (232); 
the other was T. Genucius, kinsman of plebeian tribunes 
holding prosecutions in the 470's, and the consul who set 
up the consular tribunate with Curtius in 445 (233).
Perhaps it had been agreed that Claudius would represent
229. Ogilvie, CL 528-9- Also, the Curiatii had legend­
ary links with the Sicinii (n.l72), represented by plebeian 
tribunes in 454 and 449; the next Curiatus known was 
plebeian tribune in 401 (Livy 5.11-4).
230. See Livy 3-33-4; D.H. 10.54-3-5; Staveley, Hist.
1954, 420.
231. See n.147 and Ch.3 206, 208, for hints of their 
plebeian status.
232. Ogilvie, CL 376, 386-7.
233. Broughton, MRR 27, 29, 45, 52.
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the patricians who dominated the priestly colleges and 
the senate, and Genucius would represent those challenging 
the control of the consulship by patrician factions, and 
that they would co-opt eight others to form a Decemvirate 
(234). Ap. Claudius’ likely nominees were C. lulius,
A. Manlius and Sp. Postumius, who had all won consulships 
in the period of patrician monopoly, and Sulpicius, the 
consul of 461 ; their kinsmen reappear in the period from 
447 to 424, when patrician factions again monopolised 
consular office. Genucius’ likely allies were Veturius, 
Romilius, Sestius and Curiatus, who had gained consulships 
since the breakdown of patrician control; indeed the latter 
two, like Genucius, were probably plebeian (23$). Other 
reasons for the choice of Decemvirs by the consuls besides 
the need to compromise over patrician monopolies may also 
be detected. Sestius had formally proposed the Decem­
virate; Romilius had proposed the embassy on which 
Postumius, Manlius and Sulpicius had learnt about Greek 
methods of codification; all the others were ex-consuls 
of varied age and experience (236) . All ten belonged to
234. Their position is not clear; while Livy 3-33.3, D.H, 
10.54-6 and Zon. 7.18 suggest that they gave up their 
consulships in return for leadership of the Decemvirate, 
Cic. de rep. 2.$1 and Fast. Cap. (Degrassi, op.cit. 94, 
364-5) call them consuls.
235. Broughton, MRR 45-6; cf. Beloch, RG 238f and Ogilvie, 
CL 456-7.
236. Livy 3.33.5-6; D.H. 10.56.2. cf. Ogilvie, CL 450, 
457. Concern to get a broad range of experience might 
have been the basis of the choice of ex-consuls of the 
past thirty years who had not shared office (a fact noted 
by Beloch, RG 231f and E. Gintowt, ’Dictator Romanus’,
RIDA 1949 385-394; for objections to their conclusions, 
see Staveley, Hist. 1956 96).
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Sabine or Latin gentes well established in the state - 
three, indeed, gave their names to rural tribes - and thus 
would have favoured retaining the traditional ways of life 
in the civil code; any plebeian Decemvirs supporting 
economic concessions to the people were presumably out­
voted by their colleagues.
The outcry of plebeian leaders at the limited 
constitutional changes and harsh civil code produced by 
the Decemvirs and the incompleteness of the code by the 
end of 451 meant that a second Decemvirate had to be chosen 
for 4.50 (237). The first Decemvirs issued their laws in 
ten tables as leges datae (238) and stepped down from 
office; a second Decemvirate was then created, apparently 
by a free election (239). Those likely to have won 
mainly through popular appeal were members of leading 
plebeian gentes - Minucius, consul of 458, Q. Poetelius, 
kinsman of a plebeian tribune agitating for land in 441, 
the year before Minucius was praefectus annonae, and K. 
Duillius, kinsman of the plebeian tribune of 470 who had 
brought App. Claudius to trial, and who was re-elected as
237. D.H. 10.55.3, 58.1-2; Livy 3-34.8. For details 
of the laws of the first Decemvirate, see notes 16, 17 
and 43 above.
238. Livy 3.34-2-6 and D.H. 10.55-5, 57.5-7 say that they 
were approved by senate and people. Given the reaction to 
them, however, this may be a late Republican rational­
isation, to contrast with the traditionally repressive 
second Decemvirate; see Staveley, Ath. 1955 17-18; 
Bleicken, LP 90f.
239. D.H. 10.58.2-3, 11.6.4; Livy 3-35; Ogilvie, CL 460.
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tribune in 449 U40j. Those likely to have won through 
personal authority and client control form a close circle ■ 
Claudius, M. Sergius, Fabius consul of 459, and Cornelius 
son of Fabius’ colleague; all give their names to tribes 
north of Rome, where the founders of the patriciate, led 
by Fabius’ and Cornelius’ forefathers, fought from 485; 
Fabius, Cornelius’ father and Claudius’ brother all 
opposed the Terentilian law in 46C (241). This leaves 
three Decemvirs to account for. Antonius’ gens only 
provides one curule magistrate in the fifth century (242); 
Rabuleius’ gens is only otherwise known in the plebeian 
tribunate of 486 (243); Cppius’ ancient Roman gens (244), 
is only otherwise known until the third century by the
24c. For variants of their names, see Broughton, MRR 46-7 
and Cgilvie, CL 462. D.H. 1C.58.4-5 only notes Poetelius 
and Duillius as plebeian; cf. n.233* Since all, like the 
Genucii, won consulships in the second half of the fourth 
century, they probably also had influential friends and 
clients to help them win the elections.
241. See Degrassi, op.cit. 94; Broughton, MRR 46-7 and 
Cgilvie, CL 462 for variations in their names and their 
likely family relationships. D.H. 11.4.7-5.1, 16-18,
and Livy 3.4C.8-I4, 41-4, 9 attest to their mutual loyalty 
in 45C—449•
242. D.H. 1C.58.4 (cf. Livy 3.35.11), accepted by Willems, 
SRR 1 54-5 and Cornelius, UFRG 1C4-1C5, implies that 
Antonius was patrician, however they assume that all 
consular tribunes were patrician up to 4CC (Livy 5.12.12), 
which I question (see Ch.IB 59f; above 125; Ch.3 2C2).
243. Since D.H. 1C.58.4 (cf. Livy 3-35.11) implies that he 
was patrician, Munzer, ’Rabuleius’, PWRE l.A.l (Stuttgart, 
1914; 29 discards the plebeian tribune of 486.
244. Cgilvie, CL 461-2; Richard, CPR 223-
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Vestal Virgin of 483 (245), and tribunes in 449 of dubious 
credibility (246). I would suggest that whichever were 
plebeian, they were all creatures of Claudius, who 
supported them to enable him to control the Decemvirate 
while fulfilling the demands of plebeian leaders for equal 
patrician and plebeian representation (247); hence the 
stories of Claudius’ volte face towards the plebeians in 
canvassing (248). With the support of these stooges, the 
patrician Decemvirs were able to outvote their opponents 
in the college and pass the lex conubii; by this means 
they hoped to prevent the personal bonds between plebeian 
and patrician gentes which had partly caused the breakdown 
of patrician control, and which would have been of little 
concern to the minor plebeian Decemvirs. This may partly 
explain why the second Decemvirs came to be portrayed as 
repressive tyrants (249) comprising only patricians (250), 
despite the fact that some of their names appear in the 
plebeian tribunate of 449 (251). It may have been an
245. Munzer, 'Die romischen Vestalinnen bis zur Kaiserzeit', 
Philol. 1937-8 211f.
246. D.H. 10.58.4 (cf. Livy 3.35.11) says Oppius the 
Decemvir was plebeian. See 176-8 belowon the tribunes.
247. Bernardi, RIL 1945-6, 12f uses this equal division as 
an argument for the board's authenticity.
248. cf. D.H. 10.57.2-4, 58.4-5; Livy 3-33.7, 35-3f-
249. See e.g. Cic. de rep. 2.63; D.H. 10.59-3-60.5, 11.2,
22, 40-1 and Livy 3.36-7. Valerius' concern to contrast 
the Decemvirs with his ancestor in 449 and the harshness 
of the whole civil code also contributed.to this picture 
(Ogilvie, CL 453-4, 465-6; Scullard, HRW 87-8).
250. Livy 4.13.17.
251. Thus I would answer those such as Willems, SRR 1 51,
De Sanctis, StR 2 48f and Ogilvie, CL 461-2, who use these 
plebeian tribunes as counter evidence to the existence of 
the second Decemvirate.
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attempt by Fabius Pictor, concerned to maintain the 
reputation of his forefather the Decemvir, to counteract 
this image, or a misunderstanding of the consuls’ 
publication of the Twelve Tables in 4.4.9 (252) that led 
Diodorus to suggest that these consuls were actually 
responsible for the lex conubii (255).
Presumably Claudius hoped to nominate his allies as 
consuls the year after the Decemvirs had completed the 
civil code, which they published as leges datae like their 
predecessors (254); however the plebeian leaders and their 
patrician friends, outraged at the lex conubii and the lack 
of further recognition of the plebeian state,were able to 
provoke the soldiers into seceding to the Aventine after 
they had returned from a campaign led by some of the Decem­
virs against the Aequi and Sabines (255). The soldiers 
may have been already angered by the failure of the campaign 
and the Decemvirs’ codification of the harsh primitive 
laws (256). The traditional accounts of Siccius’ murder 
and Claudius’ attack on Verginia simultaneously causing 
uprisings in the two army camps while still on campaign
252. Livy 3.37.10; cf. Ogilvie, CL 507.
253. Diod. 12.26.1; Bernardi, art.cit. 13-14- and Ath. 1952, 
36f accepts this as a solution to the apparent problem of 
plebeian Decemvirs passing the lex conubii.
254. Livy 3.37.4, 50.13; D.H. 10.60.5- Staveley, Ath. 
1955, 18-19 notes other views of their implementation.
255. D.H. 11.23, 40-44; Livy 3-41.7, 42.7, 50-4; Cic. de
rep. 2.63; Diod. 12.24; Flor. 1.24-
256. Ogilvie, CL 452-3, 498.
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are unconvincing (257). The plebeian leaders are likely 
to have raised the revolt mainly to ensure the complete 
overthrow of the Decemvirs and the election of their 
supporters as consuls and plebeian tribunes (258); it was 
on these terms that the end of the secession was 
negotiated (259)•
Plebeian tribunes elected in 449 were the leading 
plebeian agitators of the day (260); five were from gentes 
listed in earlier plebeian tribunates (261). However, 
one of them, C. Oppius, may have had his name added to 
the tradition, like Oppius, the military tribune who 
supposedly led the secession to Rome (262), by 
descendants powerful later in the Republic, to counteract 
the unfavourable tradition of their ancestor the
257. For the dubious elements in the accounts of D.H. 
11.25-39 and Livy 3.43-49 passim see Ogilvie, CL 475-6 
and n.265 below. They could have developed partly 
because of a genuine tradition of links between the 
Verginii and Sicinii in this period; see 151 above.
258. For hints of this see Cic. de rep. 2.63, D.H. 10.40-1, 
60.6, 11.2.1, 5-21 and Livy 3.36.9, 37.5-8, 38.7-41.6, 52-3
259. Livy 3.50.16, 51.12, 53-4; D.H. 11.45.1.
260. The pontifex maximus may have held their election 
(Livy 3.54.6-15) because there was no other magistrate 
available (Niccolini, FTP 31) or the story may be a 
confusion of a ceremony acknowledging their sacrosanctitas 
(Ogilvie, CL 394-5; cf. Ch.IB 55).
261.Broughton, MRR 15-16, 24, 31, 37-43, 48-9. The 
credibility of most of them is suggested by hints of their 
family ties noted below, and varied evidence of their 
sympathy with the plebeian cause earlier in the century 
(e.g. see 151, 154, 167-8 above).
cf. Ogilvie, CL 383, 496-7.
262. D.H. 11.43.6, 44.2; Livy 3-51.10.
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Decemvir (263). The latter was actually prosecuted in 
449 by a plebeian tribune, Numitorius, after Numitorius’ 
colleague and nephew, L. Verginius, had prosecuted Ap. 
Claudius (264). Claudius' charge was supposedly based 
on his abduction of his prosecutor's daughter, Verginia, 
the betrothed of Icilius, another plebeian tribune of 
449. This story, another version of the well used tale 
of the rape of a woman at the end of an oppressive regime, 
was probably developed from the basic elements of the name 
of Claudius' prosecutor, and the recent passage of the 
controversial law against marriage between patricians and 
plebeians (265). In fact, the trial may be associated 
with the fact that Claudius and Oppius were the Decemvirs 
who remained in Rome during the military campaign, carrying 
out most of the unpopular judgements on the people (266). 
The hint that all the Decemvirs went into voluntary exile 
may simply be part of the hostile tradition against them
263. cf. Ogilvie, CL 461-2, who concludes from the 
suspicious number of Oppii in 450-449 that the Decemvir 
is spurious.
264. cf. Livy 3.54.4, 11-12, 56-8; D.H. 11.28.7, 46.2-5;
Zon. 7.18-19; Cic. de rep. 2.63.
265. For the main versions of the legend, see Diod. 12.24; 
Cic. de rep. 2.63; Livy 3.44-9; D.H. 11.28-39; Val. Max. 
6.1.2; Suet. Tib. 2.2. The oldest version, given by 
Diodorus, in which the heroine is patrician, illustrates 
the plebeians' challenge to the lex conubii, which might 
well have been led by the prosecutor, being from a gens
of uniquely ambiguous status. Later a plebeian heroine
was developed; thus she could be portrayed as the 
prosecutor's daughter, gaining a suitable name, and the 
debauched character of the Decemvir became the point of the 
story. cf. Pais, ALRH 187-190, Alfoldi, ERL 153f,
Ogilvie, CL 476-487 and Watson, RTT l66f on the development 
of the legend. For variations of the same themes, see 
Livy 10.23 and Ogilvie 'The Maid of Ardea', Latomus 1962 
477-483.
266. cf. D.H. 10.60, 11.2, 22-24; Livy 3.41.7-10, 49.6, 
58.7; Zon. 7.18.
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all (267). Claudius' supporters, however, did lose 
political influence; although Fabius' son was consul in 
442, the Cornelii and Sergii did not reach consular 
office until the raid 430's, Claudius and Antonius did 
not return until the 420's, and the Rabuleii and Oppii 
did not return at all.
The consuls of 449, presumably chosen through an 
interrex, were L. Valerius and M. Horatius, whose 
relations supported plebeian agitators in the 450's and 
who are themselves portrayed as opponents of the Decem­
virs (268). The second secession probably persuaded 
most patricians to support their view that plebeian 
institutions must be more fully acknowledged within the 
constitution. Accordingly they passed laws reiterating 
that no magistrates be elected without provocatio, 
recognising plebeian tribunes' sacrosanctitas, decreeing 
that the senatus consulta be kept by the plebeian aediles, 
and making plébiscita valid if they were given auctoritas 
patrum (269). The consuls also fought the Sabines and 
Aequi; the tale of their triumph by the authorisation of 
the people may be an embellishment by Antias to emphasise 
their popularity (270).
267. D.H. 11.46.4; Livy 3-58.10, cf. 3-59.1-3.
268. Livy 3.39-41, 49.3, 50.16, 51.12, 53; D.H. 11.4.5, 
19-20, 23.6, 38.5-39.
269. See Ch.IB 55, 69-70, 73, Ch.2, 127,
for details of the laws. See 
Staveley, Ath. 1955 15f on the motives behind them.
270. cf. D.H. 11.47-50, 57, 59; Livy 3*57.7-9, 59-63;
Dio. fr. 23; Zon. 7.19; Degrassi, op.cit. 537-8; Ogilvie, 
CL 513.
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After their military victories and internal settle­
ments, Valerius or Horatius named as consuls for 448 
Lars Herminius and T. Verginius. Herminius was from an 
Etruscan gens last represented by the consul of 506, who 
was allied to Valerius' grandfather and one of the 
Horatii, and is never known in power again; he is likely 
to have been a plebeian. The Verginii's role in the 
plebeian disputes, often in alliance with the Valerii, 
have been noted several times - in 494» 479-475, and 456. 
It is likely that the consuls were simply old family 
friends who had supported the consuls' action the 
previous year (271).
In 447 and 446, Geganius, lulius, Quinctius and 
Furius were consuls (272). All shared patrician status 
(273) and personal interests in defending Latium against 
the Aequi and Volsci; the latter concern prevailed from 
471 to 463 and from 444 to 430, when the consuls of 447- 
446, or their kinsmen, held a total of nineteen consular 
posts (274). Patrician pressure for military activity 
to enhance their reputations and prevent domestic unrest, 
and Verginius' own interest in the military policy, may 
explain the installation of this clique in the consulship
271. See Livy 3.65*2. See Broughton, MRR 50 and Ogilvie, 
CL 515-6 on the consuls' exact identity.
272. Broughton, MRR 50-1.
273. The Geganii, unknown since 492, are likely to have 
been patricians; they were of ancient standing in the city 
(Livy 1.30.2; Plut. Num. 10.1) and held several curule 
magistracies up to 367.
274* cf. Cornelius, UFRG 115; above, 158.
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(275). In 447, the levy was obstructed (276); doubt­
less Quinctius, with the authority of three past consul­
ships, was elected partly to ensure one for 446; the 
hostile tribes were then repelled (277). The first 
quaestors were freely elected in the centuriate assembly 
in 447; they were Valerius, the consul of 449, and 
Aemilius, whose family, like those of all the consuls, 
had not been involved in the recent civil strife; 
popularity and awe of the patricians might have contributed 
to the people's choice (278).
By the time of the election of 445 agitation by 
plebeian leaders now fearing the monopoly of government 
by another group of patricians, may have forced the 
electoral president, Quinctius or Furius, to name two of 
their number as consuls. Thus Genucius and Curtius, 
relations of the consuls of 451 and 453 respectively, 
became consuls (279) and made another compromise between 
the patrician and plebeian factions. The lex conubii.
275. Livy 3.66f hints at the former; the fact that 
Verginius' kinsmen also appear in consular office in 
471-463 and 444-430 suggests the latter.
276. D.H. 11.51; Livy 3.65*5-6.
277. Livy, 3*66-72; Frontin. Str. 2.8.2.; Diod. 12.30.6. 
Livy's unlikely tale of Rome's settling of a dispute over 
land between Ardea and Aricia by making the land ager 
publions (Ogilvie, CL 523; Sherwin-White, RC^ 27) may 
have been based on a true account of Roman interference 
in Ardea to bolster its defences (possibly led by Furius 
the consul, whose gens had personal connections there; 
see Livy 5*44*1); resentment of this in Ardea is attested 
by military threats from it to Rome in the next two years 
(Livy 4*1*4, 7.2).
278. Tacit. Ann. 11.22.
279* Broughton, MRR 52; Ogilvie, CL 528-9*
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which would have been proved quite unworkable by this 
time, was abolished, while the alternative system of the 
consular tribunate, a compromise between the patricians, 
who won the censorship by way of compensation, and the 
plebeian tribunes, who had demanded compulsory seats in 
the consulship for plebeians, was devised. It was 
supported by the two Quinctii, anxious to continue their 
military plans uninterrupted (280).
Conclusion
Looking back on all the elections from 509 to 445, we 
must admit that we can never be certain that family 
loyalty or military experience was not the sole reason for 
the electoral president’s choice of his successors in any 
one year. However, if senators did have views on 
political matters in this period, as one might reasonably 
expect, the pattern of magisterial names suggests that they 
generally did influence the president's choices, which may 
be divided into three categories. Firstly, he may often 
have been influenced by his views on the long term issues 
of the patrician attempt to monopolise the state, and the 
opposing plebeian aims of reducing the power of the curule 
state, or that of the patricians within it. Senators' 
views on these matters depended primarily on which gens 
they belonged to. More frequently, perhaps, short term
280. D.H. 11.54-61; Livy 4*1.4-6.
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policies, such as the military defence of certain areas 
of the state, and the aversion of internal dispute 
dictated the president's choice. Again, attitudes to 
these were dictated largely by gens. Thirdly, there may 
may have been occasions when the need to make a 
compromise between factions disputing over policy was 
the president's prime concern.
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CHAPTER 3 - ELECTIONS: 444-367
The Political Issues
In the first three decades of this period, steady war 
against neighbouring Etruscans, Aequi and Volsci was main­
tained (1), laying the ground for a more aggressive policy 
of attack on all these peoples from about 415* This was 
crowned in 396 by the destruction of Veii, Rome's ancient 
rival for the northern trade routes and possessor of much 
fertile land (2). The Gallic invasion of 390 put Rome 
on the defensive again (3), but she regained her former 
position by 360, after a period of steady consolidation 
of all the frontiers (4)* Besides the basic questions of 
of their location, purpose and strategy, three important 
political issues are related to these wars. Firstly, 
they provided the opportunity for Rome to strengthen
1. The importance of war in this period is suggested by 
the fact that there were seven dictators from 444 to 416, 
compared with four from $09 to 445*
2. Last, CAH7 503, 509f, and Scullard, HRW^ 96-7, 99-100, 
note the increasing aggression. Ager publicus almost 
doubled from 420 to 396; see Beloch, RG 620. See D.H.
12.1$ and Ogilvie, CL 626f on the economic benefits of 
Veii'8 conquest.
3. For the build up of Gauls in the north, see Polyb.
2.17; Plut. Gam. 1$-16; Diod. 14.113; D.H. 13.10-11; Livy 
5.33-5; Ogilvie, CL 700-15. Their raid on Rome was 
probably simply for plunder; see Homo GAH7, 562f; cf. 
Toynbee, HL 1 25.
4. Polyb. 2.18. While Livy Bk.6 passim may have exagger­
ated Rome's successes in this process of recovery, Beloch,
RG 314-320, is too sceptical about them; the Gallic sack was 
not as devastating as the ancients suggest (Ch.lA 11 n.3), 
and had Rome not been consistently successful against the 
Aequi, Volsci and Etruscans from 389 to 367, she would not 
have been able to quell Latin unrest at the same time, face 
further Gallic attacks from 367, and the Samnites from 343; 
on this question, cf. De Sanctis, StR 2 246f; Homo, 0AH7 
566f; Salmon, Phoenix, 1953 131; Toynbee, HL 1 372-7.
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diplomatic contacts with Caere, Massilia, the Lipari 
islands and Greece (5). Secondly, they caused unrest 
among Latin states which felt that the provisions of the 
Gassian treaty for the equal division of military support 
and subsequent spoils were not being fairly interpreted by 
Rome as she grew more powerful (6). Their demands were 
only partly met by the creation of Latin colonies to 
garrison points vulnerable to Etruscan, Volscian and 
Aequian attack from 442 to 382 (7); military conflict over 
the issue in the decade after the Gallic invasion 
culminated in Rome further strengthening her position in 
the Latin league by defeating all hostile Latin cities and
5. Rome's ancient friendship with Massilia was estab­
lished as hospitium after Massilia gave aid after the 
Gallic sack; see N. De Witt, 'Massilia and Rome', TAPA 
194C, 605-61C; Thiel, HRSP 343 n.9; M. Sordi, I Rapporti 
Romano - Ceritie L'Crigine della Givitas sine Suffragio 
(Rome, 1960}(=RRC) 97-lCC. Rome's links with the Etruscan 
port of Caere through the Tarquinii and the Carthaginians 
(Beloch, RG 227; Cgilvie, CL 229-230; J. Heurgon, 'The  ^
Inscriptions of Pyrgoi', 1RS 1966, If; Sherwin-White, RG 
193) were consolidated as hospitium after Caere gave aid 
during the siege of Veii and after the Gallic sack; see 
Ogilvie, CL 723-4, 740; Toynbee, HL 1 415, 420-3; M. Torelli, 
Elogia Tarquiniensia (Florence, 1975)(=ET) 72f; cf. Sordi, 
RRC, 107f. Roman embassies were sent to Delphi, Apollo's 
sanctuary, in 398 and 394, the second being rescued from 
pirates by the king of Lipari, who thereby gained hospitium 
with Rome. They may have been partly under the influence
of Massilia and Caere, which had treasuries at Delphi 
(Strabo $.2.3; Diod. xiv 93; App. Ital. 8; De Sanctis,
StR 2 147-9). cf. n.lO, 214, 217-8, 233 below.
6. See De Sanctis, StR 2 l$lf; Salmon, art.cit. 12$f; 
Sherwin-White, RC^ 23f.
7. Livy hints that they were Roman colonies, but this was 
not in accordancOpWith the Gassian treaty; see Gh.2 128-9; 
Sherwin-White, RG 24, 36-7, 196-7; Salmon, art.cit. 93f, 
123f; Toynbee, HL 1 391-7.
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incorporating Tusculum in the Roman state in 380 (8). 
Thirdly, the creation of four new tribes of citizens at 
Veii, the possible settling of citizens on the Pomptine 
lands won in 389, and the enfranchisement of Tusculum 
not only increased Rome’s military strength, but also 
benefited politically those senators who could marshal 
clients and amioi from them (9).
The severe economic distress among the Roman people 
attested in accounts of pestilences, drought, corn short­
ages, a rising population and debt (10) was of political
8. Livy 6.2-29 passim. Some Latin cities remained loyal 
(Homo, CAH7 577-8); Tusculum only broke away briefly in 381 
(n.l8$). The enfranchisement contributed to renewed Latin 
unrest in the mid fourth century (Salmon, art.cit. 131; 
Toynbee, HL 1 126).
9. See Ch.1C 104f. See Taylor, VDRR 47-9, 283-7 
for the Veian tribes. Livy 6.21.4 only notes the appoint­
ment of commissioners to divide up the Pomptine land in 383; 
De Sanctis, StR 2 2-48, and Toynbee, HL 1 375, note their 
likely difficulty in allocating it amid Latin and Volscian 
hostility.
10. For the rise in population (including enfranchised 
Etruscans but excluding colonists) see Livy, 3.24.10 and 
Pliny, NH 33.16. For the grain shortages see Ogilvie, ERE 
137-8, CL 394-5. The story of the rise of the Alban lake 
in 398 (n.l26) may be based on drainage activity to reduce 
pestilence there (Ogilvie, CL 658-660; Scullard, HRW^ 100).
A temple to the Creek god of healing, Apollo, vowed in 433 
(the only one from 466 to 396), was also an attempt to avert 
disease (Livy 4.25.3; cf. Diod. 12.58). The cult probably 
came to Rome through Cumae, Etruria or Sicily, which were 
sources of corn, one of the few active areas of trade
(Ch.2 130, 143; Gage", AR 19-66; Ogilvie, CL 572, 574, 623) 
The fall of Veii and the victory over the Volsci in 389 
provided booty to stimulate trade and industry; relations 
with trading areas were strengthened (n.5); colonies may 
even have been sent to Sardinia and Corsica to protect
shipping from pirates (Cassola, GPR 32-3); three temples
were built from 396 to 388 ( 215 below; Livy 6.5.8).
But the ransom to the Gauls and the expense of rebuilding the
city after the Gallic invasion (cf. Plut. Cam. 28, 30-2;
Diod. 14.116; Zon. 7.23.8; Livy 5.48.8-9, 55, 6.1.4) 
contributed to debt (Livy 6.11.9, 27.3, 32, 34.1-2, 35.4, 
39.2); building of defensive walls was only started in 378, 
and they were not complete in 353 (Livy 6.32.1, 7.20.9; 
for full details, see Thomsen, KST 218-237).
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relevance for several reasons. The prospect of popular 
revolt, which broke out in 414 and 410, threatened military 
policies (11). At the same time, expansion into Etruria 
and the south by military means may have been partly to 
facilitate the import of corn from these areas when 
harvests were bad, and to settle the peasants on the land 
won (12). The promise of alleviating economic distress 
was an essential basis of power for the plebeians still 
agitating for political equality against patrician cliques 
dominating curule offices; the tribunes' ability to use 
their vetoes and threaten secessions effectively depended 
on their having popular backing, and being unobstructed 
by their colleagues. Since most citizens still lived in 
the vicinity of Rome in this period, unattached voters 
could readily be attracted to the tribunician elections by 
popular appeal; at times of greatest hardship, patricians 
may not even have been able to prevent their own clients 
freely voting there (13). Popular support was also used 
by tribunes in their prosecutions of political enemies in 
the tribal and centuriate assemblies, and in their attempts 
to gain political equality by legislation. The prime 
example in this period of the latter is the plébiscita 
proposed by plebeian tribunes Licinius and Sextius in 376, 
abolishing the consular tribunes, extending the system of 
free elections to all magistrates, reserving one consular 
place for plebeians, alleviating debt, and limiting the
11. cf. Livy 4.12.5, 49f, 53.2f, 55, 5.27.10, 6.31.4.
12. cf. Schwegler, RG 3 162-172; Last, GAH7 537-540; 
Toynbee, HL 1 164-7, 312-4.
13. See Ch.IB 44, 72 and Ch.1C 101, 113.
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amount of ager publicus taken up by an individual; it 
directly linked political and economic reforms to win votes 
for the former in the plebeian assembly (14).
Plebeian leaders were demanding political equality 
in this period because whenever enough patricians were 
united over other issues, they were able to dominate 
curule magistracies. They could nominate each other to 
the consulship as before, and soon discovered that their 
more organised and influential candidates could also win 
the free consular tribune elections. Hence they became 
increasingly willing to have consular tribunes whenever 
plebeian tribunes seemed sufficiently united to veto 
consular elections; only twice in such circumstances up 
to 400 did they have to resort instead to interregna to 
ensure their continued monopoly (15). However, the 
consular tribunate did not simply become a weapon of 
united patrician factions. From 405 to 367, a period 
when six consular tribunes were returned in all but three 
years, an increasing number of plebeian leaders were 
supported by patricians as candidates to these colleges. 
This was partly because tribunes were threatening
14. See Ch.IB 46-7, 60-3, for the political clauses of 
the law and its passage. Last, CAH7 543, argues that the 
clauses on debt (Livy 6.35*4, 39*2) are credible. The 
view of Tibiletti, Ath. 1948, 173-236, Ath. 1949, 3-41, 
that the agrarian clause limited holdings of ager publicus 
to something less than 500 iugera, is generally accepted 
today; see G. Stockton, The Gracchi, (Oxford, 1979) 206f.
15. See Ch.IB 46f and Ch.10 lOOf, 117f  ^  ^ for
these methods of electoral control. Patrician factions 
would have generally been reluctant to resort to interregna, 
because their frequent use devalued them, they had to be 
justified, they wasted time, and they provided a say for 
all patricians.
188
obstruction to all elections, realising by this time that 
they could not defeat united patricians in the free 
elections, and partly because patricians were developing 
personal links and common political views with them of 
more importance to them than their loyalty to the patriciate 
Such patricians realised the value of their plebeian allies' 
provincial connections, their growing client bases, and 
their power as plebeian tribunes. Also, when there were 
great disputes between factions in the senate over policy, 
free elections of consular tribunes were voted simply 
because they were the only means of giving a fair chance 
of success to all candidates (16).
Two points concerning the detection of political 
attitudes should be made. Firstly, members of the same 
gens would have generally retained enough traditions and 
economic interests in common to maintain the same views on 
the above political issues, although the declining import­
ance of patrician status and Rome's general expansion in 
the early fourth century might have caused some individuals 
to be influenced more by the interests of their immediate 
family than their gens in forming their views on policy 
by the end of the period. Secondly, the magistrates, as 
opposed to the senate, still had the main say in the 
policies being implemented, although their actions were 
often dictated by plebeian agitation or military expediency 
(17).
16. See Ch.IB 54-6; Ch.10 80-2, 101, 120-1.
17. See Ch.IB 68-79 and Ch.1C 84-90 for the
basis of this. Most gentes were only represented by one
or two families, descended from early fifth century consuls;
see Willems, SRR 1 71f and Beloch, RG 53f.
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The Elections
From 444 to 426, the magistrates seem to have belonged 
to a broad political faction, maintaining patrician mono­
poly of government and pursuing a military drive against 
neighbouring tribes. Many had been, or were related to, 
magistrates of the period 462 to 445; of those who had 
then agitated for plebeian equality in state government, 
some might have now turned back to their old patrician 
friends because they were satisfied with the compromises 
reached over the past decade and shared their concern with 
military affairs. Since it included many leading senators, 
the group was frequently able to vote in the senate for 
elections of consuls, in which they passed office to each 
other. Whenever plebeian leaders threatening to impede 
consular elections or obstruct the military levy forced 
it to opt for consular tribunes, the same group was able to 
win most of the places. All this may be illustrated with 
some details of names and events.
From 444 to 426 twenty-one individuals from fifteen 
gentes were represented in twenty-seven consulships (18).
All these gentes were probably patrician except for T. and 
Ag. Menenius, the consul of 452 and his son, who, having 
estates in the east, would have shared their patrician
18. See Broughton, MRR 52-67 for full refs. Beloch, RG 
9 and Ogilvie, CL 566 discard the consulship inserted by 
Diod. 12.77.1 between 428 and 427; Degrassi, II 13.1 538, 
argues that in 437 a consul suffect, Valerius, won a 
triumph rather than a dictator; the consulship of 434 
noted by Macer is the result of confusion in the libri 
linteii, while that of 434 noted by Antias is an incomplete 
version of the consular tribunate (Livy 4*23.1-3; Diod. 
12.53*1; cf. Ogilvie, GL 566, 570-1); for arguments against 
a consulship in 444 see n.36 below.
190
colleagues* concern to defend the Latin area from the 
Aequi (19). Like their forefather in 477 they may have 
been named as consuls in 440 and 439 to quell plebeian 
demands for representation. In 440 and 439, the dominant 
party would have feared it could not control consular 
tribunes* elections, because popular discontent over the 
extent of land given at the colony of Ardea in 442 had 
been fanned by the plebeian tribune, Poetelius, pressing 
for land allotments in 441 (20), and by Maelius offering 
cheap corn during the shortage in 440 (21). Quinctius 
Gincinnatus may have been appointed as dictator to quell 
Maelius* sedition; either as his magister equitum or as 
a private citizen Servilius Ahala killed Maelius in 439 
(22). Gincinnatus and Servilius, and the other two 
consuls in these years, Geganius and Quinctius* brother, 
Capitolinus, were clearly part of the main faction in 
power, their families being known in twenty-one different 
posts from 447 to 426. Geganius* forefather had been 
consul with one of the Minucii in an earlier corn shortage 
in 492; like Minucius, the plebeian named as praefectus 
annonae in 440 (23), he might have been chosen because
19. See Ch.2 136-7, 152-3. The Aebutii's
status is uncertain; see Ch.2 157.
20. Livy 4.11-12.
21. Livy 4.12-14; Zon. 7.20; D.H. 12.1-4.
22. Gage, RP 1953, 46-7, Ogilvie, GL 550-1, 554-5, and 
Lintott, Hist. 1970, 13-18, VRR 54-8, suggest that 
Gincinnatus* dictatorship is a late addition to the legend, 
and that Servilius * slaying of Maelius as a private citizen 
is the genuine version of the tale, being a primitive 
procedure for dealing with a potential tyrant.
23. Livy 4.12.8-11, 13.7-9; D.H. 12.1.6, 11-15; Zon. 7.20. 
See also Gh.2 142-3, 164*
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he inherited relevant knowledge or contacts. The personal 
authority of the Quinctii brothers, who had already held 
six consulships and one dictatorship, would have contributed 
to the choice of one or both of them amid such domestic 
strife (24).
Because of the pestilence in Rome from 444 to 426 (25), 
which may have made religious authority and knowledge a 
factor in the choice of consuls from within the dominant 
faction (26), the armies were not led out every year.
Yet the consuls’ concern with military affairs is clear; 
they or their relations held twenty-two other posts dealing 
with military and foreign policy in this period (27), and 
their names may be linked with the expected spheres of 
military activity. From 443 to 441 ^nd 431 to 430, when 
Rome was at war with the Aequi and Volsci (28), all the
24. Livy 4.15-16, Zon. 7.20 and D.H. 12.2-4 describe the 
dictator quelling internal unrest; this may have been done 
by the consul of the same name, or the dictator may have 
been appointed to do so after Maelius was slain.
25. Livy 4.20.9, 21, 25.3-4, 30.7-11; D.H. 12.6.3.
26. The Papirii, who had much religious authority (Ch.2 
164), held four consulships and one censorship from 444 
to 426. Three priests, Furius, Cornelius and Servilius 
(Livy 3.54.5, 4.27.1; H. Dessau, Inscriptiones Latinae 
Selectae (Berlin, 1892-1914)(=ILS) 9338.2) and three 
censors, Furius, Geganius and Papirius (Livy 4.22.7;
Cic. de rep. 2.60) were consuls or dictators from 444 to 
426. The temple of Apollo was dedicated in 431, and there 
were attempts to avert superstitious panic in 428 (Livy 
4.29.7, 30.91; Ogilvie, CL 583).
27. And nine consuls from this period held more than one 
consulship from 447 to 419.
28. Livy 4.9.10, 26-30; Val. Max. 2.7.6; Diod. 12.64.2-3; 
Cell. 17.21.17; Ovid. Fast. 6.723f; Degrassi, op.cit. 538; 
Ogilvie, CL 576f.
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sixteen generals and lieutenants in office, from the Furii, 
lulii, Papirii, Fabii, Aebutii, Sulpicii,Quinctii and 
Postumii, had long standing family interests in the defence 
of Latium against the tribes, or were descended from consuls 
in office from 471 to 463» or 447 to 446, when similar 
wars predominated (29). And when Rome was at war with 
Etruria, from 437 to 435, and from 429 to 427 (30), five 
consuls, one dictator and two legates were from the 
Servilii, Sergii, Cornelii and Fabii, gentes based in the 
north (31), where they might have served in these years, 
had they not been prevented by pestilence. They were 
clearly allies of those more personally concerned about 
the Aequi and Volsci, for all their predecessors, 
colleagues and successors, Aemilius, Geganius, Valerius,
29. See Ch.2 138, 145, 156-8, 164, 179-180.
Notably, the dictator and magister equitum in the major 
battle against the Aequi in 431 were father-in-law and 
kinsman respectively of the consuls of that year, Quinctius 
and lulius (Livy 4.26; his story of the consuls’ lack of 
harmony may reflect personal rivalries or differences over 
strategy; the detail in it of Servilius’ intervention comes 
from a similar tale of 418).
Perhaps Fabius gained office so soon after his father’s 
disgrace in the second Decemvirate because of the latter’s 
successes against the Aequi from 465 to 458; his son may 
have gained experience under him. Both fought at Algidus, 
the elder in 465, the younger in 431, just like Quinctius 
Capitolinus and his nephew.
30. Since the origins of the wars (Livy 4.17-22,30; Diod. 
12.80.6; Pliny, NH 34-23; Cic. Phil. 9.2; Frontin. Str. 
2.8.8; Ogilvie, CL 558-9) and the magistrates’ names are 
similar in both periods. Last, CAH7 507-9 and Scullard,
HRW^ 99, suggest that the earlier war duplicates the later; 
cf. Ogilvie, ERE 141-3, CL 569-570, who argues that only
a few military details were repeated; see n.53 for one 
example.
31. See Ch.2 139, 149. _ The Sergii 
only hold offices from 450 to 380, when fighting against 
the Etruscans is a major issue.
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Verginius, Lucretius and members of some of the gentes 
noted above, had family interests in their areas of 
attack. Many may also have inherited interests in Etruria, 
where the forefathers of all but three fought from 504 to 
478 (32).
We may now review the six consular tribunate elections 
from 444 to 426. In 444» no doubt in fear of plebeian 
agitators, the senate voted for consular tribunes; only 
three won absolute majorities: Atilius, Sempronius and 
Cloelius (33). Atilius, being from a plebeian gens not 
known again until his son was consular tribune in 399» 
with Genucius, son of the consul of 445, may have been a 
plebeian agitator for the consular tribunate. Sempronius 
and Cloelius, being from gentes last known over forty years 
before, but holding several curule posts, including 
censorships, before 367, were probably minor patricians 
(34). Their position within the dominant military faction 
is suggested by three facts. One of the Cloelii may have 
been a legate to Fidenae in 438 (35), their successors in 
443, the consuls Geganius and Quinctius, named Sempronius
32. For support of all this, see Ch.2 134-7, 143, 149, 
157-8, 160.
33. Broughton, MRR 52-3; cf. Ogilvie, CL 542.
34. Shatzman, CQ 1973, 74. For further hints of their 
status, see D.H. 4*62; Livy 1.30.2.
35. Livy 4.17.2.
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as censor with Papirius (36), and in 442 Cloelius was a 
Triumvir founding a Latin colony at Ardea to defend it 
against the Volsci with Menenius, consul of 439, and 
Aebutius, brother of the consul of 442 (37). Notably 
all these individuals, save Quinctius, were descended 
from consuls fighting the Aequi and Volsci before the 
patriciate was formed, their gentes holding only three 
consulships from 491 to 444- Like others in this sub­
group, Sempronius and Cloelius may have gained support 
both from patrician leaders sharing their military object­
ives and fearing the effects of the free election, and 
those sharing their concern to break monopolies of office
(38).
36. Some of the ancients suggest, following Macer, that 
Papirius and Sempronius were noted as consuls in a treaty 
with Ardea and in the libri linteii for 444, and that they 
were named by Quinctius Capitolinus, interrex, after the 
consular tribunes were forced to abdicate (Livy 4.7.3-12;
D.H. 11.62; Cic. de fam. 9.21.2; Cassiod. in Degrassi,
op.cit. 369; cf. Ogilvie, CL 546). Hints of recent 
discord between Rome and Ardea suggest that the treaty is 
credible; see Ch.2 180 n.277; Sherwin-White, RC^ 27.
But Macer may have only seen Sempronius' name on it, mis­
read the libri linteii's record of the censorship of 443, 
and assumed Quinctius' role as interrex from his presidency 
of the censors' election. For similar views, see A. 
Boddington, 'The Original Nature of the Consular Tribunate', 
Hist. 1959, 359, and Palmer, ACR 227. For some alternatives, 
cf. Mommsen, RSt 2^  335 n.l; Beloch, RG 80f, 249f; Ogilvie, 
Hermes 1961 380f, CL 54203-
37.Livy 4.11.5-7; Diod. 12.34.5; Ogilvie, CL 549.
Cloelius may have been included because he made the treaty 
with Ardea in 444. Civil discord in the town may partly 
explain the creation of the colony and Livy's setting of 
the tale of the maid of Ardea there (Ch.2 177 n.265).
38. See Ch.2 136-8, 143 for hints of their family
spheres of interest and military activity before 486.
Cloelius may even have shared ancestry with the leader of 
the Aequi who attacked Ardea in 443 (Livy 3.25.8, 4*9.12).
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The senate then voted for consuls, until plebeian 
leaders were able to demand the election of consular 
tribunes in 438, amid popular unrest after Maelius’ death
(39). Three leading members of the patrician military 
faction were returned, presumably through their personal 
authority and their marshalling of rich amici and clients. 
They were Quinctius, son of the dictator of 439» lulius, 
the consul of 430, and Aemilius (40), who was appointed 
as dictator to fight in Etruria in 437, 434 and 426, always 
choosing members of the faction as his magistri équités; 
Quinctius, consular tribune of 438, Postumius, dictator 
of 431, and Cornelius, consul of 428 (41).
The plebeian leaders rallied again to threaten dis­
ruption of the consular elections in 434 (42), and won 
consular tribune elections for three years, but the same 
faction prevailed in them (43). Eight of the nine elected
39. cf. Livy 4.10.9, 12.5, 16.5-6.
40. Broughton, MRR 57-9.
41. Klebs, 'Aemilius' PWRE (Stuttgart, 1894) 1 570-1.
The story of the dictator being disenfranchised in 434 
because he limited the censorship to 18 months (Livy 
4.24; Ch.IB, 62, n.93) is obviously unhistorical, if only 
because of the evidence of the third dictatorship, as 
Livy 4.31.5 suggests; see also Fraccaro, Ath. 1933,
167-8, 171, and Ogilvie, CL 573.
42. The extent of popular support for the plebeian tribune 
Maelius prosecuting Servilius and Minucius in 436 is un­
certain; cf. Livy 4.21.3-4; Cic. de dom. 86; Val. Max. 
5.3.2. Livy does not note tribunician obstruction of 
consular elections until 433 (4.25.1-2), but in 434 he
is mainly concerned with the nature and identity of the 
magistrates (n.l8).
43. Broughton, MRR 61-3.
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were patricians sharing personal interests in the areas of 
war expected against the Etruscans, Aequi and Volsci (44); 
only two of them, Manlius and Pinarius,were from gentes 
not already noted as part of the ruling faction (45).
Four of the eight were related to priests or censors of 
the period 463 to 380 (46), and the gens of the ninth, 
Folius, is only otherwise represented, until the late 
fourth century, by a pontifex maximus in 390 (47). The 
religious authority of these leaders may have won them 
support in the senate and assembly at this time of pest­
ilence which inspired the consultation of the Sibylline 
books, and the vow of a temple to Apollo, the Greek god of 
healing in 433 (48).
For a few years after 432, the leading patricians 
held consular elections without obstruction from the 
plebeian leaders, who were doubtless disillusioned by 
their lack of success in the free elections, and the law 
against canvassing in 432, while the people were distracted
44. Livy 4.23-24.2, 25.6-8.
45. Both gentes were last known fighting the same tribes 
in 475-2, when a Manlius drew up a forty year truce with 
Veii; Manlius' election the year it expired may be no 
coincidence.
46. Furius (n.26); Pinarius (Livy 4.29.7; Cic. de rep. 
2.60); Postumius (Ch.2 169, n.227; below, 202);
Sulpicius (Livy 3.7.6).
47. Livy 5.41.3.
48. Livy 4.25.4; n.10,26. Notably, three consular 
tribunes of 434-2 were kinsmen of the envoys to Greece in 
454, Manlius, Postumius and Sulpicius, who had interests 
in the Sibylline Books (Ch.2 169).
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by the wars (49). In 426, however, four leading members 
of the patrician military faction were elected as consular 
tribunes (50). The success of four candidates and the 
fact that one became the first consular tribune allowed 
to name a dictator (51) clearly attests to the faction's 
prominence in the senate and authority and client control 
in the assembly; perhaps they were such as to cause it to 
vote deliberately for the consular tribunate to ensure 
that there were many generals with consular authority for 
a big expedition to Veii (52). One of the consular 
tribunes, Cornelius, the consul of 428, chose as dictator 
Aemilius, whom he had already named as legate to Fidenae 
in 428; either as Aemilius' magister equitum, or as 
consular tribune, Cornelius won the spolia opimia in 426. 
Other consular tribunes were Postumius, Quinctius, also 
consul in 428, and Furius, the consul of 441 (53).
49. cf. Livy 4.25.9-26.1, 30.1; Ch.1C 101.
50. Broughton, MRR 66.
51. Livy 4.31.2-4.
52. cf. Ogilvie, CL 584-5.
53. The repetition of all these names may partly explain 
confusion over Cornelius' spolia opimia. The evidence 
from an inscribed corselet and the libri linteii that he 
won them as consul, i.e. in 428 (Livy 4.20.6f, Fest. 204L, 
accepted by De Sanctis, StR 2 139-140, Last, CAH7 507-8 
and Scullard, HRW^ 474 n.ll) is disputed by Livy 4*20.9, 
Diod. 12.80.6, Ogilvie, CL 563-4, and Luce, TAPA 1965, 
211-218, 232. Livy 4*19-20, 32.4 and D.H. 12.5 suggest 
that he won them as military tribune in 437, when Aemilius 
was dictator, but won no triumph (n.l8), while others 
suggest that he won them in 426 as consular tribune (Serv. 
ad Aen. 6.84I) or magister equitum (Val. Max. 3*2.4, cf. 
Frontin. Str. 2.8.9; Livy 4*20.10). The greater victory 
and triumph of Aemilius in 426 (Livy 4*31-4; Degrassi,
op.cit. 539) favour the latter year.
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From 425 to 416, political trials, disruptions of 
levies and promotion of land laws by plebeian tribunes 
indicate conflict between patrician leaders primarily 
concerned with military affairs, and plebeians and minor 
patricians protesting at their monopoly of office (54)*
The role of policy in most of the elections in this 
confused period is particularly uncertain.
In 425, the dominant faction in the senate again 
seems to have controlled the consular tribunes' election. 
Four patricians, A. Sempronius, son of the censor of 443,
L. Quinctius Gincinnatus, consular tribune in 438, L. 
Furius, consular tribune in 432, and L. Horatius, son of 
the consul of 449, were elected (55). Hints of their 
family interests in the Latin area, their drawing up of 
a twenty year truce with Veii in 425, which left Rome free 
to deal with the Aequi when their truce ended in 422, 
and the re-election of the first three as consular tribunes 
in 420, when there was a threat of Aequian attack, suggest 
that they shared particular concern with Rome's eastern 
defences (56). All may have been supported by the 
military faction for this reason; Horatius might also have
54. The monopoly of office by the Postumii, Sempronii and 
Quinctii, who held twenty curule posts from 444 to 414 may 
explain why they were the victims of the trials and mutiny 
from 423 to 414; see Munzer, Philol. 1937-8, 59f« Because 
of the trials, a change of emphasis in military policy to 
the north, and plebeian successes in the elections, these 
gentes only won five curule posts from 413 to 39G.
55. Diod. 12.81.1; Livy 4-35.1; Ghr. 354 in Degrassi, 
op.cit. 374.
56. See Gh.2 153, and above, n.29, 38, for hints of their 
spheres of interest. For the truce of 425, see Ogilvie,
GL 589.
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been supported to preclude protests about monopoly of 
office (57).
In 424, no military or domestic policies are apparent 
(58); perhaps the four patrician consular tribunes, Ap. 
Claudius, son of the disgraced Decemvir, Sp. Nautius,
Sex. lulius and L. Sergius, the consul of 429, won the 
election simply through the support of family friends 
united by patrician loyalty (59), the consular tribunate 
having been voted because of the patricians' continued 
confidence in their control of the assembly.
In 423, the senate voted for a consulship; perhaps 
its patrician leaders feared popular support of plebeian 
tribunes, who had proposed land reforms in 424, might 
disrupt their control of the consular tribune elections, 
while hoping that such plebeian leaders would not have 
sufficient influence in the tribunician college to impede 
consular elections (60). Claudius, the president (6I), 
returned two patrician consuls, Q. Fabius, who was son of 
one of the second Decemvirs, like Claudius, and brother 
of the consul of 442, and G. Sempronius, nephew of the 
consular tribune of 444 (62). Both might have been 
chosen partly because they gained from these relations
57. Like Sempronius (whose son and nephew were now closely 
linked with the patricians: n.54) in 444. See Gh.2
178 for Horatius' father's influence with plebeian leaders
58. Livy 4.35.3-4.
59. Their families were linked in office in 475-1, 460- 
458, and 451-0.
60. cf. Livy 4.35.5-36.5.
61. Livy 4.36.5.
62. Broughton, MRR 68.
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influence in Ardea, useful at this time of Volscian unrest
(63).
The successful prosecution of Postumius, the consular 
tribune of 4-26, for military incompetence by plebeian 
tribunes in 423, suggests that after Sempronius’ near 
defeat by the Volsci in 423, popular support for plebeian 
agitators had increased (64). Perhaps, therefore, the 
senate voted for a consular tribunate in 422 in fear of 
a consular election and levy being disrupted by plebeian 
tribunes just when Rome was under threat of Volscian and 
Aequian attacks (65). In the political conflict only 
three consular tribunes were returned - L. Papirius, the 
consul of 427, L. Manlius, brother of the consular tribune 
of 434, and Q. Antonius. Papirius' experience, and 
support from recent magistrates for all three might have 
contributed to their success (66).
In 421, the year after the end of the truce with the 
Aequi, the leaders in the senate voted for a consulship, 
presumably to ensure, after the inconclusive results of 
422, that appropriate military leaders were chosen, 
assuming that the plebeian tribunes' failure to prose-cute 
Sempronius, the consul of 423, for military incompetence
63. Livy 4-36.4, 37.4.
64. Livy 4.37-41; Val. Max. 3.2.8. Quinctius, consular 
tribune in 426, also tried for incompetence, was acquitted 
because of his greater reputation. The delay of the trial 
since 426 suggests its political nature.
65. cf. Livy 4.42.2.
66. See Broughton, MRR 68 and Ogilvie, CL 597 for their 
names. Antonius' father might have been the Decemvir 
patronised by the father of Claudius, in office in 424.
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meant that they would not be sufficiently united to dis­
rupt the consular elections (67). Accordingly, one of 
the consular tribunes of 422, named as consuls, N. Fabius, 
brother of Sempronius' colleague in 423, and T. Quinctius, 
son of the consular tribune of 426 acquitted the previous 
year (68). Both were from gentes with traditions of 
fighting the Aequi, and Fabius won an ovatio over them in 
421 (69). Their concern with military expansion is 
indicated by their increase in the number of quaestors to 
four, so that two could help the general with his booty 
(70).
In 420, an interrex, L. Papirius, named four men as 
consular tribunes, L. Quinctius, L. Furius, A. Sempronius 
and M. Manlius (71). Livy's confused account suggests 
that the interregnum was called after conflict between 
the patrician military faction and a united college of 
plebeian tribunes, who had been introducing land laws to 
build up popular support, and threatened to use their veto 
in the consular election (72). The interrex, who did not
67. Livy 4.42; Val. Max. 6.5.2; Ogilvie, CL 596-7.
68. Broughton, MRR 69-70.
69. Most recently, Quinctius' cousin had served with
Fabius' brother in the battle of Algidus in 431. See 
Livy 4.43.2 and Degrassi, op.cit. 539 for Fabius' ovatio.
70. Livy 4.43.3-5,12. His account of plebeian demands 
that two be reserved for them may have developed from 
evidence of their election now being moved to the more 
convenient tribal assembly (Ch.IB 35 n.21; Ch.10 105)
and of the subsequent disappointment of plebeian candidates 
for the post.
71. Broughton, MRR 70-1.
72. Livy 4.43; cf. Ogilvie, CL 599-
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give the centuries any choice, presumably named four 
consular tribunes rajther than two consuls because more 
than two generals with consular authority seemed necessary 
to meet Aequian attacks. The first three were the 
experienced leaders who had made the truce with Veii in 
425.
By the time of the election of 419, three plebeian 
tribunes, whose relations had failed to win the extra 
places in the quaestorship, presumably because the patrician 
candidates had greater authority and client support, had 
finally convicted Sempronius, consul of 423, for military 
incompetence, his unpopularity having increased because 
he opposed the tribunes’ land laws and his cousin had 
presided over the election of the quaestors (73). In 
420 there had also been another trial, probably based on 
resentment of patrician monopoly of office - that of 
Postumia, a Vestal Virgin, sister of the consular tribune 
of 426, for misconduct, by Minucius, the plebeian pontifex 
maximus whose gens had not won consular office since 457 
(74). In these confused circumstances, an election of 
consular tribunes was called, and Ag. Menenius, the 
plebeian consul of 439, C. Servilius, the consul of 427,
P. Lucretius, son of the consul of 429, and Sp. Nautius,
73. Livy 4.44.2-10, suggesting that Antistius, one of the 
prosecuting plebeian tribunes, was related to one of 
Sempronius' defenders in 422; perhaps the family was 
divided, or Sempronius had lost their support, as Livy 
suggests, and as one might expect, given the Sempronii's 
shift into the centre of the patrician faction since 444 
(above, 194» 198-9). cf. Ogilvie, CL 600-1.
74. Livy 4.44.11-12; Plut. Inim. Util. 6. Beloch, RO 18 
doubts Minucius’ priesthood, but I think it was possible 
for plebeians to hold such positions (Ch.IB 63 n.97). 
Munzer, Philol. 1937-8, 57f, argues for the historicity 
and political significance of the trial.
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son of the consul of 424, were elected (75). The 
repetition of office by three of them in 417 and the fact 
that four of them were returned suggests that they were 
political allies; since they all belonged to gentes hold­
ing consular office just once each since 440, they could 
have been supported by their associates among the military 
leaders partly to quell objections to the recent monopoly 
of office by a few gentes (76).
In 418, a slave revolt and the renewed threat of 
Aequian attack (77) made the patrician military leaders 
support experienced leaders as consular tribunes; they 
were only able to return three: L. Sergius, who had held 
four consular offices, G. Servilius, who had held two, 
and M. Papirius, who was Servilius’ colleague in the 
consulship of 427 and had personal interest in the protect­
ion of Latium (78). Their family loyalties, despite 
tales of their quarrels over command and tactics in the 
course of the year (79), are indicated by their nomination 
of Q. Servilius, the victor at Fidenae in 435, as dictator
75. Broughton, MRR 71-2.
76. The leaders might have feared Lucretius and Menenius, 
whose families had only reached office since 486 at times 
of domestic unrest, supporting plebeian agitators. The 
next known Menenius, indeed, was a plebeian tribune pro­
moting popular measures in 410.
77. D.H. 12.6.6; Livy 4.45.1-4.
78. Broughton, MRR 72.
79. Livy 4.45.5-47.6; cf. Dio. 6.23.4. The dispute was 
probably exaggerated because of misunderstanding of the 
practice of rotating fasces (Ogilvie, CL 603-4); also, the 
record of Servilius winning three consular tribunates from 
419 to 417 fostered the theme of jealousy.
(cU/f
to take Labici after Sergius' defeat there, his appoint­
ment of the consular tribune Servilius as his magister 
equitum (80), and the naming of Papirius, father of the 
consular tribune, as censor (81).
The years 4-17 and 4-16 broadly follow the pattern of 
4.19 and 4-18. In 4-17 there was peace abroad (82), but 
internal conflict after the creation of the Latin colony 
of Labici, where the plebeian tribunes Metilius and 
Maecilius had demanded land for the Roman people (83).
The three consular tribunes of 4-19, together with Sp. 
Veturius (84-), whose gens had not been represented in 
consular office since 4-55 (85), probably won the 
consular tribunate election on the same grounds as in 
4.19. In 4-16, because of the lack of security at Labici 
(86), the patrician military leaders returned, together 
with Nautius, colleague of his predecessors in 4-19, three 
more experienced generals: A. Sempronius, the consular
80. Diod. 13.6.8; Livy 4*4-5.6f; Degrassi, op.cit. 376-7.
81. Degrassi, op.cit. 97, 376.
82. Livy 4*47.8.
83. Livy 4.47.6-48, records the agitation over the land 
in 417 and 4I6, after the creation of Labici in 418; how­
ever his statement (4.48.1) that the tribunes for 416 had 
been elected for three years, and the fact that the con­
sular tribunes of 417 and 416 included all those of 419 
are hints that he misplaced the agitation, which would 
more naturally have taken place before the land was divided 
up with the Latins; cf. Ogilvie, CL 606-7.
84. Broughton, MRR 73 *
85. A Lucretius and a Veturius had been consuls in 462, 
amid similar agitation against monopolies.
86. Livy 4.49*4*
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tribune of 425 and 420, M. Papirius, consular tribune of 
418, and Q. Fabius, consul of 423 (87).
All those in power from 415 to 401, except for the 
Quinctilii, were from patrician families in consular office 
since 444, and hence dominant in the senate. In this 
period they pursued a more aggressive military policy, 
pushing back the Aequi and Volsci and then setting out to 
destroy Veii when its truce with Rome ended in 40$. 
Fifty-five of the fifty-nine consular posts were held by 
leaders whose forefathers were consuls with similar, though 
more modest, military aims from 485 to 463, the first 
period of patrician monopoly. Notably four gentes 
prominent in the foundation of the patriciate, the Cornelii, 
Fabii, Valerii, and Furii, whose estates together faced the 
main areas of military conflict held thirty-two consular 
posts from 415 to 401 (88).
In 415 and 414 eight patrician consular tribunes 
from the faction described above were returned: the brothers 
Q. and N. Fabius, consuls of 423 and 421, Q. Quinctius,
P. Postumius, P. and On. Cornelius and G. and L. Valerius
(89). The first six were all related to the consular 
tribunes who made the big expedition to Veii in 426; the 
last two were clearly promising generals, since they were 
to lead the army in nine more consular posts by 390.
Flood prevented any military activity in 415 and 414
87. See Broughton, MRR 73.
88. The Cornelii provided more individuals from a broader 
spectrum of the gens than any other; they generated the 
many powerful Cornelii families of the fourth century.
89. Broughton, MRR 74-5.
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besides the capture and recapture of Bola from the Aequi
(90).
After taking Bola in 414, Postumius died at the hands 
of his soldiers when he refused, or was unable, to give 
them the booty they had been promised, and objected to 
the colonising of the town with Romans, which had been 
proposed by plebeian tribunes in 41$ and 414 (91); he was 
no doubt concerned to satisfy the demands of his Latin 
associates for a share in the land. Since Postumius had 
come to power just after his brother’s heavy fine and the 
attempted conviction of his sister, his family must have 
been rich and powerful, and may have come to represent 
in the eyes of the people aristocratic ambition for war 
without concern to compensate the Roman people with 
adequate booty. In the aftermath of this revolt, the 
military faction in the senate voted for consuls, fearing 
that it could not control the consular tribune elections; 
when the tribunes then vetoed the election, an interregnum 
was called (92). The consuls for 413 named by the 
interrex. Fabius, consular tribune of 414, were the first 
of a five year series of patrician consuls from the military 
faction, which therefore must have dominated the patriciate 
as a whole. They were M'. Aemilius, C. Valerius, Cn. and
90. Livy 4.49; Diod. 13.42.6; Ogilvie, CL 608.
91. Livy 4.49.6-50.7; Val. Max. 9.8.3; Flor. 1.17.2.
The quaestor who tried to quell the mutiny and the plebeian 
tribune who proposed land laws have the same name, Sestius 
or Sextius; cf. Munzer, ’Sextius’, PWRE 2.A.2 (Stuttgart, 
1923) 2040 (the quaestor is a duplicate of the tribune) and
Ogilvie, CL 610 (vice versa).
92. cf. Livy 4.50.6-8.
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A. Cornelius, Q. Fabius, M. Papirius, Sp. Nautius and C. 
and L. Furius (93). Five of them already had experience 
of consular posts, and five were to hold them again. 
Except in the period of famine in 412 and 411» all led 
military campaigns in and beyond Latium against the Aequi 
and Volsci, capturing the strategic points of Ferentinum 
in 413, Carventum in 410, lost the subsequent year, and 
Verrugo in 409 (94)* Their elections were held free 
from threats of disruption by opposing plebeian tribunes, 
presumably because the latter could not form united 
colleges, after the people were appeased by the invest­
igation of Postumius’ death in 413 (95). Land laws 
proposed by plebeian tribunes Icilius, in 412, and 
Menenius, in 410, came to nought, although Menenius was 
able to obstruct the levying of troops for some time. 
Menenius, unlike his forefathers, may have resorted to 
the plebeian state because of renewed patrician loyalties
93. Broughton, MRR 75-8; cf. Ogilvie, Hermes I96I, 389- 
392, CL 613-4, who suggests that the college of 411, of
Papirius and Nautius, was a consular tribunate, including
Sempronius Atratinus, because Livy 4.52.5 gives Papirius 
the cognomen Atratinus, otherwise unique to the Sempronii. 
However, the Papirii and Sempronii are so closely connected 
in offices in this period, holding a censorship together in
443 and ten curule posts from 430 to 416, that simple
confusion of their names is perfectly credible.
94. Livy 4.51.7-53.11, 55.4,8. Notably the consuls of 
411 shared office in 416, as did their forebears in 458; 
on all three occasions military action against the Aequi 
was expected in the area of Labici, Carventum and the pass 
of Algidus. Ogilvie partly bases his reconstruction of 
the name Papirius Carventanus in the lists of 458 on his 
assumption that it is a doublet of the consul of 411; see 
CL 614-5; Ch.2 I64, n.206. However, the independent 
evidence of the Papirii's links with this area of Latium 
(see Ch.2 I64, n.208) and the coincidence of the spheres 
of expected activity in all three years suggest that the 
reconstruction stands up without this assumption.
95. Strachan-Davidson, PRCL 1 225f.
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among the military leaders (96).
In 409 increasing popular support for the plebeian 
leaders is indicated by another obstruction of the levy 
(97), and the election of three plebeians, Aelius, Papius 
and Silius, along with K. Fabius, as quaestors (98).
Hence the dominant faction in the senate, to avoid dis­
ruption and delay of consular elections by united plebeian 
tribunes, voted for a free election of consular tribunes 
in 4O8 on the condition that the plebeian tribunes of 409 
did not stand as candidates (99). Since the votes were 
weighted towards the patricians’ rich amici and clients 
in the comitia centuriata, unlike the tribal assembly, 
where the quaestor elections were held., the competition 
of the plebeian candidates could only reduce to three the 
number of absolute majorities won in this election by the 
leading faction. After this success, consular tribunates 
were voted again for 407 and 406 (100), and the patricians.
96. cf. Zon. 7.20; Livy 4.51.2-6, 52.1-3, 8, 53.2-8.
Livy 4.53.11-13 notes that the patricians held a consular 
election for 409 in fear that Menenius might win a consular 
tribunate with popular backing.
97. Livy 4.55.2-6.
98. See Livy 4.54, calling them the first plebeian 
quaestors; cf. n.91. Since none are from gentes known 
until the late fourth century, while Sextius’ gens is active 
in 452 and 379-366 in association with patrician leaders, 
they may have been the first plebeian quaestors from out­
side the broad ruling class of patricians and plebeians.
99. Livy 4.54.8-55.7; cf. 4.56.3.
100. Livy 4.56.9-57.10 uses the story, also told in 431 and 
4I8, of the consular tribunes resenting the appointment of 
a dictator to explain the continuance of consular tribunes 
in 407. The consular tribunes of 408 included a Servilius 
re-elected the next year (as in 418) and a Julius (as in 431); 
thus the tale was readily transposed.
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promoting candidates of prestige and experience, gained 
four places each year (101). No effective agitation by 
plebeian tribunes is recorded in these years; perhaps 
hopes of spoil (102) placated the people. The patrician 
military leaders from 408 to 406 were 0. lulius. P., P. and 
On. Cornelius, G. Servilius, L. Furius, G. and L. Valerius 
and N. Fabius; the same gentes were also represented by 
a dictator, magister equitum and lieutenant (103).
They continued their military policy, fighting the Aequi 
and Volsci in the area of Labici, which Servilius' father 
had captured in 418, and more aggressively in the upper 
Liris valley beyond. They also fought the Volsci attack­
ing with the aid of Antium along the coastal route towards 
the estates of the Valerii (104).
From 40$ to 401, the dominant issue was the siege of 
Veii, which the Romans began as soon as the truce expired 
at the end of 406, despite the continued unrest of the 
Volsci (10$). From 403 there was also fighting against
101. cf. Livy 4.57.11. Five had previously held consular 
posts.
102. Livy 4.55.8, 59.9-11, 60.
103. cf. Broughton, MRR 78-80; Degrassi, op.cit. 96; 
Ogilvie, CL 617.
104. For details of the military activity, see Livy
4.56.4-7, 57.7-8, 58.3-5, 59.1-8; Diod. 14.16.5; Enn.
Ann. 4.165; cf. De Sanctis, StR 2.167-8 and Ogilvie, CL 
6I8-622. Note that in 406, Valerius fought at Antium, 
where his family had connections (Ch.2 136-7) and
Fabius, whose grandfather and father were consuls when 
Antium and Ardea became colonies (Ch.2 157-8 and 
above, 192, 194) fought beyond them at Anxur.
105. Contradictions in the date the siege began (cf. Plut. 
Cam. 2.5, 5.1, 7.1; Diod. 14.16.5; Livy 4.58.1-2, 7, 60.9, 
61.2) may be due to confusion of the Romans' provocation 
of war with the siege itself, and attempts to match its 
length with that of Troy. For detailed discussion, see 
Last, CAH7 511-2; Sordi, RRC If; Ogilvie, CL 589, 620, 629
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other Etruscan cities which supported Veii (106).
Almost all the thirty consular tribunes returned in this 
period were likely advocates of the current policy.
They comprised members of gentes in power from 415 to 406, 
Sergius and Claudius, whose gens estates lay towards Veii, 
Manlius, Sulpicius and Verginius, whose forebears all held 
office in 435 and 434» during the previous war with the 
Etruscans, and Quinctilius, whose possible allegiances 
are noted below (107). This military faction would have 
voted for consular tribunes in this time of heavy war, 
partly because it could not afford the disruption and 
delay of consular elections by plebeian tribunes, and 
partly because it required several generals with consular 
authority in the different spheres of aciton (108).
Since each consular tribunate contained six members, and 
twenty-three individuals gained places in them, a broad 
range of members of the faction must have been co-operating 
in marshalling their clients and amici to the elections.
The faction also attempted to prevent popular discontent 
with the heavy levies and winter campaigns at Veii from 
403 by giving pay to the soldiers, although taxes to pay 
for it had to be implemented by the censors Postumius
106. Livy 5.1, 7.2-3, 8.5-13, 10.2, 12.4-6; Diod. 14.43.5; 
Zon. 7.20. It allowed the Volscians to recapture Anxur 
in 402 (Livy 5.8.2-3).
107. Broughton, MRR 80-4; Ogilvie, CL 63O-I.
108. Ten had experience of fighting the Aequi and Volsci 
from 421 to 406; seven of these were consular tribunes in 
405 and 404, when war with the Volsci continued.
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and Furius Camillus (109), and public resentment of the 
long war grew. The plebeian tribunes of 401, Metilius, 
Minucius and Guriatius, were quick to take advantage of it, 
prosecuting and fining Verginius and Sergius, consular 
tribunes of 402, for military incompetence, proposing an 
agrarian law, and forbidding the collection of war tax 
(110). Guriatius belonged to the gens of a consul in 
office with a Quinctilius in 453, in the period when 
Minucii and Verginii were demanding plebeian equality.
I would suggest that Quinctilius and Verginius, both 
minor patricians or plebeians, were supported as candidates 
for the consular tribunates in 403 and 402 by members of 
the main military faction in the hope of appeasing the 
plebeian leaders with whom they were linked, who were 
protesting against the policy and domination of the 
patrician military leaders, and that it was in fear of 
the plebeian tribunate being taken over by the increasing 
number of plebeians with such patrician connections that 
Trebonius introduced his law against the co-option of 
plebeian tribunes in 401 (ill). Verginius' prosecution 
by his plebeian associates may be explained simply by 
public pressure for the trial after the severe setback
109. Diod. 14.16.5; Zon. 7.20; Livy 5.2.2-7, 12.12;
Plut. Cam. 2; Val. Max. 2.9.1. The imposition of the 
tax by Postumius, the consular tribune convicted in 423, 
may have inflamed public reaction.
110. Livy 5.8-12 passim.
111. See Ch.IB 45 n.51 for details on Trebonius' law. 
cf. Ogilvie, CL 649, who concludes from the pattern of 
names that the plebeian tribunes were fictional.
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at Veii in 402 (112).
From 400 the Etruscan war and conflict with the 
Volsci were the main political issues until Veii was 
destroyed in 396 (113). Six consular tribunes were 
returned each year from 400 to 396, suggesting that the 
elections were controlled by a united senatorial group; 
yet they fall into two distinct categories. All but 
one of the patricians holding consular tribunates, four 
in 400 and 399, twelve in 398 and 397, and one in 396, 
were from the gentes Manlii, Furii, Valerii, Servilii,
Sulpicii, lulii, Sergii, Postumii, and Cornelii, which
held consular office in the past decade; eight had been consular
tribunes themselves. The other patrician, Veturius,
whose gens had held only one post since 451, may have
shared concern about their monopoly of office with the
plebeians, Licinius, Titinius, Maelius, L. and Vol.
Publilius, Genucius, Atilius, Pomponius and Duillius, 
who held the remaining consular tribunates; all were 
related to leading agitators for office in the fifth 
century {114). As in 403 and 402, the patrician military
112. While the story of dispute between Verginius and 
Sergius over tactics (Livy 5-8) may be based on genuine 
differences over the best sphere of activity after the 
Volsci took Anxur, the fact that the two belonged to circles 
within the war party with differing attitudes to the plebeian 
leaders could have contributed to it. Details in it are 
duplicated from 418 and 408; see Ogilvie, CL 646.
113. Livy 5.13-14, 16; Ogilvie, CL 651.
114. For support of all the names, see Degrassi, op.cit.
99, Broughton, MRR 84-88, and Ogilvie, CL 652-4, 666-9.
The last nine gentes noted were represented by supporters 
of the plebeians' cause in 494-3, 451-444, and 436 (Beloch,
RG 253), and all but two reached the consulship within 
thirty years of the Licinian-Sextian law.
213
leaders may have supported the latter group as candidates 
in fear of plebeians demanding representation disrupting 
the elections and delaying the war (115). We may detect, 
for some, common interests and personal ties which presum­
ably contributed to their choice. The Veturii, being 
neighbours of the Valerii in the west, and the Publilii, 
possibly originating in the Volscian area, would have had 
personal interests in the Volscian war; Licinius' and 
Pomponius' gentes, like the Verginii, originated in the 
main area of war, Etruria, and the Maelii had clients there 
(116). Common interests in Etruria may have been the 
basis of family ties made by Licinius with the Cornelii, 
Fabii, Sulpicii and Manlii by 367 (117).
The election of plebeians in 400 and 399 caused the 
withdrawal of tribunician opposition to war tax (118); 
only after patricians had been elected for two years, 
hoping that with their greater military experience they 
would complete the war (119), did the plebeian tribunes
115. cf. Livy 5.12.7-8, 13.2, 17.5; Bernardi, Ath. 1952 46.
116. See Ch.2 136-7; Livy 4.13.2; Gundel, 'Pomponius'
PWRE 21.2 (Stuttgart, 1952) 2323; Munzer, RAA 56f; Ogilvie,
CL 653. Licinius, Verginius, and the forebears of their 
contemporaries in office in 402-400, Minucius and Sergius, 
had the cognomen Esquilinus, denoting the hill fully included 
in the city during the Etruscan monarchy (Ch.2, 137 n.68).
117. Licinius, the consular tribune of 400, was 'frater'
to Cornelius, his predecessor in office; Licinius, plebeian 
tribune in 376, was brother-in-law of Fabii, in office from 
406 to 390, and Sulpicius, in office from 388, and 'cognatione' 
to Manlius, son of the consular tribune of 397; see Livy
5.12.12, 6.34.5, 39.4; cf. Munzer, RAA 13, 56.
118. Livy 5.12.13.
119. Livy 5.14.2, 16.3-5, suggests some conflict with the 
plebeian leaders in these elections.
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threaten the election, in 396. Finally, an interrex, 
Camillus, appeased them by naming as consular tribunes 
one patrician and five plebeians, who had all been consular 
tribunes in 400 and 399 and therefore could also claim 
military experience (120). During the year they named 
Camillus as dictator to take Veii, and he chose P.
Cornelius as his magister equitum; the experience both had 
of fighting at Veii would have dictated their choice (121).
One reason for the success in the senate and 
assemblies of some consular tribunes from 400 to 396 may 
have been their claims to have religious solutions to the 
critical military situation and the pestilence of 399 
(122). They held the first lectisternium by order of the 
Sibylline books in 399 (123). Four leading magistrates, 
Valerius, Cornelius, Licinius and Fabius were sent to 
Apollo at Delphi in 398 to inquire about a portent at 
Alba (124). Camillus vowed temples and games, and held
120. No doubt the threat of obstruction by the plebeian 
tribunes contributed to the decision to have an interregnum, 
but the need for three interreges may have been due not to 
such obstruction, as Livy 5.17.1-5 suggests, but to the 
patricians being unable to agree on consular tribunes.
121. See Livy 5.16.2, 17.6-10, 18.7-12, for the build-up 
of hostility against Rome by 396. See Broughton, MRR 88 
for full refs, to the dictator taking Veii.
122. Eight of the patrician gentes had furnished censors 
or priests in the fifth century (Broughton, MRR passim).
123. Livy 5.13.4-8, 14.2-5; D.H. 12.9; Ogilvie, CL 651; 
Scullard, HRW& 399. Apollo was included to heal the 
pestilence (cf n.lO) and Hercules, Mercury and Neptune to 
provide 'marine insurance' for imported grain (J. Carter, 
The Religion of Numa (London, 1906) 77-81; Scullard, FCRR 
Ï68). The books were last consulted in the consular 
tribunate of Sergius' forebear; see D.H. 4.62 and n.48 
above for hints that several other consular tribunes 
inherited interests in them; note also Publilius' Greek 
cognomen (Degrassi, op.cit. 113).
124. Broughton, MRR 86.
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a vivid triumph in 396 (125). His temple to Juno, an 
important goddess in both Veii and Alba, may have been 
intended not only to symbolise Veii’s conquest, but also 
to appease the gods in the Alban region (126). Camillas' 
temple to Mater Matuta, a goddess of Satricum and Antium 
linked with Fortuna, with whom the Valerii associated 
themselves (127), may be linked with the concern of 
Camillus, the Valerii and their allies to establish Roman 
control in this area claimed by the Volsci (128).
For the next fifteen years, there was little change 
in the gentes controlling the senate and elections; 
fifteen represented in curule office from 415 to 396 
held eighty-seven of the ninety-two consular posts from 
395 to 380, the most prominent again being the Furii, 
Fabii, Cornelii and Valerii, who held thirty-six.
They pursued the same broad policies - patrician control 
of government, when feasible, and war - first aggressive.
125. Diod. 14.93.2; Plut. Cam. 5, 7; Livy 5.19.6, 23-4-7, 
31.3; Pliny NH 33.111; Val. Max. 4.1.2; Zon. 7.21; cf. 
Ogilvie, CL 679-680. His cognomen (Macrob. Sat. 3.8.7; 
Sordi, RRC 145) and early censorship suggest he had already 
developed religious authority.
126. Camillus' vow to Juno to bring her statue to Rome if 
Veii fell {Livy 5.21.2, 22.4-7, 23.7; D.H. 13.3; Plut.
Cam. 5.6; Val. Max. 1.8.3) was a standard procedure to win 
over the enemy's tutelary god (Ogilvie, CL 673-5). The 
story of the Veian soothsayer recommending the drainage of 
the Alban lake to allow Rome to take Veii (Livy 5.15-17; 
Zon. 7.20; D.H. 12.10-13; Plut. Cam. 3-4; Cic. de div. 
1.100, 2.69) may have developed because of the connection 
of Juno with both Veii and Alba (Wissowa, RKR^ 187f; K. 
Latte, Romische Religionsgeschichte (Munich, 1960)(=RR)
I66f). The real evil portent at Alba was not the rising 
of the lake, but the pestilence (n.lO).
127. See Ch.2 137 n.67; Livy 6.33.4; Ovid, Fast. 6.569; 
Ogilvie, CL 680-1.
128. Ogilvie, CL 681.
216
then defensive - against the Etruscans, Aequi and Volsci.
The likely attitudes of certain sectors of the faction to 
three more specific current issues should be outlined. 
Firstly, those with personal associates in Latium, or 
estates nearby, would have tended to favour the foundation 
of Latin colonies to satisfy their Latin friends and 
protect themselves from growing unrest in Latium over 
Roman power. Secondly, the same sector would have supported 
the full incorporation of appropriate Latin towns in the 
Roman state which might provide them with influential 
Latin friends among the Roman senators and voters. Their 
promotion of these aims, together with the need for their 
local knowledge and influence, may explain why the number 
of offices held by gentes with well founded interests in 
and around Latium shows a marked increase in this period 
(129). Thirdly, those who had neighbouring estates or 
had contributed to their acquisition would have had special 
interests in the disposal of the Veian and Pomptine lands, 
presumably hoping either to exploit it themselves, or 
patronise the citizens settled there. Since all the 
consular tribunates in this period contained six leaders, 
compromises or agreements over all these potentially 
conflicting aims were presumably often made at senatorial 
level to ensure that the control of the patrician military 
faction as a whole was maintained; thus they may often 
not have been directly significant for the elections’ 
results.
129. e.g. The number of curule posts held by Aemilii, 
Papirii, Horatii and Menenii, who had the names of rural 
tribes around Latium, increases from 5 in 4-15-396, to
17 in 395-380.
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In 395 and 394» these leaders voted for consular 
tribunes to fight Veii’s Etruscan allies in the north, 
and the Aequi and Volsci in the south, not fearing plebeian 
competition in the assembly in the euphoria of victory. 
Twelve consular tribunes were returned; seven had already 
held office since 405 and the other five were close 
relatives of their colleagues (130). They belonged to 
the Fabii, Cornelii, Servilii, Valerii, Aemilii, Postumii 
and Furii, all gentes with interests in the north where 
they quelled Falerii and Gapena, near the west coast where 
they helped to found a colony at Girceii, south of Antium, 
and around Latium where they defeated the Aequi (131).
Increasing public unrest, stirred up by the plebeian 
tribune, Sicinius, who since 395 had been proposing 
generous citizen settlements on the fertile lands of 
Veii, was of prime concern in the election of 393 (132). 
Part of the reason that Camillus was named as consular 
tribune in 394 was to combat this unrest (133); he had 
tried to distract the people by sending Valerius, Manlius 
and Sergius to Apollo with a gift to thank the god for
130. Broughton, MRR 89-91.
131. cf. Livy 5.24-9; Plut. Gam. 9-10; D.H. 13.1-2;
Diod. 14.98.5, 102.4, 16.96; Val. Max. 6.51; Front. Str. 
4.4.1. No one date for the colony of Girceii is given; 
395 is credible, since the revolt of Antium, just to 
the north, is likely to have been quelled by 406; see 
Ogilvie, GL 6I8, 682-3; Thiel, HRSP 51; cf. Toynbee, HL
1.122. n.4.
132. Plut. Gam. 7,9,11; Livy 5.24-4-25.13. The details 
of the proposal, and Camillus’ invective against it are 
suspect, being elaborated with much propaganda, and 
duplicating those set in 390; see Ogilvie, GL 683, 741f.
133. Livy 5.26.1; Plut. Gam. 7.
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the victory of 396 and exempting them from war tax (134) 
However Sicinius’ persistence forced most of the senate 
to support making some citizen settlements at Veii by 
393. Hence Verginius and Pomponius, who had maintained 
the firmer line as plebeian tribunes vetoing Sicinius in 
395 and 394, were not returned in 393, and were fined by 
tribunes in the course of the year (135). These 
tribunes presumably maintained the compromising attitude 
of the military leaders, and prevented their colleague 
Sicinius obstructing the consular election, voted by the 
senate to ensure its control of the assembly (136).
After the resignation of the first pair of consuls 
returned, Valerius and Cornelius, possibly because of 
procedural error, Lucretius and Sulpicius were elected. 
The first two, and Sulpicius’ kinsmen had been generals 
at Veil; Lucretius, whose gens was last in power in 417, 
may have been closer to the plebeian leaders (137).
At any rate, the consuls were clearly named to placate 
the people; they divided up much of the Veian land for 
the people, after the tribes had rejected Sicinius’ bill
134. Livy $.21.2, 23.8-11, 25.7.10, 27.15; Flor. 1.6.10; 
App. Ital. 8; Diod. 14.93.2; Plut. 0am. 7-8. De Sanctis, 
StR 2 147-9, and Last, 0AH7 513-4, argue for the credib­
ility of the mission. Certainly the names of the envoys 
are plausible, one of the Manlii had been to Greece in 
454; one of the Valerii had been to Delphi in 398; the 
three envoys had held seven consular tribunates during the 
siege of Veii.
135. Livy 5.25.1, 29.6-10. Both were related to consular 
tribunes in office during the siege, and therefore probably 
had ties with the military leaders.
136. cf. Livy 5.29.2.
137. Broughton, MRR 91-2; cf. Ogilvie, GL 691. Cornelius, 
UFRG 116-7, notes that Sulpicii shared four out of five 
offices held by Lucretii from 393 to 367; thus they are 
likely to have had personal ties.
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in expectation of this (138). They also named censors, 
Papirius and lulius to implement this (139), and continued 
the war against the Aequi (14-0). The settlement in 393 
allowed another consular election to be held without 
tribunician obstruction in 392 (14-1). The choice of the 
consuls, L. Valerius and M. Manlius, may have been partly 
due to the personal influence of Camillus, their -close 
ally (14-2) . They fulfilled his vows of 396 by cele­
brating the great games, and dedicating the temple to 
Juno (14-3). Valerius may also have been chosen to 
compensate him for having to resign the previous year 
(144), and. because of his great military experience in 
five consular posts; he triumphed over the Aequi in 392, 
while Manlius had an ovatio (145).
In 391 and 390, fears of Gallic invasion amid
138. Livy 5.29.3, 30.1-8; cf. Diod. 14.102; Ogilvie,
CL 693.
139. R. Cram, ’The Roman Censors’ HSCP 1940 75-6; 
Broughton, MRR 91-2.
140. Livy 5.29.3-5; Diod. 14.102.4.
141. Livy 5.31.1.
142. See Broughton, MRR 92 for their names. In each of 
the nine years Camillus held high office from 403 to 394, 
at least one of the Valerii and Manlii held a post; 
Valerius and Manlius’ uncle took Camillus’ bowl to Apollo 
in 394.
143. Livy 5.31.2-3. They may have had special interest 
in the temple; Juno was a goddess of fertility, like 
Fortuna and Mater Matuta, with whom the Valerii were 
associated (see 215 above) and was part of the
Capitoline Triad defended by Manlius in 390 (Wissowa,
RKr2 181f).
144. His colleague did not regain office until 390, but 
his brother became suffect censor in 392 (Degrassi, op. 
cit. 100, 386).
145. Livy 5.31.4; Diod. I4.IO6.4.
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Etruscan unrest (14-6) dominated the elections. The 
senators probably voted for consular tribunes simply to 
ensure that there were enough generals with consular 
authority. In 391 they were named by an interrex, to 
ease popular superstition resulting from pestilence and 
military threats and to ensure suitable leaders (14-7); 
in 390, with the -Gallic invasion an immediate threat, 
those best qualified by military experience and local 
knowledge were readily elected without opposition (148). 
Eight of the consular tribunes, L. Lucretius, Ser. 
Sulpicius, C. Aemilius, L. Furius, K. and N. Fabius, Q. 
Servilius and P. Cornelius, were experienced generals who 
had. held a total of twenty consular posts in the past.
Of the other four, L. Aemilius' military skills are 
suggested by his holding five more consular posts in the 
next decade; Q. Fabius was no doubt chosen in 390 because 
he had been on a reconnaissance expedition north with his 
two brothers in 391 (149); only Ag. Furius and Q. Sulpicius 
had no known previous experience. Five of the six
146. For the war in the north in 391, see Livy 5.31.5-6, 
32.2-5; D.H. 13.4; Diod. 14.109; Ogilvie, CL 695-8; cf.
De Sanctis, StR 2 149, 151.
147. Livy 5.31.7-9; Ogilvie, CL 697.
148. For their names, see Broughton, MRR 93-6; Ogilvie,
CL 697.
149. The story of these envoys provoking the Gauls' 
invasion by fighting with them when answering an appeal 
by Clusium probably developed from the story of the trial 
of one of the Fabii after the invasion, because a pretext 
was needed for the Romans' defeat at the Allia; for 
different versions of all these events, cf. Plut. Cam. 
17-19; Livy 5.35.4-38; Diod. 14.113.4-114.5; for alter­
native reconstructions, see Munzer, 'Fabius' PWRE 
(Stuttgart, 1909) 1750-1, 1757-9; Ogilvie, CL 699-700, 
716, 786.
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consular tribunes in 390, the Fabii, Cornelius and 
Servilius, had family estates in the north, and therefore 
may have had vital influence among the Etruscans (150).
The concern of the patrician military leaders to 
recover authority both at home and abroad after the Gallic 
attack clearly dictated the electoral results of 389. 
Firstly, they recalled the great military and religious 
leader, Camillus, from voluntary exile at Ardea. The 
exact charges against him and the identity of his 
prosecutors are unclear, but his trial in 391 was probably 
the result of plebeian leaders’ resentment of his aggressive 
military policy and patrician loyalties, and increasing 
jealousy of all of his reputation and influence (151).
He was made interrex in 389 to renew the auspices (152), 
and named six consular tribunes, from loading gentes in 
the senate, to ensure that there were enough magistrates 
with military experience and authority among the people 
for the tasks at hand. They were L. Verginius, consular 
tribune of 4-02, who may have had influence among the 
plebeian leaders, L. Valerius, consular tribune of 394,
150. Note also that Aemilius' father had fought in the 
north three times.
151. For a summary of the various dates and procedures 
given by the ancients for his trial, see Shatzman, Hist. 
1972 189-90. While stories of his return to save Rome 
from the Gauls in 390 are dubious (Broughton, MRR 95; 
Ogilvie, CL 727f; Scullard, HRW4 476), his absence from 
the magistracies in 390, when all the best generals were 
required, shows that his exile was not devised merely to 
set up his absence from Rome (A. Momigliano, 'Camillus and 
Concord', CQ 1941, 112-3; Ogilvie, CL 698-9; cf. Beloch,
RG 304-5).
152. Livy 6.1.5-8. This may be why he was recalled by 
the comitia curiata (Livy 5.46.10; Ch.IB 51-2).
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L. Postumius, P. Cornelius, A. Manlius, brother of the 
defender of the Capitol in 390, and L. Aemilius, who had 
fought the Etruscans in 391 (153). Manlius commanded 
the troops near the city, and Aemilius marched against 
the Etruscans, while Camillus, appointed by them as 
military dictator, defeated the Volsci, Aequi and 
Etruscans (154). Furius and Papirius, both from families 
with much religious authority, were appointed as censors 
to register the citizens, including recently enfranchised 
Etruscans, purify the state, and organise the rebuilding 
of the city (155). Finally, Fabius, consular tribune 
of 390, was prosecuted by Marcius, a plebeian tribune, 
for his role in Rome’s humiliation in 390; this may have 
been approved by most of the governing class, for he 
committed suicide during the trial and only one member of 
his gens was able to win consular office again before 
369 (156).
153. Broughton, MRR 96-8.
154. Livy 6.2.5-4.4; Plut. Cam. 33-6; Degrassi, op.cit.
101, 389, 539.
155. For the censors, see Broughton, MRR 97-8. For the 
enfranchisement of the Etruscans, see Livy 6.3.4. Plut. 
Cam. 30-2, and Livy 5.50-6.1, may attribute religious 
measures and rebuilding to Camillus in his spurious dictator­
ship in 390 partly because one of the censors, who they do 
not mention, had the same gens name. Other measures 
supposedly decreed by Camillus in 390, such as the establish­
ing of hospitium with Caere and Massilia (n.5) and the 
consulting of the Sibylline books may have been instigated 
by the consular tribunes of 390 or 389; their interests in 
such matters are suggested by the fact that all but three 
were from gentes providing envoys to Greece in the past 70 
years.
156. Livy 6.1.6; cf. Diod. 14.113.6. The Marcii later 
claimed ancient religious authority (Palmer, ACR I46-I5I) 
which may have been significant in this trial if it was 
intended to purify the city in some way.
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By 388, there was unrest both within Rome, over the 
division of the Pomptine land won in 389, and without, 
among Etruscans, Aequi and Latins, the latter possibly 
also concerned about the Pomptine land (157). These 
matters may have dictated the choice of the six consular 
tribunes (158). Q. Servilius and L. Lucretius had past 
experience of leading the armies. L. lulius, Ser. 
Sulpicius and T. Quinctius had long standing influence in 
Latium. L. A-equillius, a plebeian, was an old family 
friend of the Sicinii, who were agitating for the division 
of Pomptine and Veian lands among the people in this 
period; perhaps Aequillius, whose gens was later registered 
in the Pomptine tribe, stood for their policy (159). 
Lucretius, who, with Sulpicius’ kinsman, had made the 
settlement at Veii in 393, may have represented those 
favouring a more modest settlement.
None of these matters were resolved in 388, and in 
387 Sicinius became plebeian tribune, and demanded the 
division of the Pomptine land among the Romans (l60).
An interregnum was instituted, apparently for religious 
reasons but really, perhaps, to ensure a fair compromise 
among senators differing over some of these issues, and 
to ensure control of the assembly (l6l). Six consular
157. Livy 6.2.3, 5.1-5.
158. Broughton, MRR 98-9.
159. Ch.2 145; Taylor, VDRR 192-3.
160. Livy 6.4*8-9, 5.5, 6.1-2.
161. Livy 6.5.6. It took three interreges to find a 
college pleasing to all.
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tribunes were named so that there were enough generals 
with consular authority (162). Cn. Sergius and L. 
Cornelius may have been named for their influence in and 
knowledge of Etruria, and as representatives of those 
supporting the creation of four new tribes in the north, 
in which their families were later registered (163).
L. Papirius and Lie. Menenius may have represented those 
favouring their Latin neighbours’ demands for fair treat­
ment in the division of the Pomptine land (I64). L. 
Aemilius, consular tribune of 391» and L. Valerius, 
consular tribune of 394 and 389, might have been named 
for their military experience; they would have been 
particularly concerned with military protection of the 
Pomptine area, beyond their gens estates. Valerius, 
having helped to take the land in 389, may also have 
hoped to patronise settlers there.
By 386, internal unrest had declined (165), and 
concern with the defence of the state against rumoured 
Volscian attacks amid continued Latin and Etruscan
162. Broughton, MRR 99-100.
163. Taylor, VDRR 204, 207, 225, 230, 253-4, notes Claudii, 
Sergii, Cornelii, Licinii and Manlii in these tribes later 
in the Republic: the latter three were represented by 
magistrates in 396, when the land was taken. The interests 
of all five in Etruria have already been noted. One of 
the consular tribunes in 387, Papirius, may have furthered 
their influence in the area when censor in 393.
164. Since Menenius’ tribe lay on the borders with Prae- 
neste, which led the Latin revolt in 382, Menenius is 
unlikely to have supported his plebeian friends’ agitation 
for land that the Latins claimed in this period.
165. Increasing military threats in the area would not have 
made settlements on the poor Pomptine land attractive to 
the Roman people.
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unrest (l66) dominated the election of consular tribunes 
(167). Four were leading generals, eventually holding a 
total of twenty-five consular tribunates between them - 
Q. Servilius, Ser. Cornelius, M. Furius Gamillus and P. 
Valerius, who may have been chosen partly because of his 
personal connections at Antiura, where he fought in the 
course of the year. L. Horatius and L. Quinctius may have 
been supported partly in the hope that their connections 
in Latium would ensure continuing levies from the remaining 
loyal towns (168).
In 385» the consular tribunes A. Manlius, P. Cornelius, 
T. and C. Quinctius, L. Papirius and Cn. Sergius, who had 
all held the consular tribunate in the past five years 
were probably elected for similar reasons to their 
predecessors (I69). Their recent military experience, 
and the seniority of the dictator, in 385» A. Cornelius 
Cossus, consul of 4-13» suggests that the victory over the 
Volsci and their allies, which Livy ascribes to the 
dictator, belonged to the consular tribunes, and that the 
dictator was appointed solely to take action against the 
sedition of M. Manlius at Rome {170).
166. Livy 6.6.4.
167. See Broughton, MRR 100-1, 104» for their names.
168. For militarypactivity, see Livy 6.6.6-10.9; Front. 
Str. 2.8.4; OIL 1 191. Some of the successes they
attribute to Camillus are likely to have been by other 
generals, or have been borrowed from 389 {Beloch, RO 315f)
169. For the issues at hand, see Livy 6.11.2; for the 
names, see Broughton, MRR 101-2.
170. cf. Livy 6.II-I6; App. Ital. 9; Plut. Cam. 36 {who 
attributes the dictatorship to Quinctius, whom Livy calls 
magister equitura, but supports this view of its purpose); 
Diod. 15.35.3 {noting Manlius’ execution in 385).
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The military victory was followed up with the foundation 
of a Latin colony at Satricum, to defend the Pomptine 
lands and avert Latin unrest (171).
M. Manlius, who had been consul in 392, rebelled 
against his family and political allies (172) because 
his defence of the Capitol, his family seat, in 390 (173) 
had been overshadowed by his brother’s two subsequent 
consular tribunates, and by the glorious career of 
Camillus, who had associated himself with Jupiter and 
Juno, deities of the Capitol (174)* He had renewed his 
popularising by the time of the election in 384, and the 
consular tribunes elected then were probably supported 
by other senators largely because they were authoritative 
enough to meet his challenge to the established methods 
of controlling the assemblies. They were Camillus him­
self, Ser. Cornelius, P. Valerius, Ser. Sulpicius, C. 
Papirius and T. Quinctius; all but one had been consular 
tribunes in the past five years (175). Manlius’ 
demagogy may have threatened not only their existing 
authority in the assemblies, but also their plans of
171. Livy 6.16.6-8.
172. Livy 6.18; Plut. Cam. 36.
173. App. Ital. 9; D.H. 13.8, 14.4; Diod. 14.116.6-7^
Plut. Cam. 27; Livy 4.47; Degrassi, op.cit. 100; Gage,
RP 1953, 42,53; Ogilvie, CL 734.
174. For his jealousy of Camillus, see Plut. Cam. 36.1-2 
and Livy 6.11.3-7. While Camillus’ creation of the 
Capitoline games is not credible (n.l55; Ogilvie, CL 740-1) 
his triumph in 389 revived the associations he made with 
Juno and Jupiter in 396.
175. Broughton, MRR 102. Quinctius’ cognomen Capitolinus 
suggests his family connections with the hill.
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marshalling influential Latins to vote in Rome, once they 
had been enfranchised (176). With their backing, two 
plebeian tribunes, Publilius and Menenius, both from 
gentes recently noted as sharing the consular tribunes’ 
interests in Volscian and Latin areas respectively, 
secured Manlius' conviction at the Peteline grove, out 
of sight of the Capitol, for treason in 384. He was 
executed after being unsupported in his trial by the rest 
of his family. Henceforth no patrician was allowed to 
live on the Capitol, and Manlius’ house there was pulled 
down (177). The attempt by Manlius, a member of a gens 
maior, to win power by popular appeal, and his quelling 
by plebeian tribunes on behalf of the ruling patrician 
party within a few years of the enfranchisement of many 
Latin plebeians by their patrician allies in Rome clearly 
illustrates the anachronism of the division between 
patricians and plebeians (178).
In 383, since Volscian and Latin unrest continued, 
five of the consular tribunes, L. Valerius Poplicola,
A. Manlius, Ser. Sulpicius, L. Lucretius and L. Aemilius, 
were experienced generals, having held thirteen consular 
posts since 394- The sixth, Trebonius, the last known
176. cf. Gage^ , RP 1933 50f. Four have been noted as 
having ancient family interests in Latium. Livy 6.17.7-8 
notes them taking a harsh line in 384 with Latins taking 
arms against Rome.
177. Livy 6.18-20; Plut. Cam. 36; Zon. 7.23.10; Dio. 7.2.6; 
D.H. 14.4; Diod. 15.35.3. Gage, RP 1953 42f suggests 
that the trial followed an ancient procedure of the Latin 
confederacy hostile to the dwellers on the Capitoline.
178. cf. Livy 6.11.7, 19.6-7.
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of his gens, which was only previously known in plebeian 
tribunates, may have been supported as a candidate by 
the main faction in fear of public disorder being aroused 
by plebeian tribunes in the corn shortage and pestilence 
(179). In 383» the consular tribunes set up a commission 
to allocate Pomptine land, and agreed upon Latin colonies 
at Setia, near Satricum, and. Sutrium and Nepete in the 
north. These provided both Latins and Romans with 
further land and strengthened the federation's defences, 
giving particular protection to the Veian and Pomptine 
settlers (180). Most of the consular tribunes had direct 
interests in these developments which may partly explain 
their election; Lucretius had settled the Veian lands in 
393; Valerius and Aemilius, who had personal interests 
in the Pomptine lands, held office in 387, when their 
disposal was a major issue; Satricum was founded in 385, 
Manlius' last office. Despite these settlements, the 
same issues - Volscian attacks and Latin unrest, now 
expressed in open war - prevailed in the elections of 
382-380; hence each year six consular tribunes were 
returned from gentes represented in consular office since
179. For the issues at hand, see Livy 6.20.15-21.2.
For the names of the consular tribunes, see Broughton, 
MRR 103.
180. See n.9 on the commission; cf. n.l31, Beloch, RG 
305f, De Sanctis, StR 2 149 n.3, and Toynbee, HL 1 122 
n.4, 158, 374-5, on the colonies, whose dates are 
confused.
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390; ten with previous experience of high office (181).
In 380, after two years of fighting against the Prae- 
nestines and Volsci (182), T. Quinctius, the consular 
tribune of 384,was named as dictator; after choosing 
Sempronius, an old family friend, as his magister equitum
(183), he won the final victory over the Latin rebels
(184). Also in 380, Tusculum, the Latin town with 
closest ties to Rome, which had briefly joined the Latin 
rebels in 381, was enfranchised, and became part of the 
Papiria tribe, in which some of the Furii are later 
recorded (185). Sp. Postumius and C. Sulpicius may have 
begun to register such citizens when they became censors 
in 380 (186). All gentes named here may have been 
supported for the twelve curule posts they held in these 
three years because they had influence in Latium, and 
thus were promoting enfranchisement there.
181. Broughton, MRR 103-6. The tradition of 380 is badly 
confused; I aceept the first six names noted by the 
Capitoline Fasti, since Livy and Diodorus note at least 
four of them, and I accepted above that Sergius had his 
second consular tribunate in 385. The only plebeian in 
the three years is Menenius in 380, when his tribe was 
attacked directly by Praeneste (Livy 6.27.11-28.3).
182. Livy 6.22-4; Plut. Cam. 37.
183. Quinctius’ uncle had shared consular tribunates with 
the last known Sempronius, in 425 and 420, when Aequian 
attacks on Latium were their main concern.
184. For full refs, to this, see Broughton, MRR 105.
185. Plut. Cam. 38; Dio. 7.28; Livy 6.25-6; D.H. 14.6;
Val. Max. 7.3 ext.9; Taylor, VDRR 216-7, 301.
186. For support of their censorship, see Cram, HSCP 
1940, 78-80; Degrassi, op.cit. 102; Broughton, MRR IO6.
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In 379» rising debt, which caused disruption to the 
levy in 380 (187), and the Volscian war were the issues 
at hand. Three consular tribunes, P. and C. Manlius 
and L. lulius, a consular tribune of 388, were patricians, 
and three, 0. Sextilius, M. Albinius and L. Antistius, 
were descended from fifth century plebeian tribunes 
(188). Since six were returned, a compromise was 
probably agreed in the senate before the election to 
ensure that in the popular unrest majorities were won in 
the assembly, but the basis for it is uncertain (189).
By 378 the Manlii had been defeated by the Volsci 
and Praeneste had revolted (190). Again, six consular 
tribunes, largely from lesser gentes, were returned (191). 
They were Q. Servilius, consular tribune of 382, Sp.
Furius, M. Horatius, Menenius, the plebeian consular 
tribune of 380, and P. Gloelius and L. Geganius, both 
from minor patrician gentes, last represented with 
Menenius' and Furius' forebears from 444 to 439. As 
in that period, the minor leaders might have gained office 
partly because they shared the plebeian leaders' objections
187. Livy 6.27.3-11.
188. Livy 6.30.2; cf. Chr. 354 in Degrassi, op.cit. 394; 
Diod. 15.51.1.
189. The nature of earlier links between patrician leaders 
and the kinsmen of Antistius and Sextilius is unclear; see 
n.73, 91, 98. Albinius had helped to save Rome in 390 
(Livy 5.46.7-10; Plut. Gam. 21; Ogilvie, GL 724); perhaps 
he had threatened to arouse internal unrest, like Manlius, 
cousin of his colleagues, in 384, if he was not supported;
cf. Livy 6.30.9.
190. Livy 6.30.3-8.
191. Broughton, MRR 107.
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to the recent monopoly of office, and partly because 
they belonged to gentes based on the restless Latin and 
Volscian borders, and therefore shared the military 
leaders' concern about the wars. Four of the consular
tribunes led the armies out in 378 (192) after they had
appeased plebeian agitators by appointing Sp. Servilius 
and Q. Gloelius as censors to investigate debt, and 
promising that no war taxes or judgements on debt be 
made until the war was completed (193).
In 377, since the question of the state's defence 
largely dictated the choice of the six consular tribunes, 
the renewal of prosecutions by the censors for debt may
not have begun until after the election (194). L.
Aemilius and P. Valerius, the consular tribune of 380, 
defended their estates against the Latins and Volsci in 
the west, winning the surrender of Antium, possibly 
through Valerius' personal influence. Ser. Sulpicius, 
and L. Quinctius, who both had ancient ties in Latium and 
were kinsmen of victors there in 380 recovered Tusculum 
from the Latins. G. Veturius and G. Quinctius shared 
both these spheres of interest; Veturius, from a gens 
represented twice since 451» may also have shared some 
of his predecessors' resentment of monopoly of office 
(195).
192. Livy 6.31.5-8.
193. Livy 6.31.2-5; cf. Degrassi, op.cit. 102.
194. cf. Livy 6.32.1-3, 34.1-4.
195. Broughton, MRR 107-8 gives full refs, to names and 
events.
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After the military successes of 377, the questions 
of plebeian representation in curule office, debt and 
land shortage became the main political issues until 367.
It would have been generally appreciated by this time that 
the original purpose of the consular tribunate - to 
prevent monopoly of office - had been entirely lost once 
the patrician military leaders dominated the senate and 
developed client control, and that it was hardly in the 
state's general interests for the plebeian leaders to be 
forced to threaten to use vetoes and instigate secession 
whenever they could muster enough popular support to do 
so in order to win high office. Furthermore, many 
different types of political and personal ties were 
developing between patrician and plebeian leaders.
Hence, when, in 376, the plebeian tribunes Licinius, son 
of the consular tribune of 4-00, and Sextius, possibly a 
relation of the consular tribune of 379» introduced their 
proposals for political and economic reform in the 
plebeian assembly, they would have gained support from 
those patricians who hoped that if one seat in the freely 
elected consulship was reserved for plebeians, then they 
might combine with their most influential plebeian allies 
to exclude patricians with whom they had increasingly 
little in common. Such patrician supporters of the law 
are likely to have included some of those establishing 
new spheres of interest in the new citizen areas in 
Etruria and Latium, because some plebeian leaders in Rome 
had family branches there, and many powerful Latin plebeians 
had recently acquired citizen rights (196). The only
196. cf. Sordi, RRC 77-89.
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patrician supporters named in the tradition are Fabius, 
Licinius' father-in-law, and Manlius, Licinius' kinsman, 
who was appointed as dictator in 368 in the hope that 
his authority might help the plebeian tribunes to carry 
the law; he chose Licinius as his magister equitum (197).
A few other families most likely to have supported the 
law may be suggested; the Cornelii and Sulpicii were also 
related to Licinius (198) and the Valerii and Postumii 
shared with all those noted above an interest in Greek 
religion, reflected in this period by the passage of a 
law reserving places among the decemviri sacris faciundis 
for plebeians in 368 (199); all these families were active 
in the recent period of expansion and continued to hold 
office regularly after the passage of the law.
Despite this support, Licinius and Sectius linked 
their demands with economic measures to prevent obstruct­
ion in the plebeian assemblies from colleagues; such 
plebeian opponents would have included those who had no 
hope of benefiting from the political clauses, and who 
advocated more extreme economic reforms. Patrician
197. For Fabius' support, see Livy 6.34.5-11, 36.7f;
Dio. 7.29; Zon. 7.24; cf. Alfoldi, ERL 147f. For 
Manlius' dictatorship, see Fast. Gap. in Degrassi, op. 
cit. 32-3, 103-4; Livy 6.38.10f; Plut. Gam. 39.5; Dio.
7.29.5-6. Plutarch may only say that he passed the 
law on the ager publicus because he knew the legend 
that Licinius later contravened this clause (Gh.4, 248); 
Livy 6.39.2-4 contradicts him.
198. See above, 212, 224, n.l63 for details of all 
Licinius' patrician relations and their common interests
199. See above, 196, 214-5, 217-8, 222
for hints of these interests. See Gh.lB 63 for the 
law of 368. Le Bonniec, GG 236, and Gage, AR 115f, 
197f, link the development of Greek religious practices 
under the decemviri with the increasing influence of 
Gaere.
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opponents might have had allies among the leading plebeian 
families in Rome and Latium and have foreseen combining 
politically with them on occasion, but have still opposed 
the reservation of one plebeian place in the consulship, 
fearing that it would reduce their chances of office.
Livy names Furius •Camillus as such an opponent in 368 
(200). Minor patrician gentes which never reached 
consular office for more than a century after the 
implementation of the law, such as the Geganii, lulii, 
Sergii, Lucretii, Nautii, Pinarii, Aebutii, Sempronii, 
Gloelii, and Horatii, are also likely opponents.
Livy also notes objections to the law by Claudius (201), 
whose gens never appears to have had any links with 
plebeians, except in 450, when his grandfather, in order 
to pass the lex conubii, promoted plebeians who were not 
in the same class as the patricians, similar to those 
who now opposed the Licinian-Sextian law (202).
In the conflict over the Licinian-Sextian law only 
four leading figures, who had already held ten consular 
tribunates - Menenius, Papirius, Cornelius and Sulpicius - 
had enough personal authority and client control to win 
the consular tribunate election in 376 (203). From 
375 to 371 Livy says that Licinius and Sextius obstructed 
the elections of consular magistrates, but the absence of 
names is more likely to be the result of chronological
200. Livy 6.38.4F; Plut. Gam. 39.
201. Livy 6.40-1; cf. Cornelius, UFRG 29.
202. Livy 6.35.7f, 36.8f suggests that the tribunes 
vetoing the bill had been called by patricians to do so.
203. Broughton, MRR 108-9.
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confusion (204). From 370 to 367 plebeian tribunes 
Licinius and Sextius continued to build up popular and 
senatorial support for their law, but still failed to 
win it through the plebeian assembly, because of the 
veto of plebeian opponents. In this period, four colleges 
of six consular tribunes were elected (20$). Perhaps 
compromises over the domestic issues were being made at 
senatorial level to ensure that there were enough generals 
to deal with the military threats, first from Velitrae, 
and then from the Gauls (206). Fifteen of the twenty- 
four consular tribunates were held by those who had been 
generals; all the others were from gentes represented by 
consular tribunes in the past twenty years, who had local 
interests in defence of the areas under attack. It may 
have been fear of obstruction of the levy at a time of 
possible Gallic invasion that caused the consular tribunes 
to name Furius Camillus as military dictator in 368 and 
367. Like many of the consular tribunes, his magistri 
équités, Aemilius, who was consul with Sextius the year 
after the Licinian-Sextian law was finally passed, and 
Quinctius, might have differed with him over the bill, 
but have been chosen for their military experience (207).
204. See Ch.lA 17 n.2$. Because of this, Livy 6.36.3, 
assumes that an interrex held the election in 370.
20$. Broughton, MRR 110-113-
206. Livy 6.36.1-6, 38.1, 42.4f.
207. Fourteen consular tribunes from 370 to 367 belonged 
to gentes noted above as likely supporters of the bill; 
only one belonged to those listed as possible opponents.
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Once it was clear that there would be no invasion in 
368, Camillus was forced to abdicate by the supporters of 
the bill and was replaced by Manlius (2Ù8). In 367, 
however, after the tribunes finally got the law through 
the plebeian assembly, but its patrician opponents prevented 
it winning auctoritas patrum, he used his authority as 
dictator to bring about an informal compromise, whereby 
extra posts of praetor and curule aedile were created 
for the patricians, who agreed in return not to obstruct 
the election of plebeian consuls (2-Ô9).
Conclusion
Summing up, matters of policy might have influenced 
the results of most curule elections at senatorial level 
from 4-44 to 367. The most prevalent policies - the 
maintenance of patrician monopoly, which was declining by 
367, the wars, and the attempts to reduce land hunger, 
were generally of a fairly long term nature, and the
208. Plut. Cam. 39, Livy 6.38.8 and Fast. Gap. in Degrassi 
op.cit. 398, hint at Camillus' military intentions in 368; 
the impossibility of Livy's suggestion (6.38.4f) that he 
tried to prevent the law when president of the concilium 
plebis, the identity of his magister equitura, his early 
abdication, and the likely nervousness of Rome's leaders 
about rumours of another Gallic invasion at a time of such 
internal unrest (cf. Livy 6.36.4) all suggest that Livy 
6.38.3 and Plut. Cam. 39 assumed his appointment was 
primarily to deal with internal affairs only because they 
knew he opposed the law, and took action concerning it in 
367.
209. Polyb. 2.18.2, shows that Camillas' war against the 
Gauls in 367 (Livy 6.42.4-8; D.H. 14*9.10; Plut. Cam.
40-2; Degrassi, op.cit. 32f, 539-540) is a duplicate of 
that of 361. For this interpretation of the final internal 
settlement (Livy 6.42.9-14; Plut. Cam. 42; Ovid. Fast. 6 
641-644), see Ch.IB 60-63. Momigliano, CQ 1941 H5f, 
shows that Camillas' dedication of the temple of Concord
to mark the agreement is doubtful.
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factions implementing them seem to have been relatively 
stable, each holding power for several years at a time. 
Throughout the period, the practice of popularising was 
consistently quelled, most notably in 440, 432, 391 and 
384, as such factions developed the custom of marshalling 
clients and amici to the elections. In the latter years 
of the period, the prospect of winning large consular 
tribunates may often have encouraged political leaders 
with similar, or at least not conflicting, policies to 
co-operate with each other in order to use these marshalled 
voters effectively. Of course, it must be acknowledged 
that in any one year the repetition of office might be 
due to the need for military experience rather than 
factional loyalty, the family links of magistrates might 
be due solely to family loyalty rather than the family 
basis of political views, and the sharing of office by 
those with few apparent views in common might be due to 
the above factors, or a chance result, rather than 
compromises between political factions.
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CHAPTER 4 - ELECTIONS: 366-304 B.C.
The Political Issues
The use of various methods of electoral control, now 
that free choice was available in all regular elections, 
was a prime political issue in this period. Attempts by 
electoral presidents, especially dictators, who had the 
most personal authority and were frequently required in 
this time of heavy war, to exercise their full powers, 
and augural interference, are regularly cited in the yearly 
account below. The laws passed in 342 and 338 after a 
series of solely patrician consular colleges suggest that 
the patricians, when they shared enough common ground, 
were still controlling elections by co-operating over 
candidates and using the auctoritas patrum and interregna. 
When the patricians were not united, the interregna served 
to attain compromises after the use of other devices caused 
deadlock (1). The practice of marshalling clients and 
amici from beyond Rome was fully developed in this period. 
Enfranchisement and citizen settlement beyond the immediate 
boundaries of the city, resulting in the creation of six 
new tribes, was encouraged by senators who had personal 
connections in their areas in the hope of gaining electoral 
advantages from them. Such senators supported the 
development of a code of practice condemning the dis­
traction of clients and tribesmen from their commitments 
by bribery and canvassing, and opposed the publication of 
the civil law in 304» which loosened clients' dependence
1. For details of all these devices, see Ch.IB 48-56,
64—66.
239
on their patrons. However, the frequent changes in tribal 
registration, enfranchisements, and varying political 
allegiances as the state rapidly expanded, made client 
control particularly difficult; hence the prevalence of 
the other methods noted above and the importance of gaining 
spare votes in the assembly in this period (2).
A political issue closely linked with that of 
electoral control was the development of the new broader 
governing class, as the patrician monopoly collapsed.
Concern to prevent such monopolies of government inspired 
the lex Genucia of 342, and the lex Ovinia, passed by 312 
(3). Personal jealousy played a significant part here.
Well established but minor gentes envied and feared the 
Latin aristocrats entering the senate (4). Generals 
winning glory and riches in the great wars at the end of 
the century developed great personal rivalries, which 
contributed, with their differences over policy, to their 
political disputes.
It was partly in reaction to the increasing 
opportunities for magistrates to build up powerful positions 
for themselves on more distant campaigns that the senate 
developed its authority over the implementation of foreign 
and military policy in the second half of the period. At 
the same time, the reduction of the role of auctoritas 
patrum in 339 made the preliminary senatus consulta more
2. See Ch.1C 94, 102-113 for all these methods of 
controlling voters.
3. Ch.IB 66, 77.
4. Ch.1C 80f.
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significant in regular legislation (5). Senators with 
the greatest ability to control elections by marshalling 
clients, and thus the least dependence on their fellow 
senators' support, such as Fabius Rullianus, would have been 
least willing to see such senatorial authority increasing 
over the magistrates, and most able to resist it (6).
We can only infer a magistrate's political attitude from 
his actions in the second half of this period when he seems 
to have such personal authority, or to belong to a faction 
dominant in the senate.
The heavy wars which made Rome the dominant power in 
central Italy by the end of the period were the issues of 
greatest immediate concern in the elections (7). The scale 
of war is indicated by the appointment of about thirty-five 
dictators, seventeen suspensions of the lex Genucia which 
forbad frequent repetition of office, three promagistracies, 
some thirty-five triumphs, and an increase in officers in 
311 (8). Military expansion was motivated by several
factors. Senators naturally shared concern to improve
Rome's military defences and those of vulnerable neighbours, 
and extend Rome's dominions, especially in their own spheres 
of interest. More specifically, those who aided personal 
associates in Latium, Campania and Etruria against external 
attacks or internal opponents hoped that Rome might thus
5. For full details see GhlB 68-75.
6. See Ch.1C 120; below 288.
7. For some recent historical treatments of them, see 
Toynbee, HL 1 120-153; Salmon, 88 187-254; Harris, REU 
45-61.
8. Broughton, MRR 114-168 passim; Degrassi, II 13.1.540- 
543; Develin, POH 14-15; Ch.IB 35.
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gain control of such areas, to the mutual political 
advantage of themselves and their provincial allies (9).
The senators’ traditions of war and personal desires for 
glory, influence, and riches from land, trade and industry, 
all particularly accessible in Campania, also contributed 
to their promotion of war (10). Their commercial, 
industrial and cultural interests were stimulated in this 
period by increasing contacts with Carthage, Etruria, 
and maritime Greek cities in south Italy, and by the 
growing wealth in the state (11).
Economic distress in Rome in the first half of the 
period, caused by pestilence and lack of colonisation, 
is indicated by several debt measures from 357, and a 
revolt in 342 against long wars without substantial economic 
gains (12). Subsequently, however, it was steadily 
relieved by the creation of viritane allotments and 
colonies on land won in the wars (13); the increase in
9. I would not assume, as e.g. Sordi, RRC 58f, does of 
Etruria, that those with personal ties in an area would 
have favoured no military aggression there. cf. Ch.1C 
95-6; Polyb. 1.6.3-4; Heurgon, CP 252f; Bernardi, Ath.
1943 21f; Sherwin-White, RG^ 23f: Harris, WIRR 175-182; 
Toynbee, HL 1 330f.
10. Livy 7.31.1; Staveley, Hist. 1959, 410-433; Cassola,
GPR 26f; Salmon, SS 194-217; Harris, WIRR 54f.
11. See Frank, ES 1 35, 43, 51-5, and Staveley, art.cit. 
419-423 (wealth, public works and trade); Ogilvie, CL 88f 
(the development of the legend that Numa was a pupil of 
Pythagoras); Scullard, HRW4 350f (Etruscan and Greek art 
at Rome). Full details of diplomatic contacts with 
Mediterranean powers are noted in the yearly account under 
348, 343, 332 and 306.
12. Livy 7.1.7f, 27.1; Frank, ES 1 37-8; Staveley, art.cit
420 n.65; Salmon, RC 44f; Cassola, GPR 146-8.
13. cf. Beloch RG 620; Frank ES 1 41-2; Last, CAH7 542; 
Salmon, RC 45f; Taylor, VDRR 53-9.
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citizens in the whole period was only just over half the 
proportionate increase in acreage of Roman land (14).
By 326, debt laws were probably largely for the benefit 
of those speculating in commercial and industrial enter­
prises as a result of their Campanian connections, and by 
the final years of the second Saranite war, the promise 
of movable wealth and the provision of new commercial and 
industrial opportunities rather than the need for land 
would have been used to encourage military commitments 
by the people of Rome and Latium (15).
The detection of political views is difficult in 
this period of expansion. We can no longer assume that 
all those in the biggest gentes had the same attitudes.
For example, we shall see later that the direct descendants 
of the leading generals in the period of expansion from 
the early fourth century, from gentes such as the Claudii, 
Cornelii, Aemilii and Valerii, who appear particularly 
frequently in curule offices after the settlement of 338, 
often seem to retain more ambitious foreign policies than 
their kinsmen in the minor branches of their gentes, such 
as the Aemilii Papii, Valerii Flacci and Potitii, Claudii 
Marcelli and Cornelii Lentuli. And because of the heavy 
wars and increasing authority of the senate, magistrates' 
military talent and experience or local knowledge might 
often have been of more importance to their election than 
their views on policy, and at other times external circum­
stances, rather than any Roman policy, might have dictated
14. Frank, AJP 1930 313-324.
15. cf. Staveley, art.cit. 420f.
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their actions (16).
The Elections
In the period from 366 to 343, the agreement of 367 
that a plebeian consul would be elected each year, while 
patricians maintained other curule posts, rapidly collapsed, 
as leading senators united in cliques over other political 
issues of more immediate importance. Twenty gentes held 
curule office in the whole period; of the fourteen 
patrician, nine had held curule posts since 370, and hence 
would have dominated the senate (17). Since there was 
relatively little change in the composition of the citizenry 
in this period, we may assume that the magistrates won the 
elections at assembly level largely through client control, 
except where other methods are noted.
Fifteen of the twenty gentes were represented by curule 
magistrates from 366 to 361. Furius Gamillus held the 
first praetorship, the office which his father had instituted 
to compensate the patricians in the compromise of 367. 
Claudius and Pinarius were likely opponents of the Licinian- 
Sextian law, since Claudius spoke against it in 368, and
16. cf. Ch.1C 87f, 121-2.
17. Since senators' views on major issues of the day - 
military expansion, electoral control, and the extent of 
plebeian representation in high office - would have largely 
been dictated by the spheres of interest they inherited
in central Italy and their family ties, and since almost 
all gentes in office are represented by only one member, 
or members whose kinship links can be traced within the 
previous century, individuals' views may largely be deduced 
from their gentes in this period. For the names of all 
magistrates: 366-343, see Broughton, MRR 114-133-
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both were from families unrepresented since the fifth 
century (18). The views of Aemilius, Servilius and 
Quinctius about the law are not clear. Fabius, Manlius, 
Cornelius, Sulpicius and Postumius, however, shared close 
links with Licinius, who gained consulships in this period. 
Other plebeians in curule office were Sextius, Licinius' 
fellow plebeian tribune, two Genucii, members of a leading 
plebeian gens last represented in curule office during 
the siege of Veii together with the forefathers of Licinius 
and his allies, and Popillius, from a previously unknown 
family. Altogether, it is likely that most of these 
magistrates had united in support of the Licinian-Sextian 
law before 367 (19); in its spirit, they introduced the 
free election of military tribunes in the tribal assembly 
in 362 (20).
While there may have been a few differences over 
plebeian representation among those in power from 366 to 
361, all shared concern to keep back the Gauls and dispel 
Latin and Hernician unrest, not just for the sake of 
general security, but also to protect their family spheres 
of interest and, for some, to improve upon the performance
18. Ch.3 234-6; Garzetti, Ath. 1947 180.
19. Ch.3 212, 232-3. Fast. Cap. (Degrassi, II 13.1.32-5) 
gives C. Licinius Calvus as consul in 364 and C. Licinius 
Stolo as consul in 361; Livy 7.2.1, 9*1 and Val. Max.
2.4.4 give the reverse. Since they share the same prae- 
nomen, and four other consuls repeat office in these five 
years, they may simply be the same man. cf. Munzer, RAA 
9-21, who, following Fast. Cap., argues that until 361 
leading plebeian and lesser patrician consuls mediated in 
the struggle of the orders.
20. Ch.IB 35.
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of their forefathers against the Gauls in 390 (21).
In 366 and 363-1, when military action was most likely, 
four of the generals had held military command since 377, 
and the consular colleges of 365 and 364 may have been 
re-elected in 362 and 361 partly for their experience of 
leadership (22).
Another issue possibly influencing electoral results 
from 366 to 361 was the pestilence of 365-4; the consuls 
of 364, Licinius and Sulpicius, whose families shared 
interests in Etruscan and Greek religion, attempted to 
avert it with a lectisternium, and distract the people 
with Etruscan scenic games; when this failed, their 
kinsman, Manlius, was named as dictator 'clavi figendi 
causa* on the Capitol, his family seat; this was a rite
21. For their military policy, see De Sanctis, StR 2 
253-4. Servilius* grandfather. Fabius* father and 
uncles, a Sulpicius and a Cornelius fought the Gauls in 
390. All gentes in power from 366 to 361, save 
Claudius, Licinius and Genucius, had ancient ties in 
Latium (Ch.2 136-8, 144-5, 155-7; below 246)
or could have developed them in previous wars; members 
of all twelve, save the Popillii, Manlii and Pinarii, 
fought the neighbouring Aequi, in the wars of 471-463, 
and 431-408, in the likely direction of the Gauls' 
invasion in 366-361 (Livy 7.1.3) and, more recently, 
with a Manlius, fought the Latins from 383 to 380; 
three of them, Servilius, Sulpicius and Postumius, were 
censors in 380 and 378, registering enfranchised 
Tusculans.
22. Aemilius, consul in 366, when attacks by Gauls and 
Hernici were rumoured (Livy 7.1.3) and in 363, when the 
Hernici still threatened (Livy 7.3*9) fought the Volsci 
in 377; Claudius, the dictator fighting the Hernici in 
362 (Degrassi, op.cit. 98, 539-540) after Genucius* 
unsuccessful attack on them (Livy 7.6-8) fought at Veii
in 403; Sulpicius, who fought the Hernici in 361 (Degrassi, 
op.cit. 54O) fought the Latins in 380 and the Hernici in 
362 (Livy 7.7.1, 8.6); Cornelius, magister equitum fight­
ing the Gauls in 361 (Broughton, MRR 119-120 gives full 
refs.) had been consular tribune seven times.
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of Etruscan origin reputed to allay pestilence (23).
Only ten gentes held curule office from 360 to 356. 
Almost all shared personal interests in Latium, where 
Tibur had allied with the Gauls in 361; nearby the Hernici 
were still in arms against Rome (24). The Popillii and 
Plautii, being unknown in Rome before 367, may have been 
recently enfranchised Latin aristocrats; branches of the 
Plautii are later known in Tibur and Praeneste; the 
Plautii*s and Marcii's registration in the Papiria tribe 
may date to this period (25); the Fabii, Manlii, Sulpicii, 
Quinctii, Servilii and Valerii could have built up 
associations in Latium when they held office in the early 
fourth century (26). In 358 the group temporarily 
restored peace in the area by renewing the Cassian treaty, 
which allowed them to defeat the Gauls and Hernici, and 
face the Etruscan cities and Privernum, which had taken 
advantage of these wars to rebel against the growing power 
of Rome and Latium; most of those in power at Rome also
23. Livy 7.2-3; Zon. 7.24; Val. Max. 2.4*4; Sordi, RRC 
77, 79; Latte, RR 154. For hints of the religious 
interests of these magistrates, and Pinarius, Manlius* 
magister equitum, see Ch.2 145; Ch.3 214-5, 233.
The first lectisternium was held in the period 400 to 
396, when ten of the gentes in curule office from 366 to 
361 held power. The attempt to convict Manlius, on 
charges varying in different accounts, by Pomponius 
(possibly an ally of those in power, also being descended 
from a consular tribune of 400-396) was probably due to 
fears of his ambition when he overstayed his dictatorship 
(Munzer, 'Manlius* PWRE (Stuttgart, 1928) 14.1, 1177-9; 
Degrassi, op.cit. 106).
24. Livy 7.11.1-3.
25. Degrassi, op.cit. 105; Munzer, RAA 44-5; Taylor,
VDRR 273, 301-2; cf. Beloch, RG 338.
26. See n.21 above.
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had personal interests to maintain in these areas of 
conflict (27). Their concern to ensure Rome's military 
defences and strength, after hints of discontent in the 
army in 358 (28), may partly explain the creation of two 
new tribes in 358 - the Pomptina, on Volscian land north 
of Privernum taken in 389, and the Publilia, on 
Hernician land won by Plautius in 358 (29)- the passage 
of a tax law to provide for military pay (30), and an
attempt to ease debt in 357 (31).
The dictators and magistri équités fighting the 
Gauls from 360 to 356 would have been named largely 
because they had influence among the Latins, and military 
experience or talent (32). The other magistrates of the
period appear to have formed a clique bound by the common
27. All patrician gentes in power had been represented 
by several leaders in the Etruscan wars of 405-390, and 
the Volscian wars of 408-4 and 386-3; the interests of 
the Valerii and Marcii in the Volscian area and Ostia 
date to regal times (Ch.2 144; Ch.3 209f).
For events in the period, see Degrassi, op.cit. 68-9,
540 (noting six triumphs); Homo, CAH7 570-3 and Walbank 
CP 1 185-7 (on the chronological difficulties in the 
accounts of the Gallic incursions); Harris, REU 47-8 
(arguing for the Etruscan war being defensive); Beloch,
RG 359-360 (on Rome's progress in the west).
28. Livy 7.12.12f.
29. See Taylor, VDRR 50-3 for their location. The 
Pomptine tribe took the name of the area (Beloch, RG 356- 
8); the Publilia took that of an ancestress of the censor 
(Mommsen, RSt 3^  171-2; Munzer RAA 35.n.l) or Plautius 
(Taylor VDRR 50-2).
30. Concern about the army's loyalty may explain why it 
was passed in the camp; see Livy 7.16.7-8; Ch.IB 71.
31. Livy 7.16.1; Tac. Ann. 6.16.
32. The dictators, Servilius and Sulpicius, held four 
consulships from 365 to 361; their magistri équités 
Quinctius and Valerius held four from 355 to 351; Sulpicius 
and Quinctius had ancient family ties in Latium (Ch.2 135, 
155); Sulpicius had named Quinctius as dictator to fight 
the Gauls in 361.
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aim of gaining political control by marshalling clients 
and amici in tribal formation; this involved the promotion 
of certain influential plebeians, including Latin aristo­
crats (33). It has already been suggested that the 
father and uncle of the Fabii brothers and Manlius, the 
patrician consuls of the period, supported the Licinian- 
Sextian law for this reason (34). For the first time, 
in 356, a plebeian, Marcius, consul of 357, held a 
dictatorship, with Plautius, consul of 358, as his magister 
equitum (35). Popillius, consul in 359 and 356, had 
already gained the curule aedileship, breaking the 
agreement of 367, in the tribal assembly in 364 (36).
His prosecution of Licinius when aedile again in 357 may 
be a hint of the dividing off of this clique within the 
broader set of plebeian leaders (37). The plebeian 
tribune who passed a law against ambitus in 358 (38),
33. cf. Munzer, RAA 21f, who argues that a similar clique 
maintained a monopoly for 18 years from 360.
34. Ch.3 232-3.
35. Livy 7.17.6-9. The senate's denial of a triumph to 
him may be a hint of the reaction against such plebeians 
evident from 355.
36. He carried out the scenic games in 364; see Mommsen,
RSt 2^  482 n.2; cf. Beloch, RG 347-8. The electoral
president, Genucius or Servilius, having probably supported 
the Licinian-Sextian law himself, would have accepted his 
candidature; cf. Livy 7.1.6.
37. cf. Sordi, RRC 74f. The charge that he held more
ager publicus than his own law allowed (Livy 7.16.9) is
clearly a late invention (Tibiletti, Ath. 1948, 227-8,
230; Ch.IB 61). D.H. 14.12 notes no charge.
38. Ch.1C 110.
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Poetelius, was consul in 360; the plebeian tribunes who 
passed the debt law in 357, Menenius and Duillius, shared 
old family ties with Marcius and Poetelius, and Menenius 
had ancient links with Latium; all presumably won their 
offices partly because the consuls' faction marshalled 
clients for them (39). The clique would have created 
the two new tribes in 358 partly with the intention of 
improving such methods of electoral control of all the 
assemblies (40).
Natural resentment and fear of the predominance of 
such a clique by other patrician gentes caused conflict 
in the elections from 355 to 351. Four times this 
resulted in solely patrician consular colleges; the need 
for six interroges before the first suggests great dispute 
over the issue within the patriciate (41). The patrician 
consulships clearly represent compromises, since of each 
pair one belonged to a gens - either the Fabii or 
Sulpicii - which had held consular office with a plebeian 
colleague since 366, and one - from either the Valerii
39. The Duillii, Marcii and Poetelii were all represented 
in the plebeian tribunate from 449 to 440; Menenii, whose 
tribe lay by the Anio, held three posts in allegiance with 
Fabii and Manlii against hostile Latins from 387 to 380.
40. One of the Menenii was consular tribune in 387, when 
the new tribes at Veii, in which the Manlii are later 
known, were created (Ch.3 224). Plautius gained 
influence in the Publilia, when he conquered its land in 
358; Manlius' grandfather held office with Valerius' 
father, both in 389, when the latter took the Pomptine 
land, and in 383, when commissioners were appointed to 
allot it; Fabius' grandfather, as censor in 363, might 
have gained influence in all these areas.
41. Livy 7.17.10-13, 18.3-10, 19.5-6, 22.1-2; cf. 
Staveley, Hist. 1954 201. See Ch.IB 63, n.96, and 
n.33 above for alternative views of the 2 patrician 
colleges.
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or Quinctii - did not. Military threats made such a 
compromise essential. Tibur, having risen again, was 
temporarily quelled in 354, but the treaty with the 
Samnites beyond Latium in that year indicates that Rome's 
leaders still felt insecure. The following year's events 
justified their fears; the Volsci invaded Roman land, and 
Caere joined the Etruscan towns in arms against Rome from 
355 to 351 (42). The consuls were clearly named partly 
for their personal influence in the areas where they 
fought, being all members of leading military families 
of the fifth and fourth centuries, and for their military 
talents, sharing between them eighteen consular posts 
from 380 to 342. The most prominent were Quinctius, 
Valerius and Sulpicius, who held seven consulships from 
355 to 351; although two were from families absent from 
office since 367, all had particularly relevant experience; 
Valerius, who had fought the Gauls allied with Tibur as 
Sulpicius’ magister equitum in 358, fought Tibur in 355, 
and in 353 fought the Volsci in the area taken by his 
father in 389; Quinctius, who had made a pact with Tibur 
in 361 when dictator, forced surrender from it in 354, 
and fought the Etruscans in 351, as he did in 354;
Sulpicius fought Tarquinii in 353 and 351, as he did in
42. For arguments that the Samnite treaty was a defensive 
move, see Adcock, CAH7, 585-6, RAW 52, 76; Forni, Ath. 1953 
231. cf. Sordi, RRG 61, and Salmon SS 188-195, 204, who 
see it as part of a policy of expansion into Campania.
For the Etruscan war, see De Sanctis, StR 2 255-6 and 
Harris, REU 47-9; for objections to the view of Torelli,
ET 82f, that the leader of Tarquinii included Caere in an 
Etruscan league against Rome, see the review by Cornell,
JRS 1978, 171-2. For the conflict with the Latins and 
Volsci, see Livy 7.18.2, 19.2-4, 8-9; Degrassi, op.cit.
540.
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355 (43). Two military dictators were also required, 
Manlius, named to quell Caere, had proved his military 
talent against the Gauls in 361. He and his magister 
equitum, Cornelius, may also have been chosen for their 
personal influence in Caere, which had special links with 
Delphi; both were descended from envoys to Delphi, and 
dedicated a temple to Apollo after renewing Rome’s 
alliance with Caere {44)« lulius, named to meet Etruscan 
threats which actually came to nothing, was from a gens 
unknown since 379» but his magister equitum, Aemilius, 
had held three consular posts. Given lulius’ background, 
the story of his attempt to use his authority to return 
patrician consuls in 351» which resulted in an interregnum, 
is credible (45). lulius was presumably reacting against 
the choice of the plebeian Marclus, as consul in 352, 
after the plebeian leaders had taken advantage of mounting 
popular distress over debt to protest over the resumption
43. Of the other three consuls. Fabius, who quelled 
Tarquinii and made the Samnite treaty in 354» had already 
fought Tarquinii in 356, and had a Samnite great-grand­
father (Ch.5 339 n.l31); P. Valerius and Marcius did not 
have to fight.
44. For Manlius' exploits in 361, see Broughton, MRR 119-
120; n.58 below. For the view that Caere’s alliance with
Rome was renewed after its revolt, seOpBeloch, RG 363-5;
Toynbee, HL 1 415-8; Sherwin-White, RC 33-8; for some 
alternative views, see De Sanctis, StR 2 256-7; Sordi,
RRG 123f. Manlii and Cornelii had held fourteen curule 
posts during the Etruscan wars and Gallic sack from 405 to 
390, when Rome and Caere were closely allied; on this, 
their forefathers’ embassies and Caere’s links with Delphi, 
see Ch.3, 184, n.5, 214-5, 217-8. For the dedication 
of the temple, see Gage, AR 149-150.
45. Livy 7.21.9-22.1; Ch.3, 234.
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of patrician monopoly, causing another interregnum (46). 
Marcius could claim the necessary military experience, 
having won a triumph in 357, and having been dictator 
in 356. He might also have encouraged the debt law in 
357; a commission was set up to investigate debt in 352 
(47), and he followed up its work as the first plebeian 
censor, the following year, with his consular colleague 
of 357, Manlius (48).
In 350, fear of the Gauls may have inspired a 
compromise in the senate among those wrangling over 
electoral control by small cliques. Consuls were the 
Latin plebeian M. Popillius, who in 350 defeated the 
Gauls in Latium (49), where he had led the array as consul 
in 356, and L. Cornelius Scipio, son of the curule aedile 
of 366, whose gens had held no consulships since the
46. For the twelve interroges of 352, see Livy 7.21.2-4• 
Perhaps conflict over plebeian consuls in the election of 
352 is the basis of the obscure note of Cic. Brut. 55 :
’M'. Curium, quod is tribunis plebis interroge Appio 
Caeco diserto homine comitia contra leges habente, cum de 
plebe consulem non accipiebat, patres ante auctores fieri 
coegerit: quod fuit permagnum nondum lege Maenia lata'; 
he may confuse the validation of auctoritas patrum with 
the patricians' nomination voiced by the interrex, and 
Caecus with his grandfather; cf. Willems, SRR 2 69f; 
Staveley, Hist. 1954 201.
47. Frank, ES 1 30; Last CAH7 544. Broughton, MRR 126, 
notes Duillius, Decius, Publilius, Aemilius and Papirius 
as the commissioners. The first three were from leading 
plebeian gentes in Rome in the fifth century, like Marcius 
The conclusions from the fact that the five, and Marcius, 
or their relatives, all held curule offices from 342 to 
336, when Rome took control of Campania, that they shared 
resentment of recent patrician monopoly (Miinzer, RAA 34-8) 
and that they shared a Campanian policy based on concern 
to bring wealth to the debt-ridden community (Staveley, 
Hist. 1959 427) may both be partly right.
48. Livy 7.22.6-10, 10.8.8. His family's religious 
authority (Ch.3 222, n.l56) may have helped him gain the 
censorship.
49. Livy 7.23-4; App. Celt. 1.2.
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passage of the Licinian-Sextian law. The praetor was 
P. Valerius Poplicola, consul in 352, in the period of 
reaction against the dominance of Popillius and his allies. 
The election of such a trio may have been partly due to 
the influence in senate and assembly of the electoral 
dictator, M. Fabius, princeps senatus (50) and consul in 
360 and 356, and his magister equitum, Servilius, consul 
in 365 and 362; together they represented the three phases 
of government since 367 (51).
In 349» the electoral dictator, L. Furius Camilius, 
returned as consuls and praetor, himself, App. Claudius 
and Pinarius. The latter two have already been noted as 
opponents of the Licinian-Sextian law with Furius' father; 
Furius himself, who had gained no curule post since serving 
in his father's army forty years before, is likely to have 
shared with them concern to regain patrician monopoly 
(52). Perhaps Scipio, being too ill to hold the election 
himself, had named a dictator with such attitudes in 
jealousy of his colleague's triumph over the Cauls, and 
it had been in return for this that Camilius made his 
brother his magister equitum (53). Camilius' inheritance 
from his father of influence in Rome and Latium, where the 
levy to fight the Gauls was greatly resented in 349, 
presumably aided his unorthodox election in both senate 
and assembly (54)•
50. Pliny, NH 7 133.
51. cf. Livy 7.22.10-23.1.
52. Above, 243-4; Plut. Cam. 35.1.
53. Livy 7.24.10-25.2; Degrassi, op.cit. 68-9; 540.
54. Livy 7.25.3-12. See Broughton, MRR 128-9 for full 
refs, to Furius' defeat of the Gauls m  349*
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From 348 to 343, peace being established elsewhere, 
the policy of expansion down the west coast prevailed. 
While it may have been prompted initially by the raids 
of Greek pirates in 349 (55), its eventual purpose was 
to gain control of the rich land of Campania, which had 
been an important part of the old Etruscan trading empire. 
The four most prominent patrician gentes in office in 
this period, the Furii, Valerii, Cornelii and Manlii, 
shared interests in the Etruscan and Volscian coastal 
areas, having dominated the leadership from 408 to 380, 
when Rome's influence there was greatly increased; more 
recently, as dictator, Manlius, consul of 347 and 344, 
with Cornelius Cossus, consul of 343, as his magister 
equitum, had renewed Rome's alliance with Caere in 353- 
Through such contacts, all these gentes could have gained 
personal associates in Campania who encouraged such a 
policy (56).
Since the crucial steps towards western expansion 
were all taken in the three consulships of Valerius 
Corvus, he may be viewed as a leading promoter of the 
policy (57). Having already demonstrated his military 
talent against the Gauls, he reached his first consulship
55. De Sanctis, StR 2 264f; Thiel, HRSP 7-8, 49f.
56. For particularly clear hints of these gentes' 
spheres of interest, see Ch.3 205f, 209, 213-9, 222, 
225-6, 231; above 251.
For hints of Romans having Campanian associates in this 
period, see Livy 8.3.3.
57. cf. Staveley, Hist. 1959 426-7; Salmon, SS 206.
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in 348 at the age of twenty-three (58). In that year, 
he secured a renewal of Carthage's treaty with Rome, 
whereby Carthage restricted Roman traders, but in return 
recognised Rome's authority in Latium, and promised 
maritime protection of the Latin coast, thereby hinting 
at her moral support of Rome's future expansion on land 
(59). In 343, Corvus, and his consular colleague, 
Cornelius Cossus, may have made a similar agreement, 
gaining acceptance of Rome's influence in Campania in 
return for recognising Carthage's trading rights there, 
when Punic envoys brought congratulations for Rome's 
successes in their war against the Samnites (60), This 
war had been declared by Rome in 343 in response to 
Campanian appeals for aid (61).
58. Livy 7.26, 32.5-17; Develin, POH 60; Broughton, MRR 
129. While Valerius' supposed combat with a Gaul in 349 
closely resembles that of Manlius in 361 (Heurgon, CP 163-4) 
the careers of both suggest that they were based on genuine 
traditions of their military talents.
59. This agreement does not imply that Rome's leaders had 
no interest in commerce, as Frank, ES 1 36 suggests; it 
simply shows that gaining such an ally, which might protect 
the coast, not just from foreign pirates, but also from 
those based in Antium, and thus deter Latins contemplating 
revolt, was more significant. For full details, see 
Adcock, CAH7 586-7; Thiel, HRSP 15-16, 53-4; Walbank, CP 1 
345-9; Sordi, RRG 100-6; Toynbee, HL 1 521-6, 536-9; Meiggs,
R02 23-4.
60. De Sanctis, StR 2 253 n.3; Toynbee, HL 1 540-2.
61. Adcock, CAH $88-9 and Heurgon, CP 163-7, view the 
whole war as an invention, arguing that Rome would not have 
taken such a risk when the Latins were already restless; 
however this risk precluded a Samnite/Latin alliance forming 
against Rome; see further De Sanctis, StR 2 269f; Bernardi, 
Ath. 1942 89f, Ath. 1943 25; Salmon, SS 197-202, 207; 
Toynbee, HL 1 124, 128; all acknowledge that the Campanians' 
supposed deditio to Rome in 343 (Livy 7.30f) is unlikely.
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In his second consulship in 346, Corvus had prepared 
the way to Campania by retaking Antium and Satricum from 
the Volsci, destroying the latter, save the temple of 
Mater Matuta, and distributing much booty (62). The 
following year, Furius Camilius, the consul of 349, was 
named as dictator to face the neighbouring Aurunci, who 
had risen in reaction to this, and were causing further 
unrest in Latium; with Cn. Manlius as his magister equitum, 
he defeated the Aurunci, and vowed a temple to Juno (63). 
Clearly the military leaders were trying to gain the 
people's support (64), and the approval of the gods, 
especially those fostered by their forefathers. For 
similar reasons, the Sibylline books were twice consulted 
in this period, in Corvus' consulship in 348, after 
pestilence, and in T. Manlius' consulship in 344, after 
bad prodigies followed the dedication of the temple of 
Juno. The first resulted in a lectisternium; the second 
in the appointment of Valerius Poplicola as dictator to
62. His gens had special links with Antium and Mater 
Matuta; see Ch.3 215. For these events, see
Livy 6.33.5, 7.27.2, 5-9; Degrassi, op.cit. 68-9; Toynbee, 
HL 1 128 n.l.
63. Furius inherited Latin connections (above, 253) 
and fought just north of the Aurunci in 389 (Plut. Gam. 
35.1) and 349 (against Greek raiders); for his action in 
346, see Livy 7.28.1-6, Degrassi, op.cit. 105. His 
father had also vowed a temple to Juno (Ch.3 219).
64. For a hint of opposition to the levy, see Livy 7.27.4
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establish days of worship (65). Also, in 343, when 
Cornelius Cossus, who had_ dedicated a temple to Apollo 
in 353, and Corvus were consuls, the Delphic oracle was 
consulted; as a result, statues of Pythagoras and 
Alcibiades were built in Rome, which also served to 
ingratiate Rome to the Greeks in south Italy during the 
Samnite war (66).
Although the Fabii and Sulpicii shared the same 
spheres of interest as the other patrician gentes in office 
in this period, it is less certain that their represent­
atives in this period, the consuls of 345» and the 
magister equitum of 344» supported western expansion. 
Fabius* kinsman had made peace with the Samnites in 354» 
and both gentes held only two other curule posts from 350 
to 326, when Rome became fully established in Campania. 
Perhaps senators unnerved by the Volsci stirring up fears 
of Roman ambitions in Latium supported the consuls of 
345» Fabius Dorsuo and Sulpicius Camerinus, because they 
had a more neutral attitude to western expansion and 
personal influence in Latium. They precluded Auruncan 
infiltration into Latium by taking Sora, on the upper 
Liris, beyond the Publilia tribe founded in 358, when one
65. See Ch.3 214-8, 233, and above, 245-6, 251 for hints of the 
interests of Valerii, Cornelii, Furii and -Manlii in the 
Sibylline books and Greek religion. For the measures
taken in 348 and 345-3, aee Livy 7.27.1-2, 28.6-8; Pliny,
NH 34.26. Furius may have felt that the execution of 
Manlius, in whose consulship his father's temple to Juno 
was dedicated, had somehow contaminated the temple, and 
built the new one on the site of Manlius' house to 
emphasise that he was renewing the cult. The appointment 
of Manlii, who had formally disowned the condemned man, 
as magister equitum in 345 and consul in 344 may have been 
partly for similar reasons.
66. Alfoldi, ERL 346.
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of the Fabii renewed the Latins’ treaty. His influence 
in Latium and their common religious interests may explain 
the choice of Fabius Ambustus as magister equitum by 
Valerius Poplicola to aid him in organising the particip­
ation of the Latins in supplications to the gods (67).
Turning to the plebeians in office from 348 to 343» 
there are clear hints that Plautius, consul in 347» and 
Marcius, consul in 344» supported the policy of western 
expansion. Marcius inherited ancient connections with 
the west coast; one of the Plautii was consul when the 
Pomptina tribe was established; the Plautii adopted 
Decius, who had close links in Campania, at about this 
time; Plautius and Marcius held their second consulships 
during the first Samnite war (68). Both shared concern 
with debt at Rome, a problem readily solved if Rome gained 
access to the wealth of Campania; measures were carried 
to alleviate it in their consulships in 347 and 344» 
and in Marcius’ consulships in 357 and 352. Such concern 
may have been motivated partly by their own commercial
67. See 244-6 above, and the refs, to Ch.3 
quoted in n.23 and 56 above for hints of the Fabii’s and 
Sulpicii's spheres of interest and religious authority.
Note that Sulpicius Camerinus was the first member of his 
family in office since the censor of 380, who registered 
Tusculans in the state. Fabius Dorsuo, whose family 
links with the Fabii Maximi are unknown, may have represent­
ed the gens because the next generation of the latter was 
too young (Develin, POH 62). There are hints of the 
families being linked; in 390 a Fabius Dorsuo acted for
the gens (Livy 5.46.2) and Fabii Maximi inherited connect­
ions in Sora (Münzer, RAA 59)» as did Sulpicius' son, who 
recaptured it in 314. For Sora's capture in 345, see 
Salmon, SS 194 n.l; cf. De Sanctis, StR 2 266, and Adcock, 
CAH7 587, who argue that it duplicates 314.
68. See 246-7 above, and 259-262, 272, n.ll7 below.
259
interests, and partly by their recognition of its value 
in gathering popular support to prevent their exclusion 
from curule office, especially if they were now divided 
over foreign policy with their former supporters, the 
Fabii (69). The support of former allies such as the 
Fabii may still have contributed to the election of the 
other two plebeians in power, Poetelius, consul of 34-6, 
and Popillius, consul of 348, whose gentes show no signs 
of support for western expansion; they only appear in 
three years when reasons for elections are particularly 
uncertain, until the second century (70). Popillius' 
influence as Flamen, and the popularity he acquired 
holding the scenic games in 364 and distributing booty 
in 350, all of which may have helped him quell popular 
sedition in 348 (71), and the religious authority that 
Marcius and Poetelius inherited (72) might have aided 
their elections in both senate and assembly; religious 
measures taken in Popillius' and Marcius' consulships 
have been noted above.
From 342 to 338 Rome's position in central Italy 
was fundamentally changed. After a mutiny in Campania 
in 342 by Roman soldiers, alarmed by the distance of the 
Samnite war, and probably encouraged by pro-Samnite
69. For the debt measures and their significance, see 
Frank, ES 1 28-31; n.47 above. There were two solely 
patrician consular colleges in this period, in 345 and 
343, both doubtless due to the senate's preoccupation 
with the military situation.
70. See 273, 282-4 below.
71. n.36 above; Livy 7.24.9, 25.1; Cic. Brut. 56
72. Palmer, ACR 146-152.
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Campanians and conscripted Latins (73), Volsci and 
Privernates were defeated in 341 (74). The Romans then 
renewed their alliance with the Samnites who had asked 
for peace, since they needed their aid against Latins, 
Volsci and Campanians, who had united in arms against 
Rome by 340 (75). After their defeat (76), Latin and 
Campanian land was confiscated, and the Campanian people 
were forced to pay an indemnity, while the Campanian 
knights who had remained loyal were given civitas sine 
suffragio and special rights in the army (77). Some 
Latin and Volscian towns were only finally quelled in 
338 (78). A final settlement was then made, whereby 
further land was taken, all Campanians, loyal since 340,
73. Bernardi, Ath. 1943 25 ; Heurgon, CP 243f; Cassola,
GPR 146-8; Toynbee, HL 1 128-9. The story that T. 
Quinctius came out of retirement at Tusculum to lead the 
revolt (Livy 7.39.11-41.2) may have developed from a 
genuine tradition of his opposition to the Samnite war 
amid Latin unrest; he had made the Samnite treaty in 354; 
his gens is represented only once in the rest of the fourth 
century, when Rome expanded south; living in Latium, he 
would have appreciated the scale of unrest there.
74. Livy 8.1.1-6; see also n.ll7 below.
75. Bernardi, Ath. 1943, 24-5; Toynbee, HL 1 124f, 143f; 
Salmon, SS 206-7.
76. For full refs, to it, see Broughton, MRR 135-7. It 
was probably near Capua; see Beloch, RG 373; Salmon, SS 
207-8; Scullard, HRWA 478. The tale of Manlius’ harsh 
discipline of his son at the battle is told of Postumius in 
431 (Livy 5.29.5-6) and is echoed in tales of his own 
father's trial in 363 (n.23). Decius' 'devotio' in the 
battle, and that of his grandson in 279, duplicate that of 
his son in 295; see De Sanctis, StR 2 257 n.2; Heurgon, CP 
262-3, 268-270.
77. In defence of this version of events, see Heurgon, CP 
157, 254f; Cassola, GPR 122; Toynbee, HL 1 401-2; Sherwin- 
White, RC^ 40.
78. Broughton, MRR 137-8.
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gained civitas sine suffragio, some Latins were enfranch­
ised, others became allies or gained the lus Latii, and 
citizen colonies were established at Ostia and Antium.
This ensured long term peace, and laid the basis of the 
Roman federation (79).
Almost all magistrates of this period gained election 
as part of a faction united in support of these develop­
ments because of their personal interests in Campania 
and Latium (80). C. Marcius, consul of 342, M. Valerius 
Corvus, dictator of 342, Plautius, consul of 341, and T. 
Manlius, consul of 340, who together held six consulships 
from 348 to 343, have already been noted for their 
promotion of western expansion. Their influence in the 
senate and experience of leadership would also have 
contributed to their election. In particular, Corvus* 
authority as leader of the Campanian policy made him the 
natural choice as dictator to quell the army mutiny in 
342 (81). L. Aemilius, Valerius* magister equitum in
79. For full details of these measures and their signif­
icance, see Bernardi, Ath. 1942 86-103, Ath. 1943 25-6; „ 
Staveley, Hist. 1959 422-3; Salmon, RC 45-54; Meiggs, RO^ 
20f; Sherwin-White, RC 31-41; Scullard, HRW4 111-4.
80. cf. Munzer, RAA 37f; Heurgon, CP 246f; Staveley, art. 
cit. 426f; Cassola, GPR 126f; Salmon, SS 205-6; all note 
various combinations of magistrates of this period support­
ing this policy.
81. See Broughton, MRR 129-137 for details of these 
magistrates. Military requirements gained three dispens­
ation from the Genucian law noted below, and in 340, caused 
an interregnum (Livy 8.3.4-5). Heurgon, CP 249-250, and 
Cassola, GPR 127, suggest the latter was due to differences 
over policy, but the use of the minimum number of interroges 
supports Livy. Valerius' use of the Peteline Grove to 
pass his military reforms (Gage, RP 1953 48f) may explain 
the tradition that a Manlius led the revolt (Livy 7.42.4); 
see Ch.3 227.
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34-2 and consul in 341, Ti. Aemilius, praetor in 341 and 
consul in 339» the Cornelii Scipio brothers, censors in_ 
340, L. Furius Camilius, consul of 338, and the Papirii, 
dictator and praetor in 340, were also likely supporters 
of current policy, being directly descended from 
magistrates active in Rome’s expansion in Etruria, the 
Volscian areas and Latium from 408 to 380. More recently, 
Furius' uncle and the Cornelii’s kinsmen had promoted the 
Campanian policy with Corvus from 348 to 343. The four 
families were represented regularly in office down to 
the end of the century, when Rome’s southern interests 
were extended; indeed magistrates of the period held six­
teen posts from 337 to 310. It may be no coincidence 
that the Papirii and Furii, whose gentes had the most 
ancient interests in Latium, were elected in 340, when the 
Latin rebellion was at its height, and 338, when the final 
settlement was made (82).
Decius, consul in 340, Publilius, consul and dictator 
in 339, lunius, magister equitum in 339, and Maenius,
82. See Broughton, MRR 134-8 for details of these 
magistrates. While forefathers of the Papirii, both 
Cursor and Crassus, fought mainly in Latium, near their 
family tribe (Ch.3 191-4, 200-5, 224-9);
their holding of seventeen curule posts from 
340 to 310 suggests they shared interests in southern 
expansion; for Cursor, it allowed him to exercise his 
great military talent (Beloch, RG 480; cf. Cassola, GPR 
145). The immediate forefathers of the Aemilii Mamercini, 
who held seven curule posts from 342 to 310, fought mainly 
in Etruria (Ch.3 195, 209f, 217-221) and beyond
their family tribe against the Volsci (Ch.3 228, 231); 
perhaps the family fostered the story of its descent from 
Numa (Ch.2 149 n.l29) as the story of Pythagoras teaching 
Numa developed from their southern contacts in this period; 
cf. n.ll. For the spheres of interest of the Furii and 
Cornelii, see n.44 and 63 above. Note that in the settle­
ment, Lanuvium had to share its cult of Juno, who was 
promoted by the Furii (n.63)j with Rome (Livy 8.14.2).
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consul in 338, were from gentes represented by plebeian 
tribunes in the fifth century (83). At the same time, 
the story of Decius' military exploit in 343 in Campania 
and his nomination the year of the Campanian revolt (84), 
the Greek and Volscian cognomina of Publilius and his 
forefathers (85), and the family ties of the lunii with 
the Etruscan kings of Rome (86), are hints that branches 
of their gentes were also established in the west coast 
and Campania. Certainly they appear to have supported 
current policy; Publilius, Maenius, lunius and his kins­
man, and Decius' son held twenty-one more curule posts 
before the end of the second Samnite war (87).
Foreign policy was not the only issue at hand from 
342 to 338. By this time many senators, including some 
hoping to gain from the foreign policy outlined above, 
had become united by their common resentment of the 
monopoly of office by small cliques since 360.
Servilius, the last to represent his family in curule 
office in 362, may have been elected as consul with
83. For details of their forefathers' and their own 
posts, see Broughton, MRR 15-17, 23» 29-30, 74» 102, 135-8.
84. Decius rescued Cornelius at Saticula, in Campania, 
in 343 (Heurgon, CP 270-5) and contributed to the victory 
of 340 (n.76). Either he originated in Campania, and
the early plebeian tribunes of his name belonged to another 
branch of the gens in Rome (cf. Munzer, RAA 37f; Bernardi, 
Ath. 1943 27-8; Heurgon, CP 260-277; Toynbee, HL 1 340 n.l) 
or he was descended from the tribunes, and had relations 
in Campania (cf. Garzetti, Ath. 1947 187; Cassola, GPR 153-4)
85. See Ch.3 213.
86. See Ch.2 132f for the lunii's ties with the Tarquins; 
see D.H. 4.62, Ogilvie, CL 234» and Ch.3 184 n.5 for the 
Tarquins' interests in the west coast.
87. Publilius was the most prominent; see Beloch, RG 477f; 
Garzetti, art.cit. 185f; Cassola, GPR 124f•
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G. Marcius in 342, when the state was hard pressed by 
threats of Latin unrest and internal revolt, as a 
compromise with this sector in the senate to ensure the 
election of two experienced leaders. Since the Servilii 
are subsequently absent from office until 284» he may not 
have been an active supporter of southern expansion, 
unlike other patricians who shared his concern about 
monopoly of office, the Aemilii and Papirii, whose gentes 
were previously represented in curule office in 363 and 
368 respectively (88). Plebeians of this sector included 
Genucius, Publilius, Maenius, Decius and lunius. All 
were from gentes unknown since their plebeian tribunates 
in the fifth century, except after protests against 
monopolies - in consular tribunates from 400 to 396, 
consulships from 365 to 362 with Servilius and Aemilius, 
and in the debt commission of 352, with members of the 
Aemilii and Papirii (89). Since Genucius' 
gens is absent after 342 until 303» he may have gained 
election as plebeian tribune in 342 through the same 
senatorial compromise as Servilius, as well as by promising 
debt reform to the people (90). All the other plebeians 
have been noted as likely supporters of the current 
foreign policy. The influence of this whole sector in
88. Servilius had chosen Quinctius, who features in 342 
as an opponent of the Samnite war, as his magister equitum 
in 360. Servilius' personal influence in Latium (n.32) 
would have been an important factor in the compromise of
342.
89. See n.47 for its significance.
90. Genucius' debt law banned interest (Livy 7.42.1-2; 
Tacit. Ann. 6.16.3; App. B.C. 1.54; Last, CAH7 544-5).
265
the senate is indicated by Genucius', Publilius' and 
Maenius' passage of laws restricting repetition of office 
and the use of auctoritas patrum, and the recognition, 
henceforth, of the Licinian-Sextian ruling on plebeian 
consuls (91) •
From 337 to 327, there was a broad range of 
magistrates - thirty individuals from eighteen gentes, 
only eight of which had held power between 366 and 341 
(92). This pattern was due partly to the Genucian law 
against repetition of office - no crucial war requiring 
its suspension - and partly to a decline in electoral 
control, because of recent changes in the number and 
location of citizens. Hence conclusions about the 
reasons for the magistrates' elections in this period 
are particularly speculative.
In 337, the consuls were G . Sulpicius Longus, son 
of the consul of 345» and P. A_elius, whose gens was last 
represented by a fifth century quaestor (93). They may 
have been randomly elected through personal support, 
there being no contentious political issues after the 
recent settlements of domestic and federal issues.
When the Aurunci appealed to Rome for aid against the
91. See Ch.IB 60-3, 66, 70 on these measures. Livy 
(8.12.4-17) may have assumed that Aemilius and Publilius 
were opponents of the senate because Publilius was a novus 
homo, Aemilius appointed Publilius as dictator, unusual 
but not unique (Beloch, RG 478), and Aemilius was refused 
a triumph, which may have been simply because he did not 
end the revolt. cf. Beloch, RG 476f; Munzer, RAA 34f» 
Heurgon, CP 246f.
92. cf. Munzer, RAA 33» Develin, POH 13-15.
93. See Broughton, MRR 78, 138-9 for them and Aelius' 
forefather.
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Sidicini in the course of the year, the consuls, neither 
of whom appear to have had any interests in southern 
expansion (94), hesitated to take out troops. The senate, 
whose leaders were doubtless anxious to extend Rome's 
influence in the area, then demanded that they name a 
dictator to take military action. However, the dictator,
G. Claudius, was then declared to be faultily elected and 
abdicated; perhaps this was a manoeuvre by augurs opposing 
further southern activity, to delay military action and 
decrease the number of ex-magistrates with aggressive 
military policies in the senate (95).
In 336 and 335» with the war against the Sidicini at 
hand (96), the senate's military leaders regained some 
control of the elections. Patrician consuls were L. 
Papirius, the dictator of 340, and M. Valerius Corvus, 
the consul of 343» who in 335 ended the war, capturing 
Cales (97). He may also have made a treaty with the 
Cauls of Apulia, to ensure an ally in Samnium's rear (98).
94. See 257-8, n.67 on the Sulpicii; Sulpicius' opposition 
to Publilius' election in 336 may have been due to their 
differences over policy (Livy 8.15-9» suggests that it
was because he was plebeian; this is unlikely; see 
244, 249f above). No Aelii hold military
posts again until the third century, and nothing else is 
known of the early gens.
95. Livy 8.15.1-6; cf. Ch.IB, 50, 54» 74-5. The Claudii's 
interests in western expansion are suggested by hints of 
their gens in Corsica and Caere in the fifth and fourth 
centuries (Livy 9-36.2-9; Rawson, Hist. 1977, 340).
96. Livy 8.16.1-4-
97. Broughton, MRR 139-140.
98. Polyb. 2.18.9 dates an agreement thirteen years after 
the previous invasion, which Livy 7.26 places in 349.
267
The plebeian consuls, K. Duillius and M. Atilius, and 
Publilius, the first plebeian praetor in 336, belonged 
to the sector resenting monopolies; all were descended 
from leading plebeian agitators for political represent­
ation in the fifth century. Publilius and Atilius, 
who had close Campanian connections, and may have gained 
office partly because of his local knowledge, would also 
have shared their patrician colleague's attitude to the 
war (99).
In 334; the consuls, still fighting the Sidicini, 
named a fellow supporter of southern expansion, L.
Aemilius, consul of 341» as electoral dictator; he made 
Publilius his magister equitum. However, since Gales 
had been taken by the time of the election, senators 
may have simply supported personal allies in this election, 
in which Sp. Postumius and T. Veturius were returned (100). 
While there are some indirect hints of their gentes'
99. For their names, see Broughton, MRR 139-140.
The three gentes provided plebeian agitators: 472-0,
449-4. 400-396 {Ch.2 155, 172-3, Ch.3 193, 212).
Duillius' kinsman was on the debt commission with 
Publilius (n.47), but unlike those of his colleagues, 
his gens was absent from curule office from 334 to 260; 
hence he and Publilius may only have shared opposition 
to monopoly. For full details of the Atilii's Campanian 
connections, see Munzer, RAA 56f, and Heurgon, GP 285-294» 
arguing that he was actually Campanian; see Beloch, RC 
338, and Gassola, GPR 152f, for objections to this.
100. For the timing of the election, see Livy 8.16.11-12; 
for the names of the magistrates, see Broughton, MRR 140-1 
Mommsen, RF 1 120, Munzer, RAA 123 and Shatzman, CQ 1973 
65f, accept the plebeian status of Veturius, whose gens 
was otherwise apparently patrician (Ch.2 158); cf. Beloch, 
RG 344f.
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interests in commerce and the west coast (101), they never 
appear when expansionist policies were being pursued in 
the south in the second half of the fourth century, and 
two of the commissioners appointed in 334 to colonise 
Gales, M. Fabius and T. Quinctius, have been noted as 
possible opponents of such policies (102). The enforced 
abdication of the dictator, P. Cornelius Rufinus, and his 
magister equitum, Antonius, who were named when it was 
feared that the Samnites were gathering arms, could have 
been a step by conservative augurs to prevent expansionist 
leaders instigating another war, or holding the next 
election, if the consuls had named the dictator under 
pressure from such leaders in the senate, as in 337 (103).
In 332, on the pretext of the pestilence after the 
dictator's abdication an interregnum was called; only 
after five interreges were consuls named. There may have 
been particular disputes within the patriciate between the 
two main factions divided over future policy in Campania
101. The Veturia tribe lay in the west (Oh.2 137); Antium 
and Ostia were included in it in 338; Postumius' early 
forefathers had interests in Greece (Gh.2 169); and recently 
a Postumius, from Etruria (Gassola, GPR 28) or Antium 
(Thiel, HRSP 7 n.l2) had been captured in Sicily for piracy 
(Diod. Sic. 16.82.3).
102. The gentes of both consuls had been absent from office 
for thirty years already. For the commission, see Livy 
8.16.13-14. See Gh.3 192-8, n.54 on the old family 
ties between Quinctius and Postumius; see 257-8
and n.73 above for hints of the opposition of the Fabii 
and Quinctius to southern expansion. M. Fabius might have 
been the consul of 360, the consul of 345» or the captive 
in Gales who helped Corvus take the town (Livy 8.16.9-10).
103. For the dictatorship, see Broughton, MRR I4I» noting 
333 as a 'dictator year'. Since Rufinus' branch of the 
gens is unknown, Antonius' gens is only known previously 
twice (Gh.2 173)» and neither individual appears again, 
they would have been easily manipulated by the senate.
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because a censorial election was due, and being the first 
since the settlement of 338, the censors’ registration of „ 
citizens was of special significance for electoral control 
(104). After Cornelius Cossus, a promoter of southern 
expansion, and On. Domitius, a novus homo whose allegiances 
are unknown, were agreed as consuls, and L. Papirius, the 
consul of 336 or 326, became praetor, one member of each 
faction, Q. Publilius, the consul of 339, and Sp. Postumius, 
consul of 334 - either by direct competition in the assembly 
or prearranged compromise in the senate - were returned 
as censors (105). They registered citizens in the former 
Volscian lands in west Latium in two new tribes, Maecia 
and Scaptia (IO6). Other measures taken in 332 reflect 
the policy of the patrician consul’s faction. Acerrae, 
near Naples, was given civitas sine suffragio (107), and 
a treaty was completed with Tarentura and its ally Alexander 
of Epirus, who were concerned to ensure Roman neutrality in 
their southern wars. The treaty linked Rome up with 
another of Samnium’s enemies in the rear (108), which may
104. Livy 8.17.4; Staveley, art.cit. 427.
105. Livy 8.17.11.
106. Taylor, VDRR 53-5. Given Publilius’ Volscian connect­
ions (n.85) and Postumius’ influence in Latium (n.2l), both 
censors may have already had personal influence in the area
107. Livy 8.17.12.
108. Since the treaty stipulated that military ships could 
not sail past the Lacinian headland (Thiel, HRSP 21-2), its 
most likely date was during the Tarentine/Samnite war, 
before Rome gained land in Apulia (M. Gary, ’Early Roman 
Treaties with Tarentura and Rhodes’, J.Phil. 1920 165-170). 
See Gassola, GPR 39-41 for the idea of a Roman embassy 
going to Alexander the Great in this period.
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have been a device particularly favoured by Cornelius Cossus 
and Valerius Corvus; it was in their consulships in 348,
343 and 335 that similar links were made with Carthage and 
possibly the Gauls. When attacks by the Gauls were 
rumoured, in the east in 332, the consuls named a dictator,
M. Papirius Crassus, who may have had appropriate local 
knowledge; he took P. Valerius Poplicola, who had gained 
military experience against the Gauls when praetor in 350, 
as his magister equitum (109). The particular religious 
authority of several of these magistrates (110) would have 
contributed to their choice in this year of pestilence.
In 331, the consuls were C. Valerius Potitus, from a 
branch of his gens absent for fifty years, and M. Claudius 
Marcellus, the first known member of a freedman branch of 
his gens; both families were absent from office again from 
327 to 287 (ill). Other magistrates, C. Quinctius, 
dictator ’clavi figendi causa* to avert the pestilence, 
and Q. Fabius Rullianus, curule aedile, were sons of the 
consuls of 354, who I have suggested opposed military 
expansion in the south (112). Perhaps all the magistrates 
were united over this issue, gaining election because 
events in 332 caused more senators to take this attitude.
109. Livy 7.23.3, 8.17.6-7; n.82 above; cf. Beloch, RG 69.
110. For hints, see Ch.2 I64, 169; Ch.3 214-5; above 251,
257.
111. Broughton, MRR 143. The last known Potitus was consul 
in 392. For Marcellus* origin, see Cic. de orat. 1.39.176; 
see Schur, Hermes 1924, 467-470, for an alternative view.
112. Livy 8.18.4-5, 12-13; n.l02 above.
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and because Postumius the censor, a likely sympathiser, 
had aided their client control when registering citizens 
in the new tribes (113). The religious authority of 
Potitus, whom Quinctius named as his magister equitum, 
and Quinctius' family links with the Capitoline, where 
he performed religious rites, would also have contributed 
to their election (ilk).
After 331, the policy of strengthening Rome's control 
over the western coastal area, including Campania, seems 
to have gained increasing support in the senate. The 
measures taken from 330 to 326 - the punishment of 
Privernum's leaders and bestowal of civitas sine suffragio 
on its inhabitants in 329 after its revolt in 330, the 
colonisation of Tarracina and Fregellae in 329 and 328, 
the war with Palaepolis and Naples in 327, followed by 
a treaty of alliance with the latter in 326 - inevitably 
resulted in hostilities with the Samnites again by 326 
(11$). At home, imprisonment for debt was abolished the 
year that the Samnite war broke out, to stimulate popular 
backing for the war, especially among those recently
113. Since Fabius' father had promoted tribal marshalling 
of clients from 360 to 356, and forefathers of Fabius, 
Postumius and Sulpicius (the consul of 337 who probably 
shared their views) had held six censorships since 380, 
when Quinctius' father took Tusculum (Broughton, MRR 105, 
115, 117, 142), their faction could have had particularly 
efficient client control.
114. Quinctius, like Manlius, the last dictator to drive 
the nail, had the cognomen Sapitolinus, while Potitus, 
like Pinarius, Manlius' magister equitum, guarded the cult 
of Hercules (n.23 above; Gh.2 137). The latter coincidence 
may be simply because Hercules protected commerce, and in
a pestilence corn was usually imported.
115. For full details of these events, and how they 
contributed to war in 326, see De Sanctis, StR 2 295-302; 
Staveley, art.cit. 425-6; Gassola, OPR 121-3; Toynbee, HL 
1 142-4; Salmon, SS 210-9.
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speculating in Campania (116).
Those promoting this aggressive policy dominated the 
elections from 330 to 326. Indeed eight of the consuls 
in this period were themselves, or were kinsmen of, 
magistrates in office in the initial stage of the policy, 
from 34-8 to 335, and therefore were now leaders in the 
senate. The unusual sequence of Plautii holding three 
consulships from 330 to 328 may be due to their inheritance 
of relevant local influence; the kinsman of the consul of 
330 had fought at Privernum in 341» and the consul of 329 
and 328 may have been adopted from a Campanian family. 
Papirius, consul of 330, who fought the Sidicini in 336, 
and Aemilius, consul of 329, who had fought at Privernum 
in 341, would have been elected for similar reasons. 
Publilius, Papirius Cursor and Poetelius, consuls in 327 
and 326, also had experience of leadership (117).
Despite these events and magistracies, there are 
hints that those opposing southern expansion had some 
influence in this period. In 329 Valerius Potitus was 
elected as curule aedile (118), and the senate only decided
116. Last, GAH7 545-6; Staveley, art.cit. 420-1.
117. For refs, to reconstructions of the faction promoting 
the Samnite war in this period, see n.80. See Broughton,
MRR 143-7 for details of the magistrates. Munzer, RAA 37,
argues that Plautius Decianus, consul of 329, was adopted 
from the Decii. Livy 8.19.13,21 hints at the Plautii's 
links with Privernum. Even the leader of the revolt had
a house in Rome (Livy 8.19.4). The assumption from the 
coincidence of names and events in 341 and 329 that those 
in 341 (Livy 8.1.3, 11.13) duplicate those in 329 (Beloch, 
RG 359, 390; De Sanctis, StR 2 273) or vice versa (Salmon, 
SS 198 n.7) is unwarranted; the punishment in 341 could 
have partly inspired the revolt in 329 (see further Munzer, 
Plautius No. 18, PWRE 21.1 (Stuttgart, 1951) H-13; Taylor, 
VDRR 56).
118. Broughton, MRR 144*
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on the fate of Privernum after a long debate (119).
In 327, when perhaps some senators were having last minute 
doubts about another Samnite war, another possible opponent 
of the war won a consulship; he was L, Cornelius Lentulus, 
from an unknown branch of the gens, taking only one more 
post before the end of the war, and. naming M. Claudius 
Marcellus, Potitus' colleague in 331, as electoral dictator 
for 326; Marcellus named Postumius, the consul of 334, as 
his magister equitum. However, augurs in the war party 
forced Marcellus to abdicate, and, despite the tribunes' 
suspicions, called for an interregnum. In the patriciate 
opinion was clearly divided too; it was the fourteenth 
interrex who finally named acceptable consuls- Papirius, 
the magister equitum of 340, and Poetelius, consul of 346; 
they may have represented a compromise of attitudes to the 
war. Another reason for their choice may have been their 
inheritance of religious authority; in 326 a lectisternium 
was held to propitiate the gods for the coming war (120).
In the period of the second Samnite war, from 32$ to 
304, factions of opinion formed on questions such as the 
extent of Roman military activity, especially in the more 
outlying regions of Apulia and Etruria, the nature of 
settlements made with conquered peoples, the extent of 
senatorial authority, the number of novi homines in the 
governing class, and the marshalling of voters to elections
119. Livy 8.20.10-21.10; Val. Max. 6.2.1.
120. For the election and lectisternium, see Livy 8.23 
14-17,25.1; Staveley, art.cit. 427-8; cf. Salmon, SS 217. 
For the consuls' religious authority, see Ch.2 164 and n.72 
above. Poetelius' attitude to the war is not clear; see 
above, 259.
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in tribal formation. The fluidity of political allegiances, 
continued fear of monopolies, and difficulties of client 
control, meant that twenty-six different gentes, six for 
the first time, were represented in curule office from 325 
to 304 (121).
In 325, the war party clearly controlled the elections; 
four experienced members were elected - Furius, the consul 
of 338, and lunius, magister equitum of 339» as consuls, 
Papirius Crassus, consul of 330, as praefectus urbi, and 
Papirius Cursor, consul of 326, as dictator (122). They 
laid the way for the war party's aggressive strategy of 
fighting the Samnites both from Campania and Apulia, with 
which an alliance had been made in 326; Furius fought from 
Campania, until Cursor replaced him when he fell ill, while 
lunius quelled the Vestini, trying to open a northern route 
to Apulia (123). Cursor's magister equitum, Q. Fabius 
Rullianus, who shows no interest in southern expansion in
121. The need for military experience was also catered for;
18 consulships and 7 military dictatorships were held by 
ex-consuls, and the lex Genucia was suspended 11 times.
122. Broughton, MRR 147-8.
123. See Livy 8.29 for military activity this year. Livy 
8.25.3 notes an alliance between Rome, Apulia, and Lucania, 
which may be a town in the land of the Ferentani, in 326;
the idea is supported by Rome's recent alliance with the Gauls 
(above, 266), the absence of hostilities with the Aequi for 
over 60 years, and the Roman talent for long marches (Adcock, 
RAW 69-71). This alliance, Tarentum's suspicion of Rome 
and the alliance of Lucania, south of Campania, with the 
Samnites (Livy 8.25.8,27) may explain lunius' activity in 
325; see De Sanctis, StR 2 303-5; Frederiksen, JRS I968 
225-7; Ogilvie, rev. Salmon, SS, CR I968 331. For doubts 
about the alliance and Roman activity in Apulia up to 320, 
see Beloch, RG 397; Adcock, CAH7 595-8; Salmon, SS 215-6,
222-4. For a general discussion of the links between 
foreign policy and strategy, see Adcock, RAW 75f.
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the rest of his career, may have been named primarily 
for his knowledge of Campania and his military talent (124) 
The quarrel between Fabius and Papirius, which the ancients 
use to illustrate constitutional points, borrowing many 
details from a similar incident in 217, may in fact have 
been due to jealousy and their basic disagreement over the 
aggressive strategy (125).
The .consuls of 323» Sulpicius, consul in 337» and 
Aulius, from a previously unknown gens, who was perhaps a 
recently enfranchised Latin aristocrat (126), may, like 
Fabius, have favoured a more defensive approach to the war; 
Sulpicius had opposed aggression in the south in 337, and 
both gentes were rarely active there in the future. They 
could have continued the strategy of 325 under pressure 
from the senate's leaders, having been elected through 
efficient marshalling of clients by those who shared their 
attitude to the war, whose numbers may have increased since 
Papirius' triumph in 325 (127).
124. His kinsman's colonisation of Gales in 334 suggests 
the former, some details in the story of his dispute with 
Papirius, and his future career suggest the latter.
See above 270-1 for hints of his attitude to the war.
125. See Broughton, MRR 147-9 for full refs, to the story. 
For ideas of how it developed from a historical nucleus, 
cf. Munzer, RAA 110; Cassola, GPR 141f; R. Bauman, 'The 
Lex de Valeria de provocatione of 300 B.C.', Hist. 1973 
37-8; Frier, LAPM 244, 269. Livy 8.29.3-6 hints at dis­
putes over strategy this year.
126. Broughton, MRR 149; Degrassi, op.cit. 109.
127. See Livy 8.37.2-6 on their activity, and
for hints of their faction's efficiency with clients.
N.B. 324 was a 'dictator year' (Broughton, MRR 148-9).
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Flavius' prosecution of the people of Tusculum in 
323 in the hope of discrediting Latin senators whose 
promotion in the Roman governing class he resented, may 
have been inspired by the results of the election of 323, 
and by the expected candidacy in 322 of a novus homo from 
Tusculum, L. Fulvius Curvus, Q. Fabius Rullianus, whose 
father had brought the first Latin aristocrats to office, 
and Plautius, a descendant of one of them; the prosecution 
failed, and the three were elected as consuls and praetor 
respectively (128). Fabius, and perhaps Fulvius too, 
since his gens is only known in two more offices this 
century, would have been backed by the same group as their 
predecessors. Fabius, as son of the princeps senatus, 
had enough personal influence to ensure that they took no 
aggressive military action. At the same time, Plautius, 
whose kinsmen had been promoting southern expansion in 
five posts since 347, and Cornelius Cossus, the consul of 
343 and 332, who, as dictator, refused to negotiate with 
the Samnites after he had defeated them, would have been 
backed by the military leaders of the senate. Cornelius 
may have nominated Fabius, the princeps senatus, as his 
magister equitum and senior military advisor as part of a 
compromise with the consuls (129)•
128. See 246-9 above; Livy 8.37.8-12, 40.2; Val. Max. 
9.10.1; Munzer, RAA 64-5; Taylor, VDRR 302; cf. Heurgon, OP 
261. Flavius had won his plebeian tribunate in 327 by 
bribery (Livy 8.22.2-4).
129. For this version of military events, see Livy 8.38-39, 
40.4-5; Zon. 7.26. Fabius, consul in 360, might only have 
been in his late 60's. The alternative version, attributing 
military action to the consuls (Livy 8.40.1-3; Act. Tr. in 
Degrassi, op.cit. 70-1, 542) is supported by Broughton, MRR 
150, and Frederiksen, art.cit. 226. De Sanctis, StR 2 306, 
and Salmon, SS 221-222 doubt victory by either magistrate.
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In 321, the consuls were T. Veturius and Sp.
Postumius, the consuls of 334. They maintained a 
defensive stand in Campania until the Samnites lured them 
into the Caudine Forks; once caught there, they surrendered 
at the instance of L. Cornelius Lentulus, the consul of 
327, giving up garrisons and hostages in return for the 
safety of the army. Presumably they gained election in 
the same way as their predecessors, and through their back­
ing and their personal authority as ex-consuls and ex­
censor, were able to pursue their own strategy until the 
Samnites' apparent threat to the footholds Rome had 
recently gained in Apulia forced them into more aggressive 
action (130).
After the consuls of 321 had made peace with the 
Samnites, the angry senate demanded that they name a 
dictator to hold the next election. After they named 
first Q. Fabius Ambustus, Rullianus' uncle, with Aelius, 
Sulpicius' colleague in 337, as magister equitum, and then 
M. Aemelius Papus, with L. Valerius Flaccus as his magister 
equitum, and all were in turn forced to abdicate, the state 
reverted to an interregnum. All four nominees may have 
shared the consuls' views on the peace; their families did 
not participate in the conquest of the south in the next
130. For the likely attitudes of the consuls and Lentulus, 
see above 267-8, 273. For full refs, to
their names and events, see Broughton, MRR 150-1; Degrassi, 
op.cit. 107. For alternatives to the traditional explan­
ation of the expedition as a rescue operation, and details 
of peace terms, see De Sanctis, StR 2 307f; Salmon, SS 224- 
6; Scullard, HR¥^ 133. The subsequent seizure of Fregellae, 
whose colonisation was the original 'casus belli' (Salmon,
SS 216), by the Samnites (Livy 9.12.5-8) was in accord 
with these terms.
278
forty years, and the defensive attitudes of other Fabii 
and Aelius have already been suggested. Presumably the 
consuls hoped that by appointing sympathetic electoral 
dictators and then marshalling their clients in an assembly 
election, they might retain the consulship for those who 
favoured peace. But the more aggressive leaders of the 
senate had enough support in the augural college and the 
patriciate to foil this scheme, the second interrex, M. 
Valerius Gorvus,named as consuls L. Papirius Cursor and 
Q. Publilius Philo, leading promoters of the war with 
recent experience of military leadership (131). They 
made a bold campaign to Luceria to rescue the hostages 
held by the Samnites as guarantors of the peace of 321, 
Papirius by the north and Publilius through Caudium; they 
succeeded in capturing Luceria, and made an alliance 
with Arpi (132).
In 319, the presidency of the dictator, T. Manlius,
131. Broughton, MRR 151-2.
132. For the renewal of war, see Livy 9.8-15.1; Zon. 7.26;
Cic. de off, 3.109; Gell. 17.21.36; Degrassi, op.cit. 70-1; 
416-7. While the story of Postumius trying to negate the 
peace by personally surrendering to the Samnites was probably 
an elaboration by Albinus to cover up his personal disgrace 
(cf. De Sanctis, StR 2 312f), the consuls' justification
of the breach of the promise of 321 not to renew war by the 
fact that their predecessors had taken their actions 
independently is credible (see Ch.IB 74-5). Since such 
a renewal of war was hardly more honourable than the 
original surrender, I would not accept the view of De Sanctis, 
StR 2 315-320, Adcock, GAH7 600f and Salmon, SS 228f, that 
it was invented to cover up the disgrace of 321, and that 
the peace in fact lasted until 316; for further objections 
to this view, see Frederiksen, art.cit. 226; Harris, WIRR 
256.
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consul in 340 who took Cursor as his magister equitum 
(133), and Cursor's local influence in Satricum, which 
had revolted by the time of the election, may have helped 
Cursor to gain re-election as consul (134), while the 
recent experience of leadership of his colleague Aulius, 
consul of 323 (135), and Aulius' possible influence as 
president in the election of the censor, Sulpicius, also 
consul in 323, may have helped these more conservative 
leaders to win their offices. Sulpicius was then 
forced to abdicate (136); presumably the augurs in the 
aggressive faction wanted to ensure that their allies 
were censors, since there were now enough citizens in 
Campania and the west coast for new tribes to be created 
there.
In 3I8, the censorship was gained by two likely 
members of the expansionist party, Maenius, consul of 338, 
and another of the Papirii Crassi, whose relations held 
office with Maenius in the period 340-338, when earlier 
settlements were made. They registered citizens in the 
new tribes of Gufentina, on Privernate land, and Falerna,
133. Fast. Cap. in Degrassi, op.cit. 36-7, 108-9.
134. cf. Livy 9.15.11. For the first hints of Satricum's 
revolt, see Livy 9.12.$. Papirius' and Manlius' grand­
fathers were consular tribunes in 385, when the colony 
was founded there, and Papirius regained it in 319 through 
the compliance of inhabitants (Livy 9.16; Degrassi, op. 
cit. 542; Beloch, RG 360; cf. De Sanctis, StR 2 296 n.2, 
317).
135. Livy 9.15.11-16.1, notes that in 319 he captured the 
city of the Ferentani; it might have been on his route to 
Apulia in 323.
136. Fast. Cap. in Degrassi, op.cit. 36-7, 109; Broughton, 
MRR 154.
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in Campania (137). Perhaps in this process, they 
favoured Plautius, consul of 318, who already had close 
ties in both areas, and Furius, the praetor of 318, a 
kinsman of Maenius’ colleague in 338; both their names 
later appear in the new tribes. We know too little of 
the other consul of 318, Folius, to draw certain conclusions 
about his election (138). The consuls of 317, however, 
appear to represent a new generation of those favouring 
southern expansion; they were C. lunius Brutus, who held 
five more posts before the war ended, and Q. Aemilius 
Barbula, who was his colleague again in 311; both were 
related to senior members of the faction (139).
A two year truce was made with Samnium in 318 by 
this group to allow it to regain control of the area 
around Satricum and -Campania, which had been restless 
since 321, and to consolidate Rome’s position in Apulia 
(140). In 318 and 317 prefects were sent to Capua,
137. Degrassi, op.cit. 416-7; Taylor, VDRR 55-6. The 
tribes consolidated Rome’s authority in Campania; see 
Bernardi, Ath. 1942 103; Heurgon, CP 278.
138. For these magistrates, see Broughton, MRR 154-5. 
Plautius may have been son of the consul of 330; see 
272 above for his gens’ spheres of interest. See 
Taylor, VDRR 217, 244 for Furii and Plautii in the tribes 
Folii are only previously known in 433 and 390; it may
have only been as a result of his magistracy in 318 that
Folius had influence in Campania in 314, and one of the 
gens was engaged in commerce by the third century 
(Cassola, GPR 31).
139. Broughton, MRR 155. Barbula could have been a 
cousin of the consul of 329.
140. Livy 9.6-7.4,15.1, 20.2-3.
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Cumae and Antium (141); Plautius gained the submission of 
the Teanenses and Canusini in Apulia in 318; the next 
year the consuls won Forentum and Nerulum there, bringing 
Roman influence to the area immediately south of Campania 
and Samnium (142).
In 316, two minor leaders became consuls, Sp. Nautius, 
the first of his gens in office since 404» and M. Popillius, 
the first since his father was consul in 348 (143).
Apart from Nautius, consul of 287, neither gens is known 
again. In 316 they may only have been elected because 
of the great competition between candidates with different 
attitudes to the war for the magistracies in the year the 
Samnite truce ended, and their difficulties in organising 
their clients after the recent registration of citizens. 
Leaders with experience against the Samnites were required, 
however; hence L. Aemilius Privernas, consul in 341 and 
329, and L. Fulvius Gurvus, consul in 322, were named 
as dictator and magister equitum; they defeated the Samnites
in 316 (144).
In 315, the two bold campaigners of 320, L. Papirius 
Cursor and Q. Publilius Philo, became consuls, and led the 
armies into Apulia, to set up a colony at Luceria. However,
141. The extent of their authority is not certain; cf.
Mommsen, StR 23 6O8; Bernardi, art.cit. 89; Heurgon, CP 
162, 278; Sherwin-White, RC^
142. Livy 9.20.4, 8-9: cf. Diod. 19.65.7; Beloch, RG 402, 465.
143. Broughton, MRR 155.
144. Livy 9.21; Degrassi, op.cit. 36-7, 109. 418f.
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when the Samnites struck out towards Latium, and Sora, 
which one of the Fabii had taken in 345, revolted, Q.
Fabius Rullianus was named as dictator, taking as his 
magister equitum Aulius, who had recently taken the coastal 
area north of Luceria and Sora. Fabius recaptured 
Saticula, just beyond Cales, which his kinsman had settled 
in 334, and defeated the Samnites, after appointing his 
brother as magister equitum to replace Aulius, who had 
fallen in battle. It appears that after Aemilius' success 
in 31-6 most senators had come to favour the more ambitious 
policy of crushing the Samnites between western and eastern 
spheres of Roman influence, but that when the Samnites 
struck back, they supported more defensive leaders, both 
for their policy and their local knowledge (145).
The consuls of 314, Sulpicius, son of the consul of 
345, and active himself just beyond the Auruncan lands in 
337 and 323, and Poetelius, a relative of the consul of 346, 
may have been supported for the same reasons as Fabius and 
Aulius; through deserters they gained the submission of 
Sora, which Sulpicius' father had taken in 345, and the 
Aurunci, who had last risen against Rome in 346, before 
defeating the Samnites themselves (146). Meanwhile, the
145. For the magistrates' names, see Broughton, MRR 156-7. 
The Apulia campaign is only indirectly suggested by Livy, 
9.23.1,26.2, and Diod. 19.72.4. Livy 9.22.1 may have 
omitted it because he confused it with that of 320, and 
was distracted by the other events. See further Beloch,
RG 405-6. For the revolt of Sora, see Diod. 19.21.3;
Livy 9.23.I; for a hint of Samnite raids, see Strabo 5.232. 
For the appointment of the dictator, see Cassola, GPR 143. 
For Fabius' campaign, see Livy 9.23; Frontin. Str. 1.11.21; 
Diod. 19.72.3-9; Degrassi, op.cit. 36-7, 109-110.
146. Livy 9.24-25, 27-28.1; Diod. 19.76.1-5; Degrassi, op. 
cit. 70-1, 110, 418-9; Salmon, SS 235-8; n.67 above.
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Roman army in Apulia, presumably under a promagistrate, 
retook Luceria from the Samnites, and established a colony 
there (147). Also in 314 Maenius and Folius became 
dictator and magister equitum to investigate conspiracies 
against Rome in Campania, presumably because they had 
developed personal influence there in their magistracies 
in 338 and 318 (148).
After Maenius and Folius quelled the -Campanian revolts, 
an investigation of coitiones in Rome was carried out, 
first by Maenius and Folius, and then by the consuls, 
Sulpicius and Poetelius (149). All these leaders belonged 
to families promoting the marshalling of clients from the 
provinces from 380, as did Publilius, the Papirii Crassi, 
Plautii, Popillii, Poetelii and Furii (150); all, except 
for the Sulpicii and Furii, who henceforth appear much less 
frequently, disappear from the lists after 312. I would 
suggest that these coitiones had -been trying to divert 
clients marshalled from the provinces from support of their 
patrons, by popularising or bribery, and that they affected 
these families most of all, because they were already 
losing influence in Latium and Campania, as the citizen 
composition rapidly changed. The novi homines among them
147. Salmon, RC 58. The promagistrate is more likely to 
be Cursor, since Publilius was in Rome later in the year
(see below).
148. Livy 9.25.2-3, 26.5-7; Diod. 19.76.3-5; Degrassi, 
op.cit. 36-7, 109-110, 416-9; Bauman, Hist. 1973 38f; 
Sherwin-White, RC^ 43. cf. Ch.10 116 and n.l51 below.
149. Livy 9.26.8-11.
150. See above 246-9, 262, 269-271, 275-7, 280.
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also faced the jealousy of other senators, which they 
displayed by calling for the consuls to investigate the 
participation of Maenius, Folius and Publilius themselves 
in the coitiones. The -consuls' differences with them 
over foreign policy would have made them willing to do so 
(151).
In 313» the outpost in Apulia having been established, 
most senators would have been concerned simply to consol­
idate the routes to Campania, and make an aggressive drive 
into Samnium from that side to end the war. Accordingly 
they supported leaders with recent experience or local 
knowledge in the elections. L. Papirius Cursor, consul 
for the fifth time, and C. lunius, consul of 317, who 
held military posts every year from 313 to 310, were 
elected as consuls; C. Poetelius, son of the consul of 326, 
became dictator, and one of the magistrates of 314» 
Poetelius or Folius, became his magister equitum (152).
They took Nola, Atina, Calatia and Fregellae, strongholds 
in Campania and north Samnium; Saticula, Interramna 
Suscina, Suessa Aurunca and Pontiae were colonised in 313
151. cf. Ch.1C 82-3, 116. Maenius' and Publilius' 
triumphs, honours and monuments (e.g. see Livy 8.13.9, 
16.12, 23.12; Pliny NH 34.20; Fest. 120L; Degrassi, op. 
cit. 541) might have been the basis of charges of popular­
ising. See further Forni, Ath. 1953, 229-230; Bauman, 
art.cit. 41f. For arguments that the inquiry in some 
sense involved conspiracies of Romans and Campanians,
cf. Heurgon, CP 278-9; Bernardi, Ath. 1943, 29; Staveley, 
Hist. 1959, 428-9; Cassola, GPR 125f.
152. For full details of the confusion in the magistrates' 
names, see Broughton, MRR 158-9. If the dictator was 
actually named 'clavi figendi causa' (Livy 9.28.2-6) the 
religious authority of himself and his magister equitum 
(see Ch.3 196 and above 259)
would have dictated their choice.
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or 312, completing a ring of fortresses around Samnium (153) 
In 312, the consuls, P. Decius Mus and M. Valerius 
Corvinus, who continued the war against the Samnites, and 
the censors, Ap. Claudius Caecus and C. Plautius Venno, 
being all sons of magistrates from 343 to 337 who supported 
expansion into Campania, may have held the same views as 
their predecessors (154)» Sulpicius, the consul of 314 who 
was less concerned with southern expansion, was also named 
as dictator in the course of the year to meet the threat 
of an uprising by Etruscans who had united to oppose Rome's 
growing strength while her forces were thinly spread; he 
took another experienced man, lunius, the consul of 313, 
as his magister equitum (155). Using public funds,
Claudius built the Appian way to Capua, and an aqueduct at 
Rome, thus promoting the conquest of southern Italy, 
commerce and industry, aiding the marshalling of his and 
his allies' voters from the Campanian area, and enhancing 
his own reputation. He also breached traditional social 
and religious norms by including the sons of freedmen in 
the senate, depriving the Potitii and Pinarii of the cult
153. Salmon, RC 58-9, SS 238-9; Thiel, HRSP 10-11; Toynbee,
HL 1 169; cf. De Sanctis, StR 2 324f.
154. Valerius had gained experience against the Samnites in 
325 {Livy 8.35.10-11). For full refs, to their names and 
military action, see Broughton, MRR 159. Valerius' supposed 
triumph over the Sorani (Act. Tr. in Degrassi, op.cit. 542) 
may be due to confusion over Sulpicius holding magistracies 
in 314 and 312; cf. Heurgon, CP 263; Salmon, SS 239.
155. Livy 9.29.1-5; Fast. Cap. in Degrassi, op.cit. 36-7,
110, 420-1; De Sanctis, StR 2 328f; Harris, REU 48f;
Torelli, ET 91; cf. Beloch, RG 412-4, denying the whole 
Etruscan war from 311 to 308. lunius had ancient Etruscan 
ties (see above 263) and Sulpicius' forefathers had
fought in earlier Etruscan wars (see above, 247, 251).
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of Hercules, and expelling from the temple of Jupiter the 
flute players, who then seceded to Tibur. Since Claudius' 
family had no known Latin ties, his grandfather had opposed 
the Licinian-Sextian law, Hercules and Jupiter were leading 
deities in Latium, and his Latin colleague Plautius resigned 
after a disagreement with him, these measures, like those 
in 323 and 314 noted above, may have been partly inspired 
by prejudice against increasing Latin influence in the 
governing class (156). Perhaps, like the censors of 307, 
who also had no clear Latin ties, he discriminated against 
Latin senators in his lectio senatus (157). Such prejudice
156. For details of Claudius' measures, see Broughton,
MRR 160; Oh.10 107. H. Fiske, 'The Politics of the 
patrician Claudii', HSCP 1902 30f, Thiel, HRSP, 10, 42,
57f, Staveley, Hist. 1959, 418f, and T. Wiseman, 'Roman 
Republican Road Building', PBSR 1970, 130, 140-2, 149, 
argue for their military, commercial and industrial sign­
ificance. For some alternative views of Claudius, cf.
B. Niebuhr, History of Rome, (trans. Smith, London, 1842)
3 2940» and Passarini, Ath. 1943 111 (a reactionary); 
Mommsen, RF 1 301f and Beloch, RG 481Ô (a demagogue);
Munzer, RAA 41-2 and Garzetti, Ath. 1947 175f (a political 
opportunist, supported by Plautius). For Claudius' 
reaction against traditional religion, and interest in 
Pythagoras see Mommsen, RF 1 303f; Fiske, art.cit. 35; 
Garzetti, art.cit. 207-9» For the significance of Jupiter 
in Latium, see Latte, RR 144-5» For the Valerii Potitii's 
and Pinarii'8 cults of Hercules, god of commerce, and the 
Pinarii, Plautii and Hercules in Tibur, see Ch.2 137, 145, 
and 246 above. Note also that after Plautius
took Privernum in 329, the goods of its leader were 
dedicated to Semo Sancus, a god linked with Hercules
(Ch.2 169; Livy 7.20.8; cf. Gage, AR I4O-I), and that 
Plautius the censor arranged the return of the flute players 
to Rome (Ovid Fast. 6.657-692). For Plautius' abdication, 
see Cassola, GPR 137f. For hints of client control of 
the Potitii and their allies in the Latin area, and their 
opposition to expansion south, see 270-1,
275-8 above. The Potitii's lack of interest in commerce 
might partly explain Claudius' taking the cult from them.
157. The censors of 307 expelled the Latin senator Annius; 
see Willems, SRR 1 265 n.l.
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might partly explain why Fabius and Marcius, the consuls 
in 310, refused to recognise his lectio, and why 
Sempronius and Furius, plebeian tribunes in 310 and 308, 
tried to make him lay down his censorship; all were 
particularly dependent on Latin allies (158).
In 311, the senate supported its leading generals 
to pursue the wars north and south. lunius, the consul 
of 317 and 313, commanded in Samnium, regaining Cluviae 
and capturing Bovianum, the rich capital of the Pentrian 
Samnites, which enabled him to distribute much booty (159). 
Aemilius, his colleague in 317 also, served in Etruria, 
trying to relieve Sutrium, where he may have had personal 
influence, since it was founded as a Latin colony when 
his grandfather was consular tribune (l60). The passage 
of plébiscita increasing the number of military tribunes 
and placing duumviri navales in charge of equipping and 
repairing a fleet by plebeian tribunes Atilius, Marcius 
and Decius, who were all kinsmen of promoters of southern 
expansion in office from 342 to 335, attests to the 
increasing ambitions of expansionist leaders in the 
senate (l'6l) .
158. Ch.IB 62, 77; Cassola, GPR 139f, 149, 151; above 
262; below, 288, 294.
159. Livy 9.31; cf. Salmon, SS 244, 251.
160. See Ch.3 195, 227-8 for
Aemilius' family interest in Etruria. For his action 
there in 311, see Degrassi, op.cit. 542; Harris, REU 49- 
56, 59; C. Delplace, 'L'Intervention Etrusque dans les 
dernières années de la deuxième guerre Samnite (312-308)', 
Latoraus, 1967, 454-7. cf. De Sanctis, StR 2 329 n.2 
(arguing that it is duplicated from 310).
161. Ch.IB 35; Livy 9.30.3-4; Thiel, HRSP 9-10, 41-7.
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While both the consuls of 310, Q. Fabius Rullianus 
and C. Marcius, the plebeian tribune of 311, inherited 
interests in the area of Campania, the Etruscan connections 
bequeathed by their fathers, who both fought there in 356, 
would have given them special interests in the northern 
wars (162). Efficient organisation of clients from the 
Latin area, and Fabius’ personal authority, rather than a 
clear predominance of those with similar priorities in the 
senate, may explain their election (163). After Fabius 
gained several victories in Etruria with Marcius, he made 
a provocative march, against the senate's wishes, through 
the Ciminian wood to north Etruria and Umbria, where he 
made an alliance with Camerinum and thirty year truces 
with Perusia, Cortona and Arretium. As Marcius was 
suffering reverses in the south, and Cornelius the duovir 
navalis was having little success at sea, the senate 
then pressurised Fabius to appoint as dictator one of the 
promoters of war in the south, L. Papirius Cursor, with 
whom Fabius had argued over strategy in the first years 
of the war; he named as his magister equitum another 
experienced leader, C. lunius Brutus, his consular 
colleague of 313; Valerius Corvus and Decius Mus were his 
lieutenants. By the end of the year, they had won back
162. For hints of their interests in Campania, see 
258, 261, 268, 274-5, 287 above. For arguments
for Fabius pursuing an 'Etruscan policy' see Munzer,
RAA 55-6, Staveley, art.cit. 432, and Harris, REU 49» 
58.
163. cf. 246-9, 270-1, 275-8 above.
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a commanding position in Samnium for Rome (I64).
In 308, in fear of the collaboration of Etruscans 
and Marsi with the Samnites against Rome (I65) senators 
supported three talented generals with recent experience 
in the elections; Fabius Rullianus, Decius Mus and 
Valerius Corvus, became consuls and praetor respectively. 
Fabius' victory in Etruria at the end of 310, and 
his influence as electoral president, doubtless helped 
him gain this immediate repetition of office (I66).
While Fabius quelled the Marsi and Paeligni, Decius re­
established Roman authority in Etruria, giving a forty 
year truce to Tarquinii, and an annual truce to Volsinii 
and other towns. He then returned to defend Rome against 
attacks by Umbrians, which Fabius pre-empted with a victory 
further north {167).
164. For hints of the senate and Fabius differing over 
his northern policy, see Livy 9.36.14, 38.9-14; Flor. 
1.12.3. For full discussions of events in 310, see 
Degrassi, op.cit. 420-1, 542; Broughton, MRR l6l-4;
De Sanctis, StR 2 329-333; Cassola, GPR 156-8; Salmon, 
SS 242, 245-6 ; Harris, REU 50-6, 59-60; Delplace, art. 
cit. 455-463. While differing over details in the 
problematic evidence, they all agree that Fabius' march 
north was beyond the bounds of necessity, and that the 
victory attributed to Papirius in the north duplicates 
a later event.
165. Livy 9.38.7,41.4. 309 was a 'dictator year'
(Broughton, MRR 163).
166. Broughton, MRR 164; Livy 9.40.18-41.1. Since 
Fabius' kinsmen had fought the Hernici in 360, founded 
a tribe on their land in 358, and taken Sora, between 
Marsian and Hernician land, in 345, he might have had 
interests and influence in the crucial area.
167. For this version of events, see Salmon, SS 243, 
246, and Harris, REU, 56-7, 6O-I; cf. De Sanctis, StR 
2 33-5 and Thiel, HRSP, 4-5, 10 (accepting Fabius' 
victory in Campania noted by Livy 9.41.3-4); Beloch,
RG 403-4 (viewing the Marsi as Rome's allies against 
the Samnites); Delplace, art.cit. 465 (denying the 
Umbrian attacks).
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These successes may have had some bearing on the 
magistracies of 307. Fabius was made proconsul, 
despite the protests of Caecus, whose lectio senatus 
he had rejected in 310; he gained the surrender of the 
Samnites at Allifae, imposing harsh terms on their 
allies. The enhanced reputation of the electoral 
president, Decius, may have contributed to the election 
of Caecus, who shared his interests in southern 
expansion, as consul for 3C7 (168). Their allies,
M. Valerius Corvinus, the consul of 312, and 0. lunius, 
the consul of 311, who also had considerable military 
standing, were elected as censors. They increased 
their personal reputations, promoted industry at Rome, 
and improved communications with the east coast, by 
letting contracts for the Via Valeria and the temple 
of Salus, vowed earlier by lunius (169). The other 
consul, Volumnius, from an Etruscan gens absent since 
461, led an expedition into the land of the Sallentini; 
he may have been promoted by his colleague's faction, 
or have been a lesser candidate winning through the 
conflict of others, and implementing the policy of this 
faction, because it still prevailed in the senate as a
168. Livy 9-42.2,6-8.
169. Broughton, MRR 165; Wiseman, art.cit. 139-140,
149. The road from Tibur allowed them to increase 
their influence in east Latium (see 285-7
above) and the area beyond, where lunius and his kins 
man had marched in 325 and 317.
291
whole (170).
In 306, the leading faction was represented by 
P. Cornelius Arvina, son of the consul of 343 and 332; 
he defeated the Samnites who had taken Galatia and Sora 
(171). He may have been supported partly because he 
inherited personal influence in Carthage and Tarentum 
from his father, who had made treaties with them in 343 
and 332. Such influence may have contributed to the 
drawing up of a treaty in 306 with Carthage, which was 
at war with Syracuse, and, like Tarentum, may have been 
concerned about Rome's recent advances south and on to 
the sea. The treaty, excluding Rome's warships from 
Sicily and Carthage's from Italy, suggests that the 
leaders of the senate by now aspired to hegemony over the
170. Livy 9.42.2-5; cf. Diod. 20.80.1-2. The expedition 
may have been to defend Roman positions in Apulia (Salmon, 
SS 246-7) or to promote support for Rome in Tarentum 
(Staveley, art.cit. 430). Volumnius may have inherited 
old family ties with leaders influential in this period; 
his gens in the fifth century was related to the Marcii; 
and its only known magistrate shared offices with members 
of the Sulpicii, Fabii, Postumii and Minucii (Livy 2.40, 
3.10.5, 25.6-9), which held seven consulships from 310 to 
304. Difficulties in assessing his attitudes are 
acknowledged by Cassola, GPR 2G2-3, who challenges the 
usual assumption that he was allied to Claudius.
171. Beloch, RG 417-8 and Salmon, SS 248-9, are sceptical 
about the extent of his success. Atilius Caiatinus, 
whose marriage to Rullianus' daughter may have resulted 
from Fabius' involvement in Gales, near Caiatia (Atilius' 
cognomen may denote his origin there), may have gained 
his position as leader of the garrison at Sora in 306 
through the Fabii (see 258, n.67, 267-8 above;
Munzer, RAA 56f; Heurgon, CP 289).
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southern half of the Italian peninsula (172). We cannot 
be certain of the basis of the election of Arvina's 
colleague, Q. Marcius Tremulus, who fought the Samnites 
with his colleague, quelled a revolt of the Hernici and 
Anagnini, and won an equestrian statue set before 
the temple of Castor, the patron of horsemen (173). He 
may have been supported as part of the faction of his 
colleague and forefathers concerned with southern expansion, 
or as a member of the sector more concerned with the defence 
of Latium, gaining his seat because this group could 
efficiently organise clients from the several tribes in 
the area (174); luventius, a Tusculan, may have gained 
the curule aedileship in 306 in the latter way (175).
In the election in 305, the main issue at hand was 
the unrest which the Hernician settlement had stirred up
172. Livy 9.43.26; Serv. ad Aen. 4.628; cf. Polyb. 3.26.
For full treatments of the treaty's date and purpose, cf. 
Cary, JRS 1919 67f; Thiel, HRSP 12f; Cassola, GPR 87-8; 
Toynbee, HL 1 540f; R. Mitchell, 'Roman-Carthaginian 
Treaties: 306 and 279/8 B.C.', Hist. 1971, 633f. Most 
date Rome's attempt to colonise Corsica to this period 
because Servius notes it in the treaty, but this may be 
due to the creation of the Roman fleet, and Carthage's 
acquisition of control of the island, recently (see Ch.3 
185 n.lO; Ch.5 340-5). The idea that Rome made a treaty 
with Rhodes at this time is rejected by Cary, JPh 1920 
171-2, and M. Holleaux, Rome, la Grèce et les Monarchies 
Hellénistiques (Paris, 1921)(=RGM) 29-46.
173. The Hernici were aroused by recent events; see Livy 
9.42.8; Salmon, SS 248. For Marcius' campaign, and the 
settlement, whereby the Anagnini were given civitas sine
suffragio, and isolated from the other Hernici, see Beloch,
RG 417-8; De Sanctis, StR 2 336-8; Sherwin-White, RC^ 48-9. 
For the statue, see Livy 9.43.22; Pliny NH 34.23; n.l83 below
174. See 246-9, 288 above.
175. Broughton, MRR I66; Munzer, RAA 48.
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amongst the Aequi, the first attested for over eighty 
years (176). It may be no coincidence that the consuls 
elected were from minor gentes whose members were active 
against the Aequi in the fifth century - L. Postumius 
Megellos, possibly grandson of the consul of 321, who had 
opposed the second Samnite war, and Ti. Minucius, from a 
gens unknown in curule office since 457. Their families 
may have been developing relevant local associations since 
that time. M. Fulvius, from Tusculum, who became consul 
suffect, would have shared their local influence and 
concern with Latium's defence. All would have been aided 
by the efficient marshalling of clients from the area by 
those with similar priorities (177). Since there were no 
actual uprisings, in the east, however, the consuls 
continued with the senate's prime concern - bringing 
hostilities with the Samnites to an end (178). They 
commemorated their successes by setting up a statue of 
Hercules on the Capitol thus reassociating the cult with 
their faction after Claudius' action in 312 (179).
176. Livy 9.45.6-8; Salmon, SS 248, 251; Sherwin-White,
RC 48—9.
177. For their names, see Broughton, MRR 166-7. For their 
forefathers' action against the Aequi in the fifth century, 
see Ch.2 157-9, 165; Ch.3 190-2, 195, 197, 205-6.
They were elected although a likely supporter of southern 
expansion, Scipio, consul of 328, was electoral dictator, 
with Decius as his magister equitum (Degrassi, op.cit. 111), 
cf. 270-1, 275-8, above.
178. De Sanctis, StR 2 338-9; Salmon, SS 249-252.
179. Livy 9.44.16. Postumius' forefather had dedicated 
the temple to Semo Sancus, who was closely associated with 
Hercules (Ch.2 169).
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In 304, those most concerned with the Aequian unrest 
were elected in the same way as their predecessors. P. 
Sempronius Sophus, who had opposed Claudius as plebeian 
tribune in 310, and whose gens was last known in 380, 
and P. Sulpicius Saverrio, from an unknown branch of his 
gens, were descended from leaders who fought the Aequi in 
the fifth century, and established firm links in Latium 
in the early fourth century (180). Both quelled the 
Aequi after making alliances with the northern Sabellian 
tribes and the Samnites (181). The censors of 304 were 
elected earlier than normal, presumably in anticipation 
of the settlements. They may represent a compromise 
between parties with different spheres of interest.
They were Q. Fabius, who was primarily concerned with 
northern and central areas, and P. Decius, who was probably 
more interested in the Campanian region (182). Fabius 
marked the final settlement with the institution of the 
transvectio equitum, to honour Castor and Pollux, the 
Greek patrons of horsemen of Rome, Latium and Campania,
180. For the consuls, see Broughton, MRR 167.
For their backgrounds, see Ch.3 191-202, 229 and above
275. Beloch, RG 339, rejects the 
conclusion of Schur, Hermes 1924, 470-2, from the 
cognomen Tuditanus of a later kinsman, that Sempronius 
was Umbrian; his own cognomen is actually Greek.
181. For the campaigns, cf. Livy 9.45; Diod. 20.101.5; 
Act. Tr. in Degrassi, op.cit. 543. For details of the 
settlement, see Salmon, SS 252-4; Toynbee, HL 1 152-4, 
I69-I7I; with it, Rome contained the Samnites who were 
now threatened by Cleonymus of Sparta, and ensured the 
routes to the Adriatic.
182. For full refs, see Broughton, MRR 167-8. For their 
spheres of interest, see 258, 263, 288-9 above.
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and to commemorate the battle of Lake Regillus, where 
the forefather of his ally, Postumius, the consul of 
305, aided by the Dioscuri, had taken the first step 
towards gaining the supremacy of the Roman Republic in 
central Italy (183). The censors, both dependent on 
the system of marshalling clients, also restricted the 
humilies of the city to four urban tribes in 304.
As I suggested in Chapter 1, this was in reaction to the 
election of Flavius as curule aedile by direct appeal to 
city voters, who included, rural tribesmen who had come 
to Rome to invest their booty or because they had lost 
their lands in the wars, and there was work on the new 
public works available. Flavius had promised that he 
would publish the civil law codes and calendar, and thus 
free the ordinary citizen from the legal monopoly of the 
pontifices, and loosen the ties of the client to the 
patron. He did so, and with the grudging aid of the 
pontifex, Scipio, built the temple of Concord, doubtless 
hoping to increase his popularity and personal
183. Hill, RMC 37-9. Postumius, son of the victor at 
L. Regillus (Ch.2 138) had dedicated the temple of 
Castor, (Ch.2 I69). The agreement made with the Campan­
ian équités in 340 was appropriately stored in the temple 
(Livy 8.11.16), thus ensuring that the god was^their 
protector within the Roman federation (cf. Gage, AR 150). 
Marcius, a possible ally of Fabius, had his statue placed 
outside the temple in 306.
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reputation (184).
Conclusion
Views on foreign policy and military strategy, and 
experience of military leadership, were the important 
factors influencing elections in this period of great 
expansion. The single most significant policy, which 
prevailed in the senate throughout the second half of the 
fourth century, was that of extending Rome’s sphere of 
domination into the rich and cultured areas further south. 
Also of importance in the elections were matters not so 
directly attested by the ancients - family loyalty, the 
expansion of the governing class, the extent of senatorial 
authority, and methods of electoral control; rapid changes 
in these spheres in this period reduce our ability to 
evaluate precise reasons for electoral results.
184. Since Flavius’ father was a freedman, Annius, 
descended from an opponent of Rome in 340 {Ch.1C 107-8) 
and one of his patron’s gens, the tribune of 327, had 
to use bribery (see 276, n.l28 above), Flavius clearly 
had little chance of gaining senatorial support, and 
thus had to use direct appeal. cf. Bauman, Hist. 1973 
45-6, who suggests that Flavius’ father actually was the 
tribune of 323. Flavius’ colleague, Anicius Praenestinus, 
may have gained his place through the client control of 
his Roman and Latin amici (Heurgon, CP 284), like Annius, 
the Latin senator expelled in 307 (n.l57), who belonged 
to a different branch of the gens to the freedman’s son 
(Ch.10 81; Taylor, VDRR 279-280) or in the same way as 
Flavius (Pliny NH 33.17; Staveley, Hist. 1959 421).
For Flavius’ legal reform, see Ch.1C 94; for the temple, 
see Livy 9.46.6-7; Pliny NH 33.19.
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CHAPTER 5 - ELECTIONS: 303-241 B.C.
The Political Issues
As a result of the expansion of the Roman state in 
the second half of the fourth century, there were great 
opportunities for Rome's leaders to build up glory, 
popularity, and large client bases in their military and 
political careers (l). Those with the most self- 
sufficient client bases and individual authority and 
talent would have hoped to benefit from this, while those 
from lesser families and of less ability and hence most 
dependent on the support of others would have feared that 
it would result in the fragmentation of the oligarchy 
and hence their own decline (2). The former clearly 
prevailed in the crucial years of the third Samnite war, 
when rival generals frequently went beyond the norms of 
electoral and executive behaviour (3); the full assertion 
of the latter in reaction to this is evident in several 
spheres by 290.
Firstly, the senate's ability to implement its 
policies through plebeian tribunes, whose elections were 
difficult for narrow factions to control, was increased 
when the requirement that auctoritas patrum be passed for
1. See further. Ch.IB 74-5; Ch.1C 96-7.
2. cf. Ch.1C 86-9.
3. cf. details in Livy 10.13-46 passim, with the norms
outlined in Ch.IB 51, 63-66, 71-79.
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plébiscita was removed by the lex Hortensia in 287; this 
also gave the senatus consulta more authority (4). 
Senatorial pressure on magistrates to return to hold the 
elections, which served to curb their executive power as 
generals, may account for the fact that only two electoral 
dictators are known in this period of heavy war ($).
When the military situation required continuous leadership, 
the senate itself appointed promagistrates (6). Except 
when disputes between the senate and magistrates over the 
implementation of foreign policy are noted (7), or 
magistrates come from narrow factions with particular 
authority, it may be assumed that policies implemented 
in this period were those of the senate as a whole, or the 
most prominent faction within it (8).
Secondly, the consuls' judicial powers were 
diminished in this period. Provocatio from their judge­
ment in capital cases to the comitia centuriata, which
4. Ch.IB 70, 73-4; Oh.10 109-110.
5. Oh.IB 50; Bauman, Hist. 1973, 45.
6. Ch.10 7$. There were seven promagistracies in the 
third Samnite war; one in the Pyrrhic war; ten in the first 
Punic war. They gradually replaced the taking of the 
praetorship the year after the consulship, which happened 
three times in the third Samnite war, twice in the Pyrrhic 
war, and once in the first Punic war {Ch.IB 66; Develin,
POH 17-18).
7. e.g. See below, 318, 331-2, 338, 348; 
cf. Ch.IB 71-5.
8. Therefore the political views of individuals may be 
less readily detected from their actions than before, 
cf. Ch.1C 118-122.
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since 449 had been possible only with the tribunes' ius 
auxilii, was made compulsory in 300 (9). However the 
plebeian tribunes still retained a political judicial 
role, prosecuting magistrates on behalf of the senate 
when they developed dangerous levels of individual power 
(10) .
Thirdly, as the administration became more complex, 
it was not left directly in the leading magistrates' 
control; they appointed triumviri from 289 to deal with 
coinage and police work, but the quaestors of the fleet, 
from 267, and the second praetor, from 242, were elected 
(11).
Finally, the oligarchy asserted its' authority over 
candidacy and electoral procedure. After 290, interregna, 
suspensions of the lex Genucia and electoral disputes were 
less frequent (12). Stricter controls were established
9. See Staveley, Hist. 1954, 414-5, 418-9, Hist. 1959 
431, associating this with the tribunes' full incorporation 
in the governing class. For an alternative view that it 
rendered the dictator liable to provocatio, see Bauman,
Hist. 1973 34-47.
10. cf. Ch.2 127. For examples, see 318, 348.
11. See Ch.IB 34-5, 75 n.l33, and 302, n.23, 306, 320,
353 below.
12. cf. Ch.IB 49, 66. There were no interregna after the 
two in 298 and 291. The lex Genucia was suspended 4 times 
from 299 to 291, but only 5 times from 290 to 264; it 
increased to 9 from 264 to 241 largely because of the first 
Punic war. From 290 to 264, individuals ten times held 
their second consulships 10-15 years after their first, 
which suggests that it was the lex Genucia which prevented 
them taking it earlier. Of course the absence of Livy 
after 290 (Ch.lA 26) may partly explain the lack of evidence 
of electoral disputes.
300
over candidacy for the post of censor, who controlled the 
composition of both the senate and the tribes, from which 
clients were by now regularly marshalled (13). No new 
tribes were created, despite enfranchisements and settle­
ments in the north east, between 299 and 2%1; this allowed 
all senators to fully organise their client bases (14,).
As a result of all this, the governing class was stabilised; 
while the number of novi homines remained constant, more 
individuals from gentes well established in the senate 
reached office than before (15).
In the course of their disputes over the role of the 
individual within the governing class, senators were also 
forming into factions according to their views on foreign, 
military and economic policy, many of which would have been 
dictated by their immediate families’ economic circumstances
13. See Ch.IB 61-2, 66, 77-8, Ch.1C 106 for full details.
11 censors in the fourth century had not previously been 
consuls; there were only 2 such censors in 303-24,1.
14,. of. Ch. 10 104,-6 . While those with their main spheres 
of interest in central Italy may have developed the best 
systems of marshalling clients in the period of tribal 
formation there from 366 to 30-0, the increasing number of 
fully enfranchised offspring of cives sine suffragio and 
Romans in Campania would have been steadily improving the 
client control of those whose main interests lay there in 
the third century.
15. On the novi homines, see Ch.1C 82-3» Develin, POH 
49-50. There was a marked increase in the number of 
curule posts held by gentes maiores in this period; see 
Develin, POH 35-7; 319 below.
The number of individuals in the consulship, the only 
magistracy regularly attested, goes up from 69 in 366-304» 
to 102 in 303-24I; cf. Develin, POH 15. The decrease in 
repetition of office contributes to the difficulty noted 
above in deducing individual attitudes, although we are 
helped by the fact that most were direct relations of other 
magistrates (Develin, POH 54-7)» and most political issues 
were still based in the family (see above, 297; below, 300-1)
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and spheres of interest (16). We may begin, however, by 
noting two broader issues in these fields which were least 
affected by such factors (17). Firstly, on certain 
occasions, the consolidation of Rome's federation by 
building up socii, citizens, and colonies within it, and 
quelling enemies on its borders, in all parts of Italy 
(18), might have appeared essential to any senators, 
wherever their own spheres of interest lay, to secure 
general stability and loyalty. Secondly, the development 
of -commerce and industry in all parts of the federation, 
stimulated by the 'pax Roma-na' and increased wealth in 
the state (19), would have benefited a broad range of 
senators. It is attested by public works (20), pottery 
and art in Rome and beyond (21), legislation promoting
16. Oh.10 84-f. Common views of members of large gentes 
on such issues cannot now be taken for granted, especially 
for those in families which take office in different periods 
when different is-sues prevail; cf. Develin, POH 32.
17. When such issues prevailed, individuals may
have reverted to their broader gens loyalties; see Ch.10 
88-9, 120-122.
18. For details of its development, see Polyb. 1.6;
Ch.10 103-4; Frank, CAH7 658f; Salmon, RC 59-65, 76-81; 
Toynbee, HL 1 147f; Scullard, HRW4 144-153.
19. Frank, ES 1 41-2; Salmon, SS 277 n.l; Scullard,
150-1.
20. See Forni, Ath. 1953, 223-8 (aqueducts and drainage); 
Wiseman, PBSR 1970, 131-7, 140, 144-5 (road building and 
repairs); Scullard, FCRR 277-8 (temples). See Ch.10 96, 
105-6, 111-2, on their value to politicians.
21. Frank, ES 1 49-52; Harris, REU 172-3; B. Bandinelli, 
Rome, the Centre of Power, trans. P. Green, (London, 1970) 
114-6. See also 313 n.64, 315-6, 320, 331-2, 339 n.l30 
below.
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commercial activity (22), the development of Rome's own 
coinage (23), and diplomatic, commercial and cultural 
contacts with the east (24).
Besides these two general motives, there were three 
specific reasons for the promotion of war in north and 
central Italy, largely held by those with existing spheres 
of interest nearby - to forestall Etruscan uprisings and 
Gallic attacks, especially before Samnium was fully 
quelled (25), to gain new land for themselves in the
22. After the secession of 287 (below, 320) business 
was allowed on 'faste' days (Macrob. Sat. 1.16.30), and 
rules on liabilities for damages to property were fixed 
in a lex Aequillia (M. Torelli, Rerum Romanorum Fontes, 
292-264 B.C. (Pisa, 1978)(=RRF) 74-6).
23. After much bronze was taken in the third Samnite war 
(e.g. Livy 10.46) triumviri were created in 289 to super­
vise its regular minting (Pomp. Dig. 1.2.2.27-32;
H. Mattingly, 'The First Age of Roman Coinage', 1RS 1929, 
22f, JRS 1945, 65; cf. Harris, CQ 1976, 102-4 and Crawford, 
RRC 598-603, for a later date. Silver didrachms were 
coined at Campania for Rome from the time of the Pyrrhic 
war (Pliny NH 33.42; Mattingly, JRS 1929, 21f; Crawford,
RRC 35f; contra T. Mommsen, Geschichte des Romischen 
Munzwesens (Berlin, I860) 211f, Frank, ES 1 42-7 etc., 
who date this to the mid fourth century). In 269, silver 
minting began at Rome (Livy, Per. 15; Pliny, NH 33.44; 
Mattingly, JRS 1945 66f; Crawford, RRC 36f, 42-3).
Mommsen's school date the denarii system to 269; Mattingly 
etc., date it after 218.
Coin markings may have been used as propaganda by 
the consuls or censors who allocated funds for their issue; 
cf. Crawford, RRC 42-5, 616-8, 712-6.
24. See 316, 328f, 335 on embassies to Epidaurus in 
292, Egypt in 273 and Apollonia in 266; see Cassola, GPR 
31-2 for direct evidence of Romans trading in the east 
in the early third century. For examples of imports of 
Greek and Sicilian customs to Rome in this period, see 
Livy 10.47.3; Pliny NH 7.211-4; n.l30 below.
25. cf. Adcock, GAH 7 615-6, Frank, CAH7 638; Salmon,
SS 256f, 280-1.
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relatively unpopulated areas of the north east (26), and 
to settle citizens and make enfranchisements. The latter 
had two purposes - to increase their own client bases (27) 
and to ensure that the traditional basis of peasant 
citizenry in the city state was maintained. Pestilences 
from 295 to 282, and the effects of the third Samnite war - 
casualties, the infusion of wealth for urban projects, 
and the creation of large colonies to defend the new 
conquests (28) - caused a sharp decline in the numbers 
of citizen peasants in the early years of the third 
century (29). The effects of this on the agrarian economy 
and the strength of the army, which thereby threatened to 
become dominated by allied contingents of more dubious 
loyalty and broader views on foreign policy (30), would 
have particularly worried those whose personal spheres of 
interest were among the rural citizens in central Italy. 
Some redistribution of ager publicus in the 290's and the 
creation and resettlement of citizens after the conquests 
in the north in 290 and 283 (31), followed by a decrease
26. This was probably the least significant; see Ch.1C 104-5.
27. Ch.10 104f.
28. See Livy 10.11-47 passim on the import of corn, pest­
ilences, war casualties and booty from 299 to 292. See 
Frank, ES 1 41 and Fraccaro, Opusc. 2 198, 200-2 on the 
exodus of citizens to 11 Latin colonies from 314 to 290.
29. cf. Ch.4 284-5, 294-5. Livy 9.19.1,10.47.2, shows 
only a modest increase in citizen numbers from 332 to 293.
30. cf. Staveley, Hist. 1959, 423; Toynbee HL 1 142-3,
292-3, 425; Cassola, GPR 89f, 148f, 193.
31. De Sanctis, StR 2 365-6; Adcock, RAW 23; Tibiletti,
Ath. 1949 30; Forni, Ath. 1953 193-214; Cassola, GPR 91-2.
For objections to the view of Forni and Cassola that the 
policy was implemented through its popular appeal, see
Ch.1C 112; Staveley, JRS 1963 183-5.
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in the number of colonies and heavy wars, and proof of the 
loyalty of southern allies in the Tarentine war reduced 
concern about this matter until the first Punic war (32).
Southern expansion continued to be a major issue in 
this period, when the whole of southern Italy and Sicily 
was brought under Rome's control. This happened largely 
as a result of opportunism on the part of the enemy, 
especially in the third Samnite war (33), direct imperial­
ism of Romans, especially those with commercial interests, 
and the increasingly complex network of obligations of 
Roman leaders to their allies. A few details about the 
circumstances of wars in the south after 290 will show 
that these reasons often cannot be clearly distinguished. 
Roman expansionism, fear of the Lucanlans gaining strength 
at the expense of the weakening Greeks, and personal links 
between Romans and Thurians may explain Rome's alliance 
with Thurii against the Lucanians in 286 (34)• However 
in the course of garrisoning Thurii and other Greek towns 
Rome violated her treaty with Tarentum (35). Concern
32. Only six Latin colonies were founded from 283 to 
244 (Salmon, RC 62-3, 110, 111); there was a pestilence 
in 266 (see 335 below); after increasing from 293, 
the citizen population fell during the first Punic war 
(Frank, AJP 1930, 323), when the allies' loyalty was 
shaky (see 306, 343-8 below). De Sanctis, StR 2.528
suggests that the four temples to native gods built from
278 to 267 (n.llO, 115, 118) were an attempt to retain 
Rome's identity amid her allies.
33. Livy 10.11.7f; D.H. 17.1-3; Salmon, SS 255f.
34. Livy Per. 11; Pliny NH 34-32; De Sanctis, StR 2.375; 
Frank, CAH7 638-641.
35. See Livy 9.14? Ch.4 291, for earlier
hints of Tarentine suspicion. The treaty of 332 (Ch.4
269-270) was violated by Rome sending a fleet to
the south coast in 282; see Beloch, RG 462f; De Sanctis 
StR 2 380f; Thiel, HRSP 23-6; Cassola, GPR 159-161.
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to maintain the loyalty of the Greek socii in the south, 
won in the consequent Tarentine war, then necessitated 
in 270 the harsh treatment of Campanian mercenaries who 
had seized Rhegium (36). However six years later, Rome 
allied with the Campanian Mamertini, who had taken Messana 
in much the same way as their allies at Rhegium, and with 
them, had aided Rome in 275 (37). This provoked the 
first Punic war, already rendered inevitable by Roman and 
Punic imperialist aims and mutual fear and distrust (38). 
Carthage's fear of Rome's expansion is indicated by the 
presence of Punic ships at Rome's taking of Tarentum in 
272 (39), and the Punic garrisoning of Messana, after the 
Mamertini's defeat by Hiero, in 269 (40). Rome's fear
36. Polyb. 1.7.12; cf. De Sanctis, StR 2 421-2; Beloch, 
Griechische Geschichte, 2nd ed. (Berlin, 1927)(-GG^) 4 
479-485; Cassola, GPR 171-8.
37. For the Mamertini's background, and action up to 275, 
see App. Samn. 9.1, 12.1; Plut. Pyrrh. 23-4; Died. 22.1.2-3, 
7.4; Polyb. 1.7.1-4,8; D.H. 20.4.11.
38. The main arguments for Rome's alliance with the 
Mamertini in 264 were that it might protect southern allies 
against possible Carthaginian aggression, and that some of 
the Mamertini themselves might have been allies or relatives 
of Romans; against this, the alliance did break the treaty 
of 306, and the Mamertini had committed a crime for which 
the Campanians had been punished in 270; see further on 
these and the more indirect reasons for war; Polyb. 1.10.3-9; 
Diod. 23.1.4; Zon. 8.8; De Banctis, StR 3 97-102; Frank,
CAH 7 669-671; Thiel, HRSP 128-141; Cassola, GPR 178-184.
39. Frank, CAH 7 655-6 and Scullard, HRW^ 164, following 
Oros. 4.3.1, argue that it was simply reconnoitring, with­
out breaking the treaty of 306 (Ch.4291-2); cf. De Sanctis, 
StR 2 419, following Livy, Per,15 (an aggressive move by 
Carthage, breaking the treaty); Beloch, GG^ 4.2. 277-8,
Thiel, HRSP 14-15, and Cassola, GPR 179 (a story fabricated 
to prove that Rome was not the first to break the treaty
of 306 in 264).
40. Beloch, GG^ 4.2. 279-280; Thiel, HRSP 145-8. of.
De Sanctis, StR 3 95-6 and Walbank, CP 1 53-5, who date 
it in 265.
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of Carthage is suggested by its foundation of coastal 
colonies, Gosa and Paestum, in 273 (41), its acceptance 
of aid from Hiero, the enemy of Carthage, in taking 
Rhegium in 270 (42), and its development of an auxiliary 
fleet of allied ships under quaestores classici and capture 
of the port of Brundisium in 267 (43).
Finally, two controversial issues particularly 
associated with the first Punic war should be noted.
The first was the construction of the first Roman navies, 
to protect allies in the south from Punic raids and relieve 
them of the heavy cost of providing their own ships for 
Rome, and reduce the pressure on the land armies in Sicily; 
however the naval allies still had to provide most of the 
rowers, and their constant shipwrecks were demoralising 
and expensive (44)• The second was a constitutional 
matter; the comitia centuriata voted for alliance with 
Thurii in 286 and with the Mamertini in 264,the latter 
after the senate reached deadlock (45); in 241 it refused
41. Frank, Klio, 1911, 379; Salmon, RC 63, 79. The
revolt of Caere, just south of Gosa, in 273, might have
been instigated by Carthage (cf. Ch.3 184, n.5; Dio. fr. 
33; Harris, REU 155).
42. De Sanctis, StR 2.422; Beloch, GG^ 4.1.643; Thiel, 
HRSP 30; Cassola, GPR 177.
43. Mommsen, HR 2.39; Thiel, HRSP 32-7; Cassola, GPR 67,
179; Meiggs, RO^ 25.
44. Polyb. 1.20; Thiel, HRSP, 37f, 46-7, 63f, 73f, 95- 
128, 320-332. For the cost of the war in men and money, 
cf. Tarn, 'The Fleets of the first Punic War', JHS 1907 
48-60; De Sanctis, StR 3.1.190 n.98; Beloch, GG  ^4-1.363; 
Frank, ES 1 61-8, CAH 7 684-9; Thiel, HRSP 83-96.
45. See 304-5 above; Polyb. 1.11.1-3; Livy Per.
16; cf. Ch.IB 71 n.l20. For objections to the view of 
Gelzer, Hermes, 1933, 133f, that the deadlock in 264 was 
invented by Pictor to excuse the senate, see Cassola, GPR 
180f.
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the initial peace terms made with Carthage (46). These 
votes may have been carried not just through client control 
and their general appeal, but more specifically through the 
influence of the growing number of urban rich looking for 
new fields of exploitation, especially in 241, when such 
prospects were more certain, and they wanted direct returns 
for the loans they had made to the state to build the fleet 
that had won the final victory in the war (47). Ten years 
later, the influence of this sector was reduced with the 
reform of the comitia centuriata (48).
The Elections
Immediately after the second Samnite war, most senators 
would have been simply concerned with consolidating Rome's 
position in Italy. In 303 and 302, the conquest of the 
eastern tribes of the Vestini, Marsi and Aequi, was completed 
with the confiscation of land, foundation of colonies, 
bestowal of civitas sine suffragio, and formation of alliances 
The borders were strengthened with expeditions north to 
Umbria and Arretium and south to the land of the Sallentini. 
The influence in the senate of those primarily concerned
46. De Sanctis, StR 3.1.187f; Thiel, HRSP 3l6f.
47. The assembly may have passed the slightly modified 
terms negotiated by senatorial commissioners in 241 largely 
because senators had time to marshal rural clients to it; 
cf. De Sanctis, StR 3.1.190f; Thiel, HRSP 318-9. See 
n.l66 below on the loans.
48. Ch.1C 114. Ed. Meyer, Kleine Schriften 2nd ed. (Halle, 
1924)(=KS^) 2.380, attributes the assembly vote to this 
sector in 264 and 241. For other factors influencing them 
in all three years, see above, 304-5; below, 321;
De Sanctis, StR 3.1.98f, 189f; Cassola, OPR 180f. .
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with northern and eastern expansion, who had dominated the 
magistracies since 310, and who may now have gained the 
support of those with Campanian interests which were for 
the moment firmly secured, is evident in these actions.
The Umbrian expedition was of an aggressive nature; only 
a two year truce was made with Etruria, and the Aequian 
and Marsian area was so rapidly settled that a tribe, 
Aniensis, was created there in 299 (49). The consuls may 
represent this group. The known forefathers of Ser. 
Cornelius Lentulus, whose gens was originally based in 
the north, C. Cenucius Aventinensis, and M. Livius Denter, 
a novus homo, who possibly had personal connections in 
Fidenee and further north, did not play an aggressive part 
in securing Campania in the second half of the fourth 
century; M. Aemilius Paullus, being son or grandson of 
•Mamertinus, and possibly a cousin of Barbula, who fought 
in Etruria-in-311 » may have had interests in both north 
and south ($0). Dictators who dealt with revolts at 
Arretium and among the Marsi and Aequi in 302, C . lunius 
and M. Valerius Corvus, and Valerius' magister equitum, 
Rullianus, were doubtless chosen primarily for their long 
experience, and for the knowledge and personal interests 
they developed in the north and north east during the
49. For full details of military activity and settlements, 
see Livy 10.1-5; Diod. 20.104; Degrassi, II 13.1, 111, 424-5, 
543; Frank, Klio, 1911, 375-6; Taylor, VDRR 56; Salmon,
RC 59-60, SS 255-6; Harris, REU 63, 115; cf. Beloch, RG 
422-3.
50. For their names, see Broughton, MRR 169-170.
For hints of their spheres of interest, see Livy 9.8.14;
Gag^, AR 254-6; Ch.2 149; Ch.4 262, 264, 273, 287.
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second Samnite war. lunius' magister equitum, Titinius, 
may have been an old family friend, who shared his interests 
in Campania and the south (51).
Corvus was presumably elected as consul in 300, when 
he fought Aequian rebels and passed the law on provocatio, 
and as consul suffect in 299» when he served in Etruria, 
because of his long military experience, his local know­
ledge, and his general authority in the senate (52). His 
colleague, Appuleius, a novus homo of an otherwise unknown 
family, continued activity against the Umbrians (53).
The censors of 300, Sempronius and Sulpicius, having been 
consuls when the settlement of 304 was made, would have had 
personal interests in their formation of the Aniensis tribe 
from Aequian land in central Italy, where Sulpicius' gens 
is later registered. They also founded the tribe of 
Terentina in the lower Liris valley, in Auruncan land north 
of Campania. Several minor gentes recently in the consul­
ships and later known in this tribe - the Titinii, Minucii, 
Appuleii and. Genucii - may have gained influence there
51. See Broughton, MRR 169-171 for details of their names, 
noting 301 as a dictator year. There is some confusion 
over Corvus' magister equitum (cf. Livy 10.3.3-8; Fast.
Cap. in Degrassi, op.cit. Ill, 424-5); Harris, REU 63-5 
argues for Rullianus, who, while very experienced, was still 
Corvus' junior. The dictators and Rullianus had already 
held 24 curule posts. For hints of all their spheres of 
interest, see Ch.4 245-7, 258, 288-290;
Pliny, NH 7.211; Salmon, SS 256. For the personal links 
between Romans and Arretium's rulers, see Forni, Ath. 1953 
235 n.2. Titinii and lunii were plebeian agitators in the 
second half of the fifth century (Livy 3.54.13, 4.16.5,
40.6) .
52. See n.9 above; Livy 10.9.7-8, 10.11.4-6; Cic. Sen. 60; 
Val. Max. 8.15.5; Degrassi, op.cit. Ill, 424-5.
53. Harris, REU 65.
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through these censors in repayment for their support in 
their election (54). Also in 300, the Ogulnii, who 
were Etruscan novi homines closely linked with the Fabii, 
passed a law reserving half the positions in the 
pontificate and augurate, which those promoting the second 
Samnite war in the south had dominated, to their political 
advantage, for plebeians. Most of those subsequently 
co-opted from plebeian gentes with appropriate religious 
authority shared with the Ogulnii spheres of interest in 
central and north Italy. Perhaps Claudius Caecus' 
opposition to the law was due to his fear that it would 
result in an increase in political power of such leaders, 
who did not share his priority of southern expansion (55).
54. For the censors' names, see Degrassi, op.cit. Ill,
424-5. For the location of these tribes, and the gentes 
known in them, see Taylor, VDRR 52, 56-9, 192, 218, 236, 
256-7, 259, 284. - For their common spheres of-interest 
and their forefathers' links in office up to 390, see Oh.2 
136-8, 169-172; Oh.3 211-3, 218; Ch.4 293-4;
Livy 3.54.13, 5.32.8.
55. For the Ogulnii's links with the Fabii - their Etruscan 
connections and religious interests, which included the 
foreign cults guarded by the decemviri sacris faciundis, the 
college similarly enlarged byLicinius backed by Fabius etc., 
in 367 (Ch.3 233), - see Munzer, RAA 83-9, Gage AR 152-3,
252 and below, 315-6. For the political
significance of the lex Ogulnia, see Ch.IB 54, 63-4. For 
its passage, see Livy 10.6-9. For the use of augural author­
ity in the second Samnite war, see Ch.4 278-9.
See Ch.4 285-7 for Claudius' religious measures
in 312, against the Latins and his political opponents in the 
senate; he was opposed then by Fabius, whose family retained 
links with the augurate throughout the 3rd century (Munzer, 
RAA 54-5; Cassola, GPR 336-346) and Sempronius and Marcius, 
who became pontifices and augurs in 300 (cf. Staveley, Hist. 
1959 432). Others were Aelius, consul of 337, Livius, 
consul of 302, and relatives of Genucius and Minucius (see 
Ch.4 265-6 and n.50, 54 above for their spheres of
interest), Decius, who might have developed interests in the 
north when he fought there in 308, and spoke against Claudius 
in 300, and T. Publilius, whose kinsmen had gained influence 
in Latium in 358 and 332 (Ch.4 247, 269). /
The Marcii (Palmer, ACR 146-151) and Livii (Gage, AR 252f) 
had ancient religious authority; a Minucius was pontifex 
maximus in 420 (Ch.3 202); Decius and Sempronius were the 
two most recent plebeian censors.
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In 299f the truce with Etruria was due to end. The 
lex Genucia may have been enforced against Fabius Rullianus' 
election as consul, but all the magistrates finally elected 
are likely to have shared his interests in expansion in 
central and north Italy (56). The consuls, M. Fulvius 
Paetinus, who captured and colonised the Umbrian town of 
Nequinium, and T. Manlius Torquatus, who made a treaty 
with Picenum, and then died in Etruria, inherited interests 
in Latium and Etruria, and their gentes held only four 
curule posts when Rome was expanding south from 340 to 311, 
and 286 to 264 (57). The curule aediles, Domitius, son 
of the consul in 332, and Carvilius, a novus homo, may 
have belonged to recently enfranchised Latin families, 
like Fulvius (58).
By the time of the election of 298, the Samnites had 
taken advantage of the Roman leaders' preoccupation with 
the north to provoke another conflict with Rome by attack­
ing the Lucanians. In the interregnum possibly called to 
reach a compromise over military priorities suitably 
qualified consuls were quickly named. Cn. Fulvius, whose 
brother fought in Umbria in 299, and who himself had served 
as lieutenant in 302 against the Etruscans, whom he fought, 
as well as the Samnites, in 298, may have represented those
56. cf. Livy 10.9.10. After the censorships of Fabius 
and his allies in 304 and 3OO, they would have had partic­
ularly efficient client control (cf. Ch.4 271, 275f, 288,
29 3-4;.
57. For their names and activity, see Broughton, MRR 173-4 
For their spheres of interest, see Ch.4 244-7, 251,
276. The treaty and colony strengthened Rome's
position in the north against Sabines and Gauls (Polyb. 
2.19.1-4; Salmon, RC 60}.
58. Livy 10.9.11-13, 23.22.41; Ch.4 269; Veil. 2.128.2.
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primarily concerned with the north. Scipio, whose fore­
father had interests in Campania, and who fought the 
Samnites and subdued Lucania in 298, may have represented 
those primarily concerned with the south (59).
The need to quell the Samnites, Etruscans and Gauls and 
prevent them uniting their forces against Rome dominated the 
elections from 297 to 295, when the threat was removed with 
the great victory of Fabius and Decius at Sentinum (60).
In the three years sixteen military curule magistracies and 
four more junior military posts were held by eleven ex- 
magistrates with relevant knowledge or experience as generals 
(6l). Previous differences between some of them, and 
competition for the great honours and booty promised by 
the wars created much wrangling both in the elections (62)
59. For the outbreak of war, see above, 304;
for the interregnum, see Livy 10.11.10; for the consuls' ' " 
backgrounds, see Livy 8.22.1, 10.4.7; Dessau, ILS 1.1;
Ch.4 262, 281; above, 311.
The ancients are confused about the exact areas of the 
consuls' activity; see Degrassi, op.cit. 543; Harris, REU 
66-7; Salmon, SS 251, 259-261; Reynolds, JRS 1971 139.
60. For full details of events, cf. De Sanctis, StR 2 
352-9; Degrassi, op.cit. 543-4; Walbank, OP 1 187-8;
Harris, REU 67-74; Salmon, SS 261-8.
61. Broughton, MRR 175-9. Ten are attested as leading 
the army, 17 times in total; the 11th, Claudius Caecus, who 
fought the Etruscans and Sabines in 296 and 295, might have 
had local connections (Ch.2 139, 149, n.l32; Ch.4 n.266 n.95).
62. Livy 10.13.5-13, 15.7-12, 21.11-23.10. His stories of
Fabius' protests at his offices breaking the lex Genucia in 
297 and 296 are presumably misplaced from 295, and his port­
rayal of disputes being over patrician monopoly may be 
anachronisms due to the reappearance in this period of names 
which featured in such disputes earlier (e.g. Ch.2 177, n.265; 
Ch.4 251-2) and the recent lex Ogulnia. See further,
Garzetti, Ath. 1947 214-7; Staveley, Hist. 1959 431-2;
Rotondi, LP 236-7; Cassola, GPR 148f.
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and on the campaigns (63). The booty won, the leaders’ 
concern with personal glory, and the need to appease the 
gods after the pestilence of 295 may explain the many 
temples and sacred offerings noted in these years. Some 
were by curule and plebeian aediles, the Ogulnii, Aelius, 
Fulvius and Fabius Gurges, who were probably all elected 
for these non-military posts through the efficient client 
control of Rullianus' faction. Their prosecutions of 
usurers and graziers for using too much ager publicus may 
have been partly motivated by their concern to secure the 
position of the citizen peasantry (64).
A new phase begins in 294; the veteran generals 
Valerius Corvus, P. Decius, C. lunius Brutus and Fabius 
Rullianus held no more curule offices after Sentinum (6.5).
63. Livy 10.17.11-12, 18.4-19.13, 24.1-26.7; Garzetti,
Ath. 1947, 216-8; Cassola, GPR 151. Details are exagger­
ated; see Broughton, MRR 179 n.l; Harris, REU 68, 70.
64. In 296, Claudius vowed a temple to Bellona, and hung 
portraits of his ancestors in it; in 295, when the Sibylline 
books were consulted. Fabius and his son vowed temples to 
Jupiter Victor and Venus, possibly from Ardea; in 295, the 
Ogulnii dedicated usurers' fines to Jupiter, improved the 
road to the temple of the god of war. Mars, and made a 
statue of Romulus and Remus and the wolf (Ch.lA 16, n.21) 
who represented Mars (Wissowa, RKR^ 141f, 555f) and gave 
Fabius a portent at Sentinum; in 295, Fulvius and Aelius 
offered graziers' fines to Ceres, the plebeian peasants' 
deity; see Livy 10.13.14, 19.17,23.11-13, 27.8-9, 29.14, 
31.8-9, 22.1.12; Zon. 8.1.6; Ovid Fast. 6.191, 199-202, 
Pliny, NH 35.12; D.H. 1.79.8. For hints of the political 
significance of these acts to the magistrates, see Scullard, 
FCRR 101-2, 146, 177; Ch.2 132, 149 n.l29; Ch.3 209, n.l04 
233; Ch.4 285-6; above, 303, 310.
65. cf. Ch.4 260 n.76; Develin, POH 60-2.
314
From 294 to 288 fifteen individuals from eleven gentes 
held the twenty-one known curule posts as well as three 
lieutenantships. Marcius Censorinus, Cornelius Arvina, 
Valerius Corvinus and Postumius Megellos had already held 
curule posts from 310 to 30$. L. Papirius Cursor, Q. 
Fabius Gurges and C. lunius Brutus, who were all the sons 
of magistrates of 310, P. Cornelius Rufinus, and two novi 
homines, Sp. Carvilius and M' Curius, all held office 
again in the period 277 to 269, when two grandsons and 
one great nephew of both consuls of 303, Rufinus' son 
Blasio, and Marcius' kinsman, Philippus, son of the consul 
of 306, also held office. The other magistrates of 294 
to 288 were D. lunius Brutus, of the same family as his 
successor in the consulship, M. Atilius Regulus, who may 
have been related, if distantly, to Censorinus' fellow 
plebeian tribune in 311 and to Fabius Gurges, and Q. 
Caedicius, who held no other office. From 310 to 303, 
and from 277 to 269 similar policies to those of 294 to 
288 were being carried out, which suggests that these 
leaders formed a specific political faction promoting 
them (66).
Firstly, from 310 to 303, 294 to 288, and 277 to 269, 
they consolidated the confederacy, with the aim in the 
south of finally quelling the Samnites, and in the north
66. For full refs, to magistrates: 294-288, see Broughton, 
MRR 179-18$. For Atilius' possible family ties, see
Ch.4, 287, 291, n.l71. For other inter­
pretations of some of these common offices, see Munzer,
RAA 63-4; Scullard, RP 32-33; Cassola, GPR 1$2, 194, 196, 
198; Lippold, C 127-8.
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of extending Roman influence into Etruria and the Sabine 
area (67).
Secondly, several of them inherited interests in 
diplomatic, cultural and commercial links with Greece and 
the east, which they developed in these periods to unite 
the confederacy, and promote their own standing (68).
In 292, Fabius' ally Ogulnius led a commission to Epidaurus 
to bring, the serpent of -Asclepius to Rome, at the bidding 
of the Sibylline books, to end the pestilence {69).
According to Greek legend, Asclepius was the son of Apollo, 
whose cult had been fostered by the forefathers of several 
members of the group (70). The temple to Asclepius was 
dedicated in 291 by lunius, the consul whose father had 
dedicated a temple to Salus in 302. It is generally 
assumed that Asclepius became associated with Salus in the 
180's when the Fabii, lunii and Postumii dominated religious 
and curule posts, but the link could have already been made 
in this period. The temple of Salus had been decorated
67. cf. Flor. 1.16.8. For details of this in 294-0, 
cf. De Sanctis, StR 2 359-365; Degrassi, op.cit. 544-5; 
Salmon, SS 268-279; Harris, REU 74-8; Torelli, RRF 36-61.
68. For some hints of these interests, see Oh.2 169, 
n.227; Oh.3 233; Oh.4 251, 257, 259, 263, 268, 288, 292- 
5; above, 310, 313; below, 324. y
For the purpose of their development, see Gage, AR 150f. 
At the same time, they did not neglect Rome's native 
religious heritage; see n.32, 64, 76, 110, 118, 172.
69. Torelli, RRF 27-36, 41-3! Gage'', AR 153-4.
70. Pindar, Pyth. 3: Ch.3 191, n.26, 214: Ch.4
251. Orawford, RRO 44-5 dates coins featuring Apollo
to 275.
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by Fabius Pictor, Rullianus' brother; one of Pictor's sons 
held consular office with Ognulius in 269; the other did 
so with lunius, son of the consul of 292, in 266, when the 
Sibylline books were again consulted because of the pesti­
lence. This was a year before the third consulship of 
Pictor's cousin, Gurges, and a year after diplomatic 
contact was made with Apollonia. In 273, when Fabius 
Licinius was consul, Ogulnius went to Egypt with Gurges, 
the consul of 292, who was censor with Carvilius in 289, 
the year triumviri of the mint were set up, and Pictor, 
Ogulnius' consular colleague in 269, when silver coinage 
was introduced to Rome (71). Fabius and the Ognulii may 
have represented themselves on coins minted at this time 
by Romulus and Remus with the wolf and Hercules, all 
heroes with whom they are linked in the tradition (72). 
Pictor the historian, son of the consul of 269, fully 
developed his family's interest in-the east later in the 
century (73).
A third matter of concern to the magistrates in power 
from 294 was the diminishing numbers of citizen peasants
71. See further on all these details. Ch.4 290;
Scullard, FCRR 54-5; Broughton, MRR 196-7, 200-1, 387-419 
passim; Munzer, RAA 83-9; Frier, LAPM 225f; Crawford, RRC 
39-40, 484; below, 328, 335.
72. The Fabii and Ogulnii had associated themselves with 
the wolf, and Romulus and Remus in 295; the Fabii, following 
Greek custom, had claimed descent from Hercules and the race 
he founded, the Spartans, by the time of Pictor; many of 
Rullianus' allies - Latins, Potitus and the consuls of 305 - 
were associated with Hercules; cf. Ch.1C 84 n.l4; Ch.2 149 
n.l29, 152; Ch.4 286, n.l56, 293, n.179;above, n.64; Pais, 
ALRH 169-178; Münzer, Fabius, PWRE 6 1740; Mattingly, JRS 
1945 67 n.l4; Bayet, Hercule 318; Lippold, 0 351-3;
Crawford, RRC 44-5, 727 n.2.
73. Ch.lA 16, 23.
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in the state, which was of particular interest to those 
who had their main connections in central and north Italy. 
Cornelius and Marcius, the censors, divided up the land 
in the Ager Privernum into allotments in 294. Graziers 
were again prosecuted for their use of ager publicus in 
293, the fines being used to pave the Via Appia. Curius, 
whose concern about this problem may have been partly 
the basis of his portrayal as a modest farmer, gave the 
Sabines and Praetuttii civitas sine suffragio after his 
expedition there in 290, and took land for a colony at 
Kadria and viritane allotments in the region (74).
Since many of these leaders had been magistrates 
since 310, they had leading places in the senate, which 
voted them many triumphs for their military tasks which 
most senators would have recognised as expedient. In 
291, Postumius was even able to break the lex Genucia 
.through his influence in the patriciate, presiding over- 
his own election as interrex just three years after his 
previous consulship. Yet the faction may not have formed 
a majority in the senate; its efficient marshalling of 
provincial voters, the religious authority of several of
74. For the measures in 294-3, see Livy 10.47.2,4. 
Marcius may have inherited interest in Privernum from 
his father (Livy 7.16.3-6). On tales of Curius' 
frugality, see n.lll. On Curius' settlements in the 
north east, see Salmon, RC 62 (emphasising its strategic 
significance), Forni, art.cit. 197-204 and Cassola,
GPR 92-3, 156-9 (both supporting the tradition of him 
founding viritane allotments to build up peasant stock, 
contra Frank, Klio 1911, 367-372; see n.30 above and 
76, 78 below for objections to their view that Curius 
thereby gained popular support). For later and 
generally less direct hints of this group's concern 
with maintaining citizen peasants, see above, 303-4; 
below, 322, n.85; 331, n.llO, 354-5.
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its members, especially significant in these years of 
pestilence, and a lack of united opposition to it, could 
have allowed it to dominate the elections as a relatively 
small group (75). This is suggested by hints of senator­
ial opposition to the faction. Senatorial pressure may 
have prevented Curius -carrying out his full plans for 
allotments in the north. More clearly, in reaction to 
some of these magistrates' attempts to increase their 
individual standing with temples, shrines and statues, 
their pursuit of their own military strategies, and their 
autocratic treatment of the army the senate refused triumphs, 
tried to recall one consul, and had another prosecuted by 
plebeian tribunes (76).
75. Cn the six triumphs, see Degrassi, op.cit. 544-5; 
Torelli, RRF 45-8. For Postumius' interregnum, see Livy 
27.6.8. For hints of these leaders' efficient client 
control and religious authority, see Livy 1C.40.9-14;
Ch.2 164; above, 3C9-311, 315.
76. For possible reasons for senatorial obstruction of 
Curius' settlements in the north east, see Ch.1C 1C3-5.
It may explain the story of his popular following of App. 
Samn. 5; cf. Forni, art.cit. 199f; Cassola, GPR 92. The 
censors of 289, Fabius and Carvilius, would still have 
registered some settlers in the area taken by Curius, and 
thereby increased their own and their allies' influence 
there; cf. n.85.
For the temples, shrines and statues, to Victory, Jupiter 
and Quirinus, see Livy 1C.33.9, 36.11, 37.15-16, 46.7-9,
14; Pliny NH 34*43. Papirius' supposed modesty and gener­
osity to the treasury (Pliny, NH 14*91; Livy 1C.42.7, 46.
2-9) may have been to placate the senate. See Livy 1C.44.
3-5 on Papirius and Carvilius giving their lieutenants 
special honours. The senate's attempt to remove Gurges from 
his command is more likely to have been because of the extent 
of his executive authority than his military incompetence; 
cf. Salmon, SS 274-5. While there are many difficulties in 
the stories of Postumius following his own strategy in 294, 
being refused a triumph, like Atilius, in 294 and again in 
291, speaking out against the senate's authority and being 
charged by tribunes in 293 (protected by Carvilius) and in 
291, for working soldiers on his own estate, they may be 
based on genuine evidence of his individualist attitude;
cf. Degrassi, op.cit. .543-4; Cassola, GPR 146-7, 194-7; 
Salmon, S3 275-6; Harris, REU 75; Torelli, RRF 43-7.
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In reaction to this phase of individualism most senators 
over the next decade seem to have been willing to make 
compromises over policy to ensure that senatorial authority 
prevailed over that of the magistrates. This meant that 
foreign policy and military strategy were dilatory and 
changeable, but on the whole conservative. Electoral results 
from 287 to 278 clearly attest to the lack of factions or 
prominent leaders in the senate. After 289, none of the 
gentes of the most individualist magistrates from 294, the 
Fabii, Atilii, Papirii, Carvilii and Postumii were able to 
gain curule posts for at least twenty years. Eighteen 
different men with broad personal connections in the senate 
or qualifications for the immediate tasks at hand held the 
twenty consulships from 287 to 278, and only four did not 
hold these consulships as their only posts. Seven consul­
ships were held by novi homines, or these whose forefathers 
had been novi homines since 340; such leaders could be most 
readily quelled if they showed any signs of individual 
ambition. Seven of the patrician consulships were held by 
members of six different families from the broad gentes of 
the Aemilii, Valerii and Cornelii, which must have held many 
places in the senate by this time, and therefore would have 
favoured an increase in its authority when united over other 
issues (77).
77. For the general basis of this summary, see Ch.1C 86, 88- 
9, 121; Ch.3 205; above 297-301; Develin, POH 15-16,
36. The attempts to retract from the aggressive moves in the 
south made in 285 and 282 would have been due not just to 
circumstances, but also to the prominence in the senate of 
those less concerned with expansion there - including the 
princeps senatus (Pliny NH 7 133) - who had held many magist­
racies since 310. The Aemilii, Cornelii and Valerii held 
half the number of patrician consulships they had in this 
period in both previous and subsequent decades, when the more 
individualist Fabii and Claudii prevailed (cf. below, 356).
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In 287 and 286, there were two distinct issues over 
which senators seem to have agreed. Firstly, in 287, 
urban discontent, increasing as the vast booty of the 
third Samnite war dried up, culminated with a secession to 
the Janiculum of unemployed urban workers, failed specul­
ators, ruined farmers and soldiers home from the wars (78). 
Earlier concern in the senate about such unrest may have 
prompted the institution of triumviri capitales, who super­
vised city police, in 289. Measures taken to end the 
secession indicate not only willingness to make some 
accommodation for commercial activity in the city, now of 
general benefit to most senators, but also the senate's 
concern to establish its' authority in the state (79). 
Secondly, in the course of 286, Thurii appealed for Rome's 
alliance; its promise of a statue and crown may have 
encouraged C. Aelius, consul of 286, to recommend it to 
the centuriate assembly, whose rich urban sector would have 
welcomed it as a chance for expanding its spheres of 
commercial activity. The hope of Rome peacefully extend­
ing her political influence among the southern Greeks
78. The secession centred on debt; see Livy Per. 11; Zon. 
8.2; Dio. fr. 37; Pliny NH 16. 37; Pomp. Dig. 1.2.2.8; Aug. 
CD 3.17; Cic. de leg. 3.9; Diod. 21.18.2; Tacit. Ann. 2.37. 
The recent urban activity and colonising, the remoteness and 
hostility of recently conquered Sabine country, and the 
nature of the known measures after the secession (n.79) 
suggest that the seceders were not agitating for land allot­
ments like their 5th century counterparts; cf. Forni, art. 
cit. 199f.
79. For the triumviri capitales, see Mommsen, StR 2 594-f; 
Lintott, VRR 102-6. For the other measures, see n.4, 22 
above. The construction of the Via Clodia, which consolid­
ated Roman authority in central Etruria in 287 might have 
contributed to the easing of urban problems in 287 (see 
Wiseman, art.cit. 137).
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would also have recommended the alliance to many senators 
(80). All the consuls of 287-6, C. Aelius, M. Claudius 
Marcellus, M. Valerius Potitus and C. Nautius, and the 
dictator of 287, Hortensius, a novus homo, were from 
minor families, the first three being kinsmen of those 
who had opposed military aggression in the south in the 
second half of the fourth century (81). All their 
families, except the Marcelli, had. probably been estab­
lished in the backbenches of the senate since the fifth 
century (82).
In 285, the consuls were C. Claudius Canina, possibly 
Marcellus' brother, and M. Aemilius Lepidus, from a 
previously unknown branch of the gens; in 284 they were C . 
Servilius, whose gens had been out of office since 342, 
and L. Caecilius, a novus homo from a gens unknown since 
439 (83). The election of such leaders, again from minor 
but well established families, would have been the result 
of uncertainty among senators about how far Rome should 
become practically involved in the south, now that the 
Thurian alliance had been made. If the Romans did fight 
the Lucanians in 285, the consuls would have named a more 
experienced man as dictator to lead them - Claudius Caecus,
80. See further above, 304, 306-7.
Pliny NH 34.32 mistakenly calls Aelius plebeian tribune; 
see Ch.IB 71, n.l20; J. Bleicken, Das Volkstribunat der 
Klassichen Republik (Munich, 1955) 45-6; Cassola, GPR I6I; 
Salmon, SS 281-2.
81. Broughton, MRR 184-6; Ch.4 265-6, 270.
82. Livy 2.39.9, 41.11, 4.42.3, 54.2-3, 5.32.6.
83. Broughton, MRR 186-7; Degrassi, op.cit. 114; Livy 
4.16.5-6; cf. Val. Max. 1.4.5.
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consul of 296, who had promoted southern expansion,
Cornelius Rufinus, who fought the Samnites in 290, or 
Aemilius Barbula, brother of the consul of 311 who fought 
in Lucania; all were dictators sometime between 292 and 
285 (84).
By 283, a Gallic invasion threatened. While one of 
the new consuls, Cn. Domitius, a novus homo, took command 
in Etruria, Caecilius, re-elected as praetor, went to 
meet them at Arretium. After the. Gauls slew Caecilius, and 
then Roman legates, more concerted action was taken against 
them. While Curius, praetor suffect, drove the Senones 
Gauls from their own country, and established the distant 
colony of Sena Gallica to protect the vast area of land 
taken, P. Cornelius Dolabella, the other consul, defeated 
the Boii Gauls and Etruscans at Lake Vadimon (85). At 
the same time, C. Fabricius, a novus homo, was sent as
84. Broughton, MRR 187; Livy Per 11; De Sanctis, StR 2 
375.
85. For Domitius' action, see Degrassi, op.cit. 545.
For Fabricius' embassy, see Cassola, GPR 162-3. For the 
campaigns of Dolabella, Caecilius and Curius, cf. Polyb. 
2.19-20; Livy Per. 11-12 (dating Sena Gallica to 290);
App. Samn. 6, Celt 11, and D.H. 19.12.2 (attributing 
conflict with Senones to Dolabella). The main difficulties 
of Polybius' account are removed if we assume that he 
exaggerated losses at Vadimon, and was mistaken in placing 
it after, rather than at the same time as Curius' Senones 
expedition; see further, Mommsen, RF 2 365-375; De Sanctis, 
StR 2 375-377; Harris, REU 79-81. For other reconstruct­
ions, see Beloch, RG 133-4, 452f; Salmon, 'Rome's Battles 
with Etruscans and Gauls in 284-282 B.C.', CP 1935, 23-31; 
Forni, Ath. 1953, 204-214.
The enforced abdication of Caedicius, consul of 289, from 
the censorship in 283 (Degrassi, op.cit. 40-1, 112) may 
have been connected with the senate's prevention of the 
settlement of the remote Ager Gallicus with citizen peasants; 
cf. n. 76.
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legate to promote the loyalty of allied cities of the 
south. Some possible reasons for these magistrates 
gaining election in these circumstances may be adduced.
The military talents of Dolabella, Domitius and Curius 
are attested by their victories; the diplomatic talent 
of Fabricius is indicated by his prominence as legate and 
consul in the next five years; the consuls may have had 
personal influence in the south, where Domitius' father 
and Cornelius' kinsman had made a treaty with Tarentum 
in 332; Dolabella may have inherited, and Curius had 
recently acquired, influence in the north (86).
In 232, with the double threat of the Gauls in 
Etruria, and the southern tribes raising arms, Aemilius 
Papus and Fabricius, being promising generals likely to 
implement the senate's wishes, were elected as consuls 
(87). While Aemilius defeated the Etruscans and Gauls (88)
86. Dolabella's previously unknown branch of the Cornelii 
might have been based in the Stellatiha, the nearest tribe 
to L. Vadimon (Taylor, VDRR 207; Ch.3 224). If the consuls 
expected to take action in the south when elected, this, 
together with his recent experience of leadership, would 
explain why the praetor led the first expedition north in 283
The links of some of these leaders and several others 
in office in this period {see n.lll, l6l) are often inter­
preted as hints of their sharing views on the Tarentine war. 
The variation in conclusions reached on their attitudes (see 
Cassola, GPR 159) in itself shows that they cannot readily 
be retrieved from these links, or from their activity in the 
changing circumstances (see further, above, 319;
Cassola, GPR 170-1; Salmon, SS 282).
87. Broughton, MRR 189. Papus' family is only previously 
known by a conservative dictator of 321; his future career 
suggests his talent.
88. cf. Polyb. 2.20.4; D.H. 19.13.2; Front. Str. 1.2.7;
Zon. 8.2. See refs, in n.85 for various reconstructions of 
events.
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Fabricius tackled the Samnites, Bruttians and Lucanians in 
the south, recovering Thurii from the Bruttians and winning 
a statue from the townspeople like Aelius. He then 
installed garrisons in Locri and Rhegium at their request, 
with the aid of a fleet commanded by Valerius Flaccus, 
possibly a family friend (89). Presumably the senate 
agreed on this gamble, which violated the Tarentine treaty, 
in the hope that Tarentum would not dare react; when it did 
so, sinking the fleet, and capturing the garrison at Thurii, 
the senate immediately became more cautious, sending Post­
umius Megellos, who may have developed personal connections 
in the south in 291, as senatorial legate to try and make 
peace with Tarentum (90).
The consuls of 281, Q. Marcius Philippus, and M. 
Aemilius Barbula, may have been chosen because they had 
personal influence in the two areas of danger - the southern 
Greek towns and Etruria (91), where Marcius successfully
89. Bee above, 304 on Fabricius* action. Flaccus 
(Dio fr. 39.4; Zon. 8.2; cf. App. Samn. 7.1; Thiel, HRSP 
23 n.60) was of the same family as Papus' magister equitum 
in 321 (Ch.4 277-8).
90. App. Samn. 7.1-2; Dio fr. 39.4; Zon. 8.2; Livy Per.
12. Tarentum's lack of reaction to the alliance with 
Thurii since 28$ and the length of its debate over war in 
281 (Polyb. 1.6.5; Zon. 8.2) show that the Roman gamble 
was not as reckless as it might first appear. The story
of Tarentum's insult to Postumius was doubtless to exonerate 
Rome from blame for the war. See further De Sanctis, StR 
2 381-2; Beloch, RG 463-4; Cassola, GPR 160.
91. Broughton, MRR 190. Marcius had a Greek cognomen 
(Degrassi, op.cit. 113) and may have been son of the consul 
of 306, who made the treaty with Carthage claiming Rome's 
hegemony in the south (Ch.4 291-2 ); his kinsmen had 
fought in Etruria in 356 and 310 (Ch.4 288).
Aemilius' father and possibly his uncle fought in Lucania 
and Etruria (Ch.4 280-1, 287; see also above, 321-2).
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fought in the course of the year, annexing Tarquinian land 
and celebrating a triumph (92). Meanwhile the envoy 
Postumius had returned to Rome without a settlement, and 
after much debate, the senate decided on war against 
Tarentum. This was clearly a reluctant decision; Aemilius 
first led his army against the Samnites, and then tried 
unsuccessfully to make terms with the Tarentines, who 
increased their chances of success in war against Rome by 
sending for Pyrrhus (93).
By 280 the military situation was grave; the consuls 
of 281 were retained in office as praetor and proconsul to 
provide experience, local knowledge, and continuity, and 
the proletarii were called to arms (94). There are no 
direct hints of reasons for the election of the two consuls, 
Coruncanius, and M. Valerius Laevinas, both from previously 
unknown families; however Coruncanius’ talents are partic­
ularly mentioned, and Laevinas may have inherited from 
kinsmen interests in the south (95). Coruncanius took 
command in Etruria, which was still restless, capturing 
much land and celebrating a triumph (96). Valerius was
92. Degrassi, op.cit. 54-5; Beloch, RG 456.
93. D.H. 19.6,8; Plut. Pyrrh. 13; Dio fr. 39-10; Zon.
8.2; App. Samn. 7.3; Polyb. 1.6.5. See further n.90; 
Walbank, CP 1 49-51.
94. Cell. 16.10.1; Oros. 4-1-3; Dio fr. 40.13; Zon. 8.3; 
Aug. CD 3.17; Act. Tr. in Degrassi, op.cit. 545-6.
95- For the consuls, see Broughton, MRR 190-192.
Cicero's pra&se of Coruncanius’ character is borne out by 
his long career (see Broughton, MRR 210, 216) although he 
may not be the first plebeian pontifex maximus (Ch.3 202). 
Some other Valerii families had interests in the south 
(see above 324; Ch.4, 285) and the tradition
hints that Laevinas represented an aggressive mood in the 
senate (Cassola, GPR l69; Salmon, SS 283).
96. Degrassi, op.cit. 545-
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defeated at Heraclea by Pyrrhus, who then retook the south­
ern towns, and marched north at least as far as Campania 
(97). After Fabricius, Aemilius Papus, and Cornelius 
Dolabella were despatched to try and get the release of 
prisoners, Cineas came to Rome to negotiate peace; however 
Campanian loyalty, and a speech by the elderly Caecus dis­
suaded a majority of senators from accepting Pyrrhus’ terms, 
which ended Rome’s claims to hegemony in the south (98).
The censors of 280, Domitius, consul of 283, and Scipio, 
consul of 298, may have gained election through the support 
of the same sector in the senate (99).
In the election of 279, held by Domitius in the 
capacity of electoral dictator, the halting of Pyrrhus’ 
advance was of prime concern. The consuls elected, 
Sulpicius, son of the man who settled central Italy in 304 
and 300, and Decius, who shared the name of the commander 
of the Campanians who had .taken over Rhegium, -might have 
been chosen largely to inspire the loyalty of Rome’s
97. cf. De Sanctis, StR 2 392f; Beloch, GG^ 4.1.547-9; 
Frank, CAH 7 644-6.
98. There are many interpretations of the various peace 
negotiations in the Pyrrhic war. For this version of 
events after Heraclea, see M. Lefkowitz, ’Pyrrhus’ 
Negotiations with the Romans, 280-278 B.C.’, HSCP 1959, 
154-9 and Cassola, GPR 164-9, following App. Samn. 10.3; 
for some alternatives, see e.g., Salmon, SS 286 n.3 
(following Plut. Pyrrh. 18; Pyrrhus was suing for peace 
with mild terms); Frank, R1 82 n.lO, CAH 7 646-7 (the 
embassy was after the rejection of peace terms), Beloch, 
GG^ 4.1. 550-2, De Sanctis, StR 2 403f, and Passarini, 
Ath. 1943 101-110 (following Justin 18.1-2 and Diod. 
22.6; peace negotiations and Claudius’ speech were after 
Ausculum (n.lOl)).
99. Broughton, MRR 191-2; for hints of their interests 
in the south, see above 312, 322-3.
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subjects and allies (100). After the consuls were again 
defeated by Pyrrhus at Ausculum, the senate sent the peace 
envoys of 280 back to Pyrrhus again. However the 
persuasions of Mago, the Carthaginian envoy who promised 
aid to Rome in Italy against Pyrrhus, in the hope that 
the rejection of the peace would dissuade Pyrrhus from 
joining forces with Carthage's enemy, Syracuse, in Sicily, 
and possibly reports of Pyrrhus' heavy losses at Ausculum 
and the disunity of his southern allies by the peace 
envoys, encouraged the senate to reject the peace when it 
was brought to Rome (101).
In 278, the consuls of 282, Fabricius and Aemilius, 
were re-elected, presumably for their military experience 
and personal knowledge of the southern towns and Pyrrhus, 
with whom they expected to renegotiate or fight. How­
ever, as soon as Carthage had divided up its naval forces 
guarding Sicily to transport Roman soldiers to retake 
Locri, according to their agreement, Pyrrhus left a small 
garrison at Tarentum and sailed for Sicily. By the end 
of the year, Fabricius had been able to defeat the
100. For the consuls' election, see Broughton, MRR 191-2. 
For their spheres of interest, see Ch.4 263;
above, 309-310. The extent of their loyalty when they
took Rhegium after Heraclea may have been as unclear to 
Roman leaders as it is to historians; cf. Mommsen, HR 2.18 
(they were traitors); Beloch, GG^ 4*2. 482 and De Sanctis, 
StR 2 395-6 (they feared Rhegium's defection); Cassola,
GPR 171-8 (this and their later actions against Greek towns 
were fostered by Romans opposed to southern expansion; for 
objections, see Staveley, JRS 1963 183-5).
101. See further Ch.4 260 n.76(against Decius' devotio at 
Ausculum); Lefkowitz, art.cit. 155-161, l63 (for the 
chronology of events); Thiel, HRSP 28-32 (on the Punic 
agreement causing the rejection of peace with Pyrrhus 
and the disappearance of the duoviral squadrons). See 
also n.98.
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Tarentines and their southern allies (102).
From 277 to 269, eleven of the twenty-four curule 
positions were held by magistrates of 298-288 or their sons 
or cousins (103); five more were held by direct relations 
of consuls of 310-303 (104). 1 have already suggested that
these leaders formed a clique primarily concerned with broad­
ening Rome's diplomatic, cultural and commercial links outside 
Italy, and consolidating the Roman confederacy, which by 277 
involved, even for the most conservative leaders, establishing 
firm control of all corners of the Italian peninsula. From 
277 to 269, these policies were vigorously pursued; the south­
ern wars were ended, alliances were made with Greek ports in 
south Italy, coastal colonies were founded, land, including 
forests valuable for shipbuilding, was confiscated, Caere was 
given civitas sine suffragio, diplomatic relations were 
established with Egypt, and the minting of silver coinage was 
begun at Rome (105). Reasons for the election of four of
102. Broughton, MRR 194; Degrassi, op.cit. $46; Lefkowitz, 
art.cit. 160-3.
103. Cornelii Rufinus and Blasio; Fabii Pictor and Gurges; 
Papirius Cursor, Carvilius, Curius, lunius Brutus and Marcius 
Philippus. (See Broughton, MRR 194-199 for all the magist­
rates of this period).
104. The Genucii brothers; Cornelii Lentulus and Merenda.
105. For the clique, see above, 313-8. For details
of the military action and settlements in the south, and the 
colonies see above, 301, 305-6; De Sanctis, StR 2
411-422; Degrassi, op.cit. 114, 546; Forni, art.cit. 214-222; 
Salmon, SS 287-292. On Caere's revolt and settlement, see 
n.41 above; Beloch, RG 363f; Toynbee, HL 1 410f; P. Brunt, 
Italian Manpower, 225 B.C.-A.D. 14 (Oxford, 1971)(=IM) 515-8; 
Sherwin-White, RC^ 53-61, 200-21 (For alternative dates for 
its civitas, see De Sanctis, StR 2 256-7; Sordi, RRC 36f, 128- 
133; Harris, REU 451). For the significance of the exchange 
ofembassies by Egypt and Rome, cf. Mommsen, HR 261; Beloch, 
GG^ 4.1.663; De Sanctis, StR 2.428; Kolleaux, ROM 60-83; A. 
Momigliano, 'Terra Marique', JRS 1942 59-61; Cassola, GPR 45-6 
On coinage, see n.23.
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the other eight curule magistrates will become apparent 
below (106).
Since their measures would have been generally favoured 
in the senate, and many of the magistrates had appropriate 
experience and local knowledge to implement them, the 
faction probably had broader support in the senate than in 
294-0. Most notably, Curius’ military skill would have 
dictated his election as consul in 275, when Pyrrhus was 
expected back in Italy; his immediate re-election in 274 
with Cornelius Merenda, the lieutenant of his colleague in 
275, as his fellow consul, was probably in honour of their 
great victory over Pyrrhus in 275. Fabius Gurges,
Cornelius Rufinus, Papirius Cursor and Sp. Carvilius, who 
all fought the Samnites and their allies in this period, 
had already won triumphs in the 290’s over them (107). 
Finally, the choice of magistrates to deal with the Camp­
anian mercenaries may have been dictated by their personal 
backgrounds. The years when their punishment was most 
feasible were 276, when Pyrrhus had just left Italy, and 
271-0, after Tarentum had been taken (108). In these
106. Fabricius, Aemilius Papus, Papirius Praetextatus, 
Quinctius . Of the other four, Ogulnius and Fabius Licinius 
have been noted as part of the clique (above, 315-6)
Aemilius Barbula, who may have inherited interests in both 
north and south Italy (see above 324) and Claudius
Canina, who may have inherited a defensive attitude to the 
south, like Fabius (see above, 321), had both held
office from 287 to 281 implementing senatorial policy; hence 
their allegiances are uncertain.
107. Cic. de orat 2.268; Veil. Pat. 2.17.2; Pliny NH 33.38; 
Passarini, Ath. 1943 112; Forni, art.cit. 179-180, 222, 238; 
Salmon, SS 287.
108. Perhaps the Campanians’ aid to Rome in 275 (above, 305) 
was partly inspired by fear of such retaliation. Details 
of which consuls led the final campaign in 271 and 270 are 
confused; see Broughton, MRR 198.
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years, Cornelius Blasio, Quinctius Claudus and the 
Genucii brothers were consuls. Quinctii and Genucii 
had held only one curule post since 354» and Blasio's 
father had been disgraced in 275. Since Cornelius 
Blasio’s father Rufinus had clients in Croton, which 
he took from the Campanian mercenaries in 277, and the 
forefathers of the Genucii and Quinctius had opposed 
the government which promoted Roman links in Campania 
in 342 (109), it may be speculated that these apparently 
unlikely leaders were supported partly because of 
their suitability for carrying out the Campanians’ 
punishment.
At the same time, suspicions of the individual 
power and ambition of members of the factions within 
the governing class as a whole may have been aroused 
in this period, as in 294-C. Curius and Papirius 
Praetextatus, the first to be censor without previously 
holding the consulship since Caecus, gained the 
censorship just three years after their predecessors, 
and commissioned extensive public works in their sphere 
of interest in the north east; two temples were built, 
one including Cursor’s portrait; lunius gave an 
exhibition honouring his father; Merenda was awarded a
109. See Ch.4 259-265; above, 308; below, 332; Degrassi, 
op.cit. 114; Cassola, GPR 170.
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gold crown (110). There are some hints of senatorial 
reaction against personal aggrandisement. P. Cornelius 
Rufinus was refused a triumph for his military successes 
in 277, and was expelled from the senate for possessing 
ten pounds of silver by the censors Fabricius and Aemilius, 
who had doubtless gained office in recognition of their 
services during the Pyrrhic war, when they consistently 
represented the senate's views. The silver may have been 
booty that custom demanded should be handed over to the 
treasury, a symbol of personal wealth, or a hint of a 
dangerous level of personal contact with the southern 
Greek cities; it may be noted that two years later the 
envoys to Egypt were careful not to conceal the gifts
110. For the censors, see Degrassi, op.cit. 114; 
Broughton, MRR 198; cf. Beloch, RG 8$, 629. Papirius' 
gens had a long tradition in the censorship (Ch.10 86, 
n.20; Ch.2 I64). Both may have had particularly 
efficient client control around Latium, where their 
gentes originated (Ch.2 I64, n.208; below, n.lll)
and in the north east area taken by Curius in 
290 and 283. The censors commissioned the Anio 
aqueduct, which used Curius' spoil of 275, and was 
completed by Curius and Fulvius, a fellow Tusculan, in 
270, the Via Curia, and possibly the drainage of the 
plain of Reate (Forni, art.cit. 223-8). Taylor's 
idea (VDRR 60f) that the censors also planned to create 
new tribes at Reate and Cures is rejected by Badian,
JRS 1962, 203.
For the temples to Summanus and Consus, inspired by 
prodigies of^lightning and possibly bad harvests, see 
Wissowa, RKR 201-3; Scullard, FCRR 153-5; n.32 above; 
for the other honours, see Livy Per. 16; Pliny NH 33 
38; Fest. 228L; Degrassi, op.cit. 546; Torelli, RRF
196-8.
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they had been given (111). Also the objection of 
Fulvius, the plebeian tribune, to the summary execution 
of the Campanian mercenaries by the consuls Blasio and 
Genucius may not have been based on disapproval of their 
policy, but on the fact that the consuls used their full 
military authority on their triumph day, when they were 
immune from provocatio, to carry out their executions 
(112); since Blasio's father had so recently shown signs 
of individual ambition, and Genucius had been granted 
dispensation from the lex Genucia, this would have been 
particularly resented by other senators such as Fulvius, 
whose gens had not reached curule office for over twenty- 
five years.
Suspicions at Rome of Carthaginian intentions in the 
south, which had been building up since 275, were further 
aroused by the Carthaginian garrisoning of Messana in 269. 
From 268 the most important political issue was the 
question of how far aggressive action should be taken to 
aid the Mamertini, deter Punic ambition in the south.
111. On the refusal of Rufinus* triumph, see Broughton,
MRR 194-5 (see n.l07 for refs, to his military skills).
For reasons for his expulsion, cf. Willems, SRR 1 266-7;
De Sanctis, StR 2 492-3; Staveley, Hist. 1959 423;
Cassola, GPR 170. Cato's pride in fellow Tusculan novi 
homines, Curius, Fabricius and Coruncanius (A. Astin,
'Cato Tusculanus and the Capitoline Fasti', JRS 1972 20-4), 
his concern about contemporary extravagance, and this 
incident, may have been partly the basis of his tales of the 
frugality and resistance to bribery of Fabricius and Curius, 
which contributed, with the fact that they held many offices 
in the same period, to Cicero's association of Coruncanius, 
Decius, Papus, Curius and Fabricius; cf. n.74; Forni, art. 
cit. 172-183. For the story of the envoys to Egypt, see 
D.H. 20.4; Zon. 8.6.11; Dio fr. 41.
112. Mommsen, RSt 1^ 132 n.5; Cassola, GPR 174F; for an 
alternative view, see Bauman, Hist. 1973 40.
333
and further that of Rome (113); the pattern of magistrates' 
names and events suggest that opinions in the senate varied 
according to circumstances.
In 268, after a revolt of Picentes in the north, most 
senators would have viewed the consolidation of the 
federation as the first priority; accordingly, in 268, the 
Picentes were quelled, deprived of land and given civitas 
sine suffragio; a permanent truce was made with Tarquinii in 
exchange for coastland; Latin colonies were founded at 
Ariminium and Beneventum; Sabines were given civitas optime 
iure to incorporate them more firmly in the state (114).
One of the consuls of 268, Sempronius Sophus, may have 
gained election because he was most interested in the north 
east; his father had made the major settlements in central 
Italy, and had actively opposed Claudius Caecus' aggressive 
plans for the south, and he himself only returned to office 
in 252, after the period of the most aggressive strategy in 
the first Punic war (11$). His colleague, Ap. Claudius
113. See 304-6 above. Those with personal links with the 
Mamertini or Greek coastal towns would have been most 
inclined to aggression.
114. For details of all these measures, cf. Frank, Klio 1911, 
373-9, CAH 7 657-8; Beloch, RG 472, 621; De Sanctis, StR 2, 
420-3; Fraccaro, Opusc. 2 193-4; Salmon, RC 63-4, 92-4; 
Sherwin-White, RC^ 98f (some differing over the extent of 
the land taken, but all agreeing on the strategic value of 
the measures and the aggression of the campaigns). The 
enfranchised Sabines (Badian, JRS 1962 203) may not have 
been put in a new tribe, because of fear of the political 
benefit to Curius and his allies, who may have included the 
censors, currently in office, Marcius Philippus and Aemilius 
Barbula (Ch.1C 104-5; above, 328-9, 331, n.llO; below, 354- 
5).
115. cf. above 309-310 on his father. He founded a temple 
to Tellus, an earth goddess linked with the plebeians' deity 
Ceres (Ch.2 132) after an earthquake (Wissowa, RKR^ 192f; 
Scullard, FCRR 204-5; cf. n.32 above).
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Russus, was one of Caecus' sons. His father's interests 
in Campania, and the fact that he is the first of three 
members of the family to hold the consulship from 268 to 
249, all at times when there were opportunities for Roman 
aggression in the south, to which the second two responded, 
suggest that he represented those more concerned with this 
area. The great client resources of Caecus' large family, 
and possibly Russus' inherited influence in Sabinum and 
Etruria, may also have contributed to Russus' election (II6).
Once the measures of 268 were taken, concern with 
Roman interests in the south prevailed in the senate; in 
267, to prepare for possible conflict, the new allied fleet 
was set up, and Brundisium was captured (117). The consul 
lulius, holding the only known office of his gens from 352 
to 208, may have gained election through conflict over this 
policy; his colleague, M. Atilius Regulus, having close ties 
in Campania, and, with two of his kinsmen, promoting 
aggressive action in the first half of the first Punic war, 
was presumably backed in the election by its supporters (118)
116. For his family spheres of interest and client base, 
see Ch.4 285-7; n.l4, 6l above; Livy Per. 19;
Cic. Sen. 37; Suet. Tib. 2.2 (as interpreted by M. Ihm, 
'Die Sogenannte 'Villa lovis' des Tiberius auf Capri und 
andere Suetoniana', Hermes, 1901, 302-4).
117. See above, 306.
118. Broughton, MRR 200. For Atilius' Campanian ties, 
see Ch.4 267 n.99, 287; cf. n.l21 below.
In vowing a temple to Pales, an^ancient god of shepherds 
after his victory (Wissowa, RKR 199-201; Scullard, FCRR 
103-5) he may have been trying to avert the pestilence of 
266; cf. n.32, 120.
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In 266, Fabius Pictor, brother of the consul of 269, 
and D. lunius, son of the consul of 292, were consuls 
(119). Their inheritance of links with gods of healing, 
and interests in Rome's eastern and northern boundaries 
and Greek neighbours may have gained them support, since 
there was a pestilence in 266, the capture of Brundisium 
had provoked an embassy from Apollonia in 267 and unrest 
among the Sallentini, and the Umbrians were also up in 
arms (120). They are also likely to have gained support 
from those opposed to further provocative action in the 
south. lunius' gens is absent from office until 253; 
the traditional attitudes and spheres of interest of the 
Fabii, and the fact that they were absent from office 
for eighteen years after 26$, suggests that they led 
such opposition (121).
119. Broughton, MRR, 201.
120. For their inherited interests, see Ch.4 274-$, 28$, 
288-290; above, 308-9, 314-6.
For the pestilence, and their consulting of the Sibylline 
books, see Oros. 4.5.6-8; Aug. CD 3.17. For their Umbrian 
and Sallentini campaigns, see Mommsen, HR 2.39; De Sanctis, 
StR 2 423-4; cf. Beloch, RG 473, 476. The return embassy 
to Apollonia by Q. Fabius is represented unfavourably in the 
tradition; see Livy Per. 1$; Zon. 8.7; Dio fr. 42; Val. Max. 
6.6.5; perhaps the story stemmed from the envoy's failure to 
reach further office; see Munzer, 'Fabius', nos. 30, 116,
PWRE 6.2 (Stuttgart, 1909) 1748-9, 1814-5, suggesting he
was Gurges' son. For the significance of the embassies,
cf. Holleaux, RGM 1-5; Cassola, GPR 38-9.
121. It is argued that the absence was due to Gurges' death
in 265, and that Atilii, Otacilii, Fulvii and Mamilii, gentes 
linked with the Fabii in earlier times or in the second half 
of the war, represented them in the first half (Munzer, RAA 
57, 63f; Heurgon, CP 28$; Thiel, HRSP 137 n.235). However, 
Surges' cousin and his son (n.l20) were eligible for office, 
and his grandson was old enough to replace him as augur in 
265 (Munzer, RAA 54-5); the priority members of each gens 
gave to the southern war would have varied according to 
circumstances and their other interests; cf. Lippold, C 115- 
121.
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In 265, Fabius Gurges gained the consulship for the 
third time, presumably because of continued fears of 
southern wars, his military experience, and his connections 
in the north, where revolt threatened at Volsinii (122).
The reason for the election of his colleague, Mamilius, 
a novus homo from a gens well established at Rome, with 
Oscan, Tusculan and Etruscan connections, also represented 
in this period by the consul's brother, who fought in 
Sicily in 262,is not clear (123). Marcius Gensorinus 
became censor for the second time in 26$, doubtless through 
his close personal ties with Fabius and his great religious 
authority (124). His colleague, Blasio, the consul of 
270, who had many allies in the Greek coastal towns, may 
have represented those becoming increasingly concerned 
about Rome's position in the south, and. the prospect of 
Carthaginian attack (12$).
122. For Fabius' identity, see Munzer 'Fabius' no. 112 
PWRE 6.2 1798-1800 (cf. Beloch, RG 458 n.l and Degrassi, 
op.cit. 11$, arguing that he was Gurges' son). The 
revolt at Volsinii was against the local aristocrats 
supported by the Romans; see Beloch, RG 458f; De Sanctis 
StR 2 424-5, and Harris, REU 115-8 (differing over the 
rebels' identity). For arguments against Decius replacing 
Fabius when he died at Volsinii (Auct. Vir. ill. 36.2)
see Degrassi, op.cit. 115; Harris, REU 83-4.
123. On his family origin, see Ch.2 165, n.212; Munzer,
RAA 65f; Palmer, ACR 275-6; Richard, OPR 231-2. It would 
seem natural to associate the brothers' rise with the war; 
see further 335 n.l21 above; 339 below.
124. Ch.IB 66; Ch.4 288; above, 3^10, 313f;
Degrassi, op.cit. 110, 432-3; Munzer, RAA 63.
125. Degrassi, op.cit. 115. He had looked to Hiero for 
aid in 270; see above, 306, 330.
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By the time of the election in 264» the Mamertini's 
request for Rome's allegiance, and continued unrest in 
Volsinii after Fabius' death there, heightened conflict 
over foreign policy, and caused deadlock in the vote over 
the former issue in the senate in the course of the year. 
It seams that the two sides in dispute also won one place 
each in the consular elections, either by arrangement at 
senatorial level, or after conflict between their clients 
in the assembly (126). The consul of 264, M. Fulvius, 
who had been active in the north east in 270, reduced 
Volsinii in 264, founding colonies at Castrum Novum and 
Firmium; he may have represented those who opposed the 
alliance (127). His colleague, Ap. Claudius Caudex, 
grandson of Caecus, clearly represented the faction 
promoting active support of the Mamertini; after arguing 
for the alliance in the comitia centuriata, he sailed to 
Messana, where the Mamertini had expelled- the Punic 
garrison, either on news of the Roman alliance, or at the 
instigation of Claudius' military tribune. When Punic 
troops, allied with Hiero, besieged Messana, he declared 
war on Carthage. While he was not able to take Messana 
by the end of the year, his lack of triumph may have been
126. Broughton, MRR 202-3; above, 305-7.
127. He may have been grandson of the consul of 299 who 
fought in the north (see above, 311-2); for his action 
in 270, see 331, n.llO. For his victory in 264 and 
transfer of statues and the local cult of Vortumnus back
to Rome, see Degrassi, op.cit, 74-5, 115, 547; Reynolds,
JRS 1971 138; Scullard, FCRR 174-5. For the strategic 
value of the colonies, see Salmon, RC 63-4, 78-9, 180 and 
Harris, REU 148-9.
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due largely to senators’ resentment of the assembly’s 
voting of the alliance and his independent declaration 
of war on this basis (128).
While military experience and talent were naturally 
important factors in the elections during the first Punic 
war, the correlation of certain names in the magisterial 
lists to the policies and strategies they implemented 
suggests that candidates’ views did play an important part 
in the elections. Most of the time the political faction 
which dominated the senate, and thereby dictated policy, 
controlled the election, except when a minor leader won 
the election because of dispute between balanced factions, 
or when a faction had better support from clients in the 
assembly elections than in the senate. Only in 249 is 
there any hint of a magistrate attempting to pursue a 
course of action opposed by the senatorial majority (129).
Having come to war so hesitantly, the senate was at 
first naturally inclined to a modest strategy of steady 
military campaigns simply to consolidate Rome's position 
in Sicily. By the end of 263, Messana had been taken, 
and Hiero had been persuaded to return to allegiance with
128. On Claudius' support of the war, cf. Thiel, HRSP 
137; Cassola, GPR 183-5; Lippold, C 114. For military 
events, cf. Polyb. 1.11.4-12.4, 15 (the Mamertini 
voluntarily expelled the Punic garrison); Dio fr. 43.5- 
15.2, Zon. 8.8-9, and Diod. 22-23 (C. Claudius, the 
military tribune, expelled it). For this view of 
Claudius' lack of triumph (Degrassi, op.cit. 547), see 
Ch.IB 71, n.l20, 73» n.l27, and above 306-7.
cf. De Sanctis, StR 3 109-110, Thiel, HRSP 160-2 and 
Walbank, CP 1 66-7 who argue that his military activity 
was not worth a triumph.
129. cf. above, 298, n.6, 299, n.12;Thiel, HRSP 78-83; 
Lippold, C 121.
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Rome; by the end of 262, Agrigentum was in Roman hands 
(130). Despite these successes, only one more military 
post was held by any of the consuls of 263-1 in the rest 
of the war, in 246, when defensive tactics were being used; 
this suggests that they gained support as advocates of 
this relatively moderate approach (131). Mamilius and 
the Otacilii, all of Oscan origin, were from gentes holding 
no office before 265; M. Valerius Messalla was great- 
grandson of Corvus, an earlier promoter of southern 
expansion; Postumius Megellos and L. Valerius Flaccus were 
relatives of those active in Rome's expansion south in 
282. All may therefore have also been promoted for their 
personal influence among Rome's southern allies, whose 
loyalty had not been tested in a major war (132). The
130. For details of military progress : 263-1, see De 
Sanctis, StR 3.1.111-123; Degrassi, op.cit. 74-5, 115; 
Thiel, HRSP 163-170. Valerius' mural of his victory 
at Messana in the senate copied a Sicilian practice.
131. For the magistrates' names, see Broughton, MRR 203-5. 
We do have hints of their interests in other areas; 
Postumius' and Valerius' direct forefathers secured central 
and northern Italy : 305-290 (Oh.4 293; above, 308-9,
313-5); the Mamilii had links in Tusculum
(above, 336) the Otacilii, while of Samnite origin,
might have been in Rome since they intermarried with the 
Fabii in the fifth century (Auct. de praen. 6; Fest. 174L; 
Salmon, SS 28f; cf. Munzer, RAA 71f, who dates the marriage 
to the early third century). cf. Thiel, HRSP 136, I68- 
170, who argues that the Valerii and Otacilii favoured an 
aggressive naval strategy from 263.
132. For the patricians' southern interests, see Ch.4 
2541; above, 324.
For the plebeians' Oscan origin, see n.l23, 131 above.
For the group's support of the war, see Thiel, HRSP 136; 
Lippold, C 114; cl. De Sanctis, StR 3.1.110.
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only other magistrates known in these years were the 
dictator named 'clavi figendi causa’. On. Fulvius, the 
consul of 298, and his magister equitum, C. Marcius 
Philippus, the consul of 281. Their authority of age 
and family religious traditions probably dictated their 
choice (133).
Because stalemate seemed to have been reached in 26l, 
support developed in the senate for the bolder policy of 
taking the whole of Sicily with the aid of a Roman navy 
(134). Most of the magistrates from 260 to 254, when this 
policy and strategy prevailed, are likely to have supported 
them (135).
In 260 and 259 the Scipio brothers were consuls, and 
led the new fleet to Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica; the 
consul of 259 was also censor in 258, and the consul of 
260, who had been captured at sea by the Carthaginians, 
was re-elected in 254, to lead the new fleet, built after 
a shipwreck, to Sicily. Since these offices span the 
phase of the aggressive naval policy exactly, and are the 
only ones held by Scipios since 298, when the consuls’
133. cf. above 310f, 324-5, 336;
Munzer, RAA 64; Scullard, RP 33.
134. Polyb. 1.20.1-21.3’8 account of the decision and the 
speedy building of the ships (Thiel, HRSP 171-8 and 
Scullard, HRW4, 169-170, 489-490) suggests that the policy 
and strategy only gained approval from the majority of the 
senate in 261; so Frank, CAH 7 667, 674-8; Thiel, HRSP 
64-5, 70-3, 168-170: Lippold, C 250-1. Walbank, CP 1 
72-3, dates it earlier.
135. Those with interests in Campania and the south are 
most likely to have favoured both the policy, because they 
stood to gain most commercially from it, and the naval 
strategy, because their coastal allies benefited from it 
(see above, 306). For details of all magistrates from 
260 to 254, see Broughton, MRR 205-211.
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father fought in Lucania, they are likely to have been 
leading promoters of the current policy (136). Of their 
colleagues, we know too little of Aequillius, the consul 
in 259 and proconsul in 258, who fought at Sicily, to 
draw conclusions about his policies; he was the only 
member of his gens known in curule office between 388 and 
176 {137). Another, Duillius, who won Rome’s first naval 
battle as consul in 260, and was censor in 258, might have 
inherited links with his colleague, and interests in the 
south from his forefather, who was active in Campania in 
the 330’s with the Scipios (138). Other likely promoters 
of the current strategy and policy were the Atilii 
Caiatinus and Reguli; they also had close Campanian connect­
ions first evident in the 330’s; one had taken action to 
prepare for the war in 267; they held six curule offices 
from 260 to 254 (139). Atilius Caiatinus made some
136. Scipio’s cognomina Asina supports the view of Polyb.
1.21 that he was captured in 260 through his own incompetence; 
hence his re-election is likely to have been through the 
authority of his family or political views rather than his 
talent; see further Thiel HRSP 178-181; Walbank, CP 1 76-77. 
The Scipios’ forefathers were prominent when expeditions to 
Sardinia and Corsica were sent in the early 4th century 
(Ch.3 185 n.lO, 215f). For those of 259-8.,see Thiel, HRSP 
I9O-6, 326 (he views them as training exercises for Africa, 
but they may have been simply to distract Carthage and gain 
booty to ease discontent in Italy; see Zon 8.11.8-9; Oros. 
4.7.12). For Scipio’s successes and consequent dedication
of a temple to the Tempestates, goddesses of weather, in 
259, see Polyb. 1.24.5-8; Degrassi, op.cit. 548.
137. For his forefathers, see Ch.3 223, and n.22 above.
For his successes at Sicily, see Polyb. 1.24.8; Zon. 8.11; 
Degrassi, op.cit. 76-7, 548; perhaps he was promoted for 
his military talent.
138. For his successes in 260, see Thiel, HRSP I8I-I9O.
For his Campanian links, see Ch.4 267; Livy 8.16.3-4.
139. cf. 334-5, n.121 above; Heurgon, CP 285f; Thiel, HRSP 
136-7; Lippold, C 114f. For their other spheres of interest, 
see n.164 below.
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advances in Sicily on land as consul in 258, triumphed 
as praetor in 257, and, as consul in 254, captured 
Panormus with the fleet (140). Atilius' colleague in 
258, Sulpicius, who won a naval victory off Sardinia, 
is the first of his immediate family known since 314 and 
does not appear in office again. His family shared 
interests in Sora with the Atilii Oaiatini, which might 
have been the basis of personal ties (I4I). C. Atilius 
Regulus, consul in 257, won a naval victory near Sicily, 
where he led the fleet again in 250. His colleague with 
the land forces in 257, Cornelius Blasio, the consul of 
270, being a likely advocate of war before 264 with 
personal influence in the southern towns, is likely to 
have shared his support of the current policy (142).
Blasio may have named Ogulnius, an earlier ally with 
particular religious authority, as dictator in 257 to hold 
the Latin festival, which served-to distract the people - 
from the long war (143). We cannot be certain of the 
views of the consuls of 256, Caedicius, possibly the heroic 
lieutenant in Atilius Caiatinus' army in 258, and Manlius 
Vulso, who led the fleet again in 250 with C. Atilius 
Regulus and was the first member of his branch of the gens
140. De Sanctis, StR 3.1. 134-6, 160-3, 255-6, 261;
Degrassi, op.cit. 76-7, 548; Thiel, HRSP 196, 241-7.
141. For his victory, see Degrassi, op.cit. 548; Thiel,
HRSP 196-8; Walbank, CP 1 81. For the Sora connection, 
see Ch.4 258, n.67, 291, n.l71.
142. See 336 above; De Sanctis, StR 3.1.136-7;
Degrassi, op.cit. 76-7, 548; Thiel, HRSP 198-205, 209-
212, 239-240.
143. See 310 n.55, 313 n.64, 315-6, 328-9 above on 
Ogulnius' background. Zon. 8.12 notes bad prodigies in 258 
See Fast. Cap. in Degrassi, op.cit. II6, 434-5 on the 
dictatorship.
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in office since the fourth century; perhaps they were chosen 
for their military promise (144). This would have been 
particularly expedient in 256, when an expedition to Africa 
to strike the enemy at its core was planned. M. Atilius 
Regulus became consul suffect after Caedicius’ death in 
256, taking the expedition to Africa with Manlius. After 
they had won some victories there, Manlius brought home in 
the fleet troops which were too unruly and expensive to 
retain there over the winter, while Regulus retained command 
as proconsul in Africa. He was then taken prisoner when 
his army was defeated. The peace terms he proposed to the 
Carthaginians before the battle may have reflected the 
aggressive mood of the whole senate, expecting him to have 
gained enough support from local cavalrymen to force their 
acceptance, unaware of the revival of the Punic army under 
a Spartan general (145). Finally, Ser. Fulvius Paetinus
144. For Caedicius' action in 258, see Cato fr. 83 Peter, 
Front. Str. 1.5.15; Cell. NA 3.7; cf. Livy Per. 17,
22.60.11, Pliny, NH 22.11, Claud. Quad. fr. 42-3 Peter, 
who attribute it to others. His father, a novus homo, 
may have had interests in the north east (see above
314-5, 322 n.85).
145. cf. Zon. 8.12; Dio fr. 43.19; Polyb. 1.26.1-2; Thiel, 
HRSP 206-7, on the reasons for the African expedition.
For this version of events, see Thiel, HRSP 206-229. The 
standard theme of an impoverished Roman general leaving 
his farm to take up leadership (see Ch.2 165, n.212; above 
n.lll) in Regulus' story could be a reinterpretation of 
the small farmers' resentment of distant campaigns; cf. 
Heurgon, CP 286-7; Cassola, GPR 193. Instructions on 
peace terms could have been sent out by the senate with those 
on Manlius' return. For an alternative view, see Heurgon,
CP 292-3, and Cassola, GPR 187-192, 358-9 (Manlius' recall 
reflected conflict in the senate; Atilius was a rash 
militarist).
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Nobilior and M. Aemilius Paullus were the consuls in 255, 
who suffered a shipwreck after evacuating Romans from 
Africa, and defeating the Carthaginian fleet (I46).
Other members of Paetinus' family were primarily concerned 
with north and central Italy up to 255, and hold no other 
military post for the rest of the war; hence we have no 
clear reason for assuming Paetinus' support of the current 
policy (147). M. Aemilius Paullus, being grandson of the 
consul of 302, who campaigned against the Sallentini, and 
a descendant of Maraertinus, who led the expansion into 
Campania in the mid fourth century, with the Scipios, is 
more likely to have favoured it (I48).
Summing up, the repetition of offices, and the family 
links and backgrounds of the magistrates from 260 to 254 
suggest that most formed a closely knit group of advocates 
of the policy being implemented, led by the Cornelii 
Scipiones and Atilii. Others may appear simply because 
they had appropriate knowledge or talent. The creation 
of promagistrates, once the detrimental effect of yearly 
changes in command in Sicily was realised, the frequent 
triumphs and apparent lack of dispute between the senate 
and magistrates suggest that this group dominated the senate 
At the same time, the continual changes in the areas and 
extent of naval activity suggest that views on strategy
146. cf. De Sanctis, StR 3.1.257-260; Thiel, HRSP 229- 
241, 327-8; Walbank, CP 1.91.
147. Paetinus could have been cousin of the consul of 264; 
see above, 311-2, 337 for his family's interests.
148. The family also had interests in the north; see 
above, 308.
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frequently changed within the party, especially after the 
mutiny of 2$6 and the shipwreck of 255. This may some­
times have weakened its control of the elections; minor 
leaders, such as Caedicius, Aequillius, Fulvius and 
Sulpicius, might have belonged to opposing factions, or 
at least have been more neutral figures winning through 
the balanced conflict of others (149).
By 253 Carthage only retained a few towns in Sicily, 
so the aim of taking the whole island became generally 
accepted in the senate. Those advocating the more 
moderate strategy of landed campaigns to capture towns in 
Sicily, using the navy only to support them rather than 
make separate expeditions, gained enough senatorial support 
to win the elections, if not control of policy, in 253; 
they continued in power in 252-1, since major naval 
campaigns elsewhere had been rendered impossible by the 
shipwreck of an opportunist raid on Africa in 253, and the 
army was becoming dangerously resentful of the long war 
without clear returns. A brief summary of the careers of 
the magistrates supports this view of them (150).
149. There were three promagistrates and two breaches of 
the lex Genucia in this period; cf. 298 n.6, 299 n.l2;
Thiel, HRSP 79-81. The nine triumphs in the period may 
have been partly to distract people from discontent with 
the war.
150. For strategy and military events ;253-1, see De Sanctis, 
StR 3.1.163-5; Frank, CAH 7 686; Thiel HRSP 247-254, 329- 
332; cf. Lippold, C 119. The disobedience of military 
tribunes and knights in Sicily in 252 (Val. Max. 2.7.4, 
2.9.7; Zon. 8.14; Front. Str. 4.1.22, 30-1) may reflect 
general discontent in the army. The expulsion of 16 
senators by the censors of 252 (Livy Per. 18) may have 
increased the influence of those favouring a moderate 
policy in the south, who would have tended to be those with 
interest in other areas (cf. n.l31, 135).
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Postumius, censor and praetor in 253» and Valerius, censor 
in 252, had pursued a similar strategy in 263-2. lunius 
Pera and Sempronius Sophus, their fellow censors, had 
held office in 266 and 268 respectively, when they were 
primarily concerned with building up Rome's influence in 
the north east, as was Aurelius, the novus homo who was 
consul in 252, in 241. Sophus' kinsman Sempronius 
Blaesus, consul in 253» and Caecilius, consul in 251, 
maintained an even more defensive strategy in the war in 
247-4* The repeated offices and victories of Aurelius, 
Caecilius, and Servilius, consul of 252 and cousin of a 
consul in 253» who all belonged to minor gentes in the 
senate, suggest that military talent contributed to their 
election. Furius, being from an equally insignificant, 
though well established gens, and having had the chance to 
gain popularity as curule aedile, might have won his office 
in increasing conflict over strategy, as-the landed 
campaigns failed to bring significant progress in the war
(151).
151. For all these magistrates, see Broughton, MRR 211-3. 
Most shared particular influence in Latium (Ch.4 244-6, 
270-1, 287; above, 323).
For full details of their family backgrounds and spheres 
of interest, and the rest of their careers, see above,
321-2, 333, 335, 339; below, 347, 349-352.
While the last known Furius had been allied with Sempronius' 
father against Caecus (Ch.4 287), Pacilus, as
aedile, had founded milestones on the Appian way with 
Caecus' son (Dessau, ILS 5801). Since Caecilius holds 
no military post after 249» his reputed age of 70 is 
credible (Develin, POH 63). Pliny NH 7.140 notes his 
talent.
The names of Servilii, Caecilii, Aurelii, Scipios and 
Aemilii appear in similar patterns in 285-3» 255-1 and 
219-7 (Scullard, RP 35-6); however, the Aemilii belong to 
distinct families (cf. 321-323» 344 above)
and political issues varied in each period; parallel changes 
in generation, and inheritance of common spheres of interest 
of recurring relevance to some of these years may explain 
the pattern.
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By 250, the senate had decided to extend Caecilius' 
command as proconsul and send out a new fleet in the hope 
of breaking the deadlock in the war; hence consuls with 
naval experience, L. Manlius Vulso, consul of 256, and 
C. Atilius Regulus, consul of 257, were supported in the 
election. They besieged Lilybaeum by land and sea, while 
Caecilius celebrated a glorious triumph for the victory 
he had since gained over the Carthaginians at Panormus 
( 152) .
The sending of another fleet in 249 indicates that 
the heavy losses the consuls of 250 incurred at sea were 
not enough to dispel the aggressive mood of the senate, 
still boosted by Caecilius' success. However, the 
electoral results of 249 -suggest close competition between 
rival factions. While one consul, Claudius Pulcher, 
brother of the consul of 268, and a likely advocate of 
aggression, may have been aided in the election by his 
broad family client base, and previous position as curule 
aedile, the other, lunius Pullus, being from an unknown 
branch of his gens, and holding this as his only office.
152. Walbank, CP 1 93-4, 101-113, by dating the consuls' 
departure after Caecilius' victory, has to reject the 
story of Atilius, the Carthaginian prisoner, going with a 
peace embassy to Rome in 250. De Sanctis, StR 3*1.154-6, 
166-7, 262-3, and Thiel, HRSP 255-271, 323-4, by viewing 
the consuls' expedition as a joint venture with Caecilius 
the proconsul, make room for the peace embassy (De Sanctis 
still discards it; Thiel rejects Atilius' role). A third 
possibility, supported by hints of the unrest of the Punic 
mercenaries at this time (Polyb. 1.43) is that the embassy 
was sent before Caecilius' victory, and inspired the senate 
to new aggression. See further on the legend, Klebs, 
'Atilius no.51', PWRE 2 (Stuttgart, 1896) 2088-2092 
(rejecting it); T. Frank, 'Two Historical Themes in Roman 
Literature', CP 1926, 311-4 (dating it to 248).
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may have only gained election through the disputes of others, 
like Furius in 251. Neither had experience of naval command, 
but that of their predecessors had been of little apparent 
use to them (153) .
In 249-8, support for the aggressive naval strategy 
was dispelled first by Claudius' loss of his fleet in battle, 
because of tactical errors and the discontent of the troops, 
who had only been mustered with difficulty, and then by 
lunius' loss of newly built ships in a storm (154). When 
Claudius, being recalled by the senate, used his executive 
authority to appoint Glicia, one of his subordinates, as 
dictator to take command after his defeat, the augurs 
forced him to abdicate, and the most successful naval 
general of the war, Atilius Caiatinus, was appointed as 
dictator with Caecilius, the victor in Sicily in 251, as 
his magister equitum, to lead the army in Sicily, where 
lunius had made temporary advances (155). In 248, Claudius 
was prosecuted and fined by plebeian tribunes Fundanius 
and Pullius, presumably representing the senate, angry both 
at the defeat and Claudius' attempt to retain control 
through the dictator (156). In this year, Servilius and
153. Broughton, MRR 211, 214; above, 334, 346 n.l51.
154. cf. De Sanctis, StR 3.1. 169-175, 263-4; Thiel, HRSP 
89-92, 271-289; Walbank, CP 1 113-8.
155. cf. Beloch, GG 4*2 289-290; De Sanctis, StR 3.1. 176-8, 
264; Thiel, HRSP 289-291; J. Ooteghem, Les Caecilii Metelli 
de la Republique (Brussels, 1967) 12-13; Lippold, C 118. 
lunius had taken the temple of Aphrodite, linked with Venus 
(Walbank, CP 1 118-9), whom his kinsmen's allies had 
fostered earlier in the century (313 n.64, 315-6 above).
156. cf. Walbank, CP 1 115, 119; Thiel, HRSP 291-2.
349
Aurelius, the moderate consuls of 252, whose campaigning 
after the previous shipwreck had been so successful, were 
re-elected. They renewed the alliance with Hiero on 
easier terms, and besieged Lilybaeum and Drepanum (157).
From 247 to 244 the sieges of Lilybaeum and Drepanum 
were maintained without any attempt to meet the enemy in 
open battle or rebuild the fleet, although privateers 
were allowed to raid Carthaginian possessions. At the 
same time, there were founded citizen colonies on the 
Etruscan coast at Pyrgoi, Fregenae and Alsium, and a Latin 
colony in the south east at Brundisium, which watched the 
Adriatic, and became Rome's major port for Greece. Most 
senators would have recognised that this policy was essential 
to defend the state against Hamilcar's raids on Italy, which 
began in 247, regain the confidence of the allies and 
citizens, and. recoup financial losses after the disasters 
of 249. With this negative mood in the senate, a small 
clique of magistrates with more individual authority was 
able to gain power. Most inherited personal interest in 
the areas where the colonies were founded, and some had 
probably opposed the war; only four had been elected to any 
office since it began. They may now have only accepted its 
continuation with this policy (158). They were led by the 
Fabii, who, having been absent since 265, now held three 
consulships in a row. N. and M. Fabius Buteo, consuls in
157. De Sanctis, StR 3.1. 179-181; Thiel, HRSP 293-8; 
Broughton, MRR 215.
158. For details of events, see De Sanctis, StR 3.1. 181- 
4; Thiel, HRSP 298-301, 328-9; Salmon, RG 64, 79, 180 n.20; 
Scullard, HRW^ 176-7. For the names of all the magistrates, 
see Broughton, MRR 216-9.
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24-7 and 245, were from an unknown branch of the gens, but 
their reappearance with Fabius Licinius, the consul of 246, 
whose father had taken the land at Caere in 273 on which 
Pyrgoi was based, their activity in the north in 247-5 and 
241, and M. Buteo’s inheritance of the position of princeps 
senatus from Gurges' family, suggests that they shared 
their kinsmens' priorities (159). Two senior senators, 
Goruncanius, consul of 280, and Fulvius, consul of 264, 
were named as dictator and magister equitura to hold the 
election of 245, only the second to do so this century.
Since both shared interests in the north and Tusculan 
origin, and the Fabii gained their third successive consul­
ship under their presidency, they may have gained their 
position through the authority of the Fabii's clique (I60). 
The fourth patrician consul was A. Manlius Atticus who, 
despite being from a family only represented in one consul­
ship in the past century, had enough influence to take the 
censorship first in 247 and a second consulship in 241.
Like Gaecilius, consul in 247, he may have inherited 
interests in north Italy from his father who fought there 
(161); like Sempronius Gracchus, cousin of Blaesus, his
159. The Buteos' patronymies suggest that their father was 
a cousin of Gurges; their cognomen^suggests they shared his 
interests in augury (n.55 above; Munzer, 'Fabii Buteones',
PWRE 6.2 (Stuttgart, 1909) 1759). For the Fabii's interests 
in Greece, Brundisium and the north, and their individualism, 
see above 308-311, 313-6, 328-9, 335-6; below 353-5.
cf. Munzer, RAA 59-61, Scullard, RP 31-3, Lippold, C 118-120, 
on their faction and policy in this period.
160. See above, 298, 311, 325, 332 n.lll, 337.
Fulvius had founded a colony at Castrum Novum, near Pyrgoi, 
in 264 and Goruncanius had taken lands for the colony of Gosa, 
just north of them, in 280.
161. See above 300 n.l3, 311, 322; below 352 n.l64; Gh.6 
383.
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colleague in 244, and Sophus, their kinsman, he had a 
cognomen implying interests in Greece which may have been 
furthered with the foundation of Brundisium in 244 (162).
The experience of Gaecilius and Blaesus, who were both 
elected in violation of the lex Genucia, and Otacilius, 
consul of 263 and 246, and the religious authority of 
Gaecilius, who was a pontifex, may have contributed to 
their election. The latter may have been considered 
expedient to appease the gods and placate the people after 
Claudius' profanities in 249; his sister was fined in this 
connection in 246 by Sempronius Gracchus and Fundanius, 
Claudius' prosecutor in 248 (I63). Finally, Atilius 
Gaiatinus, censor in 247, who had supported the aggressive 
naval strategy in 260-54» may have been generally supported 
in recognition of his distinguished service in four military 
posts during the war; at the same time, he may have reverted 
to supporting the policy of his kinsmen the Fabii, whose
162. Sophus also had interests in the north east (above 333) 
While there are no apparent family ties between Sophus and 
Blaesus, and those between Blaesus and Gracchus are merely 
assumed from their patronymies, their relatively frequent 
appearances in office (together with another member of the 
gens, Tuditanus (Gh.4 294 n.180) whose family ties with 
them are unknown) from 268 to 230 in years when defensive 
policies in the south were being pursued, and the two Greek 
cognomina, suggest their allegiance (see n.l6). Gaecilius 
may also have acquired interests in Greece from his wife 
Fabricia (Ooteghem, op.cit. 22), whose father had diplomatic 
contact with Pyrrhus and the southern Greek ports
(above 322-8).
163. Gaecilius and Blaesus had already both won triumphs; 
Otacilius had ancient links with the Fabii; see above 339 
n.131, 345-6, 348. For full refs, to Claudius' dis­
regard of the auspices in 249, the trial of 246, and stories 
of Gaecilius' acts as pontifex maximus, a post he held after 
Goruncanius' death in 243, see Broughton, MRR 214, 216-220; 
above 348; below 353 n.l67, 355. Gaecilius'
individualism and prestige are evident in his laudatio;
see Lippold, G 75f.
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interests in Greece, Brundisium and Latium are reflected 
in the careers of other Atilii. Atilius Bulbus, consul 
in 245, may have been Gaiatinus’ son (I64).
By the time of the election of 243, concern to end 
the war with a change of strategy would have already been 
developing in the senate, since the Carthaginians had 
captured Mt. Eryx in 244, and thus strengthened their 
chances of guerrilla activity in Sicily. While the policy 
pursued since 248 was continued in 243, the two obscure 
consuls elected, G. Fundanius, a novus homo noted above, 
and G. Sulpicius Galus, from an otherwise unknown family 
and holding this as his only office, might have only won 
the election because there were balanced disputes over 
strategy among the other candidates (165).
Certainly once Fundanius’ serious losses were known, 
the majority of senators favoured building another fleet 
by private loans, in order to end the war with a naval 
blockade of Sicily, or an all out victory at sea (I66).
One consul of 242, A. Postumius Albinus, from a branch of
164. See above 313-8, 334, 341-2, 348.
Atilius Regulus was supposedly farming land in the Pupinia 
tribe when called to service in 256 (Heurgon, GP 287); 
either Gaiatinus, in 247, or Gaecilius, consul of 283, 
built a road through Sabine land to Gastrum Novum (Wiseman, 
PBSR 1970 134-6). . Since Gaiatinus in 306 may have become
linked with the Fabii through the Reguli’s ties in Gales 
(Gh.4 267, 291 n.l7l) and members of both Atilii
families had pursued the same policy in 258-4, they may 
have retained political loyalty in the same way as the 
Sempronii.
165. Degrassi, op.cit. 117, 436-7; Thiel, HRSP 301-2.
166. See Thiel, HRSP 302-4, who argues that the loans were 
compulsory, and possibly interest-bearing.
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the gens unknown since the fourth century, may have been 
generally supported because he was a Flamen Martialis, 
and thus might ensure that the gods favoured Rome in the 
final conflict. Since his priesthood prevented him leaving 
the city, an extra praetor was then created to provide 
enough magistrates with imperium to fight (167). With 
the other consul, C. Lutatius, a novus homo, this second 
praetor, Q. Valerius Falto, won the final victory over the 
Carthaginian fleet at the Aegate islands. As proconsul 
in 241, Lutatius concluded the treaty with Carthage, 
celebrated a triumph, and, aided by his brother, consul 
in 241, went out to Sicily to settle the new province and 
implement the peace terms. Neither family of these 
magistrates is previously known; given the circumstances 
and their success, it is likely that they were specially 
supported for their skills or local knowledge (168).
Since the great victory in the south was known by 
the time of the election of 241, the faction in power from 
247 to 244 gained enough senatorial support to win the 
election of Lutatius’ consular colleague and other 
magistrates. A. Manlius, consul of 244, became consul
167. The Postumii traditionally had much religious author­
ity (Ch.2 169, 227; Ch.3 233; above 314-6)
and the consul’s grandfather may have been rex sacrorum 
(Munzer, ’Postumius no. 39' PWRE 22.1 (Stuttgart, 1953) 
911-2). De Sanctis, StR 3*1 185, Ooteghem, op.cit. 14- 
15, and Lippold, C 302-4, argue for this reason for 
Postumius staying in Rome. For alternatives, see Munzer, 
RAA 261 (the pontifex maximus prevented him because of his 
plebeian bias) and Thiel, HRSP 82-3, 305-6 (the senate 
feared his incompetence or disagreement with his colleague)
168. Broughton, MRR 218-220; Degrassi, op.cit. 76-7, 549;
De Sanctis, StR 3.1.185-8, 264-7; Thiel, HRSP 80, 306-320; 
Walbank, CP 1 124-7.
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again in 241; censors were C. Aurelius, the consul of 
248, and M. Fabius Buteo, consul of 245 (169). The 
faction's prominence in the senate is also attested by 
the moderate nature of the peace terms with Carthage 
(170), and by the policy pursued in Italy in 241.
Manlius, aided by Lutatius, made war on Falerii, which 
had revolted, and took a harsh land indemnity. The 
censors raised the Picentes to full citizenship and 
created the two new tribes Quirina and Velina in north 
east Italy, where many of their allies had personal 
connections. A colony was founded at Spoletium, on 
the road to Ariminium. The censors may also have built 
the Via Amerina through Falerii to southern Umbria, 
and the Via Aurelia through Cosa and Pyrgoi. Thus 
they laid the ground for further development in their 
personal spheres of interest in the north, improved 
their ability to marshal -voters, and replaced some of —
169. Broughton, MRR 219; Lippold, C 120.
170. See above 306-7, n.47.
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the citizen peasants lost in the long war (171). Also 
in 241» the Publicii, plebeian aediles from a previously 
unknown family, built a temple and established a festival 
for Flora, a primitive agricultural goddess,after consult­
ing the Sibylline books; this may have been partly to 
commemorate these events, and partly to soothe the people 
and gods after a fire in the temple of another ancient 
goddess, Vesta, from which Gaecilius supposedly rescued 
the Palladium (172).
171. For events in the north, cf. see Frank, Klio, I9II 
374-9, CAH 7 800-1; Niccolini, FTP 395; Salmon, RC 65 
(differing over the basis of the war with Falerii);
Toynbee, HL 2 66O-I; Harris, REU 163-5, 168; Wiseman,
PBSR 1970pl33-4 (giving various dates for the roads);
Meyer, KS 378-9 (arguing for settlement of peasants on 
the land as the prime aim of this policy).
For the location and extent of the new tribes,^see 
Badian, 1RS 1962 203, accepting Mommsen's idea (RSt 172 
n.9) that the Quirina was so named simply because it was 
in a Sabine area (for other suggestions, see Beloch, RG 
264; Taylor, VDRR 60f; Palmer, AGR 165).
Since the mid fourth century, Fabii, Manlii, Atilii, 
Fulvii, Gaecilii and Sempronii, all united in power since 
247, and their ally Curius, whose descendants had not 
retained power, had been developing personal interests 
in central and north Italy; during the third Samnite war, 
they were partly motivated by concern about citizen peasants; 
see above 302-4, 310-3, 316-7, 322, 330-3, 336, 349-352.
A. Manlius is later known in the Velina (Taylor, VDRR 231).
172. See further Broughton, MRR 219-220; Meyer, ibid; 
Ooteghem, op.cit. 15-20; Scullard, FGRR 110-111. See 
Ch.3 233, Ch.4 251, and above, 313-6, 335 on
the association of 
Fabii and Manlii with the Sibylline books and Apollo, 
who may have appeared on coins struck this year 
(Crawford, RRC 44-5).
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Conclusion
Summing up, Roman politics from 303 to 241 were 
dominated, broadly, by Rome's military, commercial and 
cultural expansion, as senators tried to gain what they 
felt was the appropriate balance of citizens and allies 
in the federation, agriculture and commerce in the economy, 
and executive power and oligarchic authority in government. 
At the same time, of course, all were trying to further 
their own families' political prestige, economic interests, 
and electoral control. The relative lack of repeated 
offices by individuals, the range of families in power, 
and the broad nature.of many of the political issues, 
may be attributed to the increasing authority of the senate 
as a whole over elections and policy; in other words, 
individual magistrates may have represented senatorial 
rather than factional policy more frequently than ever 
before. It may be noted that it“ was often members of the 
Fabii and. Claudii, which were not represented in magist­
racies by as many patrician families as other gentes 
raaiores, and therefore identified themselves less with 
the ruling class as a whole, who promoted factional 
policies in specific periods, and challenged senatorial 
authority (173).
173. See especially 312-9, 333-8, 348-352.
See n.l4, 56, 116, 171 for hints that their client bases 
were particularly strong.
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CHAPTER 6 - ELECTIONS: 240-219 B.C.
The Political Issues
In the period between the two Punic wars, the 
governing class was more exclusive than ever before; most 
successful candidates in the curule elections belonged to 
families well established in the senate, and their loyalty 
to the governing class was almost equivalent to their 
broadest kinship loyalties (1). As a result of united 
opposition in the governing class to individualism, as well 
as a lack of major warfare, the cursus honorum became 
increasingly regular, and the lex Genucia was enforced in 
all but three years; hence a fair number of leaders - forty- 
nine - gained the seventy-five known curule posts, and only 
six men held more than one consulship (2). The lex 
Claudia of 218, limiting the number of ships of senators, 
and possibly banning them from making contracts, may have 
been partly motivated by concern to maintain the senatorial 
class as an exclusive body free from the growing middle 
class of business men, although it was not generally 
popular because it struck at the private interests of so 
many existing senators (3).
1. Ch.1C 82-3, 86; Develin, POH 35f, 50, 54-7. Only
three novi homines were consuls; nineteen consulships 
were held by gentes maiores; six pairs of brothers with 
one cousin were consuls; nineteen consuls were sons of 
consuls.
2. Ch.IB, 66-7, 77-8; Develin, POH 35-6.
3. For this interpretation, and a full summary of 
alternative views of the law, see Cassola, GPR 215-8.
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The exclusiveness of the governing class was partly 
due to the increasing stability of the system of marshall­
ing clients to the elective and legislative assemblies 
in this period; no more major enfranchisements or new 
tribes were made; the upper class tribes were directly 
correlated with the centuries in the reform of the. comitia 
centuriata in 230, and freedmen active in the city were 
registered in urban rather than rural tribes in 220 (4).
The overall authority of the senate over policy was also 
now firmly established (5). In such circumstances the 
significance of the candidates’ views on policy in the 
elections depended largely on their standing in the senate, 
and they would have frequently stood for and implemented 
its opinion. However, when the governing class was weakened 
by divisions over political issues, or individuals developed 
unusual degrees of personal power, normal electoral practices 
and the senate’s authority over policy broke down. This 
is evident in two specific periods - 232-0 and 223-0.
In these periods, augurs enforced abdications four times; 
three dictators and one interrex had to hold elections; the 
senate refused triumphs to two magistrates pursuing strategies 
with which it disagreed; a law and possibly a levy were 
carried in the assembly against the senate's will (6).
The following review of other current political issues will 
show that these periods were times of particular crisis and
4. See further Ch.10, 85, 93-7, 104-116; Ch.5 300.
5. Ch.IB, 75-9; Ch.1C, 118-122.
6. cf. Ch.IB 47-50, 54, 73-4; Ch.10, 120. Full details 
are in the yearly account. The lex Claudia, which may have 
lacked a senatus consulta, was passed just after the second 
phase, in 218.
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change.
By 240, Rome controlled a relatively peaceful and 
prosperous federation in Italy and Sicily. There was 
enough land for peasants returning from the wars, and the 
colonies and state fleet guarded against external attack 
and internal conflict. The coastal colonies and fleet, 
access to harbours in Sicily, and the proceeds of the 
recent war facilitated commercial and industrial develop­
ment. From 240, the citizen population gradually 
increased, despite few enfranchisements, because of the 
greater prosperity and the lack of further colonies or 
major wars (7). In these settled circumstances, new 
problems of defining Rome's future role in the Mediterranean 
arose. The extent, location and purpose of military and 
diplomatic action were the prime issues of debate between 
senators between the two Punic wars.
—  While senators' views on such issues naturally 
changed with circumstances, they were still essentially 
dictated by their spheres of political and economic 
interest in Italy or beyond, and their immediate families' 
traditions. Thus repeated associations in offices of 
direct relations or members of the same pair of families 
may often be attributed to their sharing common views, if
7. For the loyalty of allies in the federation, see 
Badian, FC 52-4; Salmon, SS 293f. For the plentifulness 
of land, see Fraccaro, Opusc. 2 192f; Tibiletti, Ath. 1949
30. For the value of the fleet, see Thiel, HRSP 57-9, 
341-358. For hints of general wealth, commerce, industry 
and public works, see Frank, ES 1 67-75; Cassola, GPR 47f; 
Scullard, HRW^ 352, 358; Ch.1C 109: below 369, 374, 377 
n.56, 389. For the population of citizens and allies in
the federation cf. Frank, ES 1 56-9; Walbank, CP 1 196-203; 
Brunt, IM 44-62.
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similar issues were current each time (8). However, 
as was already becoming apparent in the first half of 
the third century, inferences about individual political 
views from immediate family spheres of interest are less 
certain when broad issues such as national defence and 
commercial development prevailed (9). Furthermore, those 
inheriting the same broad spheres of influence might have 
different priorities according to the nature of their local 
connections and specific circumstances. For example, some 
descendants of those involved in northern expansion earlier 
in the century might have retained the defence of north 
Italy against the Gauls as their prime concern, while others 
might have developed through their Etruscan contacts 
ambitions for a western trading empire, and hence have been 
more concerned with promoting war against Carthage. 
Similarly, some descendants of those who had earlier 
favoured expansion south, having inherited influence in 
the Greek towns in south Italy and Sicily, might now have 
viewed the policy of developing peaceful relations with the 
east as a priority, while others might have retained their 
forefathers' interests in aggression against Carthage (10).
8. cf. Ch.10, 88-91, 118-9. Such repeated offices 
facilitate the detection of views on policy, which are 
obscured by the lack of repetition of office and the 
senate's authority over policy; cf. Ch.5, 298, 300, n.l5
9. cf. Ch.5, 300-2.
10. cf. Ch.1C, 96-7; Ch.5, 328-9, 332-3, 335, 340, 349.
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Finally, it should be noted that conclusions about 
individuals' views on foreign policy in this period will 
never hinge on details from the period after 219, since 
the second Punic war created unique circumstances (11).
Gallic raids were carried out on north east Italy 
from 238 to 236, but no vigorous counter-offensives were 
made by Rome because the senate was preoccupied with the 
west (12). However in 232 Flaminius created viritane 
allotments on the Ager Gallicus taken in 283, primarily to 
bolster the area against Gallic infiltration south and 
create a basis for further expansion into the fertile lands 
of the Po valley. By providing large allotments for 
citizens, he encouraged emigration to the hostile area by 
peasants whom he and his political allies may have hoped to 
patronise to their political advantage (13). Fears that
11. Ch.10, 89, 121-2; Taylor, AJP 1952, 303-6. Sub­
sidiary evidence from the later period is occasionally cited.
12. Rome's action elsewhere in 238-6 (below, 36$f) 
supports the view of Polyb. 2.21.1-6 that the Gauls were 
the aggressors; see further Frank, CAH 7 808-9, 816;
Cassola, GPR 221. cf. Lippold, C 123, who accepts the 
view of Zon. 8.18 that the Romans were the aggressors.
13. Frank, Klio, 1911 373, Fraccaro, Opusc. 2 191f, Beloch, 
RG 475-6, and Cassola, GPR 209, 211 argue for the settlements 
being north of the Aesis. Frank, CAH 7 806-7, Kramer, 
'Massilian Diplomacy before the second Punic War', AJP 1948 
10-11, and Lippold, C 134 contend that they were to keep 
back the Gauls. Polybius notes the fertility of the Po 
valley (2.14f) and suggests Rome aimed at expansion there 
(2.21.9). The creation of large citizen allotments would 
have been necessary to entice settlers away from new 
commercial and industrial opportunities; now that the fede­
ration was settled, there would have been less fear of im­
balance between allies and citizens, although allies still 
greatly outnumbered Romans in the army (see refs, on 
population in n.7); see further Ch.1C 104; Ch.5 303-4; 
above, 359; Fraccaro, Opusc. 2 193f, 203f; Yavetz,
Ath. 1962 332-5; Cassola, GPR 211f.
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the settlements might provoke untimely Gallic attacks which 
together with political considerations caused general 
opposition to them in the senate (14) were justified by 
the gathering of a vast Gallic invasion force in 226.
After it was quelled at Telemon (15), aggressive campaigns 
were carried out against the Gauls from 224 to 222, 
apparently with the aim of forming a broad new northern 
frontier from Liguria in the west, to the Po valley and the 
Adriatic in the east. The conquests were consolidated by 
an expedition to the Alps and the building of the Via 
Flaminia to Ariminium, which also increased the political 
value of the settlements of 232, in 220, and the creation 
of large colonies at Placentia and Cremona in 219. 
Differences in the priorities of those promoting these 
measures - the protection of Rome’s northern allies, the 
exploitation of the new lands won, or the eradication of 
Gallic threats to allow Rome to concentrate on western 
affairs - caused conflicts over the extent of the campaigns.
14. The senators' objections (see for details, Kramer, 
art.cit. 8-9; Walbank, CP 1 193; Cassola, GPR 211-3; 
Fraccaro, Opusc. 2 202f; Ch.1C 102f) may in themselves 
explain the passage of the law without a senatus consulta; 
see Polyb. 2.21.8; Livy 22.3.4; Cic. Brut. 56, de Inv.
2.52; Val. Max. 5.4*5; since their disapproval may be 
largely due to hindsight (Ch.lA 22, Ch.IB 74, Walbank, CP 1 
193), their inference that it was passed by direct appeal 
(which may be partly due to confusion with events in 223; 
see below 383-4) need not be heeded (Ch.1C 99, 112-3; 
n.l3 above; n.65 below). The view that the senators
objected because they were already farming the area 
(Cassola, GPR 209f) is unlikely, given its distance and 
extent, the idea that settlements were made to prevent 
Gallic incursions (n.l3), and the general abundance of 
land (n.7).
15. See Polyb. 2.22-31, with comments by Walbank, CP 1 
194-207.
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the authority of the magistrates leading them, and the 
influence of those with commercial interests on the 
implementation of policy from 224 to 218 (l6).
The consolidation of Rome's alliances with Greek 
ports in southern Italy, the colonisation of Brundisium, 
and the conquest of Sicily in the first Punic war, opened 
up many opportunities for commercial, cultural and 
diplomatic contacts with the east (17), and a policy of 
avoiding expansionist wars in the west in order to develop 
these chances peacefully may be detected in this period.
In 240-239» a dispute between Carthage and Rome over Italian 
traders supplying arms to mercenaries rebelling against 
Carthage was settled amicably, and an appeal for aid from 
Rome from "Ohe Carthaginian garrison at Sardinia, which had 
rebelled, was rejected (18). Rome's south Italian allies 
went to Asclepius' festival in Cos in 241; Greek plays and 
schools and Tarentine gods had appeared at Rome by 234; 
diplomatic links were made with Seleucus and Roman envoys
16. For details of these developments and motives behind 
them, cf. Salmon, RC 65-6; Cassola, GPR 215, 220-8; Wise­
man, PBSR 1970 138; Scullard, HRW^ 190-1; below 382-9.
17. For increasing Roman interest in the east from the 
fifth to the raid third century cf. Ch.2 169; Ch.3 184;
Ch.5 302, 315-6, 328, 334-5, 349; Holleaux, ROM 1-96,
CAH 7 822-4; Badian, FC 33f; Walbank, CP 1 l66, JRS 1963,
2-3. It is generally agreed that by 230 (the first military 
intervention), Rome had developed no military or imperial­
ist aims in the east, and embassies there had made no 
political commitments to Greek states; hence Polyb. 2.12.7.
18. Polyb. 1.83.7-11; App. Spain 4, Sicil. 2.3, Pun. 5;
Zon. 8.17; Val. Max. 5.1.1. Roman mistrust of the 
mercenaries, a philoroman policy at Carthage and Roman dis­
inclination to breach the 241 treaty may explain this; see
Polyb. 2.7.10; Frank, CAH 7 802-3; Walbank, CP 1 144-6;
Scullard, HRW^ 185.
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mediated in a dispute between Acarnanians and Aetolians 
in 239 or 238 (19). In 230, an appeal from Issa for aid 
against Illyrian pirates who were hampering the trade of 
Rome's Italian allies with the eastern states resulted in 
the dispatch of an investigatory mission to Queen Teuta of 
Illyria; it bore no ultimatum of war, and clearly hoped to 
settle the dispute peacefully. When the murder of an 
envoy forced Rome to declare war, a military expedition 
was only reluctantly sent out, and the peace settlement 
quickly made was modest; a client king, Demetrius, was 
established to watch over Illyria, and several Greek towns 
simply entered into Rome's protection with no apparent 
legal obligations on either side. At the same time, the 
opportunity was taken to send embassies to establish 
friendships with other major Greek cities (20). The 
expedition to Istria in 220, and the second Illyrian war 
in 219 were provoked by further piracy and the aggressions 
of Demetrius, taking advantage of Rome's preoccupations 
elsewhere to override his sphere of influence, and were 
probably viewed at Rome largely as a necessity to secure
19. De Sanctis, StR 3.1.277-8; Gage, AR 252-3; Cassola, 
GPR 47-8; Szemler, PRR 69 n.3, 87. Holleaux, RGM 5-22, 
46-58 rejects the last two.
20. See further, Holleaux, RGM 97-129, CAH 7 824-842;
E. Badian, 'Notes on Roman Policy in Illyria', PBSR 1952, 
72-81; Walbank, CP 1 158-167; Lippold, C 130-3; Cassola, 
GPR 229-232. For an alternative view of the war as an 
imperialist adventure aimed at Macedon, see Thiel, HRSP 
344f; N. Hammond, 'Illyris, Rome and Macedon in 229-205
B.C.', JRS 1968, 1-9.
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Rome’s borders before the second Punic war (21).
Perhaps the most important single issue of debate in 
the period 240-219 was the aggressive policy of extending 
Rome’s western empire, which culminated in the second Punic 
war. It is first apparent when the Romans invaded Sardinia 
in violation of the treaty of 241 and in response to a 
second plea by the rebel Carthaginian garrison, after it had 
been expelled from the island by the local people in 238. 
When Carthage protested, the rich urban voters in the 
comitia centuriata, who hoped to benefit from the trading 
opportunities presented, voted for war, and thus forced 
Carthage to cede her rights to Sardinia, and pay extra 
indemnity (22). Also in 238, the Romans attacked the 
Ligurians, whose pirates prowled the Tyrrhenian sea. Two 
years later they invaded Corsica, whose inhabitants were 
close allies of the Ligurians (23). The islands and
21. For similar views of the Istrian war, see Cassola, GPR 
232-3 and H. Dell, ’Demetrius of Pharos and the Istrian War’, 
Hist. 1970, 30-8, arguing against the view of De Sanctis,
StR 3.1.319-320 and Walbank, CP 1 324 that it was part of 
the conquest of Gaul, and Demetrius' intrigues were merely
a pretext. For similar views of the second Illyrian war, 
see Badian, art.cit. 81-88 and Walbank, CP 1 324-7. cf. 
Holleaux, RGM 130-9, CAH 7 844-851, Thiel, HRSP 346, 349- 
350, 355-7, and Hammond, art.cit. 10-12, who suggest that 
Rome was inspired by fear of a Carthage/Macedonia/lllyria 
alliance.
22. For hints of Rome's earlier contacts with Sardinia, see 
Ch.3 185, n.lO; Ch.5 341 n.l36. See further on the assembly
vote Ch.1C 114; Ch.5 306-7 ; n.36 below. The view of
Polyb. 1.88.8-12, 3.10.1-3, 13.1-2, 27.7, 28.1-4, that the 
invasion and threat of war were unjustified aggression is 
generally accepted; see e.g. De Sanctis, StR 3.1.280-1, 398- 
401; Meyer, KS^ 383-5; Walbank, CP 1 150; Lippold, C 122f; 
Cassola, GPR 51-2.
23. Romans may have gained interests in Corsica when it was 
under Etruscan control (up to the late fourth century) and in
259-8; see Ch.3 185 n.lO, Ch.4 266 n.94, 292 n.l72; Ch.5 
340-2; Thiel, HRSP 199 n.438. For these attacks, cf. 
Zon. 8.18; De Sanctis, StR 3.1.281; Lippold, C 123-4.
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Liguria were largely quelled by about 230; a governing 
praetor was finally established in Sardinia in 227 (24). 
Short term reasons for the action against the Ligurians 
were the protection of the Roman federation’s shipping, 
and the consolidation of the defences of Etruria and 
Umbria from the Gauls. The long term aim of all the 
campaigns was clearly the creation of a western trading 
empire, even at the risk of further war with Carthage; 
possession of the islands and the quelling of the 
Ligurians allowed greater access from all parts of Italy 
and Sicily to Massilia, the Greek trading colony in the 
north west Mediterranean, and its colonies on the east 
coast of Spain. Massilia and Syracuse, having suffered 
from Carthage’s expansion in the west Mediterannean in 
the fourth century, would have encouraged Rome in this 
challenge to Carthage’s trade routes (25).
The resistance of Corsica and Sardinia to conquest 
by Rome may have been encouraged by the Carthaginians, 
who, after the mercenary war, invaded Spain, to regain 
their strength and watch Rome's expansion west-
24. cf. Zon. 8.18-19; De Sanctis, StR 3.1.280-5, 289- 
290; Lippold, C 123-130, 133. The creation of praetors 
for both Sardinia and Sicily in 227 suggests that by then 
the Romans viewed the former as a peaceful possession 
like the latter.
25. cf. Ch.3 184 n.5; De Sanctis, StR 3.1.288-9; De Witt, 
TAPA 1940 608-612; Thiel, HRSP 342-4, 350-1; Kramer, AJP 
1948 5-6; Cassola, GPR 50-6, 221; Lippold, C 256-7.
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wards (26). This in turn caused increasing concern in 
Rome about Carthaginian ambitions, which was fanned by 
Massilia, fearing for its Spanish colonies. Accordingly, 
two Roman missions were sent to Spain to investigate and 
curtail the Punic advance. The first, in 231, did no 
more than gather information and warn of Rome’s suspicions 
(27). The second, in 226, resulted in the Ebro treaty, 
which forbad Carthaginian troops north of the Ebro, and 
probably similarly restricted Rome south of the river; 
since it left much room for Carthaginian conquest in 
Spain, and acknowledged Rome’s right to arbitrate there, 
a diplomatic victory could be claimed by both Carthaginian 
and Roman expansionists. The second embassy was probably 
prompted by fear that Hasdrubal, who had made great progress 
in Spain from 229, might take advantage of Rome’s pre­
occupation with the impending Gallic invasion; hence 
reserve legions were retained at Tarentum and Sicily during 
the Gallic invasion, and a consul stayed in Sardinia, 
where there were revolts against the new praetors, until
26. Kramer, art.cit. 7-8 and Lippold, C 125-6 accept 
Zon. 8.18, Gros. 4-.12, Eutrop. 3.2 and Livy Per. 20 on 
Carthage’s role in the islands’ resistance, esp. in 235; 
De Sanctis, StR 3.1.281 n.39, 291 n.63, and Meyer, KS^
385 n.l, 387 n.2, 389, doubt it. On the Carthaginian 
motives for expansion into Spain, cf. De Sanctis, StR 
3.1.4-Olf; Schulten, CAH 7 769-787; De Witt, art.cit.
612; Scullard, HRW4 195-7, 200-1.
27. De Sanctis, StR 3.1.4-11; Badian, EC 4-8. cf. Frank, 
CAH 7 809 and Kramer, art.cit. 9-11 (the Saguntum treaty 
was made at the same time); Holleaux, RGM 123 n.4- and 
Meyer, KS^ 393 (denying the embassy).
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the Ebro treaty had been signed (28).
A few years later, again, no doubt, at the encourage­
ment of Massilia, Rome made a treaty with Saguntum, a 
Spanish port south of the Ebro; this may not in itself 
have legally violated the Ebro treaty, but it was clearly 
an aggressive move, in that it provided Rome with a pretext 
for war should Carthage attack the town. Thus it may 
have been made when Rome arbitrated in an internal dispute 
in Saguntum, after the great northern campaigns, which 
ended in 222, and after young Hannibal had replaced 
Hasdrubal; those fearing war with Carthage doubtless hoped 
that it would deter him from further expansion (29). 
However, Hannibal's aggressive military campaigns in Spain 
quickly dashed such hopes, and there was a rapid escalation 
towards war on both sides. At Rome, the recent conquest 
of the north and fear of Hannibal's inexperience resulted
28. For similar interpretations of Polyb. 2.13.3-7, 24.1, 
3.22.9-11; App. Spain 7, Hann. 2, Pun. 6; Livy 21.2.7;
Zon. 8.19,21 (the later sources deviate in order to put 
the blame on Carthage for the second Punic war) see De 
Witt, art.cit. 6l2; Kramer, art.cit. 14, 16-18; Walbank,
CP 1 168-170, 196; Cassola, GPR 219, 246-250; Lippold, C 
135-7.
29. See further J. Reid, 'Problems of the second Punic War', 
JRS 1913 178f, Errington, 'Rome and Spain before the second 
Punic War', Latomus, 1970 43f (the alliance was made at the 
time of arbitration); Badian, FC 491, Astin, 'Saguntum and 
the Origins of the second Punic War', Latomus, 1967, 589- 
594 (the alliance, made after 225, did not legally violate 
the treaty). For the alternative view that the alliance 
preceded the treaty, see e.g.. De Sanctis, StR 3.1.417-8; 
Walbank, CP 1 170-1; Cassola, GPR 245-6. Difficulties in 
reconciling the spirit of the treaty and alliance may 
explain why annalists in n.28 accounted for Saguntum in the 
treaty or assumed it was north of the Ebro (cf. Polyb.
3.30.3; Astin, art.cit. 586-9; n.27).
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in growing demands for the war, and preparations were made 
with the consolidation of other frontiers, the dispatch of 
an embassy to Hannibal to warn him off Saguntum, and an 
economy measure, the lex Metilia, which restricted the use 
of luxury materials by fullers (30). However, Hannibal 
besieged Saguntum, hoping to provoke war before Rome was 
ready for it. This did cause reticence at Rome; the 
opponents of the war and those concerned to complete the 
expedition to Illyria and the northern colonies gained 
enough influence to prevent any aid reaching Saguntum 
throughout the eight month siege (31).
The fall of Saguntum finally forced the question of 
war with Carthage on Rome, and there was a long debate in 
the senate. While one side would have argued that the 
war might give Rome complete control of the western 
Mediterranean, and that Rome was under a moral obligation 
to Saguntum and Massilia, the other could contend that such 
imperialist expansion was not in Rome's interests, the 
consuls were still in Illyria, Macedonia and Gaul were 
both dangerous, and Hannibal had not actually breached the 
Ebro treaty by attacking Saguntum. By the end of the 
debate, the latter arguments had been weakened by the 
consuls' successful completion of the Illyrian war, and
30. For events in Spain, see Polyb. 2.36.1-7, 3.13-15, 
17; Diod. 25.12.15. cf. App. Spain 8-12, Hann. 3, Livy, 
21.3-13, Zon. 8.21, and Dio fr. 54.10-11, who put Rome
in a better light by placing the siege before the first 
embassy. See further Walbank, CP 1 214-5, 319-320; 
Kramer, art.cit. 20-2; Cassola, GPR 234-5. For this 
interpretation of the lex Metilia, see Cassola, GPR 214.
31. cf. Kramer, art.cit. 22-3; Walbank, CP 1 320, 329; 
Cassola, GPR 235-6; Astin, art.cit. 595-6.
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the colony commissioners’ settlements in the north.
Hannibal may even have already made contact with the Gauls 
and crossed the Ebro for his Alpine expedition before the 
final vote was taken in the senate and assembly, and an 
embassy was sent to Carthage with an ultimatum (32).
Summing up, the basic cause of the second Punic war 
was the imperialist policy in the western Mediterranean 
of one political faction at Rome, which then caused the 
build up of mutual suspicions and fears of Carthage, 
Massilia and other Roman leaders (33).
The Elections
Rome’s pacific foreign policy until the middle of 
238, keeping peace with Carthage and developing diplomatic 
and cultural links in Greece and the east, would have been 
generally favoured in the senate after the long Punic 
war (34). All the consuls from 240 to 238 - C. Claudius
32. Saguntum fell in winter 219/8; see Walbank, CP 1 
327-8; Astin, art.cit. 580-2. For arguments for the 
debate at Rome, contra Polyb. 3.20, and discussion of its 
content, cf. De Sanctis, StR 3.1.424 n.86, 3.2.197; Kramer, 
art.cit. 23-5; Cassola, GPR 236f; Lippold, C 139-141;
Astin, art.cit. 579-580. For the idea that Hannibal had 
crossed the Ebro, or had set out to do so before the vote 
was taken, see Hoffman, ’Die romische Kriegserklarung an 
Karthago im Jahre 218’, RhM 1952, 212-216; Walbank, CP
1 333-4; for objections, see Astin, art.cit. 577f. See 
also Ch.1C 115 on the vote for war.
33. of. Meyer, KS^ 375-401, Thiel, HRSP 341f. and Cassola, 
GPR 233-4, 238f (war was the result of the imperialist 
policy of Roman capitalists, as opposed to the agrarian 
policy pursued in north Italy);,Frank, CAH 7 815-7, Astin, 
art.cit. 593f and Scullard, HRW 200-2 (war was due to 
opportunism on both sides; the inevitable clash of their 
spheres of interest). Walbank, CP 1 151, 169-170, 214-5, 
310-1, 329, 335 summarises the major distortions of the 
causes of war by the ancients.
34. See Ch.5, 352f; above, 363-4.
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Centho, son of the consul of 264» C. Manilius, son of the 
consul of 262, Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, cousin of the consul 
of 244» his kinsman Sempronius Tuditanus, Q. Valerius Falto, 
the praetor of 242, and Publius his brother - may have 
favoured such a policy because it allowed them to develop 
Sicilian and Greek contacts which they or their relations 
had made in the course of the first Punic war. This 
attitude, and their families' prominence in the senate may 
explain their election; Q. Falto's consulship would also 
have been in honour of his recent victory (35).
After this unusual three year lull in military activity 
there was a clear change of direction; in the course of 
238, the policy of extending Rome's western trade and 
defending her western and northern borders by making war 
on Sardinia, Corsica and the Ligurians was initiated. 
Sempronius Gracchus was sent to Sardinia and Liguria, while 
Falto, his colleague, met a Gallic invasion; it may not have 
been until after the election of 237 that Carthage was 
forced to cede her rights to Sardinia by the threat of war 
from Rome (36). The policy prevailed from 237 to 233.
35. For their names, see Broughton, MRR 221. Mamilius may 
have been an augur for 15-20 years; see Dessau ILS 9338; cf. 
Munzer, RAA 68. For their spheres of interest, see Ch. 5 
337-9» 350-1» 353; Lippold, C 122; Rawson, Hist. 1973 220f. 
Direct descendants of all except Gracchus served in Sicily 
or Greece in the second Punic war; see Broughton, MRR 254»
260-1, 264» 295» 303-4» 313» 321. Schur, Hermes, 1924» 
470-2 and Scullard, RP 37 trace second century ties between 
Claudii and Sempronii back to this period, and earlier.
36. See Fest. 430 L; Livy Per. 20; Oros. 4.12; Zon. 8.18; 
above 365-6. Meyer, KS2 385-6 favours 237 for the date
of the first expedition to Sardinia (Eutrop. 3.2); Walbank, 
CP 1 149-150 and Lippold, C 122 argue for 238 (Zon. 8.18), 
accepting, however, that the ultimatum may have been voted 
after the election.
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There are several hints that the magistrates of this period 
formed a clique which promoted this policy and monopolised
office through its members' mutual support, predominance in
the senate, religious authority in both senate and assembly,
and military talent (37). Thirteen individuals, including
two brothers, L. and P. Cornelii Lentuli, and a father and
son, L. and A. Postumii Albini, held at least fifteen
curule posts (38). L. Lentulus, T. Manlius Torquatus, A.
Albinus, Sp. Carvilius, Q. Fabius Verrucosus and M'.
Pomponius were all priests (39). Q. Fulvius Flaccus,
Q. Lutatius Cerco, the Lentuli, Postumii, Manlius, C.
Atilius Bulbus, Carvilius and Verrucosus were themselves,
or were direct descendants of, magistrates in office in
276-2, 247-5 and 242-1; C. Licinius Varus may have been
related to the Fabii Licinii, who held offices in these
periods. Many would have inherited interests in west
coast colonies founded within these dates (40). Atilius'
father, a relative of Fulvius' wife Sulpicia, and Scipio,
who was kinsman of the Cornelii in office in this period
37. While they comprised a quarter of those gaining curule 
posts from 240 to 219» they held one third of these posts; 
cf. 357 above.
38. See Broughton, MRR 221-5» also noting that three junior 
posts held by one of them, Q. Fabius, could have fallen in 
this period. Lippold, C 123f identifies a similar clique.
39. Szemler, PRR 69-74; 86f.
40. See Ch.5 328, 349-354;
Lippold, C 123. Fulvius' father also founded such a colony 
in 264 (Ch.5 337). Both Etruscan plebeian gentes,
the Licinii and Pomponii, had last held office in 366-1, but 
clearly had powerful connections; their sons both held major 
priesthoods by 210 (Munzer, RAA l6lf, 183f).
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(the Lentuli and one noted without a cognomen), had made 
campaigns to Sardinia and Corsica in 259-8. Scipio's 
son married Pomponius' daughter at about this time (41).
All the magistrates, save Lutatius, inherited interests 
in Etruria from the fourth century or earlier, when 
Corsica was still Etruscan, or were descended from those 
who had fought in the northern reaches of Etruria and 
Umbria, towards Gaul and Liguria, in the third century (42).
In 237-6, L. and P. Lentulus, Q. Fulvius and C.
Licinius all fought the Gauls; the Lentuli and Fulvius 
also fought the Ligurians, while C. Licinius, aided by 
his legate Claudius Clineas, who may have had local know­
ledge of the island, invaded Corsica (43). By 235, there 
may have been increasing wariness within the faction about 
the effects of a long term policy of western expansion, 
as Carthage advanced in Spain, and the islands maintained 
their resistance. It is striking that all the consuls 
of 235-3, save Pomponius, were from families whose interests 
in the east.were evident in the third century; indeed three. 
Verrucosus, Carvilius and Postumius, were re-elected as
41. Ch.5 340-2; Munzer, 'Fulvius no. 59',
PWRE 7.1 (Stuttgart, 1910) 246; RAA 161-2.
42. Ch.2 149-150; Ch.3 212-3; Ch.4 268 n.lOl;
Ch.5, 307-315; above n.23. By 212, traders
from the Postumii and Pomponii were established in Etruria 
(Livy 25.3.8-9).
43. Flor. 1.19.5; Eutrop. 3.2; Zon. 8.18; Degrassi, op.cit.
76-7, 549; Ch.4 266 n.94; above 365 n.23. The story
of the Romans trying to hand Claudius over to the Corsicans 
for making a treaty on his own (Zon. 8.18; Val. Max. 6.3.3) 
may have been developed from similar tales (cf. Ch.IB 71 
n.l20; Zon. 8.7) to conceal Roman aggression; cf. De 
Sanctis, StR 3.1.281, 287-8; Lippold, C 123-4.
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consuls to fight the Illyrian war of 229-8. Concern to 
develop this alternative sphere of interest, and to defend 
the north against the Gauls more directly, together with 
increasing fear of Carthaginian retaliation, may have 
stimulated their efforts to complete the western conquests
(44). After Manlius campaigned in Sardinia and celebrated 
a triumph in 235» he and Atilius then closed the door of 
Janus, an act symbolising universal peace; presumably they 
hoped that it would mark the final conquest of the islands
(45). However in 234 there was a rebellion by the islanders 
which Carvilius, the consul, faced with Cornelius the 
praetor, while Postumius campaigned against the Ligurians
(46). In 233, a concerted effort was made to end the wars; 
Pomponius triumphed in Sardinia, while Fabius drove the 
Ligurians back over the Alps, vowing a temple to Honos after 
his triumph (47).
44. See above (36I, 366-7) on the situation. For hints 
of the consuls' eastern interests, see Ch.5 315-6, 334,
350-2 (all five); Szemler, PRR 86-7 (Carvilius);
Cassola, GPR 360 and Lippold, C 270-6 (Fabius). Pomponius 
may have shared them; his supposed ancestor Numa was associated 
with Pythagoras (Gundel, 'Pomponius', PWRE 21.2 (Stuttgart, 
1952) 2323; Ch.4, 241 n.ll, 262 n.82) and both his fore­
fathers and descendants may have been decemviri sacris 
facundis (Ch.IB 63; Ch.3 233; Ch.4 245-6; below 376;
Munzer, RAA I6I). cf. Munzer, RAA 57, Kramer, art.cit. 6,
13 and Lippold, C 127f on the change in the pattern of names 
about this time.
45. n.26 above; Broughton, MRR 223; Staveley, JRS I964 198; 
cf. De Sanctis, StR 3.1.291; Lippold, C 125-7.
46. Zon. 8.18; Degrassi, op.cit. 76-7, 549.
47. Zon. 8.18; Cic. ND 2.6l; Plut. Fab. 2.1; Degrassi, op. 
cit. 76-7, 549.
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From 232 to 230 all the consuls were from minor 
families; only one was from a family in power since 241, 
and only one held another curule post. Such results may 
have been partly due to increasing uncertainty within the 
senate about the future direction and nature of foreign 
policy (48).
By the time of the election of 232, the controversial 
law on the Ager Gallicus may have already been passed by 
Flaminius, a plebeian tribune from a previously unknown 
gens who pursued northern expansion throughout his career 
(49). The consuls subsequently elected may have shared 
his views. M. Publicius had commemorated action in the 
north in 241; M. Aemilius Lepidus was from a minor family 
of his gens, which only gained office twice this century, 
in periods when his kinsmen, the Papi and Barbulae,
48. cf. 358 above. Munzer, RAA 160f, followed by 
Kramer, art.cit. 6-7, 12-13, and Scullard, RP 35-6, bases 
his view of the allegiance of magistrates of these years 
largely on their gentes* common offices in other circum­
stances (cf. Ch.5 346, n.151 ), marriages unlikely to 
have taken place yet (Scullard, RP 309; cf. 373 above), 
and prominence in priesthoods (cf. Ch.IB, 54 n.71).
With regard to the latter, it should be noted that we 
know more names of priests in this period, and in such 
times of dispute, religious authority would have helped 
in winning an election (Ch.IB 54; Ch.1C 111-2, 119; 
Szemler, PRR 69-100).
49. See further 361-2, 379-381, 383-4, 388-9 on 
Flaminius' law and attitudes. The Prata Flaminia (Varro 
L.1.5.154; Livy 3.54-15, 3-63-7) indicate that his gens 
was well established at Rome. When Cic, Sen. 11 notes 
Fabius' reaction against Flaminius' law in his second 
consulship (see 379-380) he assumes this was when the law 
was passed, which Polyb. 2.21.7 tells us was in 232; 
Cicero's mistake is understandable if the law was passed 
before Fabius left his first consulship in 233- of. 
Meyer, KS^ 390; Botsford, RA 334; Fraccaro, Opusc. 2 194; 
Cassola, GPR 260-1, 343f; Lippold 134-5-
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furthered northern expansion (50). Flaminius' lack of 
senatus consulta and the consuls' continuation of the war 
in Sardinia suggests that this policy did not have the 
support of the majority of senators (51); if the consuls 
did support it, their success in the election may be 
explained by their efficient client control, which may have 
been recently improved by the measures of 24.1, Lepidus' 
authority as augur, Publicius' popular measures in 241, 
and the personal support of Fabius, if he was president of 
the election (52).
In 231 M. Pomponius Matho and Papirius Maso were 
elected as consuls, doubtless aided by their authority as 
priests (53). Being son of the consul of 233 and brother- 
in-law of Scipio, Matho, who fought in Sardinia like his 
father, may have represented those still primarily concerned 
with western expansion; as such he may have encouraged the 
embassy to Spain-in 231 to deter Punic aggression (54).
Since his family shows no signs of interest in the north 
east, he may also have represented the majority of senators
50. cf. Broughton, MRR 255, 367-8; Scullard, RP 54;
Salmon, RC 186 n.l71; Ch.1C, 118-9; Ch.5, 322-4, 328-9,
355; below, 378, 381, 388-9.
The second consulship of Lepidus noted by Livy 23.30.15 
is not easily accommodated; see Munzer, RAA 168; Broughton, 
MRR 235.
51. See above 361-2; Zon. 8.18.
52. Ch.5 333, 354-5; Livy 23.30.15; Munzer,
RAA 163. Fabius could have shared with Lepidus, Publicius 
and Flaminius not only interests in the north east (below 
379-380, 385) but also interests in Greek religion
(see above 373-4; Ch.5 172; Szemler, PRR 69; Ogilvie,
CL 497, 574; below 389-390).
53. Broughton, MRR 225-6, 266, 276-7; Szemler, PRR 139.
54. See above 367, 372-4; Zon. 8.18.
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who disapproved of Flaminius' law; it might even be hazarded 
that as augur he was responsible for the enforced abdication 
of the newly elected censors, Manlius, the consul of 235» 
and Fulvius, the consul of 237, whose family backgrounds 
suggest that they would have willingly registered citizens 
on Flaminius' allotments (55). The other consul. Maso, 
may also have supported Flaminius; his family had a Celtic 
name; like the Aemilii Lepidii and Carvilii it regained 
office in this period for the first time since the age of 
Curius; it was later registered in the Velina, which 
included Flaminius' allotments; such an attitude might 
partly explain the senate's denial of a full triumph to 
him for bringing the Corsicans to terms (56). As in 232, 
efficient marshalling of clients from north and central 
Italy, the support of the electoral president and general 
uncertainty among senators about policy could explain the 
election of Maso and the censors (57).
55. See Ch.5 311-2, 331 n.llQ, 337, 350, 353-5
on the censors' family interests in the north east.
While the augurs Verrucosus, Marcellus, Lepidus and 
Carvilius shared them (see 372-3, 375-6, 379-380, 385) 
it only took one augur to stop an election (Ch.IB, 54); 
see further Cassola, GPR 330-1, 336f; Szemler, PRR 89.
56. For Maso's name, see Degrassi, op.cit. 117. For the 
former appearances of the Masones, Lepidi and Carvilii in 
290, 285 and 272 respectively, see Ch.5 321, 328-9; 
Broughton, MRR 184; cf. Munzer, RAA 160; Lippold, C 128.
In 241, Maso aided Manlius' uncle draw up the surrender
of Falerii; see Val. Max. 6.5.16. On Masones in the 
Velina, see Taylor, VDRR 241; on the Velina including 
Flaminius' settlements, see Mommsen, RSt 3^  176. For 
Maso's military activity, the senate's hostility to him, 
and his subsequent lesser triumph at the Alban Mount, 
and dedication of a shrine of Fons, see Munzer, RAA 111.
57. cf. Ch.5 330-1, 353-5.
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When the outcome of the embassy to Spain was still 
unknown, C. Duillius, who had supported aggression against 
Carthage in 260, may have been named as dictator to preside 
over the election in 230 through the influence of senators 
supporting western expansion, hoping that he might promote 
candidates of like mind; his magister equitum, C. Aurelius, 
the censor of 241, who inherited interests in both north 
west and north east Italy, may have supported his policy, 
or have been named under pressure from those more concerned 
with other areas (58). By the time of the election of 230, 
the apparent submission of Corsica, Sardinia and Liguria 
may have gained the latter sector more senatorial support; 
this, with their efficient client control and personal 
prestige, allowed them to win all the magistracies in 230. 
The consuls, M. lunius Pera and M. Aemilius Barbula, and 
the censors. Fabius Verrucosus and Sempronius Tuditanus, 
were all from families which had particular interests in 
north east Italy and Greece, and were absent at times of 
aggression in the first Punic war (59). Boosted by the 
consuls’ successes against the Ligurians, who had risen 
against Rome again in 230, and the reassurances of the 
Spanish embassy on its return, they were able to further 
their own policies in the course of the year (60).
58. Degrassi, op.cit. 44f, 117, 440f; Ch.5 341, 346, 353 
5 ; cf. Lippold, C 128.
59. For their names, see Broughton, MRR 226-7. Their 
forebears promoted policies based on these spheres of 
interest together in 292-1, 277-265, 253-2 and 247-1 
(see Ch.5 315-6, 328-336, 345-6, 349-351, 353-5).
For hints of their interests in this period, see 
above, 370-1, 373-4, 379-380, 385.
60. cf. De Sanctis, StR 3.1.411; Lippold, C 129.
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G. and L. Goruncanius, whose forefather had also had a 
defensive attitude to the first Punic war, were sent as 
envoys to Illyria (6l). The censors carried out the 
reform of the comitia centuriata to ensure that the clients 
they marshalled from rural tribes were effective not only 
in elections, but also in the votes on imperialist foreign 
policies, which in 286, 264, 241 and 238 had been implemented 
partly through their appeal to the urban rich (62).
The murder of the envoys to Illyria and peace in the 
west meant that by 229 the majority of senators favoured a 
cautious war against Illyria to redeem Rome’s honour and 
extend her influence among the Greeks. Hence they suspend­
ed the lex Genucia to allow the election of experienced 
generals, Postumius, Fabius Verrucosus and Carvilius, whose 
interest in eastern affairs have already been noted above, 
as consuls in 229-8. The fourth consul, Cn. Fulvius, may 
have been a personal ally promoted for his talent; after 
successes in 229, he became promagistrate in 228 and 
celebrated a naval triumph (63).
Having presumably registered citizens settling in 
north east Italy when censor in 230, Verrucosus may have 
suspected by the time of his consulship in 228 that the
61. Ch.5 350; above 364; Lippold, C. 130.
62. See further Ch.1C, 106-7, 114-5; Ch.5 306-7, 353-5; 
above, 358, 365.
63. See above 357, 364, 373-4; Broughton, MRR 228-9. 
While Fulvii had generally pursued the same policies as 
Fabii and Postumii since they raised them to power in 
the late fourth century (see Ch.4, 276-7, 293; Ch.5 
311-2, 337, 350; above 371-5),
we have no positive hints of their interests in the east
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settlements were antagonising the Gauls. Perhaps the 
sacrifice of two Gauls and two Greeks in the Forum Boarium 
in accordance with the oracle of the Sibylline books was 
intended to avert such a prospect (64). In fact, by the 
time of the election of 227, there was no sign of any 
immediate invasion from the north. Those who shared 
Flaminius' interests in northern expansion, including 
Verrucosus, who was possibly the electoral president, may 
therefore have supported Flaminius in the election of 
praetors in 227 to demonstrate their renewed trust in his 
policy and the settlements (65). Such support gained him 
the post, since there were no political issues of immediate 
concern to make the senators unite their efforts in factions.
64. cf. above 361-2. The origin and significance
of the sacrifice (Plut. Marc. 3; Dio fr. 47; Zon. 8.19;
Oros. 4.13.3) are much disputed; cf. 0. Gichorius,
Romische Studien (Berlin - Leipzig, 1922) 17-20; De Sanctis, 
StR 4.2.1. 320; Gage, AR 243-251; Lippold, G 255-6. The 
Fabii and Postumii had particular interests in the Sibylline 
books and Hercules, who was worshipped at the Forum Boarium 
(Gh.3, 233; Gh.4, 293; Gh.5 315-6, 353-5; below n.91).
65. i.e. I accept Gassola's view (GPR 259-275) that this 
episode was a temporary breach in the alliance of Verru­
cosus and Flaminius; for details of their common views, 
especially on northern expansion etc., see above
below 384-5» 387-9. Fabius' late appreciation
of the possible effects of the law (Gic. Sen. 11; cf. n.49) 
and Pictor's contribution to the ancients' hostile picture 
of Flaminius are often used to support the view that Verru­
cosus and Flaminius were always political opponents (cf. 
Gh.lA, 23; Munzer, 'Flaminius no.2', PWRE 6.2 (Stuttgart, 
1909) 249&f; Fraccaro, Opusc. 2 191-2; Frank, CAH 7 820; 
Staveley, JRS 1963 185-6). Pictor's hostility may only have 
been an immediate personal reaction to Flaminius' defeat 
after Trasimene, where he fought (cf. Livy 22.3; Henderson, 
JRS 1952 116). Other possible reasons for the unfavourable 
portrayal of Flaminius are the direct hostility of Polybius, 
whose patrons' forefathers opposed Verrucosus and Flaminius 
over the second Punic war (below 385-9 ;
Gh.lA 23-4; Gassola, GPR 225-8, 358-360) and constitutional 
misunderstandings (n.l4).
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These circumstances meant that other curule posts in 227 
and 226 were gained by L. Apustius, a novus homo who is 
not known again, and four senators from families with 
broad connections and no predominant spheres of interests, 
the Valerii Messalla, Flaccus and Laevinas, and M. Atilius 
Regulus, son of the consul of 267 and 256 (66).
By the time of the election of 225, Carthaginian 
advances in Spain and hints of unrest in Sardinia had 
prompted the dispatch of a second embassy to Spain, and 
there was an imminent threat of Gallic invasion. The 
consuls elected in these circumstances are not previously 
known, but their family backgrounds and successes suggest 
that they were generally supported as senior leaders 
qualified and willing to carry out the military strategy 
agreed upon by the senate. L. Aemilius Papus was son of 
a general who had defeated the Gauls, and had held all his 
offices during the Pyrrhic war, a time of much senatorial 
authority. 0. Atilius Regulus, another son of the consul 
of 267 and 256, may have gained useful naval experience 
through his father (67). Atilius went to Sardinia to 
quell revolts and watch the Carthaginians, returning to 
join Papus to defeat the Gauls at Telemon, where he died. 
Papus then ravaged the country of the Ligurians and Boii, 
celebrating a triumph with much booty (68).
66. For the magistrates, see Broughton, MRR 229-230.
Some may have had Fabius* support; see Gh.5 319, 325, 339, 
351-2; below 387-8; Gassola, GPR 384. For
objections to Lippold*s view (G I36) that they promoted 
aggressive policies, see Staveley, JRS 1964 197-8.
67. See above 367-8; Broughton, MRR 230; Gh.5
323-8, 341-3. In 225, Papus waited for the Gauls at 
Ariminium, where his father fought in 282.
68. See above 362, 367-8; Degrassi, op.cit. 78-9,
550; Lippold, G 137.
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We cannot readily ascertain the significance of the 
election of G. Claudius Gentho, the consul of 240 and M. 
lunius Pera, the consul of 230, as censors in 225. Since 
Claudius inherited interests in the western Mediterranean 
from forebears who promoted the first Punic war, he might 
have registered the rich freedmen living in the city in 
rural tribes in 225 to increase the influence of those 
favouring an imperialist policy against Carthage for 
commercial reasons, in reaction to the reform of 230.
However, preoccupied with the Gallic invasion and the 
recent signing of the Ebro treaty, he could have been 
unaware of the consequences of such registration; since, 
like lunius, he won his consulship when a pacific policy 
in the west prevailed, and Gentho*s nephews prosecuted 
consuls who probably supported war with Carthage in 219, 
there is a case to be made for both censors representing 
those who opposed aggression in the west (69).
The military and diplomatic action in 225 prepared the 
way for the policy of pushing back the Gauls towards the 
Alps, which may now have been supported not only by those 
with interests in the north, but also by some of those 
primarily interested in developing a western trading empire, 
since the consolidation of the northern borders was essential 
if their western ambitions led to war with Carthage. 
Experienced leaders probably representing this broad group 
were elected as consuls in 224. They were the censors who 
were prevented from registering Flaminius* allotments in 
231 - T. Manlius, who had triumphed in Sardinia in 235, and
69. Degrassi, op.cit. 44-5, 440f; Gh.lG, 108-9, 114-5; 
Gh.5 333-4, 337-8; above 358, 370-1, 378;
Lippold, G 141-2.
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Q. Fulvius, who had fought the Gauls and Ligurians in 237 
(70). They won the surrender of the Boii after an 
aggressive campaign in 224 (71).
In 223 and 222 those supporting the northern campaigns 
became divided over their extent and purpose, as the 
Carthaginians advanced in Spain (72).
Before their long expedition north, the consuls of 
224 named as electoral dictator Gaecilius Metellus, who 
took N. Fabius Buteo as his magister equitum. They shared 
common interests with the consuls of 224, whose fathers had 
founded colonies on the Etruscan west coast and furthered 
Roman influence in the north east with them in 247-1; 
Gaecilius had also been active as a land commissioner 
settling Flaminius* allotments from 232 (73). It was 
doubtless partly through Gaecilius* great authority that 
Flaminius won the consulship in 223. His colleague, P. 
Furius Philus, would have been aided in the election by 
his experience as a praetor, and personal standing as an 
augur. He may also have gained support among senators 
fearful of a major Gallic war or uncertain about future 
policy because they expected him, as a member of a minor 
but well established gens, to pursue the relatively moderate
70. Broughton, MRR 231; above 362-3, 371-4, 377.
71. The consuls* aggression in the north is generally 
accepted, although there is dispute over whether they 
crossed the Po; cf. Walbank, GP 1 207-214; Gassola, GPR 
222-3; Lippold, G 137.
72. See above 358; Gassola, GPR 223.
73. Gh.5 349-352; Degrassi, op.cit. 44-5, 440-1;
J. Gorbett, *L. Metellus (Gos. 251, 247), Agrarian Gommiss- 
ioner?*, GR 1970 7-8; Munzer, RAA 60; Lippold, G 143-4*
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strategy of the senate as a whole in the north (74). 
Certainly, after both consuls had advanced through 
Liguria and defeated the Insubres on the further side of 
the Po, he obeyed the summons of recall from the senate, 
which then granted him a triumph, while Flaminius, who 
had been more reluctant to return, only held a triumph 
by popular vote. Perhaps the consuls* subsequent 
abdication, resulting in an interregnum, was arranged by 
the augurs to ensure that disputes over strategy would 
not prevent suitable generals leading the next campaign 
(75).
Accordingly, in the interregnum in 222, the 
patricians named two consuls who became leading generals 
in the second Punic war. They were probably deliberately 
chosen because they had different motives for the northern
74* Ch.1C, 121; Gh.5 346 n.l51, 351 n.l63; Broughton,
MRR 231-2, 266; Degrassi, op.cit. 113. The last known 
Furius held a consulship under similar circumstances, with 
Gaecilius as his colleague.
75. Later authorities (Livy 21.63, 22.3,6.3, 23.14*4;
Plut. Marc. 4*2-5, 6.1; Fab. 2.4; Zon. 8.20; Oros. 4*13,
Flor. 1.20.4) may have placed the augurs* declaration of 
the invalid election earlier in the year to allow the 
inclusion of the standard theme of a consul ignoring the 
senate*s orders before battle (cf. Livy 9*36.14f, 22.26.7f; 
n.65 above); Polyb. 2.32-33 makes no mention of it. cf. 
on the whole campaign. De Sanctis, StR 3.1*314-6; Degrassi, 
op.cit. 78-9, 550; Gassola, GPR 223-4; Lippold, C 310-1; 
Szemler, PRR 90-1. One might also speculate that Gaecilius, 
the pontifex maximus, had political reasons for forcing the 
flamines Cornelius Gethegus and Sulpicius to abdicate (Plut. 
Marc. 5; Gh.5 351 n.l63) since both were minor kinsmen of 
those promoting western expansion from 259 and 237 (above 
371-3); however the link is obscure, and flamines had
little political power (Gh.lB, 64).
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wars (76). For two reasons, M. Claudius Marcellus is 
likely to have stood for those who favoured northern 
expansion for its own sake, and were opposed to war
against Carthage. Firstly he shared interests in Greece,
family ties with the Otacilii, and a forefather who opposed 
imperialist commercial wars, with his fellow augur, Fabius 
Verrucosus, for whom a policy of northern expansion was a 
long standing family tradition (77). Secondly, he pursued 
an aggressive strategy in the north in 222; after stirring 
up the people with hopes of booty to continue the war, 
possibly against the wishes of the senate, he brought it 
to an end with a magnificent campaign across the Po, winning 
the spolia opimia, celebrating a magnificent triumph, and 
vowing an aedes to Virtus (78). His colleague. On.
Cornelius Scipio, is likely to have represented those
promoting western expansion at the risk of war with Carthage;
76. Broughton, MRR 232-3. Marcellus had fought in Sicily 
in the first Punic war and may already have been curule 
aedile and praetor; see Plut. Marc. 1-2; Val. Max. 6.1.7; 
Livy 22.35.6-7. Scipio held eight military posts in 
Spain, and Marcellus held nine in Sicily, Campania and 
south Italy, from 218 to 208; see Broughton, MRR 239-290 
passim.
77. For hints of his and Fabius* Greek interests, see
Ch.5 321; above, 374, 378, n.76; Plut. Marc. 1, 8;
for his family links with Fabius and Otacilius, and the 
augurships of all three, see Plut. Marc. 2; Livy 24.8.11, 
26.23.7-8, 30.26.7; for his forefather*s support of 
Rullianus, see Ch.4, 271-2, 274; for the Fabian tradition 
of northern expansion, see Ch.2, 149-150; Ch.3, 205f, 215f; 
Gh.4, 244f, 274f; Gh.5 311, 314f, 335f, 349f; 
above 371-380.
78. See Gassola, GPR 224f, preferring Plut. Marc. 6 
(Marcellus alone decided to continue war) to Polyb. 2.34 
(both consuls did so), and arguing that the senate could 
not deny the triumph because of the size of the victory.
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his father and uncle pursued an aggressive strategy in 
the west in the first Punic war, and he was the first of 
three Scipios to become consuls during the build up to the 
second Punic war, from 222 to 218 (79). He fought with 
Marcellus in 222 (80).
With the completion of the northern campaigns, there 
must have been much conflict and uncertainty over Rome’s 
future policy with regard to Carthage in the consular 
election of 221. The imperialist party was strong enough 
to gain a place for one member, P. Cornelius Scipio; 
doubtless he was aided by the presidency of his cousin 
(81). His colleague, M. Minucius Rufus, being from a well 
established gens unknown since 305, might have gained 
support amid the balanced competition of more prominent 
candidates because he was a minor figure willing to 
implement the senate’s policy (82). By the time these 
consuls had reached office, Hannibal had taken command in 
Spain, and his aggressive intentions in the peninsula were 
clear; accordingly the consuls made an expedition to Istria, 
and the treaty with Saguntum was drawn up (83). It may 
have been partly this change in climate which enabled 
L. Cornelius Lentulus, the consul of 237 who had promoted
79. See above 372-3; below 390; Scullard, RP 39.
80. The extent of his participation is uncertain, since 
Polyb. 2.34-5 is so clearly biased towards him; see further 
Walbank, CP 1 210-1; Gassola, ibid.
81. Broughton, MRR, 233-5; cf. Gassola, GPR 267-8.
82. Gh.lG, 121; Broughton, ibid. Plut. Fab. 7 notes that 
he was related to Metilius, plebeian tribune of 220 (see 
n.30).
83. See above 364-5, 368.
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the original invasion of Sardinia, and was to argue for 
immediate war against Carthage in 219, to win the position 
of pontifex maximus after Gaecilius died in 221 (84).
Amid the mounting war fever Fabius Verrucosus seems 
to have had enough personal influence to gain nomination 
as dictator to hold the elections for 220 while the consuls 
were in Istria; the consul who actually named him was 
presumably the more easily influenced Minucius, whom he 
rewarded with the post of magister equitum in 217. Fabius 
doubtless hoped to influence the electoral result in favour 
of those opposed to war with Carthage; in 219 he was the 
principal speaker against Lentulus in the war debate.
Since those then elected as consuls, Valerius Laevinas, 
the praetor of 227, and Q. Mucius, a novus homo, were forced 
by the augurs to abdicate, together with the dictator and 
the magister equitum, they may have shared Fabius' views.
The war party presumably then persuaded one of the-consuls 
of 221 to nominate one of them as suffect dictator; 
unfortunately his and his magister equitum's names are not 
known. Amid continued conflict, two minor leaders finally 
gained election. They were L. Veturius, whose gens had 
been absent from known offices longer than Minucius', and 
G. Lutatius, son of the novus homo who gained the final
84. Lentulus spoke in the final debate on war (see n.32) 
against Verrucosus; cf. Scullard, RP 40-1; Gassola, GPR 
275f; Lippold, G 139-141. On his becoming pontifex 
maximus in 221, see Broughton, MRR 234.
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victory over Carthage in 242 (85). While there are no 
clear hints of the reasons for Veturius' election (86), 
Lutatius may have been supported in the hope that his name 
would intimidate or provoke the Carthaginians, and he may 
have inherited interests in western expansion from his 
uncle, who held office with Lentulus in 236 (87). The 
consuls of 220 prepared further for war against Carthage 
by making an expedition to the Alps; by the end of the year, 
the senate had sent two representatives, Valerius Flaccus, 
the consul of 227, and Q. Baebius Tamphilus, to warn 
Hannibal to desist from attacking Saguntum; this may have 
been supported both by those promoting war, who were not 
as yet prepared for it, and those still hoping to avoid 
it (88).
Censors elected in 220 were Aemilius Papus and 
Flaminius. Aemilius, having interests in Liguria and 
south Italy, might have supported war against Carthage; 
doubtless he gained office largely in honour of his victory 
in 225 (89). Flaminius, having been Fabius' magister
85. In support of this interpretation of events, see n.55 
above; Degrassi, op.cit. 118-9, 442; Broughton, MRR 234-6; 
Scullard, RP 273-4; Gassola, GPR 261-8. The most likely 
alternative, that Fabius replaced Minucius as dictator in 
221 (Dorey, 'The dictatorship of Minucius', JRS 1955 92-6)
is based partly on the assumption that Flaminius, the magister 
equitum of 221, and Fabius were political opponents; cf. n.65, 
below 389.
86. It is possible that Fabius forced him and his magister 
equitum Pomponius (elected to formal rather than military 
duties) to abdicate in 217 (Degrassi, op.cit. 118-9;
Scullard, RP 49-50) in revenge for the action of this year 
and 231 (above 377); cf. Munzer, RAA 124f.
87. cf. Gh.5 352-3; above, 371f.
88. Above, 362-3, 369; Broughton, MRR 237.
89. Gh.5 327-8; above 381; Broughton, MRR 235-6.
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equitum in 221, is likely to have belonged to the faction 
opposing war with Carthage, which may only have lost the 
consular election in 220 because the presiding dictator 
opposed them (90). Both censors had earlier supported 
northern expansion, which was consolidated in 220 by 
Flaminius* building of a road to Ariminium, and in 219 
by the creation of the colonies of Placentia and Cremona. 
Both measures, like the passage of the lex Matilia, which 
the censors supported in 220, would have been generally 
accepted as useful preparations for war. The road also 
facilitated Flaminius' marshalling of clients from his 
distant settlements. Other measures taken in the censor­
ship may also have had political advantages for Flaminius. 
The circus Flaminia, which he built for the ludi plebeii, 
increased his popularity within the city. His relegation 
of the freedmen to four urban tribes reduced the influence 
of the commercial sector in legislative voting in time 
for the expected vote on war with Carthage; his support 
of the lex Claudia in 218 indicates his lack of personal 
commercial interests (91)•
The return of the envoys of 220 with alarming tales 
of Hannibal's advance in Spain may have given those 
promoting war against Carthage enough support in the
90. See n.65, 85 above. Flaminius' popular triumph and 
huge spoils in 223 (above 384) may have aided him in
the election.
91. See Gh.lG, 114-5; above 357-8, 362-3, 369, 375-6, 
380-1, 384-5;Livy 21.63.3; Munzer, art.cit. PWRE 6.2, 
2496-9; Yavetz, Ath. 1962 339-340; Gassola, GPR 218; Wise­
man, 'The Circus Flaminius', PBSR 1974, 3-26. It may be 
noted that within the next few years, the Circus Flaminius 
became an important centre for the cult of Hercules (Bayet, 
Hercule, 240-1), Minucius made dedication to him (GIL 1% 
607; cf. Gh.4 293), and Pictor developed the story of him 
as the Fabii'8 ancestor (Gh.5 316; above 380 n.64).
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senate to win the consular election in 219. M. Aemilius 
Paullus, who was the first of his family in power since 
his father supported the Scipios’ aggressive policy in the 
first Punic war, and whose daughter probably married Scipio 
Africanus about this time, is a likely member of this 
faction (92). The views of his colleague, Livius, are 
less clear, since his gens was last represented in 302.
He may have inherited personal links with Paullus and 
Lentulus, whose grandfathers then held office, and have 
been supported in 219 by his family allies and other 
senators because he inherited much religious authority 
and knowledge of Greece and south Italy (93). The latter 
was appropriate for the campaign which both consuls carried 
out against Demetrius of Illyria; their rapid successes 
there suggest that their military talent also contributed 
to their election (94).
92. Broughton, MRR 236-7; Gh.5 344;
cf. Gh.5 346 n.l51; Munzer, RAA l64f; Gassola, GPR 375f; 
Lippold, G 142.
93. Livius, consul of 302, had been one of the first 
plebeian pontifices; his family had patronised a Greek 
playwright from Tarentum; the consul of 219’8 father 
had included Tarentine god8 in the eecular gamee when 
decemvir eacris faciundie with Lepidue in 236; see Gh.5 
308, 310 n.55; above 363-4; Szemler, PRR 109-110;
Gage, AR 251-6.
94. For the war, see above 364-5, 369.
De Sanctis, StR 3.2. 169-170 and Walbank, GP 1 327 note 
Polybius’ bias to his patron’s forefather Aemilius.
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Conclusion
Summing up, political debate from 240 to 219 primarily 
concerned foreign and military affairs, although electoral 
and legislative control and the authority of the senate 
were still occasionally of significance. In many years 
cases can be made for the political views of candidates 
on these matters being the basis of their support by other 
senators in the curule elections, although changing 
circumstances and the increasing range of known spheres 
of interest of each family or gens preclude certainty.
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SUMMARY
The definition and execution of policy, which was 
always in theory the responsibility of the curule 
magistrate, steadily came under the practical control of 
the senate in the first three centuries of the Republic. 
However, magistrates usually had enough authority and 
support within the senate to influence its decisions.
Thus it is realistic to consider the role that policy 
played at the election of these magistrates.
Extra-legal constraints on presidents of elections 
- except those with exceptional personal authority - and 
the carefully ordered group voting system in the popular 
assemblies meant that for most of the period senatorial 
families controlled elections by marshalling their clients 
and amici to the assemblies. Hence the main role of 
policy in the elections was at senatorial level.
Expediency, naturally varying in significance accord­
ing to circumstances, was always an essential factor in 
the senators’ choice of the candidates they supported. 
Family loyalties and traditions were also of fundamental 
importance both in themselves, and as the basis of the 
senators’ views on political issues.
Frequently, a magistrate’s background and career 
suggest that he was supported by other senators because he 
favoured the policies he implemented when in office. The 
repeated coincidences of certain names in the lists of 
magistrates with the execution of certain policies suggest 
that factions of senators inheriting interests in them 
formed regularly to promote them by co-operating in the
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elections. When similar patterns of names appear in the 
lists with no apparent connection to political events, 
this may be due to the prevalence of family loyalties at 
times of no political disputes in the senate, the large 
gaps in our knowledge of political issues, or simply 
coincidences of generations as the governing class became 
more exclusive and developed a cursus honorum.
In the fifth century, views on the conflict between 
patricians and plebeians, the development of the 
constitution, national defence, and the economic distress 
of the Roman people are most likely to have consistently 
dictated the electoral president’s choice of successors, 
or the composition of the factions marshalling voters to 
the assemblies. In the fourth and third centuries, 
senators may often have divided into factions competing 
in the elections over the issues of the monopoly of curule 
office by powerful groups or individuals, the role of the 
senate, methods of electoral control and the constitutional, 
military and economic aspect of the expansion of the state. 
The most readily detectable single issue throughout the 
whole period under review is that of Rome’s military activity 
Although it may often have been the result of external 
circumstances rather than deliberate policy, and sometimes 
I may have laid undue emphasis on it because of the bias 
of the sources recounting events, its importance should not 
be underrated. The most distinguished curule posts, after 
all, were those of the military leaders; military strategy 
was a short term matter in which each magistrate could hope 
to play a significant part; the overall significance of
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Rome's military activity in these three centuries is readily 
apparent from the size and power of the state by 219.
In the fourth century the extent to which the senators 
controlled the assemblies is not always clear, and therefore 
conclusions about the electoral results in that period are 
particularly uncertain. And in all three centuries under 
study the breadth of the support base of the candidates and 
hence the extent of the competition over political issues 
is never certain, except in the few cases where there is 
good evidence of conflict over policy between different 
factions, or an individual and the senate. Given the 
growing exclusiveness and authority of the governing class 
as a whole in other spheres, and the apparent increase in 
the efficiency of client control, there may have been a 
tendency towards greater agreement over policy among 
senators before the elections by the third century.
Finally, I would emphasise that the framework for 
Roman Republican government created by the constitution 
and social system, which both developed partly according 
to political expediency, was both firm and flexible. On 
the one hand, there were opportunities for the implement­
ation of long term and moderate consensus policies, at 
first through the patriciate, and later through the 
increasingly exclusive senate of ex-magistrates, protected 
by its internal bonds of family links, mutual dependence 
and the cursus honorum. On the other hand, the broadening 
of the governing class to include plebeian leaders and 
newly enfranchised provincial aristocrats saved it from 
stagnation, and the election of annual magistrates always 
allowed for the implementation of immediate short-term
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policies, reactions to immediate circumstances and fresh 
ideas. It must surely have been this continual interplay 
of dynamism and traditionalism that allowed the Republican 
state to develop as it did for three increasingly prosperous 
and relatively stable centuries.
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